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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines some of the ways in which a particular theory of 
language known as Speech Act theory has been used as a hermeneutic tool, in 
particular in relation to Biblical hermeneutics. It begins by outlining the 
context in which the theory was conceived, and gives a brief description of 
Speech Act theory and some of its problems. Thereafter, some specific 
problems relating to the theory’s use as a Biblical hermeneutical tool are 
explored.  
 
These are, firstly, the fact that Speech Act theory relates explicitly to spoken 
language, but is being proposed as a textual tool; secondly that the nature of 
the relationship assumed in the theory, between intention and meaning, is 
compromised within the theory, and that the assumption of a ‘sender view of 
meaning’ often made by its advocates undercuts the most interesting 
implications of the theory; and thirdly that the concept of uptake, integral to 
the theory, is an inadequate substitute for the concept of understanding.  
 
All of these problems are identified as fundamental flaws in Speech Act 
theory, that compromise its usefulness as a hermeneutic tool, particularly 
given that the theory is being used to buttress ideas of authorial revelation. 
This thesis also examines the relationship between meaning and significance 
proposed in the work of E D Hirsch and adopted as a supplement to Speech 
Act theory, and finds in this distinction also similar weaknesses. 
 
However, this does not mean that the concept of revelation is untenable, and 
the thesis proposes an alternative view of revelation and authorial meaning, 
using the linguistic theories of Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov, and 
based on co-operation between author and community. This proposal is 
claimed to be more hermeneutically appropriate and it is asserted that it also 
gives a far better theological account of the nature and work of the Holy Spirit.  
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It would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could have,  
or had to have, the last word. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Afterword’ to Truth and Method (see bibliography) 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. An Introduction to the thesis. 
 
Imagine a situation in which a couple are about to go out to a party. One of 
them comes down the stairs and says to the other “how do I look?”, to which 
the response is “Oh, fine, just fine”. This leads instantly to accusations of 
undermining: “can’t you just be nice for once in your life, would it kill you to 
show me some support?” and protestations of bewildered innocence: “what? 
What did I say? I said you looked fine – what’s the problem with that?” 
 
In this instance, what is in dispute is the meaning of what was said. What was 
meant by the phrase “Oh fine, just fine”: is this supportive, critical, indifferent? 
Of course, it depends among other things on the tone of voice used, but the 
interesting thing about this kind of dispute about the meaning of a phrase or 
utterance, is that there may never be an agreement about what was meant: 
both parties may remain irreconcilable. On the other hand, agreement may be 
reached, and this agreed meaning, reached after negotiation or argument or an 
appeal to third parties (“you’ll never guess what she said to me earlier” etc) 
may not be what the initial utterer originally claimed to be their meaning. In 
this instance, the meaning of a phrase is uncertain and to a degree pliable.  
 
There have been a number of occasions in the last few years in which 
television celebrities and commentators have been accused of being racist and 
using racist words. One aspect of these furores has been the debate about 
whether or not such a word in such a context is racist; another has been the 
suggestion, made by friends of the accused, that so-and-so is not a racist, and 
did not mean to be offensive. In this latter instance, what is being suggested is 
that if the comment is accepted as being in fact racist in meaning, this was not 
what the speaker meant to say: the meaning of their utterance was, 
paradoxically, not what they meant.  
 
Here, the intention of the speaker is being separated from the meaning of what 
they said: they just mis-spoke, or used an unfortunate phrase: they didn’t 
mean it. They meant (used here to mean ‘they intended’) something other than 
what they actually said. Of course, this defence may not necessarily be 
accepted, or may be treated in the so-called ‘court of public opinion’ as only a 
partial mitigation, but these examples illustrate that it is sometimes possible to 
successfully divorce meaning from intention.1  
 
Not only is it the case that there is a less than complete overlap between 
meaning and intention, but these examples also illustrate that what something 
                                                     
1 And thus that the argument of S Knapp & W B Michaels in ‘Against Theory’, Critical Inquiry 
8:4 (Summer 1982) 723-742, that meaning simply is authorial intention, is wrong. 
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means is not always determined by the author or utterer of the phrase or 
utterance in question: meaning can be a negotiated quality. It is not enough to 
say “no, I meant this” and assume that such a declaration will be accepted. 
Your audience may (or may not) agree that ‘this’ is what you intended, but 
will not thereby necessarily agree that it is what you actually said. ‘What you 
said’ (which is here a function of ‘the meaning of what you said’) is something 
your audience will determine, and may disagree about.2  
 
These examples therefore serve as a brief introduction to the idea associated 
with ‘post-modern thought’, that meaning is fluid. The examples quoted above 
both involve speech, and here disagreements about what something means 
become the subject of a debate between speaker and audience. Although there 
may be no ultimate agreement, meaning can be debated back and forth.  
 
In the case of an author and a written text, however, this kind of clarification 
or development of the meaning of a phrase is much harder to achieve. The 
author is obviously not present to a reader in the same way as speakers are 
present to each other in conversation, although of course there are many 
different sorts of presence3, and it is not generally possible to have the same 
sort of debate between reader and writer as has been imagined above in 
spoken contexts. This does not, however, mean that written meanings are 
necessarily less debatable and debated. 
 
There have been several good examples of this in recent years in the genre of 
childhood memoir. Accusations of fictionality and plagiarism have been made 
against several such books, for example Rock me gently: the true story of a 
convent childhood4 by Judith Kelly, A million little pieces5 by James Frey, and 
Don’t Ever Tell: Kathy’s story: A True Tale of a childhood destroyed by Neglect and 
Fear6 by Kathy O’Beirne.  
 
To ask ‘what is the meaning of a book’ is in fact a complicated question, 
involving an identification of the relationship between meaning, identity, and 
                                                     
2 And what we think you said, can determine what words we heard. Did Mrs Thatcher ever 
say “there’s no such thing as society”? Did Sherlock Holmes ever say “elementary, my dear 
Watson”? See also H H Clark and D Wilkes-Gibbs, ‘Referring as a Collaborative Process’, in P 
R Cohen, J Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication (Cambridge MA, MIT 
Press, 1992) p491-492: “Participants in a conversation, we have argued, are mutually 
responsible for establishing what the speaker meant. ..,. They must collaborate, in one way or 
another, on most or perhaps all other parts of speaker’s meaning”.  
3 A face-to-face conversation, a telephone conversation, video-conferencing, the reading of a 
handwritten letter, of a published novel, and of an advertisement, all involve different sorts of 
presence. The writer of a love-letter can be ‘really there’ in a more intimate way than the 
person next to you on the underground. 
4 Bloomsbury, London, 2005. 
5 John Murray, London, 2004 
6 Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 2005 
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effects7, but in the case of these three books, the initial meaning asserted by the 
author and publishers would in part at least be constituted by their 
identification as autobiographies (two have the word “true” in the title). This 
self-description asserts that these books are accurate accounts of horrific events 
and circumstances, told perhaps for reasons such as the following; to expose 
perpetrators; to provide relief to the authors; to inform and instruct readers; 
and to provide readers with emotional catharsis8. The meaning of these books 
is thus constituted by at least these strands.  
 
James Frey’s book was first published as a true story in 2004, and he admitted 
in 2006 that some of the events depicted had been made up, leading his 
American publisher to offer some aggrieved purchasers their money back, in 
response to law suits9. Kathy O’Beirne’s account of her childhood has been 
vigorously contested by some members of her own family and has led to the 
publication of Kathy’s Real Story: A Culture of False Allegations Exposed by the 
journalist Hermann Kelly10.  
 
Judith Kelly was alleged to have plagiarised from a number of authors, 
including Hilary Mantel, Graham Greene, Antonia White and Charlotte 
Bronte, and to have described fictional incidents as autobiographical.  In this 
case, Judith Kelly’s publisher defended her against a charge of deliberate 
deception on the grounds that she had read the plagiarised books and had 
subsequently, and unintentionally, incorporated these events into her own 
narrative due to her photographic memory11.  
 
Interestingly, all of these controversies are instances in which the meaning of a 
written text became the subject of a process of development, involving written 
and spoken debate12. These developments have led to the meaning of each 
evolving. ‘A million little pieces’ and ‘Rock me gently: the true story of a convent 
childhood’ are no longer simply ‘true accounts’: they are both accepted as 
containing elements of fiction. This may not make the books untrue, 
necessarily, but it has affected their perceived meaning (some readers read 
                                                     
7 This is discussed in more detail in chapters six and seven of this thesis. 
8 This list is not intended to be exhaustive! 
9D Glaister, “Million Little Pieces may cost publishers millions in refunds” The Guardian, 8th 
September 2006, ˂http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/sep/08/books.usa˃ (13th March 
2013).  
10 Prefect Press, Ireland, 2007. See also H McDonald, “Support for author accused of lying”, 
The Observer, 24th September 2006, 
˂http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/sep/24/booksnews.ireland˃ (13th March 2013).  
11 C Milmo, “Bloomsbury withdraws paperback accused of plagiarising 'Jane Eyre' and 
'Brighton Rock” Independent newspaper, 13th August 2005. 
˂http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/bloomsbury-withdraws-
paperback-accused-of-plagiarising-jane-eyre-and-brighton-rock-502659.html˃ (8th January 
2010). 
12 Books published in response, written articles and comment, interviews and press 
statements.  
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them as cheating or lying, others defend them as moving true accounts, works 
of creativity dealing with difficult and true subjects).  
 
Don’t Ever Tell: Kathy’s story: A True Tale of a childhood destroyed by Neglect and 
Fear is in some ways even more extreme: this book now has at least two 
distinct meanings for two different ‘camps’ of readers: for some, its original 
meaning remains, perhaps made even more powerful and important after the 
attacks upon it; for others the book now means something quite different, a 
prime example of a ‘culture of false allegations’. What these events illustrate is 
that even in the case of books, whose meaning is sometimes regarded as being 
as fixed as their print, their meaning can in fact be open to some debate, and 
the author’s assertions are not necessarily the ultimate arbiter of the meaning 
of the book13.  
 
Post-modern thought, however, has gone even further. The authority of the 
author has been denied, and the existence of any meaning beyond the 
subjective experience of the reader has been called into question. The most 
famous, and perhaps even foundational, example is Roland Barthes’s essay 
simply entitled The Death of the Author, in which he asserts that “once an action 
is recounted, for intransitive ends, and no longer in order to act directly upon 
reality ... this disjunction occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters his 
own death, writing begins.”14 
 
Barthes suggests that “it is language which speaks, not the author: to write is 
to reach, through a pre-existing impersonality ... that point where language 
alone acts, “performs”, and not “oneself”.”15 A text exists merely in the “here 
and now”16 of each individual reading, and therefore, for Barthes,  
 
we know that a text does not consist of a line of words, releasing a single 
“theological” meaning (the “message” of the Author-God), but is a space of many 
dimensions, in which are wedded and contested various kinds of writing, no one 
of which is original: the text is a tissue of citations, resulting from the thousand 
sources of culture. … succeeding the Author, the writer no longer contains within 
himself passions, humors, sentiments, impressions, but that enormous dictionary, 
from which he derives a writing which can know no end or halt: life can only 
imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs, a lost, infinitely 
remote imitation.17 
 
                                                     
13 As the critic E D Hirsch notes “we do not always understand by a text what we believe its 
author meant in composing it.” ‘Against Theory?’ Critical Inquiry 9:4 (June 1983) p746. 
14 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, published in Aspen 5 & 6 (1967) – this translation 
made by Richard Howard and available at  
http://www.ubu.com/aspen/aspen5and6/threeEssays.html#barthes, courtesy of UbuWeb at 
http://ubu.com/; the quote is from the beginning of the second paragraph.  
15 Op cit third paragraph. 
16 Op cit fourth paragraph. 
17 Op cit fifth paragraph. 
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Barthes himself makes clear reference here to the implications of this 
suggestion for religion: in his terms, theology requires “the Author-God” to 
insert His presence into a text, in a way that cannot in fact be achieved. Each 
reader at each reading constructs his or her own reading, and thus makes his 
or her own god. Revelation (if by this is implied the imparting by an author of 
a message or information to a reader) is impossible. All that the text can reveal 
is itself, its own infinite linguistic variety and possibility18. 
 
The effect that this ‘exile’ of the author would have on Christianity lies at the 
basis of this thesis. Reading the Bible is a fundamental activity for Christians, 
and although there are many variations in attitude to the Bible within the 
various Christian denominations, the World Council of Churches asserts that 
“all Christians agree that Scripture holds a unique place in the shaping of 
Christian faith and practice”19. There are a variety of ways in which Christians 
conceive of God’s relation to the words of Scripture (such as direct Divine 
authorship, Divine inspiration of human writers), but whatever opinion is 
held, the idea that God communicates to His people through the Bible, is basic. 
Somehow, it is through the Bible that God addresses us, and is in turn 
addressed20.  
 
The problem, then, that post-modernism as a general trend raises, is that if 
there is in fact no such thing as authorially-controlled meaning – if the 
meaning of a book or written utterance is indeterminate – then in what sense 
can Christians assert that God communicates to them through the Bible? If it is 
the reader that creates the meaning of a text, because the meaning of 
utterances is uncertain, and the author cannot be asked for clarification in their 
                                                     
18 He addresses this implication again in his essay ‘From Work to Text’, published in Image, 
Music, Text, 1977, but also available on-line at http://evans-
experientialism.freewebspace.com/barthes05.htm, courtesy of the Athenaeum Library of 
Philosophy available from the Evans Experientialism home page at http://evans-
experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm: Barthes’s proposition 4 includes the following: 
“the work has nothing disturbing for any monistic philosophy … ; for such a philosophy, 
plural is the Evil. Against the work, therefore, the text could well take as its motto the words of 
the man possessed by demons (Mark 5:9): ‘My name is Legion: for we are many’. The plural of 
demoniacal texture which opposes text to work can bring with it fundamental changes in 
reading, and precisely in areas where monologism appears to be the Law: certain of the ‘texts’ 
of Holy Scripture traditionally recuperated by theological monism (historical or anagogical) 
will perhaps offer themselves to a diffraction of meanings (finally, that is to say, to a 
materialist reading)”. 
19 World Council of Churches: A Treasure in Earthen Vessels: An Instrument for an Ecumenical 
Reflection on Hermeneutics paragraph 37. Available through the WCC website at 
http://www.oikoumene.org/gr/resources/documents/wcc-commissions/faith-and-order-
commission/iv-interpretation-the-meaning-of-our-words-and-symbols/a-treasure-in-earthen-
vessels-an-instrument-for-an-ecumenical-reflection-on-hermeneutics.html 
20 As Bartholomew puts it, the Bible can be seen “as ‘the recording witness to God’s 
authority’.”: ‘Before Babel and After Pentecost: Language, Literature and Biblical 
Interpretation’, in C Bartholomew, C Greene and K Möller (eds.), After Pentecost: Language and 
Biblical Interpretation. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2 (Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 2001) p138 
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absence, is there not a danger that when Christians read the Bible, they are 
simply talking, by-and-large, to themselves21? 
 
It is this allegation or problem that various theologians have sought to address, 
using a particular theory about how language works that appears to offer the 
possibility of countering this ‘post-modern’ view of meaning, or rather of the 
absence of meaning. The theory of language concerned is known as Speech Act 
theory, and it was first developed by the philosopher J L Austin. This thesis, 
then, is an examination of some of the ways in which various scholars have 
suggested that Speech Act theory can be profitably applied to hermeneutics in 
general and to Biblical hermeneutics in particular, as a way of overcoming the 
threat to the authority of the author over textual meaning. (It is interesting and 
perhaps even ironic to note that in the very essay by Barthes just cited as an 
instance of the destruction of the authorial idea, he himself adopts and utilises 
(albeit inaccurately) the same theory22). 
 
There are various affinities and distinctions between the scholars who use 
Speech Act theory in this way, but they are united by their belief that Speech 
Act theory can, as a hermeneutic, provide a buttress to the idea of Scripture as 
God’s self-revelation. Of particular, if sometimes unspoken, importance are the 
Reformation ideas of the ‘plain sense of Scripture’ – that the Bible needs no 
interpretation to be comprehensible; and that the Bible is itself sufficient to 
provide a knowledge of God leading to salvation (sola scriptura). Inherent in 
this is the idea that it is primarily and most importantly through Scripture that 
God reveals Himself ‘unilaterally’ to His readers and hearers23. The notions of 
‘the plain sense of scripture’ and of ‘the sufficiency of scripture alone’ assume 
of necessity the idea that the author controls the meaning of their text.  
 
However, even if these Reformation notions are not adopted, it cannot be 
denied that the post-modern dispersion of authorial meaning poses problems 
for Christianity. Irrespective of the extent to which it is asserted that Scripture 
requires a degree of interpretation, it is untenable to suppose that God could 
be entirely banished from the Bible: if there is within the Bible no element of 
Divine self-revelation, how could Christians claim to know anything about 
                                                     
21 Or to their ‘imaginary friend’, in atheist parlance. 
22 “the modern writer (scriptor) is born simultaneously with his text: he is in no way supplied 
with a being which precedes or transcends his writing, he is in no way the subject of which his 
book is the predicate; there is no other time than that of the utterance, and every text is 
eternally written here and now. This is because (or it follows that) to write can no longer 
designate an operation of recording, of observing, of “painting” … but rather what the 
linguisticians, following the vocabulary of the Oxford school, call a performative, a rare verbal 
form (exclusively given to the first person and to the present), in which utterance has no other 
content that the act by which it is uttered: something like the I Command of kings or the I Sing 
of the early bards”: Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, fourth paragraph. 
23 “Does the author’s intention determine the meaning of a word, a sentence, or a text? That it 
does is the first premise of Reformation or evangelical hermeneutics”: K J Vanhoozer, ‘A Lamp 
in the Labyrinth: the Hermeneutics of “Aesthetic” Theology’, Trinity Journal 8:1 (1987) p28. 
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God at all?24 Conversely, if Speech Act theory can re-assert authorial control, it 
‘puts God back in charge’ of Scripture and re-invigorates the belief that 
Scripture is indeed His self-revelation, even if sola scriptura is not adopted25.  
 
Consequently, this thesis has three overlapping themes. The first is an 
examination of Speech Act theory itself, the second is an examination of the 
use of Speech Act theory as a textual hermeneutic (and specifically as a Biblical 
hermeneutic) and the third is to offer some reflections on the idea of revelation 
in a ‘post-post-modern world’, using other linguistic theories as a hermeneutic 
tool, by comparison with Speech Act theory.   
 
At this point it should be acknowledged that Speech Act theory is not widely 
used in an ‘undiluted’ form as a theory of language, although it is still 
staunchly defended by its principal contemporary adherent John Searle, 
Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California Berkeley, who 
has significantly developed and altered the theory as first conceived by J L 
Austin, and who has been generally regarded as having inherited Austin’s 
“mantle”26. It has however also been adopted or adapted by a number of other 
academics, who have revised and developed related ideas of their own, in 
dialogue with and sometimes in opposition to Austin and Searle. Among these 
should certainly be included H Paul Grice, William P Alston, and François 
Recanati27.  
 
Grice began his work at St John’s College, Oxford but moved to University of 
California Berkeley in 1967 and remained there until he died in 1988. His 
contribution to speech act theory owes little to Austin, and his work has often 
been used to complement that of Austin and Searle. His most significant work 
on language and meaning was collected as Studies in the Way of Words28after his 
death. He does not focus on Speech acts or on illocutions29 as concepts, but 
instead proposed the idea that meaning is a matter of “implicatures” – 
                                                     
24 “Reformation hermeneutics thus presupposes realism in the realm of meaning. In other 
words, meaning is held to be “out there”, independent of the mind’s perception of it, waiting 
to be uncovered. But … modern philosophy, historiography, and literary criticism are 
increasingly putting such a “realism” of meaning into question”: Vanhoozer, ‘A Lamp in the 
Labyrinth: the Hermeneutics of “Aesthetic” Theology’ op cit p28. “The Christian theologian, 
however, cannot accept the premise of the death of the author”: ibid p53. 
25 “The speech act theory of John Searle is admirably suited to meet our call for an ethics of 
language and literature”: Vanhoozer, ‘A Lamp in the Labyrinth: the Hermeneutics of 
“Aesthetic” Theology’ op cit p54. 
26 H C White, ‘Introduction: Speech Act theory and Literary Criticism’, Semeia 41: Speech Act 
theory and Biblical Criticism (1988) p1. 
27 It should also be noted that part of the conclusion of the Radio 4 programme ‘In our Time’ 
presented by Melvyn Bragg on ‘Ordinary Language Philosophy’ on the 7th of November 2013 
and available through the BBC radio website, was that reports of the death of ordinary 
language philosophy in general have been greatly exaggerated! Programme available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03ggc19 
28
 Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1991 
29 Which will be explained shortly 
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implications which speakers and listeners appropriately infer or imply in 
relation to utterances.  
 
This thesis will not make any significant reference to Grice’s work, because my 
primary focus is on the particular speech act known as the illocution, which 
will be described in the next section, and which is not a concept Grice employs. 
However, I will make plain here that I don’t believe that the principles of 
language use Grice suggests in any way describe or help us to understand any 
actual linguistic or social behaviour, being far too simplistic and ‘one-note’. I 
certainly don’t believe that they have any ‘predictive’ usefulness. They relate 
to intention or meaning only as a rather elaborate byzantine superstructure 
with a tenuous ‘post-facto’ connection to the past events they describe.  
 
As Max Black suggests, while commenting on Grice’s developments of his 
initial formula, the theory is  
 
both indefinitely pliable and incorrigibly rigid: rigid in its tenacious adherence to 
the intention-to-produce-in-the-hearer-certain-effects; pliable in its capacity to 
count any consequence of an act of communication as a case of the speaker’s 
intending to produce that effect. ... It will always be possible to attach the 
intention operator to the p [the desired state-of-affairs] in question and 
thereby to ascribe to the agent a corresponding intention. But as soon as one 
perceives how automatic the adjustment is, one begins to wonder whether 
anything more is achieved than the invocation of a fictitious intention, bound to 
fit the refractory exceptions.30  
 
He goes on later to suggest that Grice’s theory “begins to look like some 
system of epicycles, infinitely adaptable, but showing less about the ostensible 
object of analysis than about the ingenuity of its creator” and refers in a 
footnote to the comparable fate of the ‘Principle of Verifiability’ which has 
“faded away” notwithstanding the “revisionary resourcefulness of its 
defenders”31. I am of a like mind with Black in this respect, and do not propose 
to discuss Grice’s work in more detail. 
 
William Alston finally published the fruits of his own long-term interest in 
Speech Act theory in Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning32 nine years before 
his death in 2009. He does use the concept of the illocution, and thus his work 
has a slightly greater link to this thesis than does Grice’s. However I do not 
devote a great deal of space specifically to Alston’s work either. This is partly 
because Alston admits to a conception of meaning as being potential alone 
                                                     
30
 M Black, ‘Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views’, New Literary History 4:2 
(1973) 267. The words in [ ] are my own, which I have inserted for ease of understanding.  
31 Op cit p268 and footnote 27. For merely one example of this in action, I would refer to p47 of 
D Vanderveken’s ‘Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory’, in D Vanderveken and S Kubo 
(eds.), Essays in Speech Act Theory: Pragmatics and Beyond New Series 77 (Amsterdam, John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002). 
32 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 2000) 
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(‘language idling’, to use Wittgenstein’s phrase)33. Therefore, his ideas can 
have no relationship whatever to anything any speaker has ever actually done, 
and he appears unaware of the always-potential difference between what I say 
(or think) I have done, and what everyone agrees that I did: or in other words 
between intention and meaning. He is committed to the idea that meaning 
exists axiomatically in the dictionary, and while this has at least an initial 
plausibility in respect of individual words, it is simply inadequate (I will 
contend) in respect of sentences34.  
 
It is also the case that the tendency to regard illocutions as a descriptive 
category, rather than a predictive one, runs throughout Alston’s work. I 
discuss this tendency in general briefly in chapter three of this thesis: I will 
simply say here that if illocutions are by-and-large a way of describing what 
was done, rather than what must/will/could or should be done, then they are 
simply a rather long-winded and highly convoluted way of talking about 
types of linguistic usage, and tend to confuse rather than illuminate. 
 
François Recanati was born in 1952 and has since 1979 been a Research 
Director at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris. 
In addition to many articles, his books include Meaning and Force; the 
Pragmatics of Performative Utterances35, Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta36, and Literal 
Meaning37. His own views have evolved, and in for example Literal Meaning he 
scarcely mentions illocutions or any other of the Austinian types of speech act.  
 
In that work he notes that the earlier antagonism between semantics (“the 
formal study of meaning and truth-conditions” in a language) and pragmatics 
(“the study of language in use”38) has evolved into a dispute between 
“literalism” which he regards as the “dominant position” and 
“contextualism”; or in other words between a view that ascribes “truth-
conditional content to natural language sentences” as they might be found in a 
                                                     
33
 Alston asserts that “the fact that an expression has a certain meaning is what enables it ... to 
be used in a distinctive way in communication”, whereas it is in fact the other way round, as 
Wittgenstein famously suggested – ‘if you want to know the meaning, look for the use’. For 
Alston, however “the meaning of the sentence is all that the hearer need know about the 
language in order to interpret the utterance”: Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning p149. 
34 He suggests that “to specify the illocutionary act performed is to specify the speaker meaning 
of that utterance”: W P Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (Ithaca NY, Cornell 
University Press, 2000) p161. By contrast, I agree with J Margolis that “all talk of the speaker’s 
intentions or of his intentions to cause a certain effect are entirely otiose, and to speak of 
explaining the meaning of his utterances in terms of his intention is nothing but a redundant 
formulation for speaking of explaining the meaning of his utterance – unless it is to speak of 
an ulterior and occasional qualification by means of a speaker’s intention of a (usually) 
meaningful utterance”: J Margolis, ‘Meaning, Speakers’ Intentions, and Speech Acts’, The 
Review of Metaphysics 26:4 (1973) 685. This question is discussed in chapter four of this thesis.  
35
 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987 
36
 Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 2000 
37
 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
38 Literal Meaning op cit p2 
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dictionary, and one which “holds that speech acts are the primary bearers of 
content”39, so that it is what speakers do that matters not what the grammar 
and ‘rules’ of the language might suggest or seem to permit.  
 
I agree with Recanati’s view that ‘contextualism’ is a better option than 
‘literalism’, but Recanati does not ‘go far enough’: he still believes that “what is 
said (the truth-conditional content of the utterance) is nothing but an aspect of 
speaker’s meaning”40 and I do not agree, as will become clear. This overly 
speaker-centred view, which is – as I will show – by no means unique to 
Recanati, is one that he has held over the course of much of his work: in 
Meaning and Force he refers to Austin’s definition of illocutions and suggests 
that “an utterance’s ‘illocutionary force’ is the intention manifested by the 
speaker to perform a certain illocutionary act by means of his utterance”41. 
This reference to intention is incorrect, both as a description of Austin’s own 
theory, and as a description of meaning and action, as I will demonstrate over 
the course of this thesis. 
 
As with Alston, I do not discuss Recanati’s work in any detail. This is because I 
believe that both of them, and indeed many other theorists, have the wrong 
view of meaning and intention, and misunderstand the difficulties inherent in 
Austin’s own work, of which Austin himself was I think aware. As a result, 
both Alston and Recanati rely far too easily on the identification of illocutions 
with intention. My approach to meaning is so far removed from that of Alston 
and Recanati, that if I have, by the end of this thesis, demonstrated the 
appropriateness of my view, their dictionary-based and speaker/intention-
centred views will not be regarded as tenable42.  
 
The reasons for examining so thoroughly Speech Act theory as Austin first 
proposed it are not because it is of mainstream significance in the philosophy 
of language, but because it is so central to the hermeneutic approach to the 
Bible under discussion in this thesis.  Also, since Austin’s own suggestions 
have been adopted and considered not merely by advocates of a stable 
authorial meaning, but also by those who identify in his work exactly opposite 
implications, the enormously wide divergence of views as to the implications 
of what Austin suggested make it advisable to examine the source itself.  
                                                     
39 Literal Meaning op cit p3 
40
 Literal Meaning op cit p4 
41 Meaning and Force op cit p10 
42
 Alston for example notes that: “my concept deals with language, not with speech. Moreover, 
in speaking of sentence meaning I am concerned with linguistic meaning – the meaning 
possessed by units of language, where a language is an abstract structure that is employed by 
people in speech – in contrast to ‘speaker meaning’, what a speaker means by what he said, 
and in contrast to ‘utterance meaning’, the meaning to be ascribed to particular utterances or 
sentence ‘tokens’, if, indeed, there is a coherent concept of this latter that is distinct from 
speaker meaning”: W P Alston, ‘Illocutionary acts and Linguistic meaning’, in S L Tsohatzidis 
(ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (London, 
Routledge, 1994). 
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In his introduction to the Semeia volume concentrating on Speech Act theory 
and Biblical Criticism, H C White notes that there are “various ways of 
appropriating aspects of speech act theory”, and identifies these as being  
 
a sharply circumscribed application which attempts to keep strictly within the 
terms of the thought of Austin and Searle …; a use which extends the original 
theory to deal with certain problems unique to literary theory often utilizing the 
thought of another major speech act philosopher, (Paul Grice) …; and a third 
approach which emphasizes, more generally, the performative dimension of 
language as such, and rests largely upon views which arose independent of the 
work of Austin.43 
 
The Biblical scholars whose work is examined in this thesis have largely 
adopted the first policy. This is because it is one specific aspect of speech act 
theory that is attractive to them: the illocution44. The other ways of adopting a 
‘speech act attitude’ listed by White, do not focus specifically on this aspect, 
and are consequently not of such interest for them45. In general, however, it is 
this ‘Austin-lite’ theory that is more attractive to literary critics, which can lead 
to problems, as discussed in chapter two of this thesis. 
 
As a philosophy of language, Speech Act theory has proved controversial in 
application, particularly in its ‘Austin-Searle’ guise. Some of the problems with 
its use as a theory of language are mentioned by Edda Weigand, in reviews of 
the collection of essays Foundations of Speech Act theory46 and of Marina Sbisà’s 
                                                     
43 Semeia 41: Speech Act theory and Biblical Criticism (1988) p4.  
44 “If the text is a speech act, it seems as far-fetched to separate an author from his language 
and literature as it does an agent from his action. The author “belongs” to his text. He is 
responsible for his illocutionary acts. Author-ity designates the right – indeed, the obligation – 
of the author to be held responsible for his speech act. And if the author is accountable for this 
speech act, surely the reader is responsible for treating the author in a way that he deserves. 
Wilfully to misinterpret a text is akin to attributing an action to the author that he did not 
commit. In combining intention and convention, speaker meaning and sentence meaning, 
speech act theory is able to preserve the emphasis on the present form of a text while at the 
same time preserving a normative role for the author and his author-ity. With speech act 
theory, the author has begun to rediscover his voice”: K J Vanhoozer, ‘A Lamp in the 
Labyrinth: the Hermeneutics of “Aesthetic” Theology’ op cit p55. 
45 For a fuller outline of the relationship between speech act theory and Biblical criticism up to 
2001, see Richard Briggs’s excellent ‘The Uses of Speech Act Theory in Biblical Interpretation’, 
Currents in Research: Biblical Studies 9 (2001) 
46 E Weigand, ‘The State of the Art in Speech Act Theory (Review Article of S L Tsohatzidis 
(ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (London, 
Routledge, 1994)’ in Pragmatics and Cognition 4 (1996) 367-406. Her impatience with many of 
the contributors to that work is almost tangible, and in particular she accuses them of 
concentrating on a philosophical and abstract idea of language, of ignoring the work of 
linguists, and omitting the fact that natural language is dialogic and expressed in use. Perhaps 
somewhat over-optimistically, she proclaims “Speech act theory based on truth-values has 
come to an end … There has to be a new beginning …” (p377). 
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Linguaggio, ragione, interazione47, where she identifies that “many linguists ... 
have for a long time now prophesied a crisis for, and the end of, speech act 
theory”48. I also am inclined to agree with Dorothea Franck’s objection that  
 
even if we assume that every utterance could unanimously be classified by 
speakers of the language – if asked – this does not imply that such a procedure is a 
necessary part of the speaker’s intentions or the hearer’s way of interpreting. 
If we look through all the expressions which are in use, whenever people discuss 
ongoing or past verbal communications, speech act notions do in fact occur, but 
also a great number of other sorts of categorization are used. The number of ways 
in which a given speech event can be described seems almost infinite … What 
makes speech acts so special?49 
 
Once again, I stress that the time taken in this thesis to discuss the work of J L 
Austin at some length is not based on a belief that Speech Act theory is 
necessarily useful as a theory of language, but because it is proposed as a 
Biblical hermeneutic, in answer to a real hermeneutical problem that requires 
addressing. It is necessary that this thesis consider some of the drawbacks to 
Speech Act theory as a philosophy of language, in the course of examining it as 
a hermeneutic tool. For the moment, however, it is enough to recognise that 
Speech Act theory is not necessarily a widely-used tool in general philosophy 
or literary criticism, but has been recently and consistently proposed as 
particularly a Biblical hermeneutic, as will shortly be demonstrated50.  
 
2. A Brief Introduction to Speech Act theory:                                                                                  
2a: The Background to the theory 
 
Before embarking on a more detailed discussion of these themes, however, 
some background information is doubtless necessary, primarily about Speech 
Act theory itself. The theory was proposed by the White’s Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at Oxford University, J L Austin. Austin was by general agreement 
an immensely charismatic lecturer and tutor, who had a considerable influence 
on his students51. However, he died (in 1960) before he had formulated his 
                                                     
47 E Weigand, ‘Review of M Sbisà, Linguaggio, ragione, interazione. Per una teoria pragmatica degli 
atti linguistici (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989),’ Journal of Pragmatics 20:4 (1993) p385-390.   
48 Ibid p390. 
49 D Franck, ‘Speaking about Speech Acts’, Journal of Pragmatics 8 (1984) p91. See also C G 
New’s objection to ‘Ordinary language’: ‘A Plea for Linguistics’, in K T Fann (ed.) Symposium 
on J L Austin (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) 148-165.  
50 A detailed examination of what Austin himself said (and wrote) will also prove instructive 
for a consideration of issues of intention and what it is to perform any action, as well as the 
apparently simpler question of how we determine what a text means. To understand the 
hermeneutical use to which it is proposed to put Speech Act theory, it is necessary to 
understand the theory. 
51 See for example G J Warnock ‘John Langshaw Austin, a Biographical Sketch’ in K T Fann 
(ed.) Symposium on J L Austin, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p14-15, Sir Isaiah 
Berlin, ‘Austin and the Early Beginnings of Oxford Philosophy’ in Essays on J L Austin by Sir 
Isaiah Berlin and others (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973), or H Paul Grice ‘Conceptual Analysis 
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theory for publication. He had, though, outlined his approach to language in 
various lectures and lecture tours and these, together with other articles and 
reviews, were collected and published after his death, most notably in 
Philosophical Papers52 and How to do things with Words53 (hereafter How To). The 
latter work, which contains the drafts of the William James Lectures that 
Austin gave at Harvard University in 1955, represents his most systematic 
account of his philosophy of language.  
 
In order to understand the impact of Austin’s theory of language it is 
necessary first of all to understand its context. At the time when Austin was 
lecturing, the dominant philosophy of language in England was that 
propounded by A J Ayer, whose Language, Truth and Logic54, first published in 
1936, remained the principal context for all linguistic philosophy into the 
1950’s: the eighth impression of the second edition was published in 1951, and 
there had been a new impression of the second edition annually since it was 
first published in 1946. 
 
Ayer expounded a version of what was called the ‘Logical Positivism’ of the 
‘Vienna Circle’ of philosophers. In the preface to the first edition he himself 
noted that “the views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the 
doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, which are themselves the 
logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and David Hume”55. His 
approach was most notable for “the principle of verification”56, which Ayer 
described as being “supposed to furnish a criterion by which it can be 
determined whether or not a sentence is literally meaningful. A simple way to 
formulate it would be to say that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if 
the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable.”57  
 
He goes on to assert, in the introduction to the second edition, in which he 
slightly revised his theory, that by verifiable he means “that a statement is 
directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-statement, or is such that 
in conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one 
observation-statement which is not deducible from these other premises 
alone”58: statements may also be indirectly verifiable on similar grounds. 
Analytic statements are those which “do not make any assertion about the 
                                                                                                                                                         
and the Province of Philosophy’, in his Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1989), where he refers to Austin’s “Playgroup” – see p181. 
52 Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, Third Edition. 
53 Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970 (edited by J O Urmson). All subsequent references are to this 
edition, and not to the second edition of the work published in 1975 and edited by M Sbisà and 
J O Urmson (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA), unless specifically stated otherwise 
(as How To 2). 
54 London, Victor Gollancz, 1951. 
55 Language, Truth and Logic  p31 
56 Language, Truth and Logic Introduction to the Second edition p5. 
57 Language, Truth and Logic p5 
58 Language, Truth and Logic p13 
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empirical world, but simply record our determination to use symbols in a 
certain fashion” such as the statements of pure mathematics or logic59. 
 
Ayer seeks to prove that metaphysical statements are “neither true nor false 
but literally senseless”60:  
 
I take it to be characteristic of the metaphysician, in my somewhat pejorative 
sense of the term, not only that his statements do not describe anything that is 
capable, even in principle, of being observed, but also that no dictionary is 
provided by means of which they can be transformed into statements that are 
directly or indirectly verifiable.61  
 
Thus, one of his assumptions is that for language to be meaningful, it has to be 
essentially descriptive, such that it could either be true or false. Although he 
recognizes that there are other uses of the word ‘meaning’ than this sort, which 
Ayer calls ‘literal meaning’, nonetheless he asserts that unless a statement 
“satisfied the principle of verification, it would not be capable of being 
understood in the sense in which either scientific hypotheses or common-sense 
statements are habitually understood.”62 Every statement, if it is literally 
meaningful, “expresses a genuine proposition about a matter of fact”63. 
 
It is this assertion that Austin sets out to question64. He points out firstly that 
most uses of language are not, contrary to what Ayer assumes, descriptive. In 
general, when we speak, or make “common-sense statements” 65, we are not 
simply describing things in such a way that our statements could be true or 
false. Instead, we are using language to perform actions, and to engage in 
continuing dialogues with others. Language is not, primarily, used to describe, 
and is therefore not primarily analysable as being either true or false.  
 
Thus, according to Austin, Ayer is not describing actual or ‘ordinary’ language 
in Language, Truth and Logic, but rather some sort of rarefied ‘statement-
making’, philosophical language, far removed from the language we use every 
day to order meals, arrange dates, and buy tickets. Moreover, as Austin goes 
on to show, not merely is most language not descriptive or propositional, but 
in fact even the sort of language that is propositional or ‘statement-making’, 
                                                     
59 Language, Truth and Logic p31 
60 Language, Truth and Logic p31 
61 Language, Truth and Logic p 14 
62 Language, Truth and Logic p 16. There is of course an interesting comparison here with what 
Mikael Stenmark refers to as ‘Scientism’: the approach to philosophy of scholars like Richard 
Dawkins. 
63 Language, Truth and Logic p 35 
64 See also his introduction to his talk on the BBC in 1956, a transcript of which was published 
as ‘Performative Utterances’ in ‘Philosophical Papers’ op cit, p233-234. 
65 Language, Truth and Logic p 16.  
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which Austin calls “constative”66, even this language is also in fact active as 
opposed to merely descriptive.  
 
In almost every case of actual language-use, according to Austin, something is 
being achieved or done; an act is being performed. Hence, he coined the 
phrase “performative”, and spoke of actions performed simply by using words 
in the right circumstances67: hence the term ‘speech acts’, coined by others to 
describe the theory. Interestingly, particularly in view of the fact that Ayer 
cites him as an inspiration, Ludwig Wittgenstein was working on his own 
Philosophical Investigations68, along many of the same lines as Austin, at the 
same time69. Both Wittgenstein’s later work, and Austin’s, are a response to 
Logical Positivism and to Ayer’s view of language. 
 
Thus the fundamental insight which underlies Speech Act theory is that 
speaking is an action and a performance70, rather than simply a report or a 
description of factual states of affairs, and that spoken utterances are thus not, 
or not merely, true or false, but are also actions which effect changes in states 
of affairs. Austin gives as examples expressions such as ‘I bet’ or ‘I promise’, 
and he observes that these expressions are not in fact statements or 
descriptions, but are the actual performance of the act of, as it might be, betting 
or promising71.  
 
In How to do things with Words, Austin examines from a number of angles the 
fact that language is used to do various things, and after a number of ‘false 
starts’, (including the putative constative-performative divide) he proposes the 
existence of a number of specific categories of performative actions using 
language: these are the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. 
Since these three kinds of speech act will be of some importance later, it is 
necessary to briefly outline them now.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
66 How To p3  
67 How To p6 
68 Hereafter Phil Inv 
69 Although Austin and Wittgenstein were apparently too different in style and approach to 
co-operate: G J Warnock ‘John Langshaw Austin, a Biographical Sketch’ in K T Fann (ed.) 
Symposium on J L Austin, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p11 
70 However, there is a point to Cerf’s objection that in describing things done with words as 
‘performances’ Austin is not quite using ‘ordinary language’, nor does it sit entirely 
comfortably with Austin’s views on ‘parasitic’ performing – see Chapter 2 of this thesis (and 
W Cerf, ‘Critical Review of How to Do Things with Words’, in K T Fann (ed.) Symposium on J L 
Austin (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) p360). 
71 How To p5ff 
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A Brief Introduction to Speech Act theory:                                                                                                                       
2b: Locutions, Illocutions and Perlocutions 
 
Austin suggests that all utterances (except those he has already reserved as 
‘etiolations’ and the like72, which are utterances that are for Austin “parasitic” 
upon ‘normal usage’73) are a combination of phonetic74, phatic75 and rhetic76 
acts. When performed as rhetic acts, they have a meaning defined as being 
composed of their sense and reference. Austin suggests that “the act of ‘saying 
something’” in its “full normal sense”77 includes the act of uttering phonetic, 
phatic and rhetic acts, and this ‘act of saying something’ he calls “the 
performance of a locutionary act”78, which is “roughly equivalent to uttering a 
certain sentence with a certain sense and reference”79. Thus, to utter a ‘normal 
sentence’ that makes sense, is to perform a locutionary act. 
 
However, in addition to meaning conceived as sense and reference, many 
utterances are also, according to Austin, examples of a specific way of using 
language with “force”80: illocutionary acts are “utterances which have a certain 
(conventional) force”81, or are “the performance of an act in saying 
something”82 as opposed to the locutionary act which is a “performance of an 
act of saying something”83.  
 
As Austin later observes, there seems in fact to be in practice no such thing as a 
pure locutionary act84, since all acts of language appear to be a performance of 
an act in saying something, and this seems to be a virtually ever-present aspect 
of the meaning of utterances in use. The question of ‘how our utterance ought 
                                                     
72 How To p92 footnote 1. 
73 This exception will be discussed in detail in chapter two of this thesis, in relation to 
Derrida’s criticism of Austin. 
74 “the act of uttering certain noises”; a “phone”. How To p92 
75 “the act of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types belonging to and as 
belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain construction” etc; a “pheme”. How To p92 
76 “the act of using that pheme or its constituents with a certain more or less definite ‘sense’ 
and a more or less definite ‘reference’ (which together are equivalent to ‘meaning’)”; a 
“rheme”. How To p92-93 
77 How To p94 
78 How To p94 
79 How To p108, and which presumably lies at the heart not merely of illocutionary acts and 
perlocutionary acts but also other acts in language such as insinuation, swearing or poetry. 
80 How To p99 
81 How To p108 
82 How To p99 
83 How To p99 
84 “in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary is an abstraction only: every 
genuine speech act is both. (This is similar to the way in which the phatic act, the rhetic act, &c, 
are mere abstractions)”: How To p146. Max Black concurs: ‘Austin on Performatives’ in K T 
Fann (ed.), Symposium on J L Austin (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969) 410, as does John 
Searle: ‘Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts’, in Essays on J L Austin by Sir Isaiah 
Berlin and others, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1973) p149: “every locutionary act is an 
illocutionary act”. 
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to be taken’, of its force in any situation, is as central to the practical aspect of 
the meaning of utterances as the perhaps more easily abstracted ‘sense’ and 
‘reference’. It is thus – as L J Cohen argues in Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?85 – 
part of the usual meaning of the word ‘meaning’ in this context86.  
 
It might, then, be fair to regard the locution in Austin’s theory as a necessary 
abstraction rather than a practical, existent part of speech. Any act that is 
actually performed will by definition be an illocution (or perhaps a 
perlocution): as Austin notes “to perform a locutionary act is in general, we 
may say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act.”87 Thus Austin 
establishes the idea of a locutionary language act with sense and reference, 
which is purely conceptual, and an illocutionary act, with sense and reference 
and force. This illocutionary act is the most important and most debated single 
concept Austin suggested. 
 
Austin also suggests, however, that there is a third category of language act: 
the perlocution. With regard to this distinction between perlocutions and 
illocutions Austin himself observed that this one “seems likeliest to give 
trouble”88. Both are, unlike the locutionary act, performative acts, since they 
can be performed, and have force (unlike the locution, which has no force, and 
is not ‘real’).  
 
                                                     
85 L J Cohen, ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 14:55 (1964) pp118-137.  
86 “When you say ‘I protest’, you are not describing your protest nor reporting it. You are just 
protesting. If your utterance is to be assigned a meaning of any kind, this meaning must be of 
a performative kind. The meaning lies solely in the making of the protest… It is thus clear that 
wherever explicitly performative expressions are used, the illocutionary force, if such a thing 
exists at all, cannot be distinguished from the meaning. 
“But even where explicitly performative expressions do not occur the term ‘illocutionary force’ 
turns out to be just as otiose. After all, if the utterance ‘Your haystack is on fire’ gives a 
warning that is rendered explicit by ‘I warn you that your haystack is on fire’, and if the 
warning is part of the meaning of the latter utterance, it is hardly unreasonable to suppose that 
the warning is also part of the former utterance’s meaning, though inexplicitly so”: ‘Do 
Illocutionary Forces Exist?’ p122-123. Searle agrees with him: ‘Austin on Locutionary and 
Illocutionary Acts’, in Essays on J L Austin by Sir Isaiah Berlin and others, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1973) p154. However, Margolis does not: in ‘Meaning, Speakers’ Intentions, and Speech 
Acts’, The Review of Metaphysics 26:4 (1973) he believes that “merely to restore the distinction 
between act and utterance, however,  outflanks Cohen’s criticism”(p691) because he believes 
that Cohen uses the term ‘utterance’ to cover “both act and what is produced” (690). To which, 
I suspect Cohen would reply: isn’t ‘what is produced’ the act: how can they be distinguished, 
except by regarding the act as an entirely ‘interior’ and ‘intention-based’ phenomenon, which 
concept Austin opposes?  
87 How To  p98 
88 How To  p109. P N Campbell, in his ‘A Rhetorical View of Locutionary, Illocutionary and 
Perlocutionary Acts’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 59:3 (1973) 284-296, notes the interesting fact 
that for the most part, Austin’s prediction has not been borne out in subsequent studies, most 
of which have concentrated on the locutionary – illocutionary distinction, and ignored the 
illocutionary – perlocutionary one. This distinction, and the reasons why it is less often 
discussed, is the subject of chapter five of this thesis.  
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Austin suggests that while the illocutionary act is the “performance of an act in 
saying something”89, the perlocutionary act is initially distinguished from it by 
being an act that is intended by its enactor to be a consequence of a locutionary 
or illocutionary act. The perlocutionary act, however, is not effective ‘directly’ 
or by convention, cannot be guaranteed, and can only be reported on by the 
recipients:  
 
saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential 
effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or 
of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention or purpose of 
producing them; and we may then say, thinking of this, that the speaker has 
performed an act in the nomenclature of which reference is made either {as in ‘he 
persuaded me to shoot her’} only obliquely, or even {as in ‘he got me to (or made 
me, & c) shoot her’} not at all, to the performance of the locutionary or 
illocutionary act.90 
 
We could say, in describing a perlocutionary act, ‘I attempted to persuade’ (or 
‘I persuaded’; past tense), or ‘I attempted to get him to shoot’, but we could 
not say ‘I persuade’ in the first person present, or even ‘I insult you’. The 
illocutionary act is performed in saying, on the basis of conventions. The 
perlocutionary act (as described91) would seem to be only performed in 
hearing and responding. Austin is subsequently insistent that while the 
illocutionary act is conventional and predictable in its occurrences, the 
perlocution is neither: “clearly any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable 
to be brought off, in sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or 
without calculation, of any utterance whatsoever”.92  
 
Although they are only introduced about half way through his series of 
lectures, in Lecture Eight, it is these three speech acts that have been of most 
interest generally to followers of Austin, and in particular the illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts. For those who seek to find in Speech Act theory a 
useful Biblical hermeneutic, it is the illocutionary act that is most attractive and 
useful, because it is the one which seems to present a conceptual vehicle to 
explain and support the idea that the meaning of an utterance or phrase 
resides in the nexus of the author, their intention, and the words spoken, 
                                                     
89 How To  p99 
90 How To  p101, where the words in { } are Austin’s own definitions to which he referred using 
shorthand nomenclature, and which I have inserted for ease of understanding. 
91 It is noteworthy that Austin is here imagining a conversational, dialogic context – this is 
suggestive in the context of weaknesses in the theory which will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters 
92 How To p109. There is, of course, as Austin will subsequently demonstrate, no such thing as 
a straightforward constative, nor is there any way of distinguishing constative and 
performative utterances on the grounds that one is a doing of something and the other is not. 
However, the fact that Austin will subsequently abandon the performative-constative 
distinction does not prevent him retaining the illocutionary-perlocutionary one. The 
implication here again is clearly that only illocutions are performative. 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
27 
rather than in the uncertainty and particularity of the reception by an audience 
of the phrase heard.  
 
The concept of the illocution as Austin outlines it, particularly in its distinction 
from the perlocution, provides a conceptual vehicle to embody the assumption 
that meaning is ‘transmitted’ by an illocutionary phrase from speaker to 
hearer, rather than constructed in being heard. The illocution allows for the 
perpetuation of, and relies for its intelligibility upon, an underlying 
assumption that meaning is, as it were, ‘begotten not created’93, and thus 
represents an example of the ‘sender’ view of meaning, a concept I discuss in 
detail later in this thesis. The concept of the illocution is used because it 
appears to ‘outflank’ or contradict the idea of the death of the author, and 
restores to them an authority over meaning. 
  
3. Uses of Speech Act theory as a hermeneutic.94 
 
The first person to suggest that Speech Act theory had potentially interesting 
or useful applications for biblical hermeneutics was Donald Evans, in his The 
Logic of Self-Involvement95, published in 1963. Evans had studied under Austin 
and developed Austin’s theory in some respects, suggesting that it had 
relevance as a philosophy of language and as a tool to aid in Biblical exegesis. 
His use of Speech Act theory was in turn taken up by Anthony Thiselton, who 
gave new impetus to attempts to use it in Biblical hermeneutics. Thiselton 
initially referred to Austin’s work in his article “The Parables as Language 
Event”96. He elaborated on this suggestion in further articles, notably “The Use 
of philosophical Categories in New Testament Hermeneutics”97 and “The 
Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings”98, and particularly in his 
magisterial overview of Hermeneutics as it relates to issues of reading the 
Bible, New Horizons in Hermeneutics99, published in 1992. His work, The 
Hermeneutics of Doctrine100, published in 2007, also refers to the theory.  
                                                     
93 Adopting the words of the last line of the second verse of the Christmas carol Adeste, Fideles, 
translated from the Latin by Frederick Oakley and others as O Come, all ye faithful, which is, of 
course, a version of the affirmation in the Nicene Creed which, in its modern English 
translation affirms that “We believe in one Lord Jesus Christ, ... begotten not made”: the 
difference being between that which is a creation of the Divine (made), such that there was a 
time when it did not exist, and that which is Divine in its essence, generated but eternal (hence 
“eternally begotten”). For the Word, the purpose is to affirm His essential Divinity as opposed 
to a ‘creatureliness’; for meaning, it expresses the difference between that which is made in the 
moment of recognition, and that which is pre-existent in the mind of the agent, begotten there 
and then ‘sent out’. 
94 For a slightly more detailed account of some of the same territory, see R Briggs ‘The Uses of 
Speech Act Theory in Biblical Interpretation’, op cit.  
95 London, SCM Press, 1963. 
96 Scottish Journal of Theology 23:4 (1970): 437-468, where he refers also to Evans. 
97 The Churchman 87:2 (1973): 87-100 
98 Journal of Theological Studies NS 25:2 (1974)  
99 London, Marshall Pickering, 1992 
100 Grand Rapids MI, William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007. 
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Thiselton’s themes have been taken up by Richard Briggs who, in a work 
which began as a Doctoral thesis supervised by Thiselton, re-examined the use 
of Speech Act theory in Biblical hermeneutics, and Evans’s Logic of Self-
Involvement, in his book Words in Action101 published in 2001. Briggs has also 
written a useful introduction to the use of Speech Act theory in Biblical 
hermeneutics under the entry for Speech Act theory in the Dictionary for 
Theological Interpretation of the Bible102, edited by Kevin Vanhoozer. 
 
As Briggs notes in this entry, Speech Act theory has also been adopted, 
although in a slightly different ‘key’, by Kevin Vanhoozer and Timothy Ward. 
Vanhoozer has not come to Speech Act theory through Evans and is 
particularly interested in using Speech Act theory in an attempt to recover a 
notion of ‘authorial intention’ against attacks on the concept by Derrida and 
others. This is the concern of his suggestively-titled Is there a meaning in this 
text?103 (hereafter referred to as Is There?), published in 1998. He is followed in 
this by Ward, whose Word and Supplement104, published in 2002, began life as a 
Doctoral thesis supervised by Vanhoozer, and who follows Vanhoozer in the 
use he makes of Speech Act theory, although the specific focus of his work is 
the concept of sola scriptura. Vanhoozer, like Thiselton, continues to refer to 
speech acts in his work The Drama of Doctrine105 although here, as in Thiselton’s 
own work on Doctrine, Biblical hermeneutics plays a lesser role. 
 
There have also been a number of Speech-Act analyses of various Biblical texts, 
for example Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An Analysis of 1 John by Dietmar 
Neufeld106; The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 by Jim W 
Adams107; Hearing Mark’s Endings: Listening to Ancient Popular Texts through 
Speech Act Theory by Bridget Gilfillan Upton108; I, He, We, and They: A Literary 
Approach to Isaiah 53 by D J A Clines109, The Prophetic Persona: Jeremiah and the 
Language of the Self by T Polk110, and Jesus and the Samaritan Woman: A Speech 
Act reading of John 4:1-42 by J Eugene Botha111. The approaches of some of these 
works, and the usefulness of the part played in them by Speech Act theory will 
be addressed in chapter three of this thesis.  
 
                                                     
101 Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 2001. It is subtitled Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation 
102 London, SPCK, 2005. p763. 
103 Leicester, Apollos, 1998. Hereafter abbreviated to Is There? 
104 Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.  
105 The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic approach to Christian Theology, (Louisville KY, 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2005) 
106 Biblical Interpretation Series volume 7 (eds.) R A Culpepper and R Rendtorff (Leiden, E J Brill 
1994).  
107 Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 448 (New York, T&T Clark, 2006). 
108 Biblical Interpretation Series Volume 79, (Leiden, Brill, 2006). 
109 (JSOT Supplement Series 1), (JSOT Press, Sheffield, 1983). 
110(JSOT Supplement Series 32), (JSOT Press, Sheffield, 1984). 
111 (Leiden, E J Brill, 1991). 
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Richard Briggs and Donald Evans, as well as Anthony Thiselton, have also 
used Speech Act theory for specific exegetical work, as well as making points 
about Speech Act theory’s general hermeneutical usefulness. This thesis will 
not, for reasons which I hope will become obvious, employ Speech Act theory 
as a specific hermeneutical tool. Instead, I will concentrate, particularly in the 
later chapters of the thesis, on the theory’s usefulness for a 
‘reconceptualization’ of hermeneutics, and in particular on the role Speech Act 
theory plays in defending a particular concept of revelation.  
 
As Briggs notes in his article ‘The Uses of Speech Act Theory in Biblical 
Interpretation’112; 
 
the various types of communicative situation relevant to biblical interpretation 
can be grouped into two broad categories: those where the communication takes 
place within the narrative world of the biblical text ... and those where the 
communication takes place between the author and the reader, or the narrator and 
the reader. To my mind this distinction corresponds roughly to that noted by Buss 
concerning whether speech-act theory is a tool for exegesis (i.e. relating to speech 
acts within the narrative world), or whether it is part of the reconceptualisation of 
exegesis (concerning how a reader is acted upon by the speech acts of the text).113   
 
Although writing from the point of view of Biblical hermeneutics, Ward and 
Vanhoozer are both interested in the implications of Speech Act theory for 
hermeneutics in general. In their concern for the identity of the agent, they 
share an interest with Nicholas Wolterstorff, although his interest in Speech 
Act theory and agency, expressed in the Wilde Lectures at Oxford University 
in 1993 and published as Divine discourse114 in 1995, is distinctive.  
 
Wolterstorff is more concerned with what is meant by the phrase ‘God speaks’ 
than with Biblical hermeneutics per se, and his work is not discussed in any 
detail in this thesis115. However, the illocution as a category is integral to his 
thesis, which accordingly stands or falls with the plausibility of the illocution, 
a concept which he nevertheless does not discuss in any detail. All of these 
                                                     
112
 R S Briggs, ‘The Uses of Speech Act Theory in Biblical Interpretation’, Currents in Research: 
Biblical Studies 9 (2001) 
113 Op cit. p237 – although I would rather see the “reconceptualisation of exegesis” as 
concerning ‘how a reader and the text-act interrelate’, than “how a reader is acted upon by the 
speech acts of the text”. The reference to Buss, as Briggs indicates, is to the opening sentence of 
his response article ‘The contribution of Speech Act Theory to Biblical Studies,’ Semeia 41: 
Speech Act theory and Biblical Criticism (1988) p125. 
114 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995 
115 As a general judgement, I agree with B S Childs that “Wolterstorff’s application of speech-
act theory to biblical interpretation is deeply flawed”, not merely because of flaws in Speech 
Act theory itself, but also for the reason Childs’s gives in his article, that Wolterstorff ignores 
the canonical context of Scripture: see B S Childs, ‘Speech-act theory and biblical 
interpretation’, Scottish Journal of Theology 58:4 (2005) 375-392, quote from p391. Childs also 
accuses Wolterstorff of confusing two distinct hermeneutical contexts he wants to address; 
‘canonical’ and ‘history-of-religions’. The danger here, though, is that Childs could be taken as 
assuming that there can be no bridge between the two. 
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approaches are illustrations of the contemporary use and relevance of Speech 
Act theory in Biblical hermeneutics.   
 
As already noted, this thesis examines the possibility of using Speech Act 
theory as a textual hermeneutic tool. One of the oddities that needs to be 
considered is the fact that Speech Act theory for Austin, as its name would 
suggest, is a theory about spoken language. While it may be perfectly 
legitimate to apply this theory to written texts, such an application requires an 
explanation and a defence. This question is dealt with in chapter two.  
 
4. Some problems with Speech Act theory itself. 
 
It should be noted that there are some issues relating in particular to the 
coherence of Speech Act theory which I do not address in detail in this thesis. 
Some of these are integral to the way Austin approached philosophy, and to 
the fact that the theory is presented on the basis of his lecture notes, published 
posthumously.  
 
Austin often worked on the basis of creating and then knocking down ideas, as 
is the case with the performative-constative distinction, which he creates and 
then dismantles in How To. There are one or two suggestions in his notes that 
he was doing this also with the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction. It is 
quite possible that, had he lived longer, he might have considerably revised 
the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary categories116. In this sense, 
the published form of his lectures ‘fixes’ his ideas in a form he might not have 
wished117.  
 
How To is based largely upon Austin’s lecture notes, supplemented by his own 
handwritten corrections, and recordings and notes made by members of his 
audiences. Some of its distinctive style is attributable to these origins. Often, 
when Austin gives the impression of ‘thinking aloud’, this is precisely because 
this is what he was doing. How To is itself an example of a text that lies across 
                                                     
116 W Cerf, ‘Critical Review of How to Do Things with Words’, in K T Fann (ed.) Symposium on 
J L Austin (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) 352 
117 In this context it is worth noting Stanley Fish’s suggestion that Austin writes “under 
erasure”, a phrase Derrida takes from Heidegger: ‘With the Compliments of the Author’ in The 
Stanley Fish Reader, (Blackwell, Malden MA, 1999) p79ff. Elsewhere, he suggests that Austin 
created “a self-consuming artifact”: ‘How to do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech Act 
Theory and Literary Criticism’, MLN 91:5 (October 1976) 1011. J H Miller regards How To as “a 
ruefully comic report” of an ultimately failed undertaking, the failure of which “has been 
ignored at their peril by subsequent theoreticians who have attempted to build a solid and 
comprehensive theory of speech acts on the foundations Austin laid. … If such speech-act 
theorists had been slightly more careful readers of Austin they would have seen that he had 
already demonstrated the impossibility of establishing a clear and complete doctrine of speech 
acts” J H Miller, Speech Acts in Literature (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 2001) p12-13. 
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several generic boundaries: it is both a spoken and a written document, in 
which the memories of the one have supplemented the other118.  
 
That said, one of the problems with How To which should be noted here, is the 
confusion between rituals and linguistic conventions, and indeed between 
conventions and ‘mere contexts’119. The relationship between rituals and 
conventions is not clearly established: in How To, Speech Act theory is a 
linguistic theory only, but some of Austin’s examples are rituals. This problem 
is not discussed in detail in the thesis because it does not relate directly to the 
use of the theory in Biblical hermeneutics. But it is noteworthy that throughout 
his description of possible “infelicities” (that is, ways in which a speech act can 
fail) Austin refers to a “procedure”, which implies a ritual of some sort.  
 
This leads to some confusion between explicit performatives and ritualised 
acts with a linguistic element, a confusion which initially crops up when 
Austin includes “I do (sc. take this woman…)” as a performative, together 
with “I name this ship”, “I … bequeath my watch” and “I bet”120. It also leads 
to a confusion between conventions and rituals, which is explored by a 
number of scholars. This confusion is discussed briefly in chapter five of this 
thesis. It should further be noted that the question of sacramentality lurks 
underneath this whole question of ‘performativity’; the Eucharistic prayer is, 
for some Christian traditions at least, a prima facie case of a speech act having 
an effect121.  
 
This is never explicitly acknowledged by Austin, but in his discussion of the 
nature of intention he has already ‘piggy-backed’ on a long history of 
theological debate over ‘ex opere operato’ and the relationship between Priest, 
Church and words in the consecration of sacraments122. The very phrase he 
                                                     
118 As is made abundantly clear in the second edition (How To 2), in the preface to the Second 
edition (p v) and the Appendix (p 165). 
119 This is the argument made by J Schleusener in ‘Convention and the Context of Reading’, 
Critical Inquiry 6:4 (1980) 669-680, where he notes that “literary language is supposed to differ 
from ordinary speech because it must be understood differently: it relies on a background of 
conventions known to the author and his audience, but it has nothing to do with the 
circumstantial contexts they might share”, so that conventional meaning “is determined by a 
body of more or less invariant rules” while contextual meaning “depends on an assortment of 
more or less contingent facts”: p670. 
120 All How To  p5 
121 As is discussed, I think, inadequately, by A P Martinich, in his two articles  ‘Sacraments and 
Speech Acts’, Heythrop Journal 16 (1975) 289-303, 405-417. That his view is too limited is a point 
made by B R Brinkman in his comments on the articles, ‘Notes and Comments: Sacramental 
man and Speech Acts again’, Heythrop Journal 16 (1975) 418-420. Brinkman’s own articles on 
‘sacramentality’ in previous edition of the Journal are very much more suggestive, though not 
‘speech act based – see the bibliography.   
122 ‘ex opere operato’ being a phrase relating to the effectiveness or validity (note the similar 
words to those used by Austin in relation to performative utterances) of Sacraments, which 
defines them as being effective “by virtue of the ‘work’ having been done”: A Loades, 
‘Sacraments’, in A Hastings, A Mason and  H Pyper (eds.) The Oxford Companion to Christian 
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uses is drawn from the definition of a sacrament in the Book of Common 
Prayer, which was at the time of his lectures the only authorised service book 
in the Church of England123.  
 
Another aspect of Austin’s discussion is also worth remarking upon: Austin 
begins his analysis of possible “infelicities” by observing that “a good many 
other things have as a general rule to go right if we are to be said to have 
happily brought off our action”124. This highlights again the air of uncertainty 
and dialogue that sits at the heart of all of How To: “have as a general rule” 
implies, as Austin almost always seems to, that there might be (unspecified 
and unexamined) exceptions. Then “to be said to have”, as often in How To, 
begs the question “be said” by whom; presumably by the dialogue partners 
who adjudge our action, but who are not explicitly identified either here or 
elsewhere in Austin, but are subsumed into the abstract and unexamined idea 
of “convention”125?  
 
There is a related confusion about constitutive and non-constitutive rules. 
Austin does not use the terms, but his successor John Searle does. This 
question is discussed briefly in chapter two, in the context of a discussion of 
Mary Louise Pratt, specifically the criticism made of her work by Michael 
Hancher126. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Thought, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) p634-637, quote taken from first column on 
p636 - where the ‘work’ is the proper form of the sacrament – the correct words. The 
alternative would be that the sacraments were effective by virtue of, say, the worthiness of the 
minister or congregation. The former suggestion, that sacraments are valid if the work is done 
properly, is directly analogous to the idea that a Speech Act is effective if the “accepted 
conventional procedure” is adopted, while the latter suggestion, that sacraments depend on 
the Minister or congregation, is directly analogous to the idea that Speech Acts depend on the 
interior intention of the speaker. M Hancher identifies the Institution Narrative (the recital of 
Christ’s actions and words at the Last Supper) as a performative in ‘Performative Utterance, 
the Word of God, and the death of the author’, Semeia 41 op cit. 
123 How To p9, referring without any acknowledgment to the definition of a sacrament found in 
the Catechism of the Book of Common Prayer of the Church of England, as “an outward and 
visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace…”. It is worth wondering whether Austin’s 
original Harvard American audience, unfamiliar with the Book of Common Prayer and having 
no sole authorised form of service, would have ‘picked up’ on this, whether Austin’s 
contemporary English audience did, and whether a modern English audience does, in the days 
of Common Worship, when Anglican catechisms have fallen out of fashion, and Church 
attendance is the habit of so few? 
124 How To p14 
125 Which is, as G J Warnock observes “not absolutely hard-edged, especially perhaps in the 
slightly stretched sense of the term” which Austin employs and bequeaths to his successors 
(and I fancy that this is something of an understatement): G J Warnock, ‘Some Types of 
Performative Utterance’, in Essays on J L Austin by Sir Isaiah Berlin and others, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1973) p71. 
126
 Alston also notes that Searle’s’ definition is unclear in his Illocutionary Acts and Sentence 
Meaning (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 2000) p256. 
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There is also confusion between performatives (Austin’s first linguistic 
category, proposed as an alternative to non-performative constative 
utterances) and illocutions (a category of speech acts proposed in his second 
attempt to categorise utterances, after he has demolished the performative-
constative divide). This relationship is examined by J O Urmson, who edited 
How To, in his article Performative Utterances127, where he suggests that Austin 
was wrong to conclude that the doctrine of illocutionary force should envelop 
that of ‘performativity’. Urmson in fact argues that Austin’s original, and 
correct, assumption was that ‘performative utterances’ are not in fact primarily 
speech acts at all, but are “those conventional acts the primary conventions for 
which are non-linguistic” 128, in other words that performatives are properly all 
rituals of some sort. 
 
In particular, Urmson wants to distinguish performatives from speech acts 
such as ‘I warn you’ which, he correctly acknowledges, are not especially 
conventional in other than linguistic terms129. Following Urmson, however, 
would make the category of ‘performatives’ a very much smaller one, 
excluding speech acts which operate primarily through linguistic conventions. 
It does not affect the existence of illocutions and other speech acts, but merely 
preserves a distinct category of performatives130.  
 
Urmson may well be correct in asserting that there is in Austin a confusion 
between rituals and speech acts: however, the distinction between 
linguistically conventional acts (speech acts) and ones that are “primarily non-
linguistic” (performatives) is likely to prove a trifle porous131. Indeed, J R 
Cameron suggests that “speech acts … are but one family within a large class 
of acts which we may call performances; and performances in turn are one 
species of the kind of act known as institutional acts.”132 Irrespective of the 
merits of Urmson’s scheme, however, it is certainly true that for Austin in How 
To, all speech is performative, but it is not all illocutionary, and that the 
relationship between illocutions, and the ‘performative criteria’ or ‘conditions’ 
for speech acts he outlined in his first lectures is not clearly expressed. 
 
                                                     
127 ‘Performative Utterances’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy II (1977) p120-127. 
128 Ibid p124. 
129 A contention with which P F Strawson also agrees: see ‘Intention and Convention in Speech 
Acts,’ in K T Fann (ed.) Symposium on J L Austin (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) 
p385 
130 There is an interesting parallel between Urmson’s paper and the suggestion by Grimes that 
Austin’s ‘doctrine of infelicities’ can provide the basis for an analysis of how rituals work: 
Grimes is though unconcerned by illocutions and the like, and has no interest in 
distinguishing rituals from speech acts – see R L Grimes, ‘Infelicitous Performances and Ritual 
Criticism’, Semeia 41: Speech Act theory and Biblical Criticism (1988) 103-122.  
131 And both require the existence of and recognition by the appropriate community or context. 
132 J R Cameron, ‘Sentence-Meaning and Speech Acts’. The Philosophical Quarterly 20:79 (April 
1970) p98. He later makes explicit that “the term [performance] is intended to suggest a 
generalization of Austin’s notion of a performative utterance” p101 footnote 7. 
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John Searle has adopted Austin’s theory, revised it, and removed some of 
Austin’s inconsistencies. However, in so doing, he has changed the style of the 
theory, and its direction, while failing to deal with its most fundamental 
inconsistencies concerning intention and action. It is these problems with 
intention and with guarantees of authority that I examine in chapter three of 
this thesis, where I show that although some of the philosopher Jacques 
Derrida’s criticism of Austin is ill-founded, he is correct in his conclusion that 
Speech Act theory is incoherent. 
 
5. Uptake and Understanding. 
 
For Austin, one of the distinctions between illocutions and perlocutions is that 
illocutions, being conventional, only require ‘uptake’. They do not require 
anything much in the way of ‘consequential’ occurrences, unlike perlocutions, 
which are sometimes even accidental consequences of a separate pre-existing 
act. Because of the – admittedly quite widespread – assumption that meaning 
pre-exists any particular context, the illocutionary act in Speech Act theory 
seems to be a way in which the speaker can achieve a guarantee that ‘their’ 
meaning will be recognised and ‘taken up’, without becoming rather more 
tenuously reliant on contextual consequences and recognition133.  
 
One might, then, say that in the illocution, the speaker’s intention is 
unequivocally the meaning of the act, conveyed by its ‘enacting’ conventions. 
To exist, the illocution merely requires the existence of an activity or a 
‘pseudo-activity’ called ‘uptake’. The concept of ‘uptake’ is also required in the 
work of E D Hirsch. This concept is discussed in chapter five of this thesis. 
Uptake is the conventionally-mandated acceptance of the act as embodying the 
speaker’s intention, which does not involve either a creative activity of 
understanding or the prior recognition of consequences of the act. It is 
foundational for the existence of the illocutionary act, although not always 
recognised as such. 
 
John Searle’s concept of “the Background” is in some ways another attempt to 
illuminate and describe the idea of uptake, or at least to explain how meaning 
is recognized. It, like the concept of uptake, is inadequate, because like all the 
other similar attempts that implicitly assume the necessity of a view of 
meaning that relates it solely to the intention of a speaker or author, it ignores 
the true nature of both meaning and understanding as things which are 
                                                     
133 Of course, there is a perfectly legitimate sense in which meaning does pre-exist any 
particular set of circumstances or context. One can look up a word in a dictionary and find any 
number of ‘meanings’ given for it. However, this list of ‘meanings’ is in fact only provisional: 
it doesn’t tell you what that word will mean in the context of a particular phrase or utterance in 
a particular context, both because language is continuously evolving, and because the meaning 
of utterances in communication is contextual. The ‘dictionary-meaning’ of a word is only a 
place to start, and it is interesting to note that dictionaries are by and large loath to give 
‘meanings’ for too many phrases: the possibilities and contextual variations are too large. This 
is discussed in chapters six and seven of the thesis. 
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collective and creative. This concept of understanding is explored and drawn 
out in the work of the twentieth-century Russian thinkers Mikhail Bakhtin and 
Valentin Volosinov. They provide a more sophisticated and accurate view of 
understanding and of meaning, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 
seven of this thesis.  
 
There is a direct analogy between the proposed uptake-understanding 
distinction in those who adopt Speech Act theory as a Biblical hermeneutic, 
and the distinction that is also proposed, especially by Hirsch and Vanhoozer, 
between meaning and significance. The distinction between meaning and 
significance parallels that between uptake and understanding and indeed 
depends upon it for its own plausibility. The meaning-significance distinction 
is also examined in chapter six of this thesis. 
 
6. Conclusion: Meaning and Revelation 
 
The inconsistencies inherent in the work of Hirsch and in Speech Act theory 
stem from some of the assumptions that underlie their work, and which are 
not made explicit, but affect the shape of Speech Act theory and of Hirsch’s 
work on meaning. Austin and Hirsch (along with many other scholars) both 
assume a ‘sender view of meaning’ and start their ideas of meaning from the 
standpoint of a single, ‘isolated’, self or agent134.  
 
Communication begins with ‘me’ – the ‘sender’ – someone who is a speaker or 
agent, and is the process whereby I move ‘outwards’ to another, ‘sending’ my 
meaning out to them in words and actions. As Vanderveken, for example, puts 
it, “speakers who make meaningful utterances of elementary sentences always 
relate propositional contents to the world with a certain illocutionary force. 
They mean to perform in the context of their utterances elementary 
illocutionary acts ... It is part of what they intend to communicate to their 
hearers”.135 This is also the assumption that lies behind much of what is 
generally called Post-modernism, except that in this case more attention is 
paid to the ‘chasm’ ‘between’ me and anyone else, than to the ‘initiating’ or 
‘sending’ agent. 
 
This initial assumption of a starting point means that if the sender’s intention 
is not identical to meaning, and if what I say is not ‘correctly recognized’, then 
                                                     
134 This is a similar idea to that of “code models” and the “conduit metaphor”, which are 
defined by Mika Lähteenmäki as “models in which communication is construed in terms of 
mechanical transmission of information. It is typical of these models ... that the 
conceptualization of linguistic communication is based on the ‘conduit metaphor’, that is, on 
the idea of language as a kind of conduit or container for the speaker’s encoded thoughts” M 
Lähteenmäki, ‘On Meaning and Understanding: A Dialogical Approach’, Dialogism 1 (1998) 77. 
135
 D Vanderveken, ‘Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory’, in D Vanderveken and S 
Kubo (eds.), Essays in Speech Act Theory: Pragmatics and Beyond New Series 77 (Amsterdam, John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002) p25 
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communication collapses and we are all doomed to remain as we started, 
isolated individuals stuck in isolated worlds. Either meaning is the possession 
of the sender and is made by them a property of the utterance or meaning is 
the property of each individual reader and thus collapses into chaos. The idea 
of the sender view of meaning – the idea that meaning is ascribed to an 
utterance by the initiator who sends the meaningful utterance out to be 
recognized (or not) by his or her audience – is a bulwark against a chaos of 
individualistic, competing, unrecognized meanings. 
 
However, as I will discuss further in chapter seven of this thesis, this entire 
assumption is based on a false model of identity and communication, that 
ignores the fact that I do not start with my own self-awareness and identity as 
a given. My sense of my ‘self’ is acquired and learned: it is a given gift, one 
might say, which is not a static intellectual possession but is something fluid 
and relational. I cannot be an isolated individual, doomed to be forever 
misunderstood, because my identity as ‘I’ is itself something communicated 
and corporate or shared. If there were no others, relating to me, ‘I’ would not 
exist. 
 
Moreover, the assumptions underlying the sender view of meaning, 
concerning communication and identity, conflict with some of the implications 
of Speech Act theory itself, especially those concerning the nature of intention, 
and the question of what makes an act recognizable as ‘an act’. They conflict, 
too, with Hirsch’s own recognition of the nature of understanding as an 
activity. Therefore, there is an element of incoherence at the heart of Speech 
Act theory and of Hirsch’s work, which affects their usefulness in any field, 
and especially in defence of authorial meaning and thus revelation.  
 
This does not, however, mean that meaning is chaotic or completely 
unpredictable, nor does it destroy the possibility that God (or any author) can 
communicate. It does, though, suggest that the concept of revelation – of God 
communicating – needs a revision which will, at the same time, make it more 
theologically coherent, and which will allow much greater recognition for the 
role of the Holy Spirit. This thesis accordingly concludes with a discussion of 
the concept of revelation, from the context of a more collaborative concept of 
meaning.  
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CHAPTER TWO: SPEECH ACT THEORY AND LITERARY 
CRITICISM 
 
1. Austin’s and Searle’s dismissal of “Parasitic language uses”: can Speech 
Act theory be applied to texts? 
 
In the introductory chapter I noted the premise which this thesis is examining: 
that Speech Act theory can be used as a hermeneutic tool. However, before 
examining the particular uses of Speech Act theory by scholars such as Briggs, 
Thiselton, Ward and Vanhoozer, it is necessary to address some general 
problems with the theory, since some of these contaminate all of the 
subsequent uses to which it is put.   
 
The first problem is, as noted in the section title above, that both Austin and 
John Searle explicitly reject the idea that Speech Act theory can be applied to 
texts, and thus that it can have any use or validity as a hermeneutic tool. Most 
importantly, the philosopher Jacques Derrida examines this assertion of 
Austin’s and uses it to dismantle the entire theory. The next task of this thesis, 
then, is to examine why Austin and Searle are so emphatic about Speech Act 
theory’s oral exclusivity; whether Derrida’s argument is conclusive; and how 
other scholars have sought to deal with this issue, in particular those on whom 
Biblical hermeneuts rely. 
 
The next three parts of section one, then, examine first Austin’s distinction, 
then its development in Searle, and finally Derrida’s criticism. Having done 
this, the following four sections of this chapter examine individual uses of 
Speech Act theory as a hermeneutic tool by those literary critics specifically 
cited by the scholars whose Biblical hermeneutic arguments are the subjects of 
this thesis.  
 
Austin’s and Searle’s dismissal of “Parasitic language uses”:                                                          
1a. Austin’s distinction 
 
Austin himself rules out any relationship between his theory of Speech Acts 
and most other sorts of language use. He suggests that the ‘ills’ which affect 
the proper performance of a speech act and which may render it ineffective, 
include the possibility that a performative utterance be spoken in the context 
of a poem or play, a context which he describes as  “parasitic”1 upon ‘normal’, 
‘serious’ language.  
 
Subsequently, having noted that since actions must be performed by actors, 
and thus that all performative utterances must have a performer, who will be 
the utterer, Austin observes that the utterer or performer will be identifiable 
                                                     
1 How To p22 
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either as the person who says ‘I …’, or “in verbal utterances, by his being the 
person who does the uttering”2, or “in written utterances (or ‘inscriptions’), by 
his appending his signature (this has to be done because, of course, written 
utterances are not tethered to their origin in the way spoken ones are)”3. This 
suggests that only those texts which are signed can be performative, let alone 
illocutionary4.  
 
At this point it should also be noted (as was mentioned in a footnote in chapter 
one of this thesis) that W Cerf observes that the very word ‘performing’ to 
describe speaking, has a hint of this parasitic context about it5. Cerf also points 
out that Austin’s use of the term ‘performing an act’ is unusual (and certainly 
not ‘ordinary’) not merely because Austin uses the word ‘performing’ to 
describe speaking, but also because he refers to ‘an act’ not ‘an action’. Not 
merely does this again refer to a ‘parasitic context’, but it also, for Cerf, helps 
obscure the distinction between most sorts of speech, and the sorts that are, or 
might be, those that perform actions, which is, he thinks, a ‘stronger sense’ 
than merely that of performing an act6.  
 
It is certainly true that Austin has departed from ‘ordinary language’ in his 
description of performatives, and it is true also that we do not usually describe 
speaking as “performing an act” or as an “action”. This may merely indicate 
the confusion between rituals and speech acts identified in chapter one of this 
thesis. This creeping infiltration of the ‘parasitic’ is not, however, noticed by 
Austin7, who develops and reaffirms the initial opposition he has identified 
                                                     
2 How To p60 
3 How To p60-61, Austin’s italics. 
4 He goes on to note that “thus what we should feel tempted to say is that any utterance which 
is in fact a performative should be reducible, or expandable, or analysable into a form with a 
verb in the first person singular present indicative active (grammatical)” and that “unless the 
performative utterance is reduced to such an explicit form, it will regularly be possible to take 
it in a non-performative way”: How To p61-62. 
5 W Cerf, ‘Critical Review of How to Do Things with Words’, in K T Fann (ed.) Symposium on J 
L Austin (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) p360. 
6 ‘Critical Review of How to Do Things with Words’ op cit, p 363. This point is also made, by 
implication, when J Hornsby notes that “Austin struggled with distinctions between acts and 
actions, and between acts and consequences; and he never settled on a single way of using the 
term ‘act’”: ‘Illocution and its Significance’, in S L Tsohatzidis (ed.), Foundations of Speech Act 
Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (London, Routledge, 1994) p187. In How To 2 the 
editors note, in the Appendix (p165), that Austin himself notes in his first chapter that 
“’uttering words’ not so simple a notion anyway!”. Indeed Gadamer suggests that “no one 
thinks of speaking as an action”: Truth and Method (New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 
2013) p599.   
7 As Jonathan Culler notes, not merely is there an irony in Austin, whose “own writing is often 
highly playful and seductive” and who undermines his own suggestions, attempting to 
separate the parasitic and non-serious, from the ‘serious’ and ordinary, but Austin is in fact 
performing a similar exclusion to the constative-based exclusion of ‘metaphysical’ or 
‘meaningless’ language he is himself attacking: J Culler, ‘Convention and Meaning: Derrida 
and Austin’, New Literary History 13:1 (Autumn 1981) p21. See also J H Miller, Speech Acts in 
Literature (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 2001) p20, 40ff. 
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between ordinary and ‘parasitic’ language, while outlining the locutionary, 
illocutionary and perlocutionary uses of language.  
 
Austin notes that there are additional and separate uses of language, which do 
not fall into his categories, such as when language is used “for something, e.g. 
for joking”8, or for acting a part or writing poetry, and there is such a thing as 
“the poetical use of language”9 by which he means, it appears, ‘purple prose’ 
or ‘high flown’ usage, which is not the use of language for writing poetry, but 
the use of language ‘poetically’. Such usages, he states, are not illocutionary 
acts since even if the meaning and force of them is clear it may remain “wholly 
unresolved which of these other kinds of things I may be doing”, among these 
“parasitic uses of language, which are ‘not serious’, not the full normal use’. 
The normal conditions of reference may be suspended, or no attempt made at 
a standard perlocutionary act, no attempt made to make you do anything, as 
Walt Whitman does not seriously incite the eagle of liberty to soar.”10 
 
In addition, there are other “things we ‘do’ in some connexion with saying 
something”11, which seem to Austin to be less remote than this category of 
joking and poetry, but which nonetheless either fall into none or more than 
one of the three classes of locution, illocution and perlocution. These actions or 
almost-actions include things such as insinuation or “evincing emotion” 12 by, 
for example, swearing; which we might say we use “for relieving our feelings”. 
In all of these actions, as with joking and poetry, there is no relation to 
“performative formulas and the other devices of illocutionary acts” since “we 
must notice that the illocutionary act is a conventional act: an act done as 
conforming to a convention”13. 
 
In these excerpts Austin clearly suggests that literature is ‘parasitic’ upon 
normal and serious language14, and that it is not conventional and thus not 
illocutionary. Indeed, writing can only be performative when signed, which 
would restrict ‘performativity’ to particular classes of written text such as 
notices or declarations, rather than books or literature in any form. It would, 
on Austin’s own account, be impossible to regard the Bible, a collection of 
books which are not merely unsigned, but whose authorship is in most cases 
disputed, as an illocutionary or even performative ‘text act’. This would be the 
case whether or not the Bible counts as literature.  
 
                                                     
8 How To p104 
9 How To p104 
10 How To p104 
11 How To p104 
12 How To p105 
13 How To p105 
14 In discussing the need for language to be ‘spoken’ and ‘taken seriously’ he notes “this is, 
though vague, true enough in general – it is an important commonplace in discussing the 
purport of any utterance whatsoever. I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem”: 
How To p9.  
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Austin’s and Searle’s dismissal of “Parasitic language uses”:                                                                   
1b. Searle’s development of Austin’s distinction 
 
Austin’s exclusion of ‘literary’ language uses from his thesis has been 
developed and supported by John Searle who quite correctly distinguishes 
between literature and fiction15, but goes on to suggest that “roughly speaking, 
whether or not a work is literature is for the readers to decide, whether or not 
it is fiction is for the author to decide”16. While I agree with him in respect of 
literature, it is clearly not the case that ‘fictionality’ is the author’s decision 
alone. This is demonstrated in one direction by for example The Education of 
Little Tree17, originally and authorially described as biography, and so 
published, which was subsequently alleged to be a work of fiction, and is now 
published in this latter category18, or by ‘childhood memoirs’ like ‘Rock me 
gently: the true story of a convent childhood’, or ‘A million little pieces’, both of 
which were mentioned in the introduction to this thesis.  
 
In the other direction, it is often said that a work such as Marcel Proust’s In 
Search of Lost Time is not just a work of fiction, but is in part autobiographical. 
This is also the case in The Transylvanian Trilogy by Miklós Bánffy. Towards the 
end of the second volume (They were found wanting) of this fictional novel there 
is the following sentence: “In the afternoons and evenings they went to 
concerts or to the cinema, but not to the theatre as Countess Roza, who had 
always loved plays, did not now want to go lest it should upset Balint” 
followed by the following:  
 
Translators’ note: This last phrase seems to be a Freudian slip on the author’s part 
for though it hardly makes sense in relation to Balint and Adrienne, it may 
possibly be an unconscious echo of an important moment in Miklós Bánffy’s 
own life when he found himself obliged to renounce his love for the well-known 
actress, Aranka Varady. Some years later, after his father’s death, they married 
and Katalin Bánffy-Jelen is their daughter.19 
 
This, then, is an indication of how easily an author themselves may get 
confused as to the fictionality or not of their narrative: in this case, the fictional 
life of a Hungarian aristocrat from Transylvania in the early twentieth century, 
written by one who lived such a life. It is marketed as fiction, but may perhaps 
be considered as semi-autobiographical? 
 
                                                     
15 J R Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge University 
Press 1979) p58-9 
16 Ibid p59 
17 by Forrest Carter (Albuquerque NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1976). 
18 See also R Gibbs Jr, Intentions in the Experience of Meaning (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
press, 1999) p209, where this case, and others, is discussed. 
19 M Bánffy, translated by P Thursfield and K Bánffy-Jelen, The Writing on the Wall: The 
Transylvanian Trilogy Book Two: They Were Found Wanting (London, Arcadia Books, 2000) p468. 
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Searle, however, continues by firstly demonstrating that “certain quite specific 
semantic and pragmatic rules”20 that apply to assertive illocutions do not 
apply to assertions made in fiction, and then by denying the assertion that 
“any … writer of novels is not performing the illocutionary act of making an 
assertion but the illocutionary act of writing a novel”21. This he denies on the 
grounds that  
 
if the sentences in a work of fiction were used to perform some completely 
different speech acts from those determined by their literal meaning, they would 
have to have some other meaning. Anyone therefore who wishes to claim that 
fiction contains different illocutionary acts from nonfiction is committed to the 
view that words do not have their normal meanings in works of fiction … [which 
would in turn require that] it would be impossible to for anyone to 
understand a work of fiction without learning a new set of meanings for all the 
words and other elements contained in the work of fiction.22    
 
It is noteworthy that Searle imagines that fiction either does or does not 
‘contain’ acts, rather than that it simply is an act. Although ostensibly 
addressing the question of fiction as an act, he is in fact already imagining and 
considering word or sentence acts within a specific work of fiction. As his 
previous quotation from an Iris Murdoch novel indicates, he is examining an 
instance of discourse out of its context, not the context itself.  
 
His dismissal of the idea that writing could be a distinct kind of illocutionary 
act also depends on the existence of ‘normal’ and ‘literal’ meanings for words, 
when in fact utterances or acts were the topic under consideration. In addition 
it depends on the assumption that a word can have a ‘normal, literal meaning’, 
and that there can be only one of these per word because, of course, there is 
only one ‘normal, literal’ context. For Searle, fictionality is a context requiring 
examination and defence – it is not a ‘normal’, ‘literal’ context but something 
exceptional or ‘other’23.  
 
Instead, Searle suggests that a writer of fiction “is pretending, one could say, to 
make an assertion”, which he further defines as “engaging in a nondeceptive 
pseudoperformance which constitutes pretending to recount to us a series of 
events”24. It is not clear how one might distinguish pretending to recount from 
actually recounting: the difference seems to lie in the reality of the events 
described. Or rather, as Searle continues, it lies in the author’s intention in 
                                                     
20 Expression and Meaning p62 
21 Expression and Meaning p63 
22 Expression and Meaning p64. 
23 Searle would presumably insist, as in his defence against Derrida, Reiterating the Differences 
(see Bibliography), that this distinction has no hierarchy; but then, unless one is radically 
revising the meaning of words like ‘normal’ ‘ordinary’ and ‘parasitic’, all of these in fact do 
imply specific hierarchies and relationships, as M L Pratt observes in ‘The Ideology of Speech 
Act Theory’, Centrum NS 1.1 (1981) 5-18 – see later in this section.  
24 Expression and Meaning p65 
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pretending to recount events. This is why Searle believes that fiction is an 
authorially-determined category: because “pretend is an intentional verb” and 
therefore  
 
the identifying criterion for whether or not a text is a work of fiction must of 
necessity lie in the illocutionary intentions of the author. There is no textual 
property … that will identify a text as a work of fiction. What makes it a work of 
fiction is, so to speak, the illocutionary stance that the author takes toward it, and 
that stance is a matter of the complex illocutionary intentions that the author has 
when he writes or otherwise composes it.25 
 
Searle is quite right that often nothing in the text identifies it as a work of 
fiction: this is normally done by the cover and blurb of the text, or in its 
bibliographic details. This ascription of fictionality owes something, 
presumably to the author, as well as to the editor, who provided it with the 
appropriate contextual packaging, but as I have previously suggested, in the 
longer term, fictionality is a property which is decided by the reading 
community. The illocutionary stance of an author towards their text is not 
always obvious, at least from the text outside its ‘packaging’ and ‘context’. 
 
Moreover, the genres that exist, such as prose fiction, poetry, romantic fiction, 
crime novels, or whatever, are not just determined by the author, but are 
inherited. They, and the author’s own language, context and experience, will 
to an extent determine what he or she creates, just as they will also to an extent 
determine how readers read. The existing context will play a part in the 
creation of any particular text. 
  
Searle indeed, goes on to note that this fictional “pretense” is made possible by 
“a set of extralinguistic, nonsemantic conventions that break the connection 
between words and the world established by the rules mentioned earlier”26. 
He describes these extra conventions as  
 
horizontal conventions [which are] not meaning rules; they are not part of the 
speaker’s semantic competence. Accordingly, they do not alter or change the 
meanings of any of the words of other elements of the language. What they do 
rather is enable the speaker to use words with their literal meanings without 
undertaking the commitments that are normally required by those meanings. My 
third conclusion then is this: the pretended illocutions which constitute a work of 
fiction are made possible by the existence of a set of conventions which suspend 
the normal operation of the rules relating illocutionary acts and the world … these 
[fictional] conventions are not meaning rules; and the [fictional] language 
game is not on all fours with illocutionary language games, but is parasitic on 
them.27 
 
                                                     
25 Expression and Meaning p65-66 
26 Expression and Meaning p66 
27 Expression and Meaning p66-67 
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It is again interesting to note that Searle here twice refers to “the speaker”, 
although is he apparently discussing fiction and his original example was 
drawn from a prose novel which has a writer, rather than a speaker. Again it 
seems that Searle is in fact imagining and discussing the illocutionary acts 
spoken by characters within fiction, not the act of writing, or indeed of 
reading. Further, it is not clear what makes the horizontal conventions of 
fiction “parasitic” and abnormal. Austin himself was aware that 
conventionality extends a long way, into the swinging of a stick28 or “doing 
obeisance”29.  
 
Searle assumes that the horizontal conventions of fiction must be “parasitic”, 
because for him there can be only one, literal, meaning to any word. This 
literal, normal, acontextual meaning – which is that of ‘normal’ conventions 
and ‘normal usage’ – is the meaning used by speakers to achieve illocutions. If 
Searle assumed that the horizontal conventions of fiction were just as normal 
as the “vertical” conventions of illocutionary acts, this would destroy the 
author-based illocutionary guarantee. Therefore, rather than describe the act of 
writing as a normal conventional act, he suggests that “it is the performance of 
the utterance act with the intention of invoking the horizontal conventions that 
constitutes the pretended performance of the illocutionary act.”30 
 
Searle thus sees works of fiction as containing both fictional and non-fictional 
utterances: “in part, certain fictional genres are defined by the nonfictional 
commitments involved in the work of fiction”31 and “a work of fiction need 
not consist entirely of, and in general will not consist entirely of, fictional 
discourse”32 but that it may well also contain instances of “serious utterance” 
or “genuine assertion”33: a serious utterance, for Searle, being one that entails a 
‘serious commitment to its truth on the part of the speaker’, and which is thus 
opposite to the “nonserious” pretence of fiction34. It might, then, be possible to 
see the Bible as a patchwork of utterances, some of which are serious, and 
some of which are not, but none of which, presumably, can be illocutionary. 
This is described by J Schleusener, I think correctly, as “an absurd argument ... 
since the fact that nonserious utterances do not refer to an immediate context 
has nothing to do with the question of whether they presume one.”35 
 
                                                     
28 “it is difficult to say where conventions begin and end; thus I may warn him by swinging a 
stick or I may give him something by merely handing it to him. But if I warn him by swinging 
a stick, then swinging my stick is a warning: he would know very well what I meant: it may 
seem an unmistakable threatening gesture” How To p118 
29 How To p69 
30 Expression and Meaning p68 
31 Expression and Meaning p72 
32 Expression and Meaning p74 
33 ibid 
34 Expression and Meaning p60 
35
 J Schleusener, ‘Convention and the Context of Reading’, Critical Inquiry 6:4 (1980) 675.  
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Searle himself states of his ‘serious/nonserious’ distinction that “this jargon is 
not meant to imply that writing a fictional novel or poem is not a serious 
activity”36. It is interesting how a study of ‘ordinary language’ so quickly 
creates its own exceptional language and jargon. As Mary Pratt somewhat 
acerbically suggests;  
 
you can uphold the standard account [of language use as inherently 
cooperative and open] and say that all these other instances are violations of 
it, that quarrelling, gossiping, flattery, exaggeration, bargaining, advertising and 
so on involve deviant or infelicitous kinds of language use. No social value 
attaches directly to the words “deviant” and “infelicitous,” of course. They mean 
merely that the instance in question falls outside the system accounted for by the 
grammar and must be dealt with at a different theoretical level, outside the 
grammar proper.37  
 
However, if one takes this route, and given the extent of the linguistic 
behaviour that falls outside the scope of the allegedly ‘normal’ conventional 
illocutionary act,  
 
such an analysis would seem to make sense only if embedded in a social critique 
of some sort. In other words, if you have a theory that designates much of what 
people do linguistically as in violation of the rules of their language, such an 
analysis would, it seems, have also to argue that a society in which such activities 
are routine is itself structured in ways that are divergent from some norm. 
Needless to say there has been no stampede to elaborate such an argument.38  
 
Austin’s and Searle’s dismissal of “Parasitic language uses”:                                                                                    
1c. Derrida’s criticism of Austin’s distinction 
 
The criticism of the inherent value-judgment implicit in the illocution is also a 
part of the criticism of Speech Act theory made by Jacques Derrida. He attacks 
the division of language into ‘serious’ and ‘parasitic’ categories in his 
                                                     
36 Expression and Meaning p60 
37 M L Pratt, ‘The Ideology of Speech Act Theory’, Centrum NS 1.1 (1981) p14. 
38 The ideology of Speech Act Theory op cit p14-15. See also Stanley Fish’s argument that the 
distinction between ‘ordinary language’ and ‘literature’ stigmatizes literature and damages 
both, in ‘How ordinary is ordinary language’, New Literary History 5:1 (Autumn 1973) p45: 
“ordinary language loses its human content [and thus can hardly be ordinary], and literature 
loses its justification for being because human content has been declared a deviation. The 
inevitable end of the sequence is to declare human content a deviation from itself”, or in other 
words “deviation theories always trivialize the norm and therefore trivialize everything else” 
p44, 49. P N Campbell also attacks Austin’s distinction, on the grounds that he has merely 
asserted rather than demonstrated it, and because it is possible to argue for a reverse priority 
‘A Rhetorical View of Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts’, Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 59:3 (1973) p295-296 – also he points out that Austin’s own use of language does not 
always preclude the parasitic or etiolated use of metaphor, although I strongly disagree when 
he suggests that Austin’s style is “oddly dead” and “dull” because of a deliberate absence of 
personality in the text. 
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somewhat acrimonious exchange with Searle39. In his first essay, Sec, Derrida 
examines Austin’s How to do Things with Words and he characterizes Austin’s 
mode of operating as follows: it  
 
consists in recognizing that the possibility of the negative (in this case, of 
infelicities) is in fact a structural possibility, that failure is an essential risk of the 
operations under consideration; then, in a move which is almost immediately 
simultaneous, in the name of a kind of ideal regulation, it excludes that risk as 
accidental, exterior, one which teaches us nothing about the linguistic 
phenomenon being considered.40  
 
For Derrida, Austin ignores the conventionality of language itself, as opposed 
to just the conventionality of the circumstances of performative speech acts, 
and “does not ponder the consequences issuing from the fact that a possibility 
- a possible risk – is always possible, and is in some sense a necessary 
possibility … What is a success when the possibility of infelicity continues to 
constitute its structure?”41 
 
Derrida concludes that “the opposition success/failure in illocution and in 
perlocution thus seems quite insufficient and extremely secondary. It 
presupposes a general and systematic elaboration of the structure of 
locution”42 which he suggests that Austin puts off “on at least two occasions”. 
These are occasions when Austin identifies various “other ‘unhappy’ features 
of the doing of actions”43, in addition to the “infelicities” which affect 
performative actions specifically.  
 
The first category of ‘unhappy features’ that Austin identifies is of  
 
whole dimensions of unsatisfactoriness to which all actions are subject but which 
are distinct – or distinguishable - from what I have chosen to discuss as infelicities 
… [and which] normally come under the heading of ‘extenuating circumstances’ 
or of ‘factors reducing or abrogating the agent’s responsibility’, and so on.44 
                                                     
39 Which, on Derrida’s part at least, is contained in the book Limited Inc (Evanston IL, 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), which contains three separate essays by Derrida: “Sec”, 
“Limited Inc abc …”, and “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion”, which is a letter 
answering some questions posed by Gerald Graff. It also contains, between “Sec” and 
“Limited Inc abc …” a paraphrase of Searle’s article ‘Reiterating the Differences: A reply to 
Derrida’, Glyph 1 (1977) 198-208, written in response to “Sec”, and to which “Limited Inc abc 
…” is itself a reply. Searle apparently refused permission to reprint the entire article, described 
by Culler as an “egregious misunderstanding” of Derrida in J Culler, ‘Convention and 
Meaning: Derrida and Austin’, New Literary History 13:1 (Autumn 1981) p16. Searle, by 
contrast, thinks that in “Sec”, Derrida “has misunderstood and misstated Austin’s position at 
several crucial points” (‘Reiterating the Differences’ p198), in an argument which is full of 
‘confusions’, and that “Derrida has a distressing penchant for saying things that are obviously 
false” (‘Reiterating the Differences’ p203). 
40 Limited Inc (Sec) p15 
41 Limited Inc (Sec) p15 
42 Limited Inc (Sec) p15 
43 How To p21 
44 How To p21 
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The second involves “language … used not seriously, but in ways parasitic 
upon its normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of 
language.”45 It is this category which is of most interest to Derrida since for 
him “it involves precisely the possibility for every performative utterance … to 
be ‘quoted’.”46 Indeed, Derrida asks  
 
isn’t it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, “non-serious” 
citation … is the determined modification of a general citationality – or rather, a 
general iterability – without which there would not even be a “successful” 
performative? So that – a paradoxical but unavoidable conclusion – a successful 
performative is necessarily an “impure” performative.47 
 
Austin’s third category arises “out of ‘misunderstanding’.”48 This comes into 
play if, for example, a promise is not “heard by someone, perhaps the 
promisee”, or is not “understood … as promising”. Derrida does not mention 
this category, perhaps because Austin himself seems unsure about whether it 
is an example of “infelicity” or not.  
 
Austin ‘puts off’ the exposition of a general linguistic theory for the same 
reason as that which lies behind the exclusion of these three categories from 
the study of ‘ordinary language’. This reason becomes clear when these three 
categories of additional “‘unhappy’ features of the doing of actions”49 are 
considered in the light of Austin’s concept of the “explicit performative”: all of 
them diminish the ability of the speaker to establish and determine the 
meaning of an utterance on his or her own. All of them require an 
acknowledgment of the part played by the audience in the context-based 
creation of the meaning of the speech act, in order to understand how it is that 
an explicit performative50 is felicitous.  
 
                                                     
45 How To p22 
46 Limited Inc (Sec) p16 
47 Limited Inc (Sec) p17. To this point, Searle responds “the answer is a polite but firm “No, it 
isn’t true” (p206) because he believes that there is a distinction between using and mentioning 
(p203 and 206). Searle believes that citation is an example of mentioning a word or phrase, 
rather than using it, as happens in “parasitic discourse” such as acting (p206), where someone 
else’s words are used. This distinction does not however seem clear to me: it seems perfectly 
possible to use a quote for some purpose or other: I wonder whether Searle thinks that the 
distinction between use and mention relates to the distinction between token (specific instance 
of something – something as used for a specific intentional purpose) and type (that of which a 
token is a specific instance – something as mentioned as a ‘neutral’ dictionary reference), a 
distinction which Derrida does not accept: his concept of the iterable argues that all types are 
‘tokenised’: or as Searle sees it, Derrida makes “a simple confusion of iterability with 
permanence” (p201). (All Searle’s quotes come from ‘Reiterating the Differences: A reply to 
Derrida’, Glyph 1 (1977)) 
48 How To p22 
49 How To p21 
50 Such as “get thee to a nunnery” or “Shoot the President” 
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All of these categories of ‘exceptions’ which Austin excludes from 
consideration require that we appreciate that it is the audience which agrees 
and recognizes the existence of what are, in these cases, firstly “extenuating 
circumstances”; secondly various culturally-regularised contexts (ranging 
from ‘ordinary conversation’ to ‘Art’); and thirdly the specific and individual 
existence and shape of each specific speech act in relationship in its specific 
and unique context. The audience needs to recognise the existence, or not, of 
these factors. The need for meaning to be established on the basis of such 
recognition cannot happily co-exist with the assumption, inherent in How To, 
that meaning is brought to the sentence by the speaker.  
 
It is interesting to note that Derrida himself concentrates only on the category 
of “etiolations”, and does not reflect on the other two more obviously 
relational and contextual categories. Had he done so, the active role they all 
together indicate for the audience in respect of the determination of meaning, 
might have affected Derrida’s own stress on the possibility of failure and of the 
‘structural risk’. As it is Derrida, like Austin, remains in some sense captivated 
by the idea of a sender view of meaning, except that since Derrida recognizes 
the impossibility of guaranteeing a ‘sent’ meaning, this leads him close to 
doubting communication itself. 
 
Austin dismisses the various ‘parasitic’ uses of language – and all the other 
categories of potential unhappiness – from his theory, in order to retain an 
element of plausibility for his distinction between explicit and primary or 
primitive performatives. I thus agree with Derrida’s criticism that the 
exclusion of writing from Speech Act theory serves the purpose of allowing 
Speech Act theorists to ignore some of the uncertainty inherent in speech acts, 
and that it is a part of Austin’s assumption about the controlling authority of 
“the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking subject in the totality 
of his speech act”51, which relies for its plausibility on the existence of “an 
exhaustively definable context, of a free consciousness present to the totality of 
the operation, and of absolutely meaningful speech master of itself: the 
teleological jurisdiction of an entire field whose organizing center remains 
intention.”52 
 
Ironically, both Austin and Derrida are aware of the ‘vulnerability’ of 
‘ordinary language’, and the sense in which the link between authorial 
intention and meaning is fragile, but both react to this in very different ways. 
Austin attempts to ‘cordon off’ a kind of ‘safe area’, within which authorial 
                                                     
51 Limited Inc (Sec) p14. 
52 Limited Inc (Sec) p15. Or, as White puts it, in Speech act theory, “the operation of 
intentionality requires a “full” subject as a given, which then fills the forms of language with a 
certain intended meaning”: ‘Introduction: Speech Act theory and Literary Criticism’, Semeia 41: 
Speech Act theory and Biblical Criticism (1988) p 12. 
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intention can be guaranteed in the meaning of an utterance53, while Derrida 
revels in the uncertainty. Derrida makes a virtue of what Austin considers a 
vice54. 
  
Austin’s safe area is inadequate, however. Austin never makes clear why, for 
example, poetry or quoting is not recognisable as a performance of the act of 
quoting or the act of being poetic or artistic. The reciting of poetry is simply 
another sort of performative use of language, recognizable by the audience in 
just the same way as is the use of language to order or threaten; through the 
context in which it is spoken. 
 
In the end, therefore, both Austin’s and Derrida’s arguments here are flawed 
for the same reason: they do not adequately reflect on the contextual and 
conversational element of meaning-creation. Derrida is correct that the 
‘ordinary/literary’ distinction is necessary to preserve the assumption that 
authorial intention equals meaning which is essential to Speech Act theory, 
and that it is inadequately defended. The distinction, if examined solely from 
the author’s point-of-view, will not stand up. 
 
The point that Derrida is making with his “isn’t it true that” question about 
iterability, and which Searle fails to grasp, is that for Austin performatives 
‘work’ on the basis of contextual conventions, but that one cannot be sure in 
advance whether they will ‘work’ or not. When describing the actual meaning 
of utterances, you can’t predict, but only describe after the event, so that the 
successful performative and later the illocution will always be a past-tense 
concept. This is precisely what Dorothea Franck observes: 
 
if we talk about the speech acts which we, the analyzers, mean to be represented 
by the sentence, isn’t there a danger of circularity? If, in our imaginary speech 
situation which surrounds the uttering of the sentence, we imagine exactly those 
conditions as given which define the sort of speech act that we want to get at, then 
the claim is trivial. Or rather, we are not making an empirical, but rather an 
analytical claim.55 
 
                                                     
53 Compare this to Hirsch, who applies the guarantee not through a specific sort of language, 
but in a kind of moral reading posture: we should read like this (and can). 
54 Although, given Austin’s tendency to set up and then knock down his own distinctions, and 
the unfinished nature of How To, it has been argued, by J H Miller for one, that Austin himself 
would have brought his audience to recognise the virtue here given time. J H Miller, Speech 
Acts in Literature (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 2001) 12-13. 
55 D Franck, ‘Speaking about Speech Acts’, Journal of Pragmatics 8 (1984) p88. See also H P 
Grice, who I take to be making the same point when he observes of “Strawson, Searle and Mrs 
Jack” (p351) that their “position hardly seems satisfactory when we see that it involves 
attributing to speakers an intention which is specified in terms of the very notion of meaning 
which is being analyzed (or in terms of a dangerously close relative of that notion). Circularity 
seems to be blatantly abroad”, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press 1989) p352. 
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As I have already noted56, you can have a discussion about the possible 
meanings of a word or, less easily, a phrase – what it has the potential, in the 
right circumstances, to mean – but you can’t predetermine the context 
completely: as Derrida notes, to do so means to imagine a saturated57 or 
“exhaustively definable”58 or “total”59 context, in which we describe what did 
happen, rather than predict what will occur60.  
 
If an ‘illocution’ has been ‘successful’, by which I here mean that both speaker 
and hearers appear to agree on an unremarkable (because agreed) co-incidence 
between intention and meaning such that everyone (more or less, perhaps) 
agrees that the same act has been performed, then in that case we can be 
(relatively, depending on what happens next) sure that the context as it has 
unfolded means that this utterance was recognised as that particular illocution.  
 
However, what we cannot conclude from this ‘success’, is that there was any 
necessary guarantee that this agreement would have been reached, or indeed 
will be sustained. There may be no grounds for doubting it, and it may not 
occur to us or to anyone else that there should be any doubt, but nonetheless, 
just because it did happen like that last time, doesn’t mean that it will do so 
next time, in what might turn out to be a different context: and of course, how 
an act is taken will affect the context we think we are in. 
 
It is not possible to pre-determine the context absolutely before the utterance is 
spoken, as Alston for example admits when he notes that rules don’t need to 
be defined in order to exist61. Only when the utterance is uttered and heard do 
we know for sure what the context is – and depending on what unfolds, we 
may not be ‘sure’ even then. The fluidity of conventions is indeterminate. 
                                                     
56 In chapter one 
57 Limited Inc (Sec) p18. 
58 Limited Inc (Sec) p15. 
59 Limited Inc (Sec) p17. 
60 There is, of course, nothing wrong with description, necessarily. Fish’s Speech Act analysis 
of Coriolanus, for example (‘How to do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech Act Theory and 
Literary Criticism’, MLN 91:5 (October 1976) 983-1025), works well as a description of the 
action of the play. What Fish could not have done, however, is predict beforehand with any 
absolute certainty what would happen in a similar ‘real-life’ situation, nor does he try to. 
Indeed, Fish himself makes exactly this point: his analysis of Coriolanus only works because it 
is a “Speech Act play”: that is, “it is about speech acts”. Therefore, “Coriolanus is a Speech Act 
play in its narrowness ... Consequences ... follow necessarily and predictably; they are not 
contingent and therefore they are not surprising” which almost makes it undramatic (p1024). 
However, for texts with a wider focus, Speech Act analysis “will always be possible, it will 
also be trivial, (a mere list of the occurrence or distribution of kinds of acts)” (p1025). This is at 
the root of the problem I identify with Speech Act biblical analysis in the next chapter: that it 
works well (potentially) as description of a particular reading or context, but is unable to be 
applied beyond specific contextually-determined, ecclesiological  or ‘pneumatic’ situations.  
61
 W P Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 
2000) p262. He notes that terms like ‘rules’ and ‘conventions’ are used sometimes without 
definition. It is true that for concepts like ‘rules’ and ‘conventions’, while we all ‘know what 
we mean’, it may be that we don’t quite all mean the same thing by them! 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Two: Speech Act theory and Literary Criticism 
50 
Alston acknowledges this, and in order to get round the indeterminacy that 
must then pervade meaning, he does what Austin is also forced to do in the 
end, which is to describe illocutions as being determined by speaker-intention, 
in complete variance with Austin’s initial description of speech acts62.  
 
As I have already noted, at the root of much of this lies the ‘sender’ view of 
meaning in which meaning is begotten not created. This is why Austin also 
has to distinguish illocutions and perlocutions63; this distinction only matters if 
you want some determinacy, or security, (or ‘guarantee’) for the meaning of a 
specific category of speech acts, such as those Austin and his successors 
describe as’ illocutions’.  
 
When I here refer to a ‘guarantee’, I mean only what I think Austin means; that 
there is some sense in which an illocution does not depend for its existence on 
the actual reception the utterance actually got64. Austin certainly accepts that 
there will be circumstances in which an illocution does not “come off” – it 
might be partially successful. But the question is what exactly does this mean – 
what exactly is ‘unhappiness’? Has the illocution happened or not? The truth 
is, you can’t be sure in ‘general’ terms, or in advance of that specific situation – 
and this uncertainty pervades every illocution, which is Derrida’s point. You 
don’t know in advance what will constitute ‘success’, but Austin’s 
identification of a category of speech acts called ‘illocutions’, described as 
being distinct from another called ‘perlocutions’, suggests – indeed requires – 
that you can65. 
 
However, Austin’s restriction on the application of speech act theory to 
written texts in general has in any case been widely ignored, not least by those 
who apply it to Biblical texts, and having established that Austin’s and Searle’s 
                                                     
62 See the discussion about intention in chapter four.  
63 As discussed in chapter five of this thesis. 
64 As Recanati puts it: “a Performative utterance is an utterance that, in virtue of its force, 
claims to be self-verifying, that is, claims to have as its effect he bringing about of the state of 
affairs it represents. ... When the state of affairs in question is the current performance, by the 
speaker, of an illocutionary act (i.e. , when the utterance is an explicit performative), the self-
verification is necessarily brought about”: F Recanati, Meaning and Force; the Pragmatics of 
Performative Utterances (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987) p211 
65 One can see the same tendency at work in Vanderveken and Subo when they assert, in their 
Introduction to D Vanderveken and S Kubo (eds.), Essays in Speech Act Theory: Pragmatics and 
Beyond New Series 77 (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002) that “the 
proper task of the theory of conversation is to analyze only the logical and dynamic structure 
of conversations whose type is provided with an internal discursive purpose” p19. To limit the 
class of ‘conversations’ to those that have an internal purpose, is to confuse communication 
and speech (overlapping categories), with the imparting of information, or the achievement of 
goals. These latter are important activities, but one suspects that many, if not the majority, of 
conversations, include far more than simply this, which is an example of a focus on 
‘dictionary’ as opposed to ‘actual’ meaning. This point is demonstrated by A Trognon in his 
essay in the same volume, ‘Speech Acts and the logic of mutual understanding’, pages 121-133. 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Two: Speech Act theory and Literary Criticism 
51 
distinctions are flawed, this thesis will now examine some of the particular 
uses made of Speech Act theory by literary critics. 
 
In defence of their application of Speech Act theory to Biblical hermeneutics, 
Briggs and Vanhoozer both refer to the work done by Susan Snaider Lanser, 
Sandy Petrey, and Mary Louise Pratt in the field of literary criticism66. 
However, this work is not supportive of a defence of authorially-guaranteed 
meaning. The work of Lanser, Petrey, and Pratt does however, demonstrate 
that there is a certain lack of subtlety in the view of texts as illocutionary 
actions that mean solely and simply whatever authors intended to say. This 
will be demonstrated in the following sections, as their work is analysed for 
evidence of an illocutionary text. 
 
2. Mary Louise Pratt’s and Michael Hancher’s use of Speech Act theory in 
Textual hermeneutics: how fixed are illocutions?  
 
Mary Louise Pratt was the first to seek to apply Speech Act theory to texts in a 
systematic way. She argues in her book Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary 
Discourse67 that there is no structural divide between literary and ordinary 
language that would be apparent unless we already knew that something was 
literary: “The concepts of a “poetic language” and hence of a linguistically 
autonomous literature can remain intact as long as the scope of linguistic 
aesthetic investigation is limited to works known to be literature.”68  
 
She uses Speech Act theory to show how important context is to reading and 
thus to identifying literary speech-acts, and she shows how the context of any 
utterance, be it literary or not, determines what it is: “the grammatical surface 
structure of an utterance is not enough”69 to allow us to identify “poeticality”, 
and “the aesthetic organization of prose fiction” cannot be attributed to 
“literariness” but only to  
 
the nature of the speech situation in which the utterance occurs, in which the 
speaker and his audience are engaged. The formal and functional similarities 
between literary and natural narrative can be specified in terms of similarities in 
                                                     
66 Ward refers only to Pratt. 
67 (Bloomington/London, Indiana University Press, 1977). 
68 p22. See also Fish, ‘How ordinary is ordinary language’ op cit: “what characterizes literature 
then is not formal properties, but an attitude – always within our power to assume – toward 
properties that belong by constitutive right to language. … Literature is still a category, but it 
is an open category … definable … by what we decide to put into it” p52. This echoes B 
Vermazen’s description of ‘art’: “’art’ as a term designating products or performances … gets 
applied to whatever resembles already accepted designata of ‘art’ … and both the preferred 
subset and the criterion of resemblance shift from age to age, or within an age from influential 
critic to influential critic” B Vermazen, ‘Aesthetic Satisfaction’ in J Dancy, J M E Moravcsik & C 
C W Taylor (eds.) Human Agency: Language, Duty and Value. Philosophical Essays in Honor of J O 
Urmson (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 1988) p212. 
69 Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse p72 
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the speech situation and their differences identified in terms of differences in that 
situation.70  
 
This allows her to suggest that  
 
speech act theory provides a way of talking about utterances not only in terms of 
their surface grammatical properties but also in terms of the context in which they 
are made, the intentions, attitudes, and expectations of the participants, the 
relationships existing between participants, and generally, the unspoken rules and 
conventions that are understood to be in play when an utterance is made and 
received,71  
 
and which allow us to understand the utterance. However, Pratt doesn’t apply 
this to a consideration of meaning itself as a dialogic property, and she 
underestimates the dialogic nature of literary contexts. Her view of meaning 
retains the assumption that the speaker ‘makes’ the meaning and the audience 
‘receives’ it, as illustrated in the quote above. Nonetheless, I entirely agree 
with her suggestion that “the real lesson speech act theory has to offer is that 
literature is a context, too, not the absence of one”72. 
 
However, as Michael Hancher argues in his review article ‘Beyond a Speech-
Act Theory of Literary Discourse’73, Pratt does not use Speech Act theory very 
rigorously. Hancher accuses Pratt of confusing the constitutive rules that 
create speech acts, with the regulative rules that help us identify genres, so 
that speech act theory is effectively neutered74.  
 
The distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is one coined by 
Searle in Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language75. Searle suggests 
that “regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose 
existence is logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute 
(and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on 
the rules.”76 Constitutive rules, although varying in “centrality”77, are 
foundational of the activity in question, and their definitions may appear 
                                                     
70 Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse p73 
71 Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse p86 
72 Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse p99 
73 Modern Language Notes 92 (1977) 1081-1098 
74 White agrees with Hancher here, suggesting that Pratt “moves from an Austinian/Searlean 
perspective which places heavy emphasis upon the constitutive nature of the speech act 
conventions, to a Gricean perspective which proposes only regulative maxims, without 
making clear the nature of this transition”, : ‘Introduction: Speech Act theory and Literary 
Criticism’, Semeia 41: Speech Act theory and Biblical Criticism (1988) p10. J Margolis suggests that 
Pratt “assimilates to speech-act analysis ... categories that are not in any clear sense kinds of 
speech acts or acts falling under the analyses presented by Austin, Grice or Searle”, and there 
is some substance to this criticism also: J Margolis, ‘Literature and Speech Acts’, Philosophy and 
Literature 3:1 (1979) p49 
75 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969). Hereafter Speech Acts 
76 Speech Acts p34 
77 Speech Acts p34 
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tautological, or of the form “X counts as Y”78, while regulative rules tend to be 
imperative. Searle goes on to suggest that “the semantic structure of a 
language may be regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of 
underlying constitutive rules, and that speech acts are acts characteristically 
performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets of constitutive 
rules.”79 Thus, the conventions that govern the felicity of an illocutionary act 
are constitutive rules.  
 
According to Hancher, however, “Pratt treats them as if they were merely 
regulative. This allows her to associate them with various genre “rules” of 
literature, which by and large are regulative, not constitutive. What she gains 
in breadth she loses in precision, at the point in the theory where it most 
matters.”80 He cites other examples of Pratt’s confusion of regulative literary 
and behavioural rules with constitutive illocutionary rules, and concludes 
“perhaps the constitutive/regulative distinction is not beyond criticism … but 
it needs to be dealt with … not simply ignored.”81 
 
There is some substance to this criticism, but Austin himself is as guilty of this 
confusion as Pratt: there is plenty of confusion in How To between rituals and 
performatives, and between illocutions and gestures, and Austin himself does 
not use the terms constitutive or regulative. Pratt assumes that constitutive 
rules are collective and fluid in a way that Austin sometimes does, and 
sometimes doesn’t. The question is, who decides what is constitutive and what 
regulative, and how much flexibility is there about this?  
 
For Pratt, the answer is that there is considerable flexibility and the context 
decides (because she doesn’t take illocutions or the constitutive/regulative 
distinction terribly seriously). For Hancher, the constitutive rules are more 
impersonal and rigid, as for Austin (sometimes); Hancher does take illocutions 
seriously. Hancher is right to show how open are the conventions that make 
literature, but they are in fact equally open for supposedly closed illocutionary 
speech acts. 
 
Indeed, the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules is not as 
helpful as it might first appear82. Hancher and Searle regard constitutive rules 
as “underlying”83 and Searle notes that “constitutive rules come in systems”84 
as well as having “degrees of centrality”85. This is to begin to approach the 
                                                     
78 Speech Acts p35 
79 Speech Acts p37 
80 Beyond a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse p1085. 
81 Beyond a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse p1087 
82 Wolterstorff suggests that Searle’s concept of institutional rules for speech acts analogous to 
the rules of games is ultimately “illusory”, Divine Discourse op cit p81.  
83 Speech Acts p40 
84 Speech Acts p36 
85 Speech Acts p34 
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central problem, which is that it is not possible to say in advance which 
specific rules are constitutive and which are regulative. There is always the 
possibility that the breach of an apparently ‘constitutive’ rule does not in fact 
destroy the ‘game’ – whether or not it does will depend upon the agreement of 
the players and spectators and those responsible for rule-making, and as ever 
there may well be disagreements. 
 
Searle cites chess as having “underlying rules”, but it is not the rules that make 
chess ‘chess’, but the entire system taken as a whole, which collectively we 
recognise as ‘chess’. It is not possible to say in advance which chess rules could 
be broken without the game becoming something else86. Is “fischerandom 
chess”87 still chess, for example? That which constitutes any game is a series of 
interrelated rules and assumptions, and the point at which the game no longer 
exists is not clear or pre-determinable. The history of cricket, with all its 
various developments and revisions, and its various current manifestations 
from ‘French cricket’ and ‘beach cricket’ to ‘quick cricket’ and through to Test 
matches, is another indication of the fact that the only thing that is constitutive 
is the agreed description.  
 
Searle imagines that constitutive rules are those which are “necessary and 
sufficient” for the felicitous occurrence of an illocution88.  In fact, the existence 
of such rules may be necessary for the adequate description and delineation of 
any ‘game’ or system, but they are not sufficient. It is not possible to 
distinguish the set of variants ‘cricket’ and ‘baseball’ except by the vocabulary 
used to describe them89, which will depend on what we have agreed that we 
are playing. As Austin himself wonders, when did Henry Webb Ellis stop 
being a cheat and become a pioneer: “sometimes he may ‘get away with it’ 
like, in football, the man who first picked up the ball and ran. Getting away 
with things is essential, despite the suspicious terminology.”90 Austin 
continues  
 
much more common, however, will be cases where it is uncertain how far a 
procedure extends – which cases it covers or which varieties it could be made to 
cover. It is inherent in the nature of any procedure that the limits of its 
applicability, and therewith, of course, the ‘precise’ definition of the procedure, 
will remain vague. There will always occur difficult or marginal cases where 
nothing in the previous history of a conventional procedure will decide 
                                                     
86 Although if you specify a context, such as ‘an official championship match’ it might be, 
although here the rules will include, possibly, many things relating to breaks etc, that are not 
included in inter-schools tournaments or exhibition matches. 
87 The version proposed by Bobby Fischer that begins with the pieces set out in random 
positions. 
88 Speech Acts p54 
89 For example ‘backstop’ or ‘wicketkeeper’ 
90 How To p30. it is also noteworthy that this story of the ‘invention’ of rugby is itself of 
dubious historicity. Inter-village “football matches” of some antiquity very often allow all 
sorts of activities that would not be permitted in the Premier League.  
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conclusively whether such a procedure is or is not correctly applied to such a 
case.91 
 
This is a profoundly ‘un-Searlean’ reflection92. It does, however, reflect 
Wittgenstein’s observations on the same topic, which also deconstruct the 
supposed regulative-constitutive distinction93.   
 
Hancher, however, assumes that all constitutive rules have an absolute 
guarantee about them; if they exist and operate, the act will occur – if they do 
not, it won’t94. In the terms suggested by L J Cohen in his article ‘Do 
Illocutionary Forces Exist?’95 they have only a ‘happy’ existence. However, as 
Austin himself noted, “in ordinary life, a certain laxness in procedure is 
permitted – otherwise no university business would ever get done” 96.  
 
Constitutive rules, which in effect create an illocutionary context, are generally 
assumed by Austin’s followers to guarantee authorial control over meaning: in 
practice they do not. They are only reliable ‘up to a point’, and it is not 
necessarily possible to pre-determine when that point will be reached, because 
                                                     
91 How To p31 
92 Although in his later work The Construction of Social Reality (London, Penguin Books, 1996) 
Searle himself comes to realise something similar: writing about the American Founding 
Fathers’ Declaration of Independence, he notes that “they got away with this, that is, they 
created and sustained acceptance of the institutional fact because of local community support 
and military force”: p118-119. 
93 “For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer 
does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But 
that never troubled you before when you used the word “game”.) 
“But then the use of the word is unregulated, the ‘game’ we play with it is unregulated.” – It is 
not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there rules for how high one throws 
the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too,” 
Philosophical Investigations (Phil Inv) I §68 p33, and again “one might say that the concept 
‘game’ is a concept with blurred edges. – “But is a blurred concept a concept at all?” – Is an 
indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an 
indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what we need?” Phil Inv 
I §71 p34. As Mika Lähteenmäki also notes, following Wittgenstein, in ‘On rules and rule-
following: obeying rules blindly’, Language and Communication 23 (2003) 45-61, “rules do not 
exist independently of action and to know a rule amounts to mastering a technique” p55, rules 
are a “praxis” and “are not external to the behaviour nor do they cause the behaviour from 
outside” p56.  
Searle himself almost realises this in his later The Construction of Social Reality (London , 
Penguin Books, 1996) when he notes that “part of being a cocktail party is being thought to be 
a cocktail party; part of being a war is being thought to be a war” (p34). 
94 Here it is worthwhile noting that A Kasher, in ‘Are speech acts conventional’, Journal of 
Pragmatics 8 (1984) 65-69, argues that if speech acts are governed by constitutive rules, and if 
“a convention is a solution of an independently given coordination problem” (p68), then 
speech acts cannot be conventional. 
95 Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?, The Philosophical Quarterly Volume 14 Issue 55 (April 1964) 
pages 118-137. 
96 How To p27 
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this depends on the context and audience, as Wittgenstein notes97. In practice, 
therefore, there can be no strict delineation between rules that constitute and 
those that merely regulate an activity – break enough regulative rules and 
your action might not be recognised – nor is it always possible to decide where 
regulative cultural norms cease and specific constitutive rules take over.  
 
Indeed, the use of the word ‘rule’ at all is misleading, implying something 
demarcated and clear98: in all cases what is in sight are cultural conventions of 
varying importance and opacity, depending on the specific circumstances of 
the culture and the actors involved, and on the realization of the audience 
(which is to some degree unpredictable99). As Searle notes, what is constitutive 
is a “system” rather than a set of rules. Searle’s observation that “it is possible 
that artifacts in general require constitutive rules to be describable”100 is a 
further indication that he is partly aware of the inadequacy of ‘rules’ as an 
image101.  
 
This distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is addressed by Pratt 
in her article ‘The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory’102, where she notes that “the 
regulative/constitutive distinction itself is known to have serious 
weaknesses”103. She argues correctly that  
 
speech act theory implicitly adopts one-to-one speech as the norm or unmarked 
case for language use … Now it is true that private one-to-one interaction does 
characterize certain highly valued, and highly privileged, contexts in this society 
… But we need to be sceptical about this as representing any kind of natural norm. 
Certainly one-to-one speech is not likely to be a quantitative norm, in this society 
or in any other.104 
 
                                                     
97 “How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe 
games to him, and we might add: “This and similar things are called ‘games’”. And do we know 
any more about it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a game 
is? - But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. 
To repeat, we can draw a boundary – for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the 
concept usable? Not at all! (Except for that special purpose.)” Phil Inv I §69 p33. 
98 With, as Derrida would note, policemen and a Judicial system whose authority is recognised 
by the players. 
99 See also the discussion of ‘judgment’ in chapter five of this thesis. See, too, D Føllesdal, 
‘Comments on Stenius’s ‘Mood and Language-game’’, Synthese 17 (1967) p 279: “even Stenius’s 
own simplified games attest to the difference between a game where language is learned and a 
game where language is used, and thereby support our conclusion that, in the language-game 
which consists in using English, the rules for the moods are not constitutive, but preservative” 
which he has defined as rules which can be broken, but not too often: they preserve the 
character of the game rather than constitute it. 
100 Speech Acts p36 footnote 1 
101 Searle’s confusion on this point is also commented on by Alston in his review of Searle’s 
Speech Acts in The Philosophical Quarterly 20:79 (April 1970) 172-179, see p178-9.  
102 Centrum NS 1.1 (1981) 5-18 
103 The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory p11 
104 The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory p7 
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This leads to the suggestion that  
 
once you set aside the notion of speech acts as normally anchored in a unified, 
essential subject, it becomes apparent that people always speak from and in a 
socially constituted position, a position that is, moreover, constantly shifting, and 
defined in a speech situation by the intersection of many different forces… Nor is 
there any guarantee that these positions will be internally consistent or consistent 
with each other.105  
 
Thus Pratt indicates here that the idea of self itself is a complex, socially-
determined one, and that the nature of communication is thus much more 
complex than is generally assumed in Speech Act theory. 
 
Pratt does not, though, use this realization to undermine the concept of the 
illocution to the extent that it deserves, probably because, as already 
suggested, the illocution as a concept is rather irrelevant to her concerns (it is 
not mentioned in this article except under the guise of “illocutionary 
intentions”106 and in a brief discussion of Bach’s and Harnish’s suggestion on 
how to retain the purity of illocutionary acts).  
 
She underestimates the part played by the audience’s realization of acts (which 
includes their realization of the actor’s intentions) when she discusses 
intention107, and when she asserts that “authorship is no more, and no less, 
than another of the many ways a subject realizes itself through speech”. It does 
not occur to her that a subject is realized, rather than responsible for its own 
realization. Nonetheless, she clearly points out that many approaches to 
Speech Act theory neglect at least “three factors: affective relations, power 
relations, and the question of shared goals”108. 
 
Her conclusion is that  
 
what we need is a theory of linguistic representation which acknowledges that 
representative discourse is always engaged in both fitting words to world and 
fitting world to words; that language and linguistic institutions in part construct 
or constitute the world for people in speech communities, rather than merely 
depicting it. We need to think of all representative discourses, fictional or 
nonfictional, as simultaneously world-creating, world-describing, and world-
changing undertakings. …Speech-act theory tends to uncritically reproduce the 
norms of “assertive discourse”, the discourse of truth and falsehood.109 
 
This is a theme that will be picked up subsequently, in the discussion of the 
work of the Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle. The irony is, of 
                                                     
105 The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory p9 
106 The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory p8 
107 The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory p10 
108 The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory p13 
109 The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory p16 
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course, that the idea that language was either true or false was one of the 
principal targets Austin himself had in view in How To.  
 
Returning to Hancher’s criticism of Pratt, he suggests that Searle, by contrast, 
offers “not a theory of fictional discourse, but a theory of discrete fictional 
acts”, and that “Searle leaves open the old-fashioned possibility that the author 
may on occasion be telling the story himself”110.  However, he does not 
identify the means by which Searle recognizes a fictional act: Searle does so, of 
course, on the basis of the author’s intention alone. Searle thus assumes an 
unmediated and rather one-sided relation between author and reader, which 
very much resembles that particular Christian approach to Scripture that sees 
it as God’s unmediated revelation.  
 
Indeed Hancher confuses himself: he suggests that Searle and Pratt provide 
“two competing speech act models for fictional discourse”111. However, 
Hancher has already noted that Searle denies the unity of the fictional act in 
favour of “a patchwork of fictional and non-fictional utterances”112. Searle then 
does not provide a model for fictional discourse; rather he fillets fiction to 
identify the discrete acts of an unmediated author. Searle breaks up the idea of 
a fictional utterance and identifies fiction as an intentional pretence between 
serious episodes, parasitic on normal illocutionary conventions.  
 
Pratt, then, is correct to assume that what constitutes an ‘illocution’ or a genre, 
is in either case our recognition of it as its audience, rather than simply the 
presence or absence of definitive rules. However, she does not argue this case 
explicitly. Hancher is correct that Pratt does not address this issue, but Pratt’s 
implicit ‘take’ on it as suggested by her practice, is closer to the truth of the 
matter than Hancher’s defence of the illocution, and its constitution by 
“necessary and sufficient conditions”113. Nonetheless, it is the case that Pratt 
does not show how a text might be illocutionary, or try and interpret an 
illocution in textual terms, and only mentions perlocutions glancingly114.  
 
This is an indication of the fact that the categories of illocution, perlocution et 
al are, aside from their plausibility or not as linguistic categories, useless in 
                                                     
110 Beyond a Speech-Act Theory of Literary Discourse p1094 
111 Beyond a Speech-Act Theory of Literary Discourse p1095 
112 Beyond a Speech-Act Theory of Literary Discourse p1094 
113 Hancher quoting Searle, see for example ‘Beyond a Speech-Act Theory of Literary 
Discourse’ p1085, 1087. 
114 Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse page 81 and in footnote 15 on page 150 
where she remarks that “a description of display texts, and indeed a basic typology of 
assertions may have to wait for a theory of perlocutions. Jerry Sadock’s hypothesis (Sadock, 
1974) that all speech acts are perlocutions and that illocutions are only one subset of 
perlocutions seems to suggest a possible way out for the display text.” – the quote actually 
from p151. 
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literary criticism, and inapplicable to texts; something that Pratt does not 
explicitly acknowledge115. 
 
3. Richard Ohmann’s use of Speech Act theory in Textual hermeneutics.  
 
Unlike Pratt, Richard Ohmann asserts, in ‘Speech Acts and the Definition of 
Literature’116, that “all three kinds of acts may be performed in and through 
writing. The nature of the locutionary act is thereby altered in obvious ways, 
the illocutionary act is more or less attenuated, and the perlocutionary act is 
more or less delayed.”117 He explicitly sets out to look for an illocutionary 
theory of literature. However, he identifies performatives as one class of 
illocutions118, and this seems to be rather questionable, as is the suggestion that 
stating is an illocutionary act but not a performative. He is unable to come up 
with an example of several of Austin’s “criteria for the “felicity” (successful 
functioning) of one class of illocutionary act”119, and thus he concludes that 
literature cannot be a real illocution120.  
 
Thus, he misses the importance of his own observation that “a reader who 
rejected the speech act because of them [his avowedly irrelevant suggestions 
for inappropriate circumstances] would demonstrate thereby that he had 
mistaken the poem for something else”121. The question is ‘what sort of 
statement or performance, if any, is a literary work?’ not simply ‘what sorts of 
statements does a literary work contain?’122 Ohmann here makes the same 
mistake as Hancher and Searle: they are not considering “speech act models 
for fictional discourse”123 but only ‘speech act models within a context already 
identified as a work of fictional discourse’124.  
                                                     
115 As Mary Hesse notes: “in all serious natural language texts, and pre-eminently in Scripture, 
metaphor and the other tropes are pervasive. No theory of interpretation that neglects them 
can be adequate for biblical hermeneutics”: ‘How to Be a Postmodernist and Remain a 
Christian’, in  C Bartholomew, C Greene and K Möller (eds.), After Pentecost: Language and 
Biblical Interpretation. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2 (Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 2001) p93 
116 Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature, Philosophy and Rhetoric 4, 1971 p1-19. 
117 Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature, p10. 
118 Ibid p11 
119 p10-11: these being the existence of ‘inappropriate circumstances’ or of ‘persons affecting 
the making of a statement’ within a literary work 
120 A view he repeats in ‘Speech, Literature and the Space between’, New Literary History 4 
(1972) p53: “literary works are discourses with the usual illocutionary rules suspended”. 
121 ‘Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature’ op cit p12 
122 A point also made by Joseph Margolis in his ‘Literature and Speech Acts’, Philosophy and 
Literature 3:1 (1979) p47, when he discusses Ohmann. 
123 Hancher, ‘Beyond a Speech-Act Theory of Literary Discourse’ p1095. 
124 See also Fish’s dissolution of this binary opposition in ‘How ordinary is ordinary language’ 
op cit. Ohmann’s article ‘Literature as Act’ in S Chatman (ed.) Approaches to Poetics (New York, 
New York, Columbia University Press, 1973) 81-108, is another instance of this – he analyses 
various individual speech acts from various plays, but does not analyse the plays themselves 
as actions. J H Miller notes (in Speech Acts in Literature (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 
2001)) that “the phrase “speech acts in literature” has at least three possible and by no means 
necessarily compatible meanings” which he identifies as being “speech acts that are uttered 
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Moreover, they all presume a sender-based view of speech acts: Ohmann, for 
example, states that a burnt poem is still a poem, a view I would challenge on 
the same basis as the opposition to the possible existence of a ‘private 
language’. For a language to exist, it must be possible to communicate in it: 
part of the definition of a language is ‘something capable of being understood 
by more than one person’125. Likewise, part of the definition of a poem 
involves its being able to be read.  
 
Ohmann himself appears to draw this conclusion in his later article ‘Literature 
as Act’126, when he asserts that “the reader builds on his tacit knowledge of the 
conventions – past and present, actual and possible – for illocutionary acts, 
and what he builds is an image of the world implied by the acts that constitute 
the work”127: the reader ‘builds-up’ the work on the basis of the writers 
‘pretended-illocutions’, and this would clearly not be possible if a poem had 
been burnt and no copies remained128. 
 
This view would certainly seem to contradict that of his earlier article, in 
which he suggests that “no misunderstanding will alter the status of the poem 
as speech-act”129, which is surely incorrect: unless someone recognizes that 
‘the poem’ is an act, it cannot be said to exist. There may, of course, be 
disagreement, so that someone recognizes ‘it’ as a poem, while the majority 
assert that it is not a poem but a lyric, or a piece of prose: this kind of 
                                                                                                                                                         
within literary works”, “a possible performative dimension of a literary work taken as a 
whole” (p1), and a sense of speech acts in “disguise” (p2). 
125 “Any system we call a “language” is a system for use … it is a language only in being used 
to communicate (or having been so used, or being designed for such use)”: J R Cameron, 
‘Sentence-Meaning and Speech Acts’. The Philosophical Quarterly 20:79 (April 1970) 97-98. There 
may be languages which only one person currently understands, but for them to be 
‘languages’, they must be in principle learnable by others – Tolkien’s Elvish languages, or 
Klingon, come into this category: when Tolkien began to invent Quenya and Sindarin, they 
were not ‘languages’, but as he developed them, and as Klingon was developed beyond its 
initial appearances in Star Trek, they acquired linguistic status and shareable structures, and it 
is now possible to communicate in them. In the same way, ‘dead’ or ‘dying’ languages in 
Alaska or Papua New Guinea or elsewhere with no remaining speakers or only one ‘native 
speaker’ have sustained communication, and could do so again in principle. However, unless 
they are or have been demonstrably capable of sustaining communication, they are 
indistinguishable from gobbledegook, no matter what their ‘creator’ might allege (although 
these boundaries have a fluidity over time). Thus, the current consensus on the Voynich 
manuscript, for example, is that it is not language but gobbledegook, but this of course will 
change if it is deciphered, or appears to be potentially decipherable! 
126 ‘Literature as Act’ in S Chatman (ed.) Approaches to Poetics (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1973) 
127 ‘Literature as Act’ p99. 
128 At best we might have ‘the memory of a poem’, and memory is by no means the same thing 
as what one might call ‘the agreed past that really happened’ (a possible, if question-begging, 
definition of history). Memory is rather – using the same lines of thought – ‘the narrative I am 
currently telling myself about where I have been and thus who I am’. 
129 ‘Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature’, op cit p12.  
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‘misunderstanding’ will alter the kind of act that ‘it’ is recognized as being. But 
a speech act is only an act if it is recognized as such, though the recognition 
need not be unanimous or in agreement as to kind130. This is a characteristic of 
all acts. ‘Misunderstanding’ is indeed only possible in a conversational or 
dialogic setting: if the poem has already been understood as a poem or at the 
least as an act. Otherwise, it will not be ‘misunderstood’; it will simply be 
unrealized, and will be unimaginable131. 
 
Ohmann does not adequately demonstrate that literary works cannot be 
speech acts; he merely shows that the decision as to the kind of speech acts 
they are is not simply sender-based132. It is not adequate to conclude, as 
Ohmann does, that “a literary work is a discourse whose sentences lack the 
illocutionary forces that would normally attach to them”133 because the whole 
point about the categories “normal” and “literary” is that they are not binary 
opposites, as Derrida or Fish demonstrate. Indeed, as Ohmann subsequently 
notes himself “it is the whole context of the whole discourse that establishes its 
literary status”134, reflecting Austin’s interest in the ‘total speech act in the total 
speech situation’. The flaw here then lies not in ‘literature’ but in the 
illocutionary category. 
 
Ohmann, too, seems confused when he suggests that  
 
a written literary work preserves in its words a record of purported speech acts. 
They are frozen in its text, to be brought alive whenever a reader reenacts them as 
a participant. … the stage of a literary work is the reader’s mind, and … I would 
                                                     
130 In this context I recall being the subject, together with my Lower Sixth classmates, of an 
experiment conducted by the Upper Sixth and our English Teacher. We were asked to 
comment upon a series of poems, which we duly did, as I remember it quite happily and 
without any sense of something odd – we were then told that in fact they were not poems, but 
song lyrics – something of which we (or certainly I), had been unaware. The 
‘misunderstanding’ of Gulliver’s Travels as a children’s book is another example of this, as is 
the episode Fish recounts in ‘How to Recognize a Poem When You See One’: this essay occurs 
in his book Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, S Fish, 
(Harvard University Press, 1990) discussed in Robert Scholes’s review ‘Who Cares about the 
Text’, NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 17:2 (Winter 1984) 171-180. 
131 Anything we can imagine as a poem, or as a speech act, has by definition been recognized 
as such – we can’t truly imagine the unrecognized, only that which is only partially 
recognized. This subject is discussed further in chapter four. 
132 It is also not entirely clear what he means when, in ‘Literature as Act’ op cit, he suggests 
that “we assume felicity and infer a speaker and a fictional world from the circumstances that 
felicity requires. Needless to add, we may drop the hypothesis of felicity at any time, given 
conflicts within the world or between the work and what we know of the world” (p100). Quite 
what the status of a narrator in a prose work might be is entirely unclear - who, for example, is 
‘speaking’ at the beginning of Pride and Prejudice? Nor is it clear what happens if we drop the 
felicitous hypothesis – do we construct another, and if so, on what basis? 
133 ‘Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature’, op cit p14 
134 ‘Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature’, op cit p15 
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add that the action on the stage is illocutionary. Like illocutionary action outside 
literature, it is inescapably ethical.135  
 
Not only does this subsume all literature into the category of drama, but it is 
not clear how the reader can participate in an illocutionary act inside their own 
mind.  
 
None of Ohmann’s many examples are taken from a novel: they are all poems 
or plays. He seems to be adopting a secular version of the stance Donald Evans 
adopts: that of the reader-as-actor. Indeed, Ohmann comes quite close to 
adopting a kind of Reader-response theory of literature based on the reader’s 
own political engagement with the text136, which would seem to classify 
literature as perlocutionary, in Austinian terms. 
 
I agree entirely with Ohmann’s conclusions that the status of a literary work 
can change: literary status is not a given. I also agree that reading is a social 
action. However, the reason that, in ‘Speech Acts and Literature’, Ohmann 
cannot distinguish “jokes, ironic rejoinders, parables and fables within political 
speeches, some advertisements, and many other such” from literature, any 
more than could Austin, is because Ohmann, like Austin, remains attached to 
the idea that the meaning of a speech act is sender-determined137.  
 
Even in the later ‘Literature as Act’, which recognizes the role of the reader, 
Ohmann is unwilling to extend this realisation to include the effect of context 
on meaning: the reader is an individual phenomenon, and Ohmann remains 
committed to the view of Literature as an entity which contains acts, rather 
than being itself a contextually-created social act: “Literature is made of acts. 
Literature is political, for writers and readers.”138 How this belief co-exists with 
Ohmann’s belief that literature contains even “pretended” illocutionary acts is 
entirely opaque, which renders ineffective his whole enterprise, the ultimate 
purpose of which also remains uncertain.  
 
4. Susan Snaider Lanser’s use of Speech Act theory in Textual hermeneutics.  
 
Susan Snaider Lanser argues in The Narrative Act: Point of View in Prose 
Fiction139 that there is a place in literary criticism for “a historical creator”140 but 
she is clear that the meaning of the text is produced relationally. For her, 
Speech Act theory is useful because  
 
by situating literary communication within a speech act framework, a concept of 
the text as message/object gives way to a more dynamic and fruitful notion of the 
                                                     
135 ‘Literature as Act’ op cit p101 
136 ‘Literature as Act’ p102-104 
137 He refers to “bizarre side-effects”: ‘Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature’, op cit p15 
138 ‘Literature as Act’ p107 
139 Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981 
140 The Narrative Act p49 
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text as a specific kind of communicative and aesthetic act. Structural analysis then 
becomes not a matter of extracting the “message” or one of its formal elements out 
of the system and analysing it in a use-free vacuum, but of encountering the 
speech act which the text makes possible. Without making simplistic equations 
between the mechanisms of literary production and the structuring of fictional 
discourse, we can use speech act theory to open for analysis a network of 
interrelated levels of communication which produce, and are produced by, the 
fictional narrative.141  
 
It is highly significant though that she here uses the term ‘speech act’, as do 
Pratt and Sandy Petrey, rather than anything more specific. Lanser is thus 
susceptible to the criticism that she elides performatives with illocutions, in a 
similar manner to that which Hancher identifies in Pratt. Lanser is also in 
agreement with Pratt and others that ordinary language is not intrinsically 
distinguishable from literary language142. For her, Speech Act theory is useful 
because “it defines meaning not as an abstraction but in terms of use”143.  
 
Lanser uses the concepts of the illocution, locution and perlocution more than 
Pratt, accepting Austin’s distinction between illocutions and perlocutions 
based on the conventionality of illocutions: “the illocutionary force of an 
utterance is produced according to the conventions for both the specific act 
and the total speech activity”144, although not without a certain degree of 
confusion: “I cannot, however, guarantee that the conventional perlocutionary 
effect will occur; all I can do is behave (speak) in ways conventionally designed 
to elicit the particular effect.”145  
 
However, she seems to imply that the meaning of all language is based on 
illocutionary conventions: she avoids confusing regulative and constitutive 
rules but asserts both that “the meaning of a given utterance is a function of its 
production according to certain conventions (rules) applied under particular 
conditions”146 (but are rules and conventions synonymous?) and that 
“linguistic rules encompass both constitutive and regulative rules.”147 She 
seeks to distinguish the perlocutionary effect of speech from the illocutionary 
action of speaking and suggests that   
 
effects upon others, as I said earlier, reside in the receivers rather than with the 
speaker of an utterance; thus perlocutionary effects are never guaranteed by the 
mere fact that an illocutionary act is being correctly performed… Perlocutionary 
effects, while conventionally associated with certain illocutionary activities, 
                                                     
141 The Narrative Act p62. 
142 “the distinction between “literary” and “ordinary” language which poeticians have tended 
to assume is not supported by linguistic research … there is nothing inherent in the surface of 
the linguistic construct to indicate whether or not it is literary, or even, frequently, whether or 
not it is fictional” The Narrative Act p64-65. 
143 The Narrative Act p68 
144 The Narrative Act p73 
145 The Narrative Act p72 
146 The Narrative Act p69 
147 The Narrative Act Footnote 17 p72, quote occurring on p73. 
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depend not only on the illocutionary and propositional content of a message and 
its surface form, but on the hearer’s knowledge, values, emotions, etcetera, as 
these interact with respect to the given utterance, its speaker and the specific 
speech context.148 
  
There is something here reminiscent of Yueguo Gu’s suggestion in his thesis149 
that perlocutions are not proper acts at all because of their dependence on 
reception. Thus while I agree with Lanser that  
 
where speech act theory has been inadequate for describing the fictional text, the 
problem lies not with fiction but with speech act theory itself; any theory of 
language use must encompass all conventional uses of language; as Mary Louise 
Pratt points out, a great deal of human discourse is indeed fictional or 
hypothetical discourse,150  
 
she does not in fact apply this insight rigorously enough as a critique of the 
conventionality of Speech Act theory.   
 
I also agree that “the verbal act, in other words, implies not only a sender, 
receiver, and message, but some potential for successful speech activity which 
depends for its realization on the sender’s authority and the receiver’s 
validation of this authority”151, and that “like all speech acts, the novel-writing 
act presumes a specific kind of authority and is highly determined by the 
author-audience dynamics surrounding its production.”152 However, the 
element of dialogue and meaning-creation is stronger than Lanser realizes, as 
is made clear when she discusses “stance”, defined as “the speaker’s 
relationship to the message s/he is uttering”153.  
 
She suggests that “stance co-determines the emotional and ideological 
response the audience will take from, and bring to, the discourse. In this way 
stance not only signifies meaning but also powerfully determines it: a given 
stance and its phraseological form can affect the very substance of what is 
said.”154 I do not disagree, except to note that it is not the case, as Lanser 
implies, that the speaker’s stance is something they convey in an ‘illocutionary’ 
or guaranteed sense. It needs to be recognised as a part of the recognition of 
the act, and the audience will recognize what they recognize, not necessarily 
what the speaker wants consciously – there may, too, be disagreement. 
 
                                                     
148 The Narrative Act p73 
149 Towards a Model of Conversational Rhetoric: An Investigation of the Perlocutionary Phenomenon in 
Conversation. Unpublished Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD, Department of Linguistics 
and Modern English Language, University of Lancaster November 1987 - discussed in Chapter 
five of this thesis. 
150 The Narrative Act Footnote 19 p74 
151 The Narrative Act p82 
152 The Narrative Act p84 
153 The Narrative Act p92 
154 The Narrative Act p93 
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5. Sandy Petrey’s use of Speech Act theory in Textual hermeneutics.  
 
Sandy Petrey, in his Speech Acts and Literary Theory155, is very interesting on the 
nature of texts, but entirely ignores the Speech Act distinction between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, concentrating solely on that between 
locutions and illocutions. He uses the terms performative and illocution as 
though the former were simply a class with illocutionary force, or even 
synonymous with each other156, and defines illocutions in a slightly 
idiosyncratic way, suggesting that “illocutionary force is a combination of 
language and social practice” and hence that Speech Act theory “must always 
move beyond the formal analyses practiced by other linguistic schools”.  
 
He thus concludes that  
 
twentieth century linguistics has been largely characterized by concentration on 
the initial features that allow language to convey a meaning. Austin shifts 
attention to the things language does other than convey a meaning. As a formal 
locution, language stands apart from society; it becomes a pragmatic illocution 
within society. Illocutionary identity consists solely of language’s function within 
the conventional interactions that characterize a given sociohistorical group.157  
 
He identifies language as having two somewhat separate identities: a 
grammatical system having meaning (locutionary), and a practice having force 
(illocutionary): “speech versus acts, saying versus doing, meaning versus 
performing, structure versus practice, locution versus illocution: every pair 
opposes language in itself to language in context, for context alone determines 
the conventional effects produced by an utterance governed by Rule A.1”158.  
 
The neatness of the binary oppositions alone ought to be enough to raise 
suspicions. Moreover, the suggestion that ‘context alone determines’ force is 
contradicted by his suggestion that “you were indeed warned” even if you 
ignored the warning, or that  
 
when the generalissimo felicitously suspends the constitution, it’s suspended even 
if a perlocutionary uprising hangs the generalissimo. Although perlocutionary 
events can ignore or undo as well as affirm the things done by words, the words’ 
illocutionary status is unaffected, if the convention is observed when the words 
are spoken.159 
 
This is a clear restatement of the idea160 of a distinction between 
force/illocutionary meaning, that requires no understanding, and something 
                                                     
155 Speech Acts and Literary Theory (New York, Routledge, 1990) 
156 for example Speech Acts p25: “the fact made obvious by the performative, that the 
illocutionary force borne by words is always also a relationship lived by people …” 
157 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p13 
158 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p14 
159 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p16 
160 that will be discussed in detail in chapter five of this thesis 
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else (here perlocutionary meaning) which does require understanding. Despite 
what Petrey asserts about illocutions being pragmatic, they are here revealed 
as being, for him, absolutely systematic (or semantic). The possibility that the 
reception of an act helps create the context itself, is missing from his analysis. 
 
It does though lie somewhere behind Petrey’s sweeping but essentially 
accurate dismissal of Austin’s attempt to separate literature and conventional 
speech161, and it is also present in Petrey’s criticism of John Searle. Searle, he 
suggests, ignores the act of reading, and concentrates solely on the act of 
writing:  
 
in Austinian speech act theory, illocutionary force is the work of a community. 
Searle restricts it to an individual, the single person whose illocutionary intentions 
are all by themselves able to suspend the illocutionary conventions that govern 
linguistic performance for the rest of the world. His essay on literature is therefore 
consonant with Searle’s general deemphasis of the collective character of 
illocution; his approach to fiction purposely and purposefully ignores fiction’s 
circulation within a community.162 
 
I agree entirely with this, at least in respect of Searle, but suggest that it fatally 
undermines the idea of the guaranteed illocution. But Petrey’s description of 
Searle: that he “makes authorial purpose the sole determining factor in 
identifying fiction: only pretending counts, and the author alone can make 
himself or herself pretend”163 could equally well apply to Kevin Vanhoozer’s 
and Timothy Ward’s elevation of the author as sole authority. Indeed, Petrey 
goes on to criticise Pratt for paying insufficient attention to the “crucial idea 
that the social formation defining illocution is not the speaker’s but the 
audience’s. In speech, the operative communities are usually the same. In non-
literary as well as literary writing, they can be wholly distinct”164. 
 
Petrey suggests that “an aesthetic performative produced by the message 
rather than the author foregrounds the fact that the forces making literary 
words do things for readers must be part of the reading, not the writing, 
experience”165, and that “textual illocution cannot be a serious category if 
illocutionary force depends on authorial intention”166: it must instead be the 
case that “textual illocutions” are conventional not intentional.  
 
Thus Petrey is absolutely correct to assert that “speech acts count as what a 
collectivity determines, and their only constitutive rules are those Austin 
labelled A and B. Rules about individual intention and behaviour are at most 
                                                     
161 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p52 
162 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p68 
163 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p67 
164 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p78 
165 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p81 
166 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p82 
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regulative”167. However he does not recognize that Austin himself is confused 
about this question, as Derrida has shown, nor that this has implications for 
the guaranteeability of illocutions, and thus for the distinction between them 
and perlocutions, and for the ‘difference’ between meaning and force168. Petrey 
does not recognize the apparent conventionality of perlocutionary results, and 
does not attempt to distinguish them from illocutionary consequences169. 
Moreover, it is quite true to state that “representation, far from restricted to 
literature, is essential to everyday life”170, but this has no necessary bearing on 
illocutionarity, and is profoundly un-Austinian, for reasons Petrey does not 
explore. 
 
Petrey is furthermore an uncomfortable bedfellow for those, like Ward or 
Vanhoozer, who seek to use a Speech Act hermeneutics to restore a degree of 
authorial authority over meaning: 
 
speech-act analysis stands opposed to every vision of the text as an object, as a 
given and permanent entity that is what it’s always been and will always remain 
so. Considered as acts, literary and non-literary utterances alike change in 
conjunction with the conventions they invoke and by which they are assessed. The 
concept of the text as static, autonomous, and determinate is radically 
incompatible with the Austinian vision of language as an interactive constituent of 
collective existence in history.171 
 
Austin himself might not be comfortable with this either. As becomes clear 
when he discusses Derrida and his criticisms of Austin, Petrey has effectively 
abandoned the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction172 and the illocutionary 
guarantee as it exists in Austin, and has turned the illocution into a kind of 
perlocution. 
 
6. The use of Speech Act theory in Textual hermeneutics: Conclusion 
 
This excursion into the use of Speech Act theory in literary criticism, then, does 
not support the suggestion that texts are ‘illocutionary’ in an Austinian sense, 
or that Speech Act theory as a philosophy proposing an illocutionary category 
of language-use is applicable to texts. Pratt, Lanser and Petrey are all 
interesting on the contextuality of texts, and on the interrelationship between 
readers and texts, positions Speech Act theory has been helpful to them in 
reaching. However, they do not adequately show how an illocution in the 
sense in which such a thing is described by Austin, can exist textually.  
 
                                                     
167 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p84 
168 There isn’t one! 
169 for example Speech Acts and Literary Theory p91 
170 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p114 
171 Speech Acts and Literary Theory p131 
172 His chapter 8 is titled “Locution, Illocution and Deconstruction” 
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All of them tend to oversimplify Austin’s description of illocutions and 
perlocutions in How To, and they tend to ignore perlocutions. All of them also, 
to a greater or lesser degree, ignore one particular element of the illocutionary-
perlocutionary distinction as expressed by Austin; the sense in which 
conventions guarantee illocutions but not perlocutions. As such, they tend 
generally to confuse illocutions and perlocutions (for the perfectly good reason 
that they are indistinguishable – a fact Pratt, Lanser and Petrey do not, 
however, acknowledge173).  
 
Thus while their work does illustrate that the idea that language use operates 
through ‘conventions’ involving the speaker/author and the hearers/readers 
is fruitful, and provides interesting insights into literary theory, it never 
manages to demonstrate successfully that “speech act theory can apply to 
texts”174. This is at least the case if Speech Act theory includes a belief in the 
existence of Austin-defined illocutions and perlocutions, and the concomitant 
assumption that meaning is begotten not created. Indeed, if illocutions and 
perlocutions along the lines described by Austin are assumed to exist, Pratt, 
Petrey and Lanser all come close to demonstrating something with which 
Austin himself might possibly have agreed: that literature is a perlocutionary 
action, not an illocutionary one. 
 
Thus, this detailed exploration of the work of Pratt, Lanser and Petrey has 
demonstrated at least that Speech Act theory cannot be applied to texts 
without a clear illustration of how textual illocutions might be supposed to 
work, or a clear re-fashioning of Speech Act theory that redefines the illocution 
to fit it into the reading contexts, and evade the strictures of Austin and Searle. 
Fish’s assertion, written before Pratt, Petrey or Lanser had published their 
texts, that 
 
speech Act theory has been sacrificed to the desire of the literary critic for a 
system more firmly grounded than any afforded him by his own discipline. 
The career of this desire always unfolds in two stages: (1) the system or theory 
is emptied of its content so that the distinctions it is able to make are lost or 
blurred, and (2) what remains, a terminology and an empty framework, is 
made into a metaphor,175  
 
seems prescient, if a trifle negative. It cannot then be appropriate to cite Pratt, 
Petrey or Lanser as evidence that Speech Act theory can be applied to texts 
such as the Bible, at least without additional hermeneutical work.  
 
This chapter has, then, highlighted two significant problems in using Speech 
Act theory as a textual hermeneutic, let alone a Biblical one. The first problem 
is that Austin’s initial exclusion of all except signed texts from his theory is 
                                                     
173 This distinction is explored in more detail in succeeding chapters. 
174 R S Briggs: Words in Action op cit p86.  
175 ‘How to do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism’, MLN 
91:5 (October 1976) p1002. 
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more fundamental than is realized by Pratt, Petrey or Lanser, and is an 
indication of a deep seated flaw that Derrida uncovers. The second problem is 
that although Austin’s exclusion of so many types of language use is self-
serving, this suggests not that texts can be illocutionary, but rather the reverse: 
texts suggest that there is no such thing as an illocution.  
 
There may be no reason in principle why we should not regard texts as 
performative, but there seem to be a number of reasons for doubting that they 
could be illocutionary. This, however, has not stopped hermeneuts using 
Speech Act theory and talking about illocutions in their biblical exegesis. Some 
of these works will be examined in the next chapter, beginning with an 
examination of the relevant work of Donald Evans and Anthony Thiselton, the 
scholars who began the introduction of Speech Act theory into Biblical 
hermeneutics.  
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CHAPTER THREE: SPEECH ACT THEORY AND BIBLICAL 
EXEGESIS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter of this thesis, I discussed the application of Speech 
Act theory in literary criticism, and concluded that the work of Pratt, Petrey 
and Lanser in fact crucially undermines the idea that the illocution has a place 
in textual hermeneutics. The literary critics have revised Speech Act theory as 
Austin and especially Searle imagine it. In so doing, they have without 
generally realising it, greatly undermined Speech Act theory’s distinctiveness, 
and effectively removed the idea of the illocution. 
 
This might not matter, if biblical hermeneuts are only seeking to use Speech 
Act theory in similar ways to those of the literary critics; that is to say, without 
bothering unduly about things like illocutions as such, and concentrating 
more on the simpler idea that language is performative1. Work would still 
need to be done on how written texts ‘perform’2, and on the relation between 
the whole text and individual phrases within it.  
 
However, in at least some cases, the idea of the illocution is the particular 
concept that is most valuable to Biblical hermeneuts, because of the 
implication that in the illocution there exists a speech act in which the 
meaning does not require active understanding to be effective, and thus in 
some senses sidetracks the reading context. This is what makes Speech Act 
theory so attractive as a Biblical hermeneutic that will defend a traditional 
idea of revelation against the ‘death of the author’.  
 
This chapter examines some of the ways in which Speech Act theory has been 
used as a biblical hermeneutic, to see whether such attempts have been any 
more successful than those of the literary critics at evading Stanley Fish’s 
gloomy prediction of vacuity and metaphoricity3.  
 
2. Donald Evans’s use of Speech Act theory in Biblical Exegesis 
 
The use of Speech Act theory in Biblical and indeed textual hermeneutics was 
initiated, as I have already noted, by Donald Evans, in his book The Logic of 
                                                     
1 Or, as Möller puts it, “Speech-act theory contributes to the discussion by drawing our 
attention to the sociolinguistic dimension of language”: K Möller, ‘Words of (In-)evitable 
Certitude? Reflections on the Interpretation of Prophetic Oracles of Judgement’, in  C 
Bartholomew, C Greene and K Möller (eds.), After Pentecost: Language and Biblical 
Interpretation. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2 (Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 2001) 377 
2 Or, if you prefer, on how written utterances are ‘performed’ 
3 Quoted at the end of the previous chapter 
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Self-involvement 4. He suggests that Austin’s identification of illocutionary, 
perlocutionary and locutionary speech acts has an application to Biblical 
hermeneutics. However, Evans also initiates the tendency to subvert and elide 
any difference between speaking and reading, by omitting any detailed study 
of ‘textuality’, and whether or not there might be any differences between a 
verbal and written illocution.  
 
He does not adequately consider how to apply a theory about the act of 
speaking, to something (reading a written text) which certainly appears to be 
a different sort of action. Indeed, at the very beginning of his book, as he 
begins to give an outline of Austin’s ‘performative theory’, Evans notes that “I 
shall restrict my analysis to spoken rather than written language, but this is 
merely a matter of convenience”5, an assertion requiring a defence he does 
not provide6. 
 
Rather than using Austin’s terminology of locutions, illocutions and 
perlocutions, Evans suggests his own. He is interested principally in the idea 
of “the performative force of language”7 and suggests that some 
performatives have implications which are “‘Indefeasible’; it makes no sense 
to disclaim what is implied”8. He is only able to make this assertion, however, 
because he has already ruled out any possible ‘contamination’. Evans has 
already stated that his examples are being spoken “in any standard* 
context”9. He does not exhaustively define this, but suggests in his footnote, 
with echoes of Austin; “that is, I am not acting in a play, testing a microphone, 
mimicking, etc.; and I am not speaking in an ironical tone of voice, giving the 
word ‘commend’ a meaning which contrasts with its ordinary, non-ironical 
meaning. In all subsequent analysis we shall ignore both sorts of exception.”10 
 
Thus he makes it clear that he is only considering the standard, ordinary, non-
ironic meaning, which he imagines as being in accordance with what Derrida 
                                                     
4 London, SCM Press Ltd, 1963. 
5 The Logic of Self-Involvement p28 footnote 1 
6 This is in fact a fairly common assumption among those using the idea of the illocution: see 
for example W P Alston, who notes “I follow current practice in using terms for speech in a 
broadened sense to cover any employment of language. Thus ‘utterance’ is to be taken to 
range over the production of any linguistic token, whether by speech, writing, or other 
means. And ‘speaker of a language’ is to be understood as ‘user of a language’”: Illocutionary 
Acts and Sentence Meaning (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 2000) footnote 1 p11, and 
again, in a discussion of Austin’s phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts, “obviously, I can produce a 
sentence by writing rather than by making noise. But there too I will have done something on 
the same semantic level as making noises, viz., making marks. To avoid intolerable 
circumlocutions I will restrict myself to oral speech, leaving it to the reader to make the 
application to other modes of linguistic behaviour”, footnote 5 p18.  
7 The title of his first chapter 
8 The Logic of Self-Involvement p47 
9 The Logic of Self-Involvement p46. I have added in the * to denote Evans’s footnote discussed 
immediately below. 
10 The Logic of Self-Involvement p46 footnote 2 
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would describe as a ‘saturated context’11. Evans does not attempt to define 
this context exactly: presumably because he is aware that it is impossible to do 
so without remainder. 
 
Evans thus assumes that meaning is the property of the sender and its 
successful ‘transmission’ is potentially assured, in the right context. The 
meaning of a phrase can be assumed to coincide with what its speaker or 
writer would assert to be their intention: meaning is thus begotten not 
created. He also, and for this reason, shares Austin’s recognition that 
illocutions must therefore be divorced from their effects, a thesis he advances 
by suggesting that “performative force” is distinct from and unrelated to 
“causal power”12. For Evans, as for Austin, the meaning of an illocutionary or 
indefeasible speech act is not related to its effects, and there is thus a 
predictability of its success or effectiveness, in the right context, which gives it 
a degree of ‘guaranteeability’ or predictability.  
 
This distinction is at the heart of the illocutionary-perlocutionary divide: 
without it, the distinction between them collapses, as does the assumption 
that meaning is begotten not created and is simply transmitted in an utterance 
or in revelation. Austin’s attempts to establish this distinction, and the 
concept of uptake which he employs, are discussed in chapter five of this 
thesis, together with Evans’s development of the distinction13.  
 
Evans disagrees most interestingly with Austin however, in his attempt to 
apply a version of Speech Act theory to texts. Evans does not suggest that 
texts can be illocutionary, since he prefers the term performative. He does, 
though, move from discussing performative expressions which are entirely 
spoken, in part one of his work, entitled “Self-Involving elements in everyday 
language”, to “Self-Involving elements in the Biblical Conception of Creation” 
(the title of part two) without any recognition that he is moving from a 
consideration of spoken utterances to a consideration of theological beliefs 
that are reflections of a written text.  
 
He assumes that there is no important distinction between a spoken and 
written utterance, but does not defend this assumption, nor acknowledge that 
Austin would have denied it. Instead, he refers to “the biblical conception of 
Creation”14 and “man’s religious language”15 as though they were themselves 
spoken performative utterances.  
 
Evans recognizes that there are many hermeneutical and historical issues 
implicit in an assessment of, for example, “the biblical conception of 
                                                     
11 Limited Inc (Sec) p18. 
12 The Logic of Self-Involvement p70ff 
13 As will be noted later, this distinction also permeates a portion of Thiselton’s work. 
14 The Logic of Self-Involvement p13 
15 The Logic of Self-Involvement p14 
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Creation”16, but he does not address the difficulty of applying a theory about 
the meaning of spoken utterances, to utterances contained within a written 
text17. Instead, he treats the text of the Bible as though it were a collection of 
spoken utterances, an assumption necessitated because he is interested in how 
the texts are used as self-involving utterances. Evans does not discuss the 
Biblical text as a text or series of texts at all, but only in terms of how self-
involving its language is, from the point of view of someone who seems 
sometimes to be a character within the text, sometimes a reader or theologian, 
and sometimes a ‘speaker-aloud’ of the text18.  
 
He refers to the “biblical context”19: this is generally shorthand for the context 
of a Christian considering the Bible in a specific way: indeed Evans later 
defines it as “the biblical context which I am expounding”20. He suggests, for 
example, that “in the biblical context, to say, ‘God is my Creator’ is to 
acknowledge a subordinate status”21, but it is never made clear how this 
‘saying’ relates to a reading, or to the fact that all of the biblical texts are the 
creations (to some degree or other) of human authors.  
 
Evans recognises that  
 
when Jones says, ‘God is my Creator’, his utterance is self-involving if it occurs in 
the biblical context. Whether or not it does occur in the biblical context depends 
on his decision; it depends on either his participation in an Occasional context 
(such as Christian worship) which involves this Traditional context, or his inner 
intention to speak within this Traditional context.22  
 
This indicates not just the specific nature of Evans’s context, but also the 
extent to which this context blurs the reading/speaking distinction to the 
point of collapse. This is not necessarily without merit in the believing context 
Evans imagines, but it requires identification, analysis, and most importantly 
the defence of its performative status against Austin’s own denials. None of 
this is ever undertaken23. 
                                                     
16 See page 18ff 
17 He notes “in this chapter and in subsequent chapters I shall not consider the historical 
reliability of the Exodus-story or the origin and growth of the story, for we are only interested 
in analysing the conception of Israel’s creation which eventually emerged in the Old 
Testament” The Logic of Self-Involvement p 146 
18 For example, Evans notes that: “I have been saying that if the utterance, ‘God is my Creator’ 
occurs in the biblical context, it is self-involving in certain specific ways. When a man utters 
these words in some other context, his utterance may not be similarly self-involving”, The 
Logic of Self-Involvement p160, and it seems clear that he imagines his biblical context here as 
spoken not read. 
19 For example The Logic of Self-Involvement p150 
20 The Logic of Self-Involvement p161 
21 The Logic of Self-Involvement p153 
22 The Logic of Self-Involvement p162 
23 As is also noted by J W Adams in his The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55. 
Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 448 (New York, T&T Clark, 2006) footnote 166 
ps50-51, the book itself discussed later in this chapter.  
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It seems almost obvious to point out that texts are not self-involving unless 
they are read in a context that permits that effect. However, Evans, while he 
would not deny this, does not investigate the nature of reading context at all. 
He focuses entirely on the individual reader, and offers no description of their 
context beyond that, except that it must be “the biblical context” of self-
involvement, in order for the text to be self-involving.  
 
Indeed, it is not inaccurate to suggest, I think, that Evans is not interested in 
‘the Bible’ as a text or a series of texts at all. Instead, he is here interested, in an 
almost Searlean sense, in discrete speech acts within Scripture that are 
appropriated into spoken discourse by the reader, and which have 
indefeasible theological implications. He aims to create or advocate a context 
in which particular – in-his-view-‘Biblical’ – speech acts can be appropriately 
performed, and beyond this interest in speech as a performance which he 
takes from Austin, Evans hardly offers a ‘speech act exegesis’ at all.  
 
Perhaps his most lasting legacy is to prompt Anthony Thiselton’s interest in 
Austin and speech acts, the subject of the next section of this thesis, with his 
recognition that  
 
when ‘dabar Yahweh’ means ‘word of the Lord’, the phrase may sometimes 
bring to the particular context some associations with the idea of the divine 
word as a deed. But the association is not a universal and distinctive feature of 
the Hebrew word ‘dabar’ as such ...; it reflects the biblical conception of the divine 
word, which is evident in the English translation24 
 
and where for him “a central theme in biblical theology is the conception of 
the divine word as an act which brings about results”25. 
 
3. Anthony Thiselton and Speech Act exegesis 
 
Speech Act theory has played a significant role in the hermeneutical approach 
of Anthony Thiselton since his first foray into the topic in 1970, referring both 
to Austin and Donald Evans, in ‘The Parables as Language Event’26. In the 
collected works edition Thiselton on Hermeneutics, published in 200627, “speech 
acts” and “speech act theory” still have one of the longest indexical entries28. 
 
                                                     
24 Logic of Self-involvement p165. This point is also taken up and developed by Thiselton in 
his ‘The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings’, Journal of Theological Studies NS 
25:2 (1974) p 289. 
25 Logic of Self-involvement p163. 
26 Scottish Journal of Theology 23:4 (1970) pp 437-468. 
27 Thiselton on Hermeneutics: the collected works and new essays of Anthony Thiselton (Ashgate 
contemporary thinkers on Religion. Collected works), (Aldershot UK, Ashgate Publishing 
Limited). 
28 Thiselton on Hermeneutics p824. 
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In his first article, Thiselton reviews the hermeneutical assumptions of Ernst 
Fuchs, and uses Speech Act theory, together with input from Wittgenstein, 
Gadamer, and other linguistic philosophers, to reflect on the parables of Jesus 
as instances of language use which “force him [the hearer] to see horizons 
which he might otherwise not have chosen to see ... [and which grip] him at 
every level of attitude, thought, and emotion.”29 As a part of this discussion, 
he mentions Evans and Austin, suggesting that “the logic of many parables is 
self-involving. They function partly as performatives” and specifically, in the 
case of the linguistic acts that Fuchs identifies, as “illocutionary acts”30.  
 
He uses Austin’s ideas to suggest that Fuchs and his colleagues have been 
overly rigid in their views of assertions, and concludes by suggesting that “it 
remains to be seen what further light can be shed by the resources and 
techniques of linguistic philosophy, both on the parables and on other forms 
of biblical literature”31: a suggestion he pursues in his article ‘The Supposed 
Power of Words in the Biblical Writings’32, when he notes that one of the 
reasons for casting doubt on the assumption that words had a kind of magical 
aura in biblical cultures is the existence of illocutionary acts which, however, 
have “little or nothing to do with natural physical cause and effect”33 but 
rather are dependent on the existence of social conventions34. 
 
In all of these examples, Thiselton uses Speech Act theory in quite a limited 
way, to explain how it is that words or utterances are performative. He uses 
the idea of an illocution simply to illustrate the social conventionality 
underlying spoken performatives that have then been recorded in texts, and is 
able to explain how the words functioned satisfactorily, without any 
necessary recourse to the supposedly ‘primitive views’ of language held by 
ancient cultures.  
 
Here, Thiselton is using speech act theory in a simply descriptive way. Speech 
Act theory serves to demonstrate the fallacy inherent in the view of language 
as ‘purely’ descriptive rather than as ‘contextually active’, and draws 
attention to aspects of the contextual situation of Biblical utterances, in which 
specific contexts they mean and act. In all of this, I entirely agree with 
Thiselton, and Speech Act theory seems up to a point helpful, as indeed it was 
– in this respect at least – for the literary theorists considered in the previous 
chapter. 
 
My one caveat with this use of Speech Act theory, in both literary and 
specifically Biblical hermeneutics, concerns the usefulness of the specific 
                                                     
29 ‘The Parables as Language Event’ p446. 
30 ‘The Parables as Language Event’ p462 
31 ‘The Parables as Language Event’ p468 
32 Journal of Theological Studies NS 25:2 (1974) pp283-299. 
33 ‘The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings’ p293 
34 But most assuredly not “on mistaken ideas about word-magic” p294. 
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categories ‘illocution’ and ‘perlocution’ here. It does not seem entirely clear 
why these categories add anything at this point, since it would be perfectly 
possible to describe speech as ‘performative’, and to illustrate its contextual 
efficacy, and the ways in which meaning is contextually established, simply 
by referring to individual types of speech act, such as orders, promises, 
commands, and the like35. ‘Illocution’ and ‘perlocution’ seem to add an 
unnecessary layer of description without providing any further elucidation of 
the particular speech acts under consideration. 
 
Of course, the reason why these categories are used is that they are inherited 
from Austin, who is using them to distinguish two fundamentally different 
generic sorts of speech act, one of which he describes as ‘conventional’, in 
relation to the other, which is much more ‘fluid’. As I have already noted, this 
distinction is examined in chapter five of this thesis, together with the 
development of it by Evans and Thiselton, who I believe absorb far too 
uncritically the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction. To pre-empt the 
detail of that discussion, I should say here simply that I believe that the 
illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction is fundamentally flawed, and exposes 
again some of the inherent weaknesses in Austin’s linguistic assumptions. 
More importantly in this specific context, I don’t see that it adds anything to 
what one might call ‘speech act textual analysis’. 
 
However, using Speech Act theory as way of describing what has occurred 
does seem to me to have a usefulness, albeit only in this descriptive and ‘past 
tense’ sort of analysis36. Where I believe more problems arise, is when as well 
as using the language of Speech Act theory in a descriptive sense, to 
understand what has happened, it also becomes used in a predictive sense, to 
describe what will or should happen, and how an utterance will be or should 
be taken. Problems here are only exacerbated by the fact that in the context of 
textual analysis, this additional use is generally directed towards the act of 
reading. I believe that Evans and Thiselton both stray too far into this 
territory.  
  
I have already indicated that Evans’s description of reading context is 
somewhat under-defined, and I believe that on occasion Thiselton is 
susceptible to the same accusation. In ‘Authority and Hermeneutics: Some 
                                                     
35 As we have seen, this is more or less how most literary theorists have used speech act 
theory. In this respect, I don’t think Fish is really quite fair to accuse this approach of vacuity, 
since it is doing at least one helpful thing, which is identifying the fact that language is an 
activity not simply a ‘neutral’ observation, in all sorts of contexts, and that as Pratt notes, 
‘literature is a context’. This is the point of the word ‘performativity’ or its ilk – to indicate 
that language is contextual and meaning is contextual. Austin ,however, was indeed trying to 
do far more than just demonstrate this: he was trying to categorize it, as Fish suggests. 
36 And only in a rather general, ‘this is an order’ kind of description. 
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Proposals for a More Creative Agenda’37, he notes, for example, that “by 
appropriating the praise and worship of the Psalmist and of Jesus and Paul, 
each new generation of believers joins in with the unfolding divine dialogue 
of loving promise, loving pledge, loving forgiveness, loving adoration and 
loving mutual acts of blessing”38, but does not outline what ‘appropriating’ 
means in a reading context.  
 
It could be argued that I am simply being pedantic, in that it  is doubtless 
clear that Thiselton is envisaging the same kind of (entirely authentic) 
believing context as was Evans. But it is helpful to make this clear, and 
possibly even to reflect on the nature of this specific context, because of the 
implications this has for the intimate, creative relationship ‘context’ has with 
‘meaning’39.  
 
I have no quarrel with the theology or with the conclusions Thiselton 
advances when – for example – he suggests that, having acknowledged that 
we are living as justified and yet sinners on the basis of a theological 
‘already/not-yet’, therefore in the same way we can say that  
 
I entrust my daily life to the consequences and commitments entailed in acts of 
promise, commission, appointment, address, directive and pledge of love spoken in the 
name of God or God in Christ in Scripture, even though the definitive corroboration 
of the validity of these linguistic acts awaits final confirmation at the last judgment. 
Just as sanctification entails a process of transformation into the image of 
Christ, although through justification I already am ‘in Christ’, clothed in his 
righteousness, even so interpretation and understanding of Scripture entails a 
process of grasping more fully the implications, entailments, nuances, and 
perhaps further commitments and promises that develop what has been 
appropriated in faith.40 
 
But here, I am – when I read – internalising spoken acts, and it is not clear 
what it means to ‘appropriate’ an ‘illocution’ in this context. The relationship 
between illocutions and reading is not explicit: can the act of reading itself be 
illocutionary? How do illocutions apply in a reading context? 
 
I can certainly say, on the basis of a ‘prior-to’ position; ‘I am going to place 
myself in this position, and/or allow these words to move me’; also, one can 
simply be moved, emotionally, in a ‘perlocutionary’ way, by the words of 
Scripture (or other texts, of course). When Jesus is recorded as speaking in the 
Gospels, or when St Paul writes, we can insert ourselves into the audience (as 
it were), through an imaginative act41, and we can say, ‘He is writing to or 
                                                     
37 ‘Authority and Hermeneutics: Some Proposals for a More Creative Agenda’ in P E 
Satterthwaite & D F Wright (eds.) A Pathway into the Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids MI, 
Eerdmans, 1994) pp 107-141.   
38 Op cit p131. 
39 See the discussion of Timothy Polk later on in this chapter.  
40 ‘Authority and Hermeneutics: Some Proposals for a More Creative Agenda’ op cit p136-137 
41 Of a sort common in some readings of some literature 
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speaking to me - this is directly relevant to me. I will base my life around this 
hope. I will choose to accept the authority of the Triune God so revealed’. This 
is my choice: my perhaps inspired response to reading and studying 
scripture. But it is not an automatic response, nor the only possible one.  
 
It would perhaps be possible to argue that I make the words I have read and 
accepted into an illocution by accepting them as an order, promise, command, 
or whatever, addressed directly to and for me, in an act of self-involved 
reading which is made possible because of, and from, my context. However, 
because this kind of self-involving reading requires understanding, this is not 
quite an illocution as Austin would have described one, since illocutions are – 
as will be demonstrated in chapter five – non-consequential for Austin, and 
are so in essence and of necessity.  
 
Thus there are in a way two illocutions here (if illocutions there be at all): the 
one described in the text, and the one I through the prompting of the Spirit 
appropriate to myself. In either case, they become an illocution when they are 
recognised as such: illocutions are then in reading made, not begotten; and 
are therefore perversely not illocutions at all – they are at the most just speech 
acts that are recognised because I have already understood them to be such a 
thing. In this case, my reading context has already told me about Jesus, and I 
am not reading the book to be convinced, but rather to be further 
illuminated42.  
 
4. Richard Briggs’s Words in Action and Speech Act exegesis 
 
The unacknowledged blurring of the oral-written distinction that we have 
noted above is not just peculiar to Evans and Thiselton. For example, in the 
discussion of Donald Evans in Richard Briggs’s Words in Action43 it is clear 
that what is actually being described is not the action of reading, but that of 
speaking and ‘owning’ the words of a text44.  
 
                                                     
42 If we are looking for an instance in which the text alone convinces a reader, we would have 
to imagine a situation in which, perhaps because all personal contact is forbidden, 
missionaries drop from a plane or secretly deposit on their land bibles or New Testaments for 
an uncontacted tribe. We would have to further assume that these Scriptures are in the tribe’s 
language, or one they can read, and indeed that they have a concept of reading, writing and 
books, and, probably, that they are aware that there are other humans out there, and are 
prepared to examine the texts. If they then begin to read, it is not then impossible that they 
are transformed by what they read and decide to alter, amend or forsake their old lives to 
include a faith in Jesus or God. In this example, one might well feel able to speak of the 
illocutionary action of the text. But the readers are highly unlikely even in this scenario, to 
arrive at the Nicene Creed or ‘our’ understanding of justification. In this case we could say 
that the text alone has transformed them. But only in this kind of case, and even here we 
would probably want to say that their faith was lacking fullness, just as Paul did to those who 
had only received John’s Baptism. 
43 Words in Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 2001). 
44 It’s a kind of ‘serious performance’. 
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Briggs believes that one can avoid “the way in which illocutions mark out 
self-involvement in a Wittgensteinian ‘logical’ sense” becoming “blurred with 
effective self-involvement in a perlocutionary sense”45, because of the 
illocutionary nature of texts which require only uptake and not a response. 
However, Briggs’s stance here presupposes a self-involvement which is not 
the prima facie response of a reader to a text46, but is a part of some 
illocutionary uptake-effect47. Briggs does not clarify it in relation to the act, or 
possibly the acts, of reading. He doesn’t discuss the transition from Speech 
acts to textual actions, instead he simply asserts, following his discussion of 
the Derrida-Searle debate, that “if speech act theory can apply to texts, the 
next step is to ask what has happened when this has been done”48.  
 
There is a missing step in Briggs’s argument between – on the one hand – a 
discussion of Derrida and Searle and their argument about the nature of acts 
of communication; and on the other hand, the application to written texts of a 
theory identifying spoken utterances as performative49 of the acts they ‘help 
make explicit’. In particular, the refinement or revision of the theory that 
identifies some performative acts as illocutionary and thus guaranteed, the 
aspect of the theory of most interest here, needs to be described in such a way 
as to make it applicable to texts rather than spoken utterances50.  
 
It is not enough simply to demonstrate that Austin’s exclusions are self-
serving or inadequate, as I agree that they are, because the plausibility of 
explicit performatives depends upon them. If Austin’s exclusion of various 
categories (including most writing) from his theory is to be ignored, the 
concept of the explicit performative needs to be re-thought to make allowance 
for the greater role of the audience in realizing and adapting conventions. 
This problem is not, however, addressed. 
 
The application of Speech Act theory to texts also raises questions about 
whether the author or the characters is the speaker, and about the textually 
enclosed, narrative nature of written communication. Even assuming that the 
text is taken as the author’s utterance, many texts, particularly ‘books’, are of 
considerable length, and it is necessary to demonstrate that the entire text is a 
consistent utterance-action, or that it is several, and how the author ‘speaks’ 
in or through the text; through narrative, specific characters, authorial asides 
etcetera. In particular this is necessary in respect of the Bible, a series of texts 
                                                     
45 Words in Action p165 
46 Or is not demonstrated to be such. 
47 The difference between understanding and uptake will be examined in more detail in 
chapter five, since it is integral to the illocutionary-perlocutionary divide. 
48 Words in Action p86 
49 (in some conditions) 
50 “Lanser’s and Pratt’s proposals will need to be appropriated after the necessary 
transpositions”, as D Patte suggests, without detailing what this work of transposition might 
involve: ‘Speech Act Theory and Biblical Exegesis’, Semeia 41: Speech Act theory and Biblical 
Criticism (1988) p100. 
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(or text) whose authorship is disputed (and which is perhaps both human and 
Divine), and which may be the product of many different authors with 
differing stances. 
 
The variously-related questions of what sorts of action writing and reading 
are, and of how the action of a writer is ‘uptaken’, understood or recognized 
by a reader, need also to be considered. This last is particularly important for 
those who, unlike Derrida, insist on the possibility of a guaranteed, 
illocutionary, textual meaning. Derrida, of course, insists rather on the 
reverse; that speech is affected or perhaps infected by writing’s absence of 
guarantee and absence of agent.  
 
5. A brief description of a selection of Biblical Speech Act exegeses: 
Introduction  
 
As we saw in the previous chapters, and as I have again mentioned in the 
preceding paragraphs, there are at least two different ways in which Speech 
Act theory can be used in textual exegesis, and these two ways can be 
variously described and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
 
On the one hand, Speech Act theory can be used to understand – in a 
descriptive sense – specific linguistic acts that have occurred in texts. 
Generally, in this case, the detail of the theory is of less importance, and may 
be lost or understated. Of principle concern is the fundamental ‘speech act 
view of language’: that language is ‘performative’: an activity, not a ‘mere 
description’. Beyond that, specific acts occurring in the text are described. 
 
On the other hand, Speech Act theory can be used to understand how it is that 
texts ‘operate’: how they are read and affect readers, or how their authors 
intend them to be read. Generally, in this case, more use is made of the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary distinctions, and Austin’s linguistic 
categories are referred to and perhaps revised in more detail51. 
 
Individual Speech Act exegeses can and sometimes do adopt both approaches 
at different times, or indeed adopt courses that steer between these poles (if 
that is what they are). In the following sections, I will offer a brief description 
of various Speech Act exegeses and their approach to Speech Act theory. 
However, it should be noted that I will not attempt a comprehensive 
description of the studies concerned, for a variety of reasons. In the first place, 
to describe a number of studies in detail would take up considerable time and 
space; more importantly, it would stray well beyond the subject of this thesis 
and the ability of this author to evaluate the detail of the exegetical arguments 
put forward.  
                                                     
51 This is essentially the same distinction as that made by Briggs when he notes that Speech 
Act theory can be used within or outside the text : ‘The Uses of Speech Act Theory in Biblical 
Interpretation’, Currents in Research: Biblical Studies 9 (2001) p237 
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Biblical Speech Act exegeses:                                                                                                                                
5a. T M McNulty, ‘Pauline Preaching: A Speech-Act Analysis’52 
 
T Michael McNulty announces that he intends, “by examining the role that 
preaching played in the experience that Paul had with the community at 
Corinth, to clarify that relationship and to illuminate the connection between 
this fundamental religious use of language and Christian life.”53 He 
determines that a consideration of preaching must take account both of “its 
self-involving character” and the “fact that it is fundamentally 
communication”54, and goes on to note that “it would be a mistake to divorce 
a linguistic event from the speaker-hearer context in which it occurs”. He cites 
Austin as suggesting this fact with his description of the “performative aspect” 
of language, which describes for McNulty the way in which language is a 
doing of something which is “institutionalized in human society.”55 
 
Thus far, McNulty’s approach sits quite lightly to the details of Austin’s 
theory. However, he then goes on to outline briefly Austin’s locutionary, 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, and suggests that “we can best 
understand preaching if we look on the proclamation of the gospel as an 
illocutionary act”56. McNulty suggests that “proclamation is most plausibly 
thought of as implicit”57, and thus that it is an implicit illocutionary act, since 
it is not necessarily immediately obvious what the speaker intends, which 
may be the occasion for misfiring of the act, when the speaker’s intention is 
not recognised.58  
 
However, Paul’s preaching at Corinth was successful because it was a simple 
demonstration of the actions of the Spirit through Paul’s own weakness: this 
proclamation was a successful “event in which something is done”: that 
something producing an “intended effect”, and the “perlocutionary act 
accompanying the proclamation was the establishing of a Christian 
community among the Corinthians.”59 
 
McNulty then tries to analyse the specific illocutionary acts included in the 
one act of proclamation, and he suggests that “there is a sense in which the 
proclamation contains the life of the preacher as an essential part”60, a part 
which should be imitated by the hearers. The similarity with Polk’s work on 
                                                     
52 Worship 53 (1979) pp 207-14. 
53 Op cit p207. 
54 Ibid  
55 Op cit p208 
56 Op cit p209 
57 Op cit p210 
58 He gives as an example Paul’s preaching to the Athenians, which he suggests misfired 
because Paul uses “philosophical methods” which “made the proclamation seem something 
it was not: mere information.” 
59 Op cit p210 
60 Op cit p211 
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Jeremiah,  discussed in a succeeding section, is interesting because McNulty 
has reached it by such different means than does Polk. I am bound to say that 
while I don’t disagree with McNulty’s conclusion that proclamation has to 
involve the life of the preacher in order to be effective, I am entirely 
unconvinced by his Speech Act analysis.  
 
However, from the point of view of this thesis, the appropriateness of his 
conclusions and the accuracy of his exegesis are immaterial. Instead what is of 
interest is the fact that McNulty is primarily describing a series of past events 
in terms of the acts that they were recognised as having been. He thus sits 
somewhat towards the ‘descriptive’ pole in terms of his use of Speech Act 
theory, despite his somewhat idiosyncratic use of Austin’s specific categories, 
and his interest in the status of the reader. He does not suggest that the text 
has exactly illocutionary relations with the reader, but he does describe within 
the text acts that the text describes as illocutionary, and he also suggests that 
the reading of the text has implications for the reader; thus there is an 
inclination towards an interest in the text itself as an illocutionary act in 
relation to the reader. 
 
Biblical Speech Act exegeses:                                                                                                                                     
5b. D J A Clines, I, He, We, and They: A Literary Approach to Isaiah 53 
(JSOT Supplement Series 1).61  
 
This monograph is among the oldest of the various works considered in this 
section, and in some ways one of the easiest to evaluate for the purposes I 
have set out, since Clines himself notes that due to the inadequacies of the 
“conventional historical criticism” in respect of Isaiah 53, he proposes instead 
to use a “new hermeneutic” which “stresses that language can become event; 
that is, that language need not be mere talk about something, but that it can 
itself do something.”62 In this regard he mentions Austin and his 
“performative utterances”63, but then immediately goes on to note that 
“Austin of course is interested primarily in performative utterances in 
ordinary language ... while I am interested in this functional aspect of literary 
language in general, and of high poetry in particular.”64  
 
Therefore, for Clines, since he is interested in “the way in which the language 
of parable or poem can be event. Here Austin’s interest must of course drop 
out of sight, since he has established simply that one conventional use of 
language is as deed, thus providing the basic and irrefutable foundation for 
the more sophisticated superstructure of hermeneutical theory.”65 This might 
                                                     
61 JSOT Press, Sheffield, 1983. 
62 I, He, We, and They: A Literary Approach to Isaiah 53, p53 
63 As well as noting that he is “much indebted to my colleague A C Thiselton” and Thiselton’s 
papers “The New Hermeneutic” and “The Parables as Language Event”, in his footnote 1 on 
p53. 
64 Ibid p54 
65 ibid 
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indeed serve as a banner for much of the literary critical use of Speech Act 
theory we have already examined, and for quite a bit of the Biblical 
hermeneutics we will shortly consider, and identifies Clines as very much 
towards the ‘specific descriptive’ pole of Speech Act exegesis.  
 
He is not in the least concerned by illocutions or by illocutionary reading 
events, rather he believes that “a literary text creates an alternative “world” ... 
which then confronts the reader” into which the reader must enter “to 
experience it, in order to understand it”66.  Indeed, Clines himself takes a very 
‘post-modern’ view of textual meaning, which is far from the idea of the 
illocution: he notes that “once it is recognised that the text does not exist as a 
carrier of information, but has a life of its own, it becomes impossible to talk 
of the meaning of a text, as if it had only one proper meaning”67 and notes “the 
vast variety of meanings the text itself can create”68. 
 
There is no recognition, in his brief and fascinating monograph, of the detail 
of Austin’s theory, nor of  – for example – Searle’s revisions to it; and no 
recognition that Austin would have been unhappy – at least on the basis of 
How to do things with Words – about the alliance between Speech Act theory 
and a poetic text. This does not, however, affect his argument, since he is 
primarily interested in attacking the approach to Isaiah 53 taken by 
“historical-critical scholarship” which “is bound to mistreat a cryptic poetic 
text when it regards it as a puzzle to be solved, a code to be cracked” rather 
than having due regard to its own “unforthcomingness”69.  
 
As the title of his pamphlet notes, Clines is proposing “a literary approach” to 
Isaiah 53, not a Speech Act one, and Speech Act theory is mentioned simply as 
an indication of the poverty and inadequacy of a view of language that would 
see it simply as descriptive. There a number of similarities in this respect, 
between Clines’s work and Timothy Polk’s examination of Jeremiah, 
discussed below, which is both of a similar date to Clines’s piece on Isaiah, 
and included within the same Journal for the Study of the Old testament 
Supplement Series. 
 
Biblical Speech Act exegeses:                                                                                                                                                
5c. T Polk, The Prophetic Persona: Jeremiah and the Language of the Self 
(JSOT Supplement Series 32).70 
 
Polk notes that in his book “our task will be to trace the picture drawn of the 
prophet by the first-person poetic, so-called autobiographical, passages and to 
                                                     
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid p59 
68 Ibid p60 
69 Ibid p25 
70 JSOT Press, Sheffield, 1984. 
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describe the function this picture performs.”71 Like Clines with regard to 
Isaiah 53, but more widely, Polk insists that the Bible should be viewed 
synchronically rather than diachronically; that is to say, as a literary whole 
rather than in terms of its historical evolution or as a kind of historical source 
book72. He also notes that “against any effort to equate meaning simply with 
an author’s intention, or to locate it as residing in the text, we want to 
maintain that meaning only transpires when the articulated thought of one 
person is heard by another*. It is a process, in other words, something that 
happens between text and reader, and is incomplete in either an intention or a 
text taken by itself.”73  
 
He suggests that “talking about intention is a way of talking about the 
patterned  production of meaning”, and that intention is definitely not 
“something in the head, ... a mental process or datum of consciousness, ... as if 
having an intention required having an awareness of it.” He concludes that 
connecting the idea of intention with those of “consciousness and causality” is 
a “misleading, and pervasive, habit of thought” 74, somewhat echoing Austin 
himself: this area is pursued in more detail in chapter four of this thesis, 
although I should note that Polk here demonstrates a sophisticated approach 
with which I agree.  
 
His approach allows Polk to make sense of phrases such as ‘the text intends’, 
which is in his terms a kind of  
 
shorthand way of saying that one reading is to be preferred to another on the basis 
of what is perceived as the texts’ comprehensive structure, thematic concerns, 
point(s) of view, tone, diction, and whatever other internal, literary features are 
deemed as relevant and recognised as impelling text and reader to ‘the point’. In 
                                                     
71 The Prophetic Persona: Jeremiah and the Language of the Self (JSOT Supplement Series 32) (JSOT 
Press, Sheffield, 1984), p8. 
72 Op cit p14 
73 Op cit p16, where the * refers to his footnote 28, contained on ps177-179, where he gives 
significant detail about his view of reading, including the assertion, with which I largely 
agree, that “all meanings are ‘given’ to the text by its readers, for meaning is a reader-
dependent concept. ... (Now, the concept ‘Scripture’, unlike ‘text’, already includes 
analytically the notion of a readership, of having been and being read, namely by the 
communities who regard the biblical text as somehow normative for faith and practice. Thus 
to speak of ‘meaning in Scripture’ is to refer to the meaning(s) that take(s) place in the process 
of a special kind of reading.)” p178. This however should be read in conjunction with his 
earlier footnote 24, on p176, which notes that “it is by no means implied here that the world 
of the text has no conventions or areas of overlap with the real world, however ‘real’ is to be 
conceived. The trick is in recognizing how the text itself regulates the way the connections 
occur, function, and are to be interpreted.” As he then goes on to note in the main body of the 
text, “it might be noted at the outset that one of the things the text does qua religious 
literature is to fashion and train reader expectations and competencies in particular ways”: 
p16. This very much echoes Louise Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of meaning, described in 
chapter seven of this thesis. 
74 Op cit p17. 
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the present case the point is a depiction of the prophet that evokes a set of insights 
into God’s purpose and a set of responses to his call.75 
 
From here, Polk’s work explores aspects of the ‘persona’76 of Jeremiah as 
developed in various sections of the Biblical text of the eponymous book, to 
enable him to make some conclusions about the relationship between the 
person of Jeremiah depicted through the text’s first person and poetic 
utterances, the revelation of God’s message, and the responses and the 
personality the Divine message requires of the hearer or reader77.  
 
He concludes with observations that are particularly informative and 
interesting in the light of Evans’s ideas of self-involvement and – I suggest – 
provide a much-needed development of those ideas, rooting them in 
descriptions of reading and of meaning in context. Polk notes that the 
language he has studied could all be described as ‘language of the heart’, and 
that for the persona of Jeremiah, this “first-order” religious language is 
language of action: it is language in which Jeremiah the persona expresses his 
feelings in a way that is “performative” of them78.  
 
This, however, is as close to Speech Act theory as Polk gets. He goes on to 
note that  
 
the use of such language, it has been argued, entails powers and capacities that are 
constitutive of human being. Further, using the language appropriately (i.e. when 
it fits the circumstances) exercises the capacities and develops the powers so that, 
in turn, one knows the circumstances better. ... Thus, a responsible language of the 
heart, and the exercise of the capacities entailed therein, give the self form and 
                                                     
75 Op cit p18 
76 Polk uses the term ‘persona to describe “the prophet as depicted in the text. Regarding this 
depicted Jeremiah as to some extent a literary-theological construct, we shall, to avoid 
confusion, refer to him as the prophetic ‘persona’.” This helps to distinguish him from the 
‘real’ Jeremiah, who doubtless existed, but who has a disputed relationship with the literary 
figure or persona depicted in the Book of Jeremiah: p10. 
77 For example, on page 47 he compares the people’s failure to lament in 4:8 with Jeremiah’s 
lamentation for them in 4:19, noting that “it may be observed here that the text, in rendering 
these words in just this way, is at once rendering an identity description (that is, 
characterizing the persona Jeremiah) while showing how identity happens, how a self comes 
to be, achieves form and definition, indeed constitutes itself. Specifically, it shows the self to 
be the achievement of the responsible, first-person use of the language of the heart.” 
Likewise, on p56: “Jeremiah’s words constitute him and enact his prophetic identity as one in 
sympathy with God. And as one in sympathy with God, he cannot keep from speaking God’s 
response to ‘wickedness’.” And on p97: “the prophet’s self has become part of his message, 
which is to say, a part of the divine message. Person and office have fully merged. Jeremiah 
constitutes himself, becomes who he truly is, precisely as he performs the office, however 
unbearable the tension.” Finally he concludes that “it is evident from the previous chapter 
that Jeremiah’s Confessions manifest the same qualities and bear upon the same range of 
topics that have occupied our attention throughout this study. Poetic form, metaphor, the 
language of the heart, self-constituting behavior, the representation of  a paradigm – all are 
closely interwoven there, just as in the other first-person speeches of the prophet”, p163. 
78 Op cit p167 
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definition, depth and breadth. So it is with the prophetic persona’s primary 
religious discourse. In it, we have seen, Jeremiah is engaged in the process of self-
constitution. Through it he also manifests a profound concept of himself, though it 
is a working, not a theoretical, concept.79 
 
What is true of the persona, is meant also to be true for the reader, Polk 
argues. In his view, the Book of Jeremiah can be viewed as a cumulative 
poetic description of the self-constitution of a prophet who embodies God’s 
word, and who can be taken as a template for the believing reader. Thus he 
firstly notes that “if one concedes that imagination was required in the 
writing of the text, one must concede that it is also essential to its reading”80, 
and then goes on to suggest that “in an imaginative religious work, ... which 
either assumes or seeks to create a context of faith, the paradigm is presented 
in a drama within which the believer is requested to see him/herself as a 
participant.”81 
 
Thus, while I do not believe that Polk has anything more to say about Speech 
Act theory than does Clines, he does cast some helpful light on self-
involvement, in which he illuminates precisely how much it is a contextual, 
reader-responsive activity. He notes that  
 
the concern here is ... with the reading process and the responses that belong to 
the logic of the literature qua work, i.e. as something written and read; the 
responses are part of, and help establish, the work’s meaning. ... The working 
hypothesis here has been that meaning does not in any definitive fashion reside in 
the text itself, but issues from the dynamic interaction of text and reader and 
belongs to the realm of reader experience.82 
 
If the reader voluntarily regards the Book as Scripture, then the account of the 
persona Jeremiah’s self-constitution under God becomes not merely a ‘third-
person’ account, but a challenge of self-identity to the reader:  
 
The text, instead of merely proposing possible ways of construing world and self, 
and beyond simply entertaining the reader with a sense of ‘having lived another 
life’, is now viewed as having a claim upon oneself. Its ultimate meaning, what it 
finally intends, is something that is only completed in the reader’s living. How 
s/he responds to the summons and pursues the intended transformation becomes 
part of the work’s scope.83 
 
Polk is clear that this is a response that arises from an interplay between 
reader and text in a specific context, but there is no suggestion that any of the 
terms of Speech Act theory are helpful here. Much like Clines, his work is not 
really in any sense a Speech Act exegesis, and Speech Act theory is of even 
less significance than it was for Clines.  
                                                     
79 Op cit p168 
80 Op cit p167. 
81 Op cit p172 
82 Op cit p172 
83 Op cit p174 
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It is not really possible to relate Polk to the ‘poles’ of Speech Act exegesis 
previously and tentatively described, but as with Clines, this does not in any 
way detract from the value of Polk’s arguments. These arguments nonetheless 
have an implication for Evans’s and Thiselton’s work, by making explicit the 
particular contexts a ‘self-involving’ reading requires, and thus casting some 
doubt on the illocutionary nature of such a reading, because these readings 
require the dynamic participation and co-creation of the reader, in a way that 
is incompatible with the illocution. 
 
Biblical Speech Act exegeses:                                                                                                                                                                 
5d. J G du Plessis: two articles in Neotestamentica84 
 
Much like McNulty, du Plessis in both his first (‘Pragmatic meaning in 
Matthew 13:1-23’) and second (‘Why did Peter ask his question and how did 
Jesus answer him? Or: Implicature in Luke 12:35-48’) articles is also concerned 
to utilise some of the specifics of Speech Act theory, which he notes that he is 
drawing from the work of G N Leech85. According to du Plessis, Leech 
distinguishes between two forces which identify the pragmatic meaning86 of 
an utterance, which are the “motivation” or “illocutionary goal” or the 
utterance’s “illocutionary force”, and the “social goals” or “rhetorical force”87.  
 
He analyses these latter in some detail in his first article, and consequently 
rather less detail in his second, using Grice’s co-operative principle and his 
idea of conversational “maxims”, and additions to Grice’s theory by Leech, 
and concludes that “stripped of all terminology Leech’s (and Grice’s) 
contribution boils down to a new awareness of the social goals of 
conversation. ... Meaning, in fact, comes into being in the relation between 
addresser and addressee.”88 
 
In his first article, du Plessis then outlines the relationships between concrete 
author and addressee, abstract author, implied reader, and the characters in 
the literary work and the narrated world within that89. In both, he provides an 
                                                     
84 ‘Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’, Neotestamentica 21 (1987) 33-56; and ‘Why did 
Peter ask his question and how did Jesus answer him? Or: Implicature in Luke 12:35-48’, 
Neotestamentica 22 (1988) 311-324. 
85 He refers to G N Leech, Principles of pragmatics (Longman Linguistics Library 30), (London, 
Longman, 1983). 
86 This du Plessis defines as “the purpose and effect” of the utterance, in distinction to 
“meaning as “sense””, which he defines as its “literal or verbal meaning”, ‘Pragmatic 
meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’, p33. The distinction he is aiming at seems to be that between 
‘dictionary’ meaning and ‘meaning-in-use’ explored in chapter six of this thesis. 
87 ‘Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’ p34; ‘Why did Peter ask his question and how did 
Jesus answer him?’ p311-313. 
88 ‘Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’ p37. He also notes that “the various principles are 
all culturally conditioned”; ‘Why did Peter ask his question and how did Jesus answer him?’ 
p313 
89 ‘Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’, ps37-38. 
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analysis of the excerpt90 in terms of the adapted Gricean principles he has 
outlined91. He suggests that the obscurity of which the disciples complain in 
Matthew’s  Gospel produces in verse 1292 a response that “is in effect a 
promise to the disciples even as it is an indirect warning to the others. The 
disciples are assured of the eventual fruition of the proclamation of the 
kingdom in their lives. These are the illocutionary forces of the adage”93, 
while in his second article he suggests that “the illocutionary goal of the [first] 
parable seems also to be perspicuous: the disciples are encouraged to await 
the return of the kyrios”94.  
 
Thus, “the illocutionary force of the conversation [between Jesus and the 
disciples] is ... convivial to the social goal”95, and Jesus is Himself analogous to 
the figure of the sower. Indeed, du Plessis suggests that “the parables are 
used to reveal to man his lack of possibilities and to persuade him to focus on 
the one from whom possible guidance can come”96.  
 
Meanwhile, the implied reader is “drawn into the intimate circle to which the 
disciples belonged”97, or “has become privy to the knowledge of God’s will, 
which is given to the disciples by Jesus. He has therefore become a member of 
the privileged group who has received much. If he uses this information to 
live with caring concern towards other followers of Jesus, he will be included 
in the promised benediction.”98 Thus, as in the previous exegeses, once again 
“the reader is being challenged in the same privileged way as the disciples 
had been. The reader has got to decide for himself whether he is part of the 
good soil or not.”99  
 
As the preceding brief description indicates, du Plessis is in many respects 
similar to McNulty in his approach to Speech Act theory, although the variety 
of Speech Act theory he uses is very different. Just like McNulty, and unlike 
Polk and Clines, he not only regards the concept of ‘performativity’ as useful, 
                                                     
90 Which in Matthew is ‘the parable of the sower’, and in Luke is ‘the faithful and wise 
steward’. 
91 Which principles, I might add, I find in general, and here also, to be entirely unhelpful. As I 
have already noted, while mentioning Grice himself in chapter one of this thesis, I don’t 
believe that the principles describe actual behaviour, or that they in any way have any 
‘predictive’ usefulness. 
92 “<13:12> For to him who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from 
him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.” RSV 
93 ‘Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’ p43. 
94 ‘Why did Peter ask his question and how did Jesus answer him?’ p316, referring to Luke 
12:39-40 . 
95 ‘Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’ p45. 
96 ‘Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’ p48 
97 ‘Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’ p49 
98 ‘Why did Peter ask his question and how did Jesus answer him?’ p321. 
99 ‘Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 13:1-23’ p51 
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but attempts to identify illocutionary speech acts within the text100. Moreover, 
while he does not ascribe illocutionary attributes to the reader-text 
relationship, he too does, like all other exegetes thus far described, suggest 
that the text challenges the reader.  
 
Biblical Speech Act exegeses:                                                                                                                            
5e. J Eugene Botha: two articles in Hervormde Teologiese Studies, and a 
book.101 
 
J E Botha produced two complementary articles in the same volume of 
Hervormde Teologiese Studies (issue 47:2), and a book (Jesus and the Samaritan 
woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42) covering much of the same ground 
in more detail, all in 1991. With regard to the book, he notes in the preface 
that “as the title of the book suggests, this study deals for the greater part 
with a speech act reading of a passage in the Gospel of John. This reading is 
not merely done to enhance the exegesis of the passage, but serves a very 
specific aim: It is done to discover something of the style of the Fourth 
Gospel.”102 
 
He further elaborates: “It is my belief that this approach to language which 
deals with the notion of speech as doing something with words, is so 
comprehensive in describing these speech acts, that most of the factors 
pertaining to style are accommodated in these descriptions.”103 Here, he is 
thus using speech act theory in its rather looser sense, as we have seen with 
other scholars previously104.  
 
Botha goes on to analyse what is meant by style, and as part of that discussion 
he refers to Austin’s three types of speech act, noting that the locutionary act 
is “where a recognizable grammatical sentence is produced and an object is 
referred to”; that an illocutionary act is “is performed”, such as “questioning, 
praising, commanding”; and a perlocutionary act can “sometimes” be 
                                                     
100 For example, du Plessis suggests that Jesus’ explanation of the parable in Matthew (which 
he terms “the application”) has an assertive illocutionary force, asserting a relationship 
“between the parable world and the disciple’s circumstances” (‘Pragmatic meaning in 
Matthew 13:1-23’ p52) so that “the promise and assurance which are the illocutionary forces 
of the parable can now be fully realized by the disciples.” (Pragmatic meaning in Matthew 
13:1-23’ p53).  
101 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 (Supplements to Novum 
Testamentum Volume 65), (Leiden, E J Brill, 1991); ‘The potential of speech act theory for New 
Testament Exegesis’, Hervormde Teologiese Studies 47:2 (1991) 277-293; ‘Speech act theory and 
New Testament Exegesis’, Hervormde Teologiese Studies 47:2 (1991) 294-303. 
102 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 op cit p ix. 
103 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p x 
104 As he later notes, “Speech act theory is basically directed against the traditional view that 
sentences can be analyzed adequately in isolation from the context and circumstances of the 
utterance, and the view that the standard sentence is a type of utterance that can only be 
judged either true or false.” Op cit p47 
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performed as well, “dealing with the impact or implication”105 of an 
utterance.  
 
Botha defines style as having to do  
 
with the choices available to users of language, and since these choices are 
determined by specific needs and circumstances, style is a contextually 
determined phenomenon. Because of this, style in effect deals with the successful 
communication of texts in context. Every aspect of language which facilitates 
this process of communication, therefore, has to do with the style of the text. 
This, however, does not mean that a general description of all the innumerable 
linguistic and literary features in a text, will amount to a description of the 
style of a text. Far from it. Only those features which facilitate the specific 
communication in that specific circumstance can be considered of stylistic 
value in this paradigm. The features in a text which facilitate this process 
should not be limited, and can vary according to the specific needs of a specific 
text or context.106 
 
However, this leads him to acknowledge that “the Gospel of John is not an 
isolated text, but is designed as a religious text to function within a specific 
community and socio-cultural context. The specific linguistic choices made 
must be related to the specifics of the text and context presupposed in the text 
of John itself.”107  
 
Interestingly, given the stress laid by other scholars on the effects of the 
Biblical text on readers, Botha quotes an Afrikaans article by W S Vorster108, 
which he translates as pointing out that the pragmatic effects of the New 
Testament are a vital part of its language, and that the texts were not written 
to be factually informative, but to be persuasive and to achieve effects in the 
reader (in this emphasis he mirrors Clines and Volk particularly). 
 
He describes an ideal “text theory”109 for use in interpretation, which he 
believes should be pragmatic rather than semantic in nature, and I note in 
particular that one of the required characteristics of the pragmatic theory he 
believes desirable is that whereas in semantics “the rules of grammar are 
fundamentally conventional; the principles of general pragmatics are 
fundamentally non-conventional i.e. motivated in terms of conversational 
goals.”110  
 
This seems particularly significant because a few pages later he concludes that  
                                                     
105 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p48 
106 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p53. There does seem a 
slight danger of circularity here – that style deals with specific successful communication, and 
only those aspects relevant to success are relevant matters of style.  
107 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p57 
108 W S Vorster, ‘Op weg na ‘n post-kritiese Nuwe-Testamentiese wetenskap’, Hervormde 
Teologiese Studies 43 (1987) 374-394. 
109 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p58 
110 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p59 
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Speech act theory deals with utterances and not sentences. Sentences are the 
object of the study of formal grammar and also of semantics, where they are 
perceived as abstract semantic and syntactical structures – abstracted from the 
real or pragmatic contexts in which they are uttered. Syntax deals with the 
grammar (in a narrow sense the syntactical structures) of the language, where 
sentences are seen as abstract entities assigned syntactic structure semantic 
content [sic]. Semantics deals with the meanings of these structures, or rather, 
possible or potential meanings, but again usually somewhat separated from a 
specific pragmatic context. Speech acts are much more related to the 
pragmatics of language – that is, utterances made in a specific context have a 
specific ‘force’, not necessarily related to the form of the utterance, but certainly 
distinguishable from it.111 
 
I certainly agree with his stress on the pragmatic importance of meaning, but 
am not entirely convinced that Speech Act theory in an ‘Austinian’ or 
‘Searlean’ sense is ‘fundamentally non-conventional’ and ‘conversational’ – 
certainly this does not seem to be the case for illocutions.  
 
Botha then returns to the detail of Speech Act theory and notes that an 
illocutionary act is “the act of producing an utterance with a certain 
illocutionary force, such as greeting, warning, ordering, requesting, and so 
on”112. There is, as will be noted, nothing in this description about 
conventions, nor is there any recognition that there is an element of circularity 
here, in the sense that an illocutionary act is defined as an act which has 
illocutionary force. This does however rather accentuate the suggestion I 
made in my comments earlier in this chapter on the work of Anthony 
Thiselton, that the additional category of illocution adds nothing helpful to 
definitions of specific acts such as ordering, promising, etc.  
 
Botha then goes on to note that a perlocutionary act is “the act by which the 
speaker achieves certain intended effects in his/her hearer, in addition to 
those achieved by the illocutionary act”113, which seems to be fundamentally 
incorrect as a definition, and the confusion here is exacerbated by the fact that 
by the end of this paragraph, Botha is again referring to intention in 
illocutions, in a paragraph which began as a consideration of the “intended” 
as against the “real” perlocution.   
 
Like du Plessis, Botha then goes on to introduce the Gricean concepts of the 
co-operative principle, the maxims, and implicature which, as with du Plessis, 
he has taken from Grice through the work of G N Leech114. He also, again like 
                                                     
111 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p64. This argument is 
largely repeated in the first of his articles, ‘The potential of speech act theory for New 
Testament Exegesis’, Hervormde Teologiese Studies 47:2 (1991) p280 
112 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p65;‘The potential of 
speech act theory for New Testament Exegesis’p280-281 
113 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p66 
114 He, like du Plessis, refers to Leech’s Principles of Pragmatics (London, Longman); Botha also 
refers to G N Leech, ‘Stylistics’, in Van Dijk, T A, (ed.) Discourse and Literature, (Amsterdam, 
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du Plessis, outlines some of the various relationships of the literary 
“communicative situation”115 that distinguish the literary variety of speech 
acts from the spoken variety116.  
 
He concludes that Speech Act theory has many advantages as a Biblical 
hermeneutic tool117; these advantages include the assertion that “one of the 
key elements in speech act theory is the postulation that all language 
communication is governed by rules”118, an assertion which is accurate, but 
perhaps does not distinguish between rules and conventions119 and is 
susceptible to the criticism that Hancher makes of Pratt120 (whom, 
interestingly, Botha has just cited himself). Botha then goes on to establish the 
principles he will adopt for his examination of the Gospel of John.  
 
Within this discussion he notes that  
 
Regarding the sort of speech acts involved on both levels of communication [i.e. 
of characters, and of implied readers], it should be noted that it is the 
contention of this thesis that locution, illocution and perlocution are involved here, 
on the level of the characters and especially on the level of the communication 
between implied author and readers. This is important because one of the 
presuppositions of this book is that religious texts have some purpose, that is, 
that it has pragmatic implications and thus is not only or chiefly interested in 
being an illocutionary act, id est, having some sort of intention or expressing 
some sort of intention, but it is chiefly a perlocutionary act, that is, it is meant to 
achieve some pragmatic aim with regard to its readers. Here the focus is on the 
readers in the text and not on the illocution of the text, and thus the text in 
itself.121    
 
There are two related points to make here: one is that Botha seems to be 
making an assumption that the effects of a speech act are perlocutionary, and 
that the intention is illocutionary, and thus that the category of illocutionary 
effects is dissolved. The second is that as a consequence of this Botha, like 
Pratt and some of the other literary critics, describes literature as a 
perlocutionary act, but in his case quite explicitly so.  
 
This again gives the impression that Botha has somewhat modified Austin’s 
conception of the illocution, and that in particular a de-emphasis on the 
uniquely conventional nature of illocutions has lead to blurring and confusion 
between them and perlocutions, and thus to the conclusion that illocutions are 
                                                                                                                                                        
John Benjamins) 39-57; see Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 
p70; and also ‘The potential of speech act theory for New Testament Exegesis’ p281ff.  
115 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p74 
116 See also ‘The potential of speech act theory for New Testament Exegesis’ p286ff. 
117 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p76ff 
118 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p77 
119 Although I grant that this is by no means an easy or clear distinction; nonetheless, given 
the conventional nature of illocutions, it seems necessary. 
120 See the previous chapter of this thesis 
121 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p83 
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equivalent to the author’s bit of the act (intention), while perlocutions are 
equivalent to the readers bit (the context, and the effects). As he goes on to 
note: “We can thus conclude that John 4, as a religious text, is an example 
where something is being done with words. ... It is therefore pragmatic in 
aim, and of a nature other that the illocutionary acts Austin describes”122.  
 
Thereafter, Botha analyses, over the next eighty pages, his chosen section of 
John’s Gospel. He divides the entire story of Jesus and the Samaritan woman 
up into various sections, and for each section, gives a detailed analysis of the 
speech acts involved, itemising the types of illocution and perlocution present 
in each verse or utterance123. It is an interesting and exhaustive survey, in 
which the majority of the illocutions are constative, and there are 
perlocutionary acts performed both by the characters in the story towards one 
another (Jesus and the Samaritan woman primarily) and by the author 
towards the reader.  
 
On occasion, the characters perform acts that function on one level in the 
story (as for example, when Jesus performs “predictives and assertives” in the 
story) while functioning as another sort of act (here “confirmatives”) on the 
level of the implied reader/author124. Overall, the impression is given that 
this story is a complex and crafted literary speech act. 
 
Botha concludes by suggesting that “while speech act theory is not exactly 
equal to ‘style’, it embraces many of the concepts necessary to specifically 
practice intrinsic, explanatory, stylistics. Because speech act theory allows for 
a number of perspectives in its approach to language, it means that these 
concepts, such as reception theory, are also available to us, and can be 
incorporated in our understanding of the text.”125 He is thus using quite a 
broad understanding of Speech Act theory to describe what is happening in a 
text.  
 
Speech act theory in this broad sense has provided a useful umbrella within 
which he has offered detailed analysis of the text as a communicative act, 
paying attention to various literary strategies adopted by the author. One of 
the things that Botha does provide, then, is that defence of the application of 
Speech Act theory to written texts that has been lacking elsewhere, in his 
analysis of texts as acts126. He doesn’t directly address Austin or Searle, but he 
does acknowledge the context of written texts, and establishes that there are 
                                                     
122 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p83 
123 Somewhat in the manner Fish has predicted! 
124 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p152 
125 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p189 
126 In both Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 and in ‘Speech act 
theory and New Testament Exegesis’ especially pages 299-300. 
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both distinctions and similarities with verbal texts127. It is important to note 
that he is able to do this, because he believes that literary acts are 
perlocutionary, and he is thus not committed to defending an illocutionary 
view of texts in their relationship to the reader. 
 
However, his use of the more detailed Austinian terminology of illocutions 
and perlocutions is not without its flaws, as evidenced again in his 
conclusion, when he seems to suggest that “intentionality”128 is the same as 
illocutionary force. More fundamentally, his continued insistence that he is 
using Speech Act theory, together with an emphasis on reception theories, to 
provide a pragmatic rather than a semantic-grammatical analysis, sits 
uneasily with the kind of Speech Act theory depicted by Searle129 and Austin.  
 
The same tension between Botha and Austin/Searle is present when Botha 
suggests, explicitly in the second of his articles but implicitly elsewhere, that 
“the concepts of illocutionary acts and, especially, perlocutionary acts make 
the theory very suitable for the pretexts and principles of reception theory”130, 
since “in speech act theory the perlocutionary act is also designed to achieve a 
certain purpose with the hearer, that is, it is goal-directed. This means that 
speech act theory is thus also susceptible to the precepts of reception 
theory.”131 This also seems to raise unanswered questions about intention, 
meaning, and the illocution. 
 
Botha’s analysis, with his detailed description of the various illocutions in the 
text, and the intended or possible perlocutions both in the story and from 
author to reader, all seem useful and stimulating. He offers both a descriptive 
analysis of actions in the text, and an interesting defence of the idea of the 
reader-response direction as perlocutionary.  
 
However, aside from concerns over the accuracy of his understanding of the 
illocution-perlocution distinction, and the fact that I believe that the 
distinction itself is untenable, it does seem that if his exegesis were, as it were, 
‘rendered down’ to remove all mention of illocutions and perlocutions, this 
would not in fact alter the ‘meat’ of his analysis: we would simply be left with 
a description of various kinds of speech acts occurring in and through the 
text, and on the readers. The analysis would still be as useful as it was before, 
and some of the flaws would disappear. 
 
                                                     
127 See for example ‘Speech act theory and New Testament Exegesis’ p295ff. I should clarify 
that I have no problem with applying Speech Act theory to texts in principle, I merely believe 
that it should not be done without a specific consideration of reading contexts.  
128 Jesus and the Samaritan woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 p198 
129 Who is nowhere mentioned 
130 ‘Speech act theory and New Testament Exegesis’, Hervormde Teologiese Studies 47:2 (1991) 
p297 
131 ‘Speech act theory and New Testament Exegesis’, p298. 
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Biblical Speech Act exegeses:                                                                                                                                                           
5f. W Houston; ‘What did the Prophets think they were doing? Speech Acts 
and Prophetic Discourse in the Old Testament’132 
 
Houston begins by noting that he intends to use Speech Act theory, 
“according to which every utterance is interpreted as an intentional  act of one 
or another kind in a particular situation”133, in order to approach the question 
of whether or not the prophets’ “pronouncements of doom were intended to 
evoke repentance and lead to reform”134. He briefly mentions some criticism 
of Speech Act theory, and in particular alludes to the Derrida-Searle debate, 
from which he concludes that “however textual a text may be, every sentence 
in it is a speech act of some kind and implies a situation” or more than one, 
and therefore that “since one situation frequently implied is that of the 
prophet addressing hearers, there is no reason why we should not assume 
it”.135  
 
He recounts the history of interpretations of the nature of prophetic language, 
and in particular a previous scholarly assumption that the original writers of 
the prophetic books saw some words as being somehow magically powerful, 
a thesis which he notes that Thiselton has used Speech Act theory to attack, 
and he concludes that Austin has demonstrated that “the power of words is 
located in the social conventions which surround our own use of 
language”136. He notes the distinction between illocutions; which he 
apparently follows Leech in regarding as pertaining to the meaning of what 
you do by saying something in a specific situation – and perlocutions; which 
pertain to the causal effects of what was said. He insists that “one can still 
promise and not keep one’s promise” and thus that “illocutionary force and 
perlocutionary effect must be distinguished”137.  
 
While being unconvinced by the ease with which this distinction is made, I 
nonetheless agree with Houston that Leech’s and Searle’s attempts to place 
declarations in a separate extra-linguistic category are not consistent: in 
particular he notes that many declarations are merely “relational”138 rather 
than specifically ritualistic, and thus exist on a “spectrum of illocutionary 
forces”139. He then proceeds to examine prophetic utterances as illocutions, by 
way of a discussion of When Prophecy Failed by Robert Carroll, who has 
apparently adopted the same initial speech act approach. 
 
                                                     
132 Biblical Interpretation 1, 2 (1993) 167-188 
133 Op cit p167 
134 Ibid  
135 Op cit p168 
136 Op cit p171 
137 Op cit p172 
138 Op cit p174 
139 Op cit p175 
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Houston criticises Carroll for apparently suggesting that the word of many of 
the prophets failed, because they were not regarded as prophets by many of 
those who heard them. Houston objects firstly that some people did regard 
even apparently unsuccessful prophets such as Jeremiah as genuinely 
prophetic, otherwise their words would not have been preserved140, and then 
goes on to suggest that  
 
even if this were not so, the successful performance of an illocutionary act does 
not in general depend on the appropriate response of the hearers. It is necessary 
to distinguish ... between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary effects of an 
utterance. For example, if an officer gives an order to a mutinous army, the order 
may or may not be obeyed, but there can be no question that he has given an 
order.141 
 
Houston thus agrees with Searle that the only relevant sort of illocutionary 
effect is that of understanding, and that “as long as the prophets’ hearers 
understood that they were warning them, calling for repentance or whatever 
the particular speech act might be, and understood the content of the warning 
or whatever it might be, the prophets had done what they set out to do, even if 
they had not achieved they effect they had hoped for.”142 Thus, on Houston’s 
account (and that of others, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters), a 
warning can warn, even though no-one was warned, and a warning can be 
understood, even though no-one was warned! 
 
I will discuss the question of the illocutionary effect of an order that wasn’t 
obeyed in more detail in sections three and four of chapter five of this thesis, 
as part of a more detailed analysis of the illocutionary-perlocutionary 
distinction, and the question of ‘uptake’ and ‘understanding’ which (in 
Austin) are different. I do not want to pre-empt that discussion here, so will 
limit myself for now to observing that it seems to me incoherent to suggest 
either that one can perform an order that no-one obeys, or that a warning has 
been spoken and understood, but no-one was warned. Quite what 
‘understanding’ entails in this account, is not clear to me, and I find it highly 
unsatisfactory.  
 
Houston suggests that “there cannot be any reasonable doubt that such 
understanding was achieved, if even we, 2500 years later, and reading their 
words in an imperfectly understood foreign language, can understand at least 
some of what they said”143, but here he makes the fundamental mistake of not 
realising that when we read the prophets’ words, we already know that they 
were prophets, whereas for their contemporaries, they did not, and the 
possibility that they were false prophets was open to them. When Houston 
suggests that “it is ‘knowing that they have a prophet among them’ which 
                                                     
140 Op cit p177 
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constitutes the success of illocutionary prophetic acts”144, he ignores 
completely the fact that in order to know that a speaker is a prophet, one must 
have understood their words to be from God. For there to be a “shared 
understanding of what the prophet was doing”145, both sides have by 
definition to agree that the speaker is a prophet, but it is precisely this extra-
linguistic fact that is in question. 
 
For a prophet to be a prophet, the crucial fact that counts, is that they have 
been sent by God to proclaim a word. Anyone can claim to have been sent, 
and there are many Biblical instances of people both being deceived, and 
seeking to deceive others, as to their genuine prophetic credentials. The 
genuine prophets whom we revere are those whom we and some of their 
contemporaries recognise as having been sent by God: if no-one had ever 
recognised their claims, they would have vanished into total obscurity, 
known only to God. We could not speak of them as prophets, because we 
would not speak of them at all. Equally,  it is possible that God has sent, and 
is even now sending, prophets whom we do not recognise, but for them to be 
prophets, someone at some time must call them prophets, otherwise the term 
has no meaning or reality.  
 
It may be that the prophetic status of some prophets will only be recognised 
on the Last Day when all things revealed. If that is the case, it will only then 
be possible to acknowledge them as prophets. It may also be that on that day, 
the prophetic authority of some is irrevocably denied. But for someone to be a 
prophet, they must be recognised as such: if not, they are a false prophet, 
which is a rather different matter, as the sparring between Micaiah, Zedekiah, 
and King Ahab illustrates146.  
 
Houston acknowledges this problem himself, when he accepts that “if 
people’s refusal to listen to a prophet means their failure or refusal to 
recognize divine authority in what they say, then on one essential point there 
is no shared understanding of the force of their words”147. He seeks to avoid 
the import of this realisation by suggesting first that the fact that the prophets 
were heard suggests that there was a shared understanding, but that in any 
case for an action to count as an action “what is necessary is that the agent 
should on performing it acquire the rights and responsibilities associated with 
the latter”, whether or not they or anyone else recognize this fact148. He 
accepts that it is possible that a prophet may be mistaken, but simply then 
asserts blithely that “the validity of the prophetic claim to divine authority is 
a theological question which is quite independent of the issues being 
                                                     
144 Op cit p178 
145 ibid 
146 1 Kings chapter 22 
147 ‘What did the Prophets think they were doing?’ op cit p178 
148 Op cit p179 
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discussed here” and that accordingly the theological question must be 
“bypassed”149.  
 
However this is entirely unsatisfactory. It will not do to suggest on the one 
hand that for the illocutionary activity of prophecy to be effective, the speaker 
must be understood to have been a prophet, but that the question of whether 
or not they were prophets sent by God is immaterial. If this is true, there 
could be no illocutionary difference between a false and a true prophet, and 
this would make prophecy impossible. Houston simply suggests that the 
prophet’s claim must be “pragmatically” accepted, but this is only a plausible 
approach because the discernment has already been performed. The words of 
the prophets that we are reading, are known to be true, because only the true 
words have been preserved (so we believe). There is nothing pragmatic about 
it, 2500 years down the line: there is no Book of Zedekiah the son of 
Chenaanah.  
 
The only effective question that determines if a genuinely prophetic act has 
been performed is to ask “did God send them, and what did He mean them to 
do?” This is the more so, since Houston goes on to assert that prophetic 
discourse is characteristically declarative: a judicial ‘announcement of coming 
doom’ and of the passing of God’s sentence150 – rather than directive: calling 
for repentance. Of course, an utterance that passes sentence can only be 
performed by someone who has authority: the image of the man carrying a 
sandwich board announcing the coming of the end used to be a stock comic 
character: what makes such an utterance effective is that, as the prophet Jonah 
knew, the announcement is regarded as authoritative. 
 
It is also interesting that while Houston uses Speech Act theory to support a 
view of prophetic discourse as declarative, Karl Möller takes a different line, 
arguing on Speech Act and rhetorical grounds that in at least the case of the 
Book of Amos, what look on a literal level like declarations of Divine 
judgement, should be seen as attempts to “shatter the people’s world view by 
painting a picture of an alternative world”151 and thereby force the people to 
acknowledge their guilt and seek repentance.   
 
While not wanting to enter too deeply into this particular debate, it should be 
noted that the illocutionary-perlocutionary confusion that I will elucidate in 
subsequent chapters can already be discerned here when, having laboriously 
spelt out the differences, Houston talks about “declarative effects” and then 
has to note that “although I have here used the word “effect”, I am still 
                                                     
149 Op cit p179 
150 Op cit p180. 
151 K Möller, ‘Words of (In-)evitable Certitude? Reflections on the Interpretation of Prophetic 
Oracles of Judgement’, in  C Bartholomew, C Greene and K Möller (eds.), After Pentecost: 
Language and Biblical Interpretation. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2 (Carlisle, Paternoster 
Press, 2001) p375 
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talking in illocutionary rather than perlocutionary terms” 152, and thus that the 
term ‘declarative effect’ is on his own admission meaningless.  It is simply not 
coherent to try to distinguish between the “actual response”, which is not 
relevant, and also “that there was a recognized state of affairs brought into 
being by these words – recognized, that is, by those who recognized their 
authority.”153  
 
I would suggest that in terms of the poles of uses of Speech Act theory, 
Houston is ‘a bit of both’. His interest in Speech Act theory is detailed and 
specific, and he is aware of and makes use of the illocutionary-perlocutionary 
distinction (which I do not believe is consistent, but that is an argument for 
another chapter). He is not aiming simply to use Speech Act theory in a 
general descriptive sense; however, he is not much interested in the 
relationship between the reader and the text, but more in, as the title suggests, 
‘what the prophets and their contemporaries thought they were doing’.  
 
I don’t find his arguments convincing, but this is not particularly because I 
disagree with his views on what the prophets thought they were doing 
(although I do incline towards Möller in this respect), but because I think 
Houston’s approach simply highlights a number of major flaws in Speech Act 
theory, which I will address in more detail in this thesis in due course.  
 
Biblical Speech Act exegeses:                                                                                                                     
5g. D Neufeld; a book and an article154 
 
To describe the aim and assumptions of Neufeld’s book, one can do no better 
than to quote his own words from the preface. He notes that he is using 
Speech Act theory because of a recognition that  
 
language is a form of action and power. Discourse becomes responsible for 
creating reality and not merely reflecting it. The aim of the writer of 1 John is to 
bring about, not simply describe, the state of affairs his kerygma represents. 
Such a use of language leaves neither the author nor the audience unchanged 
or uninvolved. These words are not empty, because the author of 1 John 
expects that both he and his audience will act in accordance with them. The 
force of the text is such that those whose behaviour is incompatible with the 
speech acts outlined by the author will be excluded from koinonia. What the 
author of 1 John wishes to proclaim to his readers and hearers is not merely 
descriptive of a personal stance in response to opponents, but it is a portrayal 
of a state of affairs “to which the author stakes his or her personal signature. 
The writer stands behind the words giving a pledge and personal backing that 
he or she is prepared to undertake commitments and responsibilities that are 
entailed in the extra-linguistic terms by the proposition which is asserted” 
[quoting A C Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, MI: 
                                                     
152 Op cit p181 
153 Op cit p182 
154 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An Analysis of 1 John (Biblical Interpretation Series volume 7) 
(Leiden, E J Brill, 1994); ‘Acts of Admonition and Rebuke: A Speech Act Approach to 1 
Corinthians 6:1-11’, Biblical Interpretation 8:4 (2000) 375-399.  
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Zondervan Publishing House, 1992) 617]. Thus, the language of 1 John is also 
self-involving or constitutive of the self.155 
 
Neufeld explicitly acknowledges the influence here of Thiselton and Evans 
and refers also to Botha’s study. Interestingly, in the light of Vanhoozer’s 
concern to root Speech Act theory in questions of authorship, Neufeld is 
interested in getting away from being bogged down in historical analysis of 
the situation of writing, very much in the manner of Clines and Polk156. For 
Neufeld, what is important is “Austin’s fundamental observation that all 
linguistic sequences, rather than describing actions, are themselves action. 
This theory opens the possibility of an approach to language and text 
unencumbered with metaphysical and existentialist concerns.”157  
 
Chapter two surveys various historical reconstructions of the context of 1 
John and finds them wanting. Neufeld argues that there is not enough 
evidence about the actual and intended audience of 1 John for us to be sure of 
who the author was addressing. He suggests that if we limit the author’s 
meaning to those specific times we are placing undue limits on his work. He 
goes on to object to what he considers to be the associated problem that a 
view of the text that is interested primarily in its historic context tends to view 
the work as “discursive or propositional”158, and thus as not doing justice to 
other registers of language.  
 
Neufeld is also explicit about the fact that he doesn’t view differences 
between text and speech as significant for his purposes. He acknowledges 
“that language is not the only modality of social life. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, however, I shall view language as socio-communicative event 
and therefore constituent of social reality where written texts are but one 
example of a specialized form of socio-communicative interaction”159.  
 
Thus he restates his thesis as being that  
 
‘text’ may be understood as a communicative event or act between the writer and 
his/her audience. The language of the text has the power to perform acts. The 
Christological confessions and ethical exhortations may be viewed as written 
effective acts intended to change the content of the readers’ confessions in order to 
bring about a proper alignment of speech and conduct.160  
 
Despite the fact that he intends to view text as merely an aspect of 
communication, however, he also cites the work of Ricoeur to support the 
idea that a text  
 
                                                     
155 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p vii-viii.  
156 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 2 
157 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p3 
158 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 38 
159 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p41, footnote 25 
160 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p41 
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once written, becomes autonomous and remains so both in regard to the author 
and the audience. He [Ricoeur] defines ‘text’ as “written discourse,”161 or as 
something said to someone about something. Though it is “discourse fixed in 
writing,”162 he insists that the text assumes a life of its own and thereby 
formalizes and intensifies the characteristics which it displays in speaking.163  
 
There does seem to be a certain inevitable tension, not fully explored here, 
between stressing the universality of the “communicative events” of 
“embodied communication”164, and the fact that the ‘semantic autonomy of a 
written text’ entails that “the specific connection of speech with hearer is lost, 
whereas the audience of a written text is potentially universal. The 
implications of textual autonomy is that [sic] what the text means now matters 
more than what the author may have meant when he wrote the text.”165  
 
I am not necessarily criticising the idea of textual autonomy, nor the idea that 
speech and writing are sometimes usefully conjoined and blurred, but the fact 
that ‘textual autonomy’ seems primarily a phenomenon of writing, while 
Speech Act theory was introduced explicitly in relation to speech alone, is 
more significant than Neufeld acknowledges, particularly if illocutions are in 
view.  Textual autonomy precisely entails that it is not clear who is 
communicating through a text, in a way distinctively different from the face-
to-face communication Speech Act theory assumes. In particular, if one is 
viewing a text as a ‘written effective act’ of a particular writer addressed with 
specific intent to a particular readership, this does not sit easily with the idea 
of the autonomy of the text. 
 
The assumption, for example, that 1 John is a letter of encouragement and 
admonition, gives it a greater degree of particular ‘embodiedness’ than might 
be accorded a poem, or narrative tale. It is interesting that in his article ‘Acts 
of Admonition and Rebuke: A Speech Act Approach to 1 Corinthians 6:1-
11’166, Neufeld seems more open to the specific epistolary contexts of first 
century letter-writing, although of course in this instance the identity of 
author and recipients is less opaque. 
 
In his book, Neufeld simply asserts that “if text is therefore something said to 
someone, my first task is to explore Austin’s speech-act theory and his 
conclusion that language is used to perform acts that have effects”167. Neufeld 
                                                     
161 The Model of the text: Meaningful action considered as text” in Hermeneutics and the human 
sciences (CUP 1981) p201ff 
162 The Model of the text: Meaningful action considered as text” in Hermeneutics and the human 
sciences (CUP 1981) p145 
163 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p43 
164 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p41 
165 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p43 footnote 38 
166 Biblical Interpretation 8:4 (2000) 375-399. 
167 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 43 – this rather abrupt segue has 
echoes of Briggs “if speech act theory can apply to texts, the next step is to ask what has 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Three: Speech Act theory and Biblical exegesis 
102 
quotes Evans and acknowledges Thiselton, but does not discuss Austin’s 
explicit focus on speech alone168. He outlines the detail of Austin’s theory; 
however, despite noting his citation of Austin’s definition169, I entirely 
disagree with Neufeld that Austin suggests that ‘all utterances were the 
product of an illocutionary act’. For Austin, some utterances are illocutionary 
acts, but not all, and utterances are as much the bearers of those acts, as they 
are the product of them.  
 
Neufeld, though, then goes on to suggest that  
 
the illocutionary force of a speech act represented the attempt on the part of the 
writer to accomplish some purpose, such as, promising, informing, warning, 
putting forward as hypothesis, arguing, predicting, etc. For instance, the 
statement, “if anyone were to say that we do not have sin, we deceive ourselves 
and the truth is not in us” (1:8), could be spoken as a warning, a prediction, an 
assertion, or an hypothetical remark, that is, as speech acts with different 
illocutionary forces. Furthermore, the attempt to accomplish some purpose in a 
speech act might also have a result. This Austin designated as the perlocutionary 
force. A speech act with the illocutionary force of a warning, e.g., “get out of the 
building,” might effect a response of alarm, anger, or curiosity, depending on the 
specific nature of the warning.170  
 
There are a number of problems with this account. In the first place, in line 
with the confusion between utterances and illocutions referred to above, there 
seems to be a confusion here between speech acts and illocutions.  
 
Secondly, the question of the ‘illocutionary force’ of ‘an attempt’ is a vexed 
one, that Austin himself was unsure about, but to speak of illocutionary force 
representing ‘the attempt of a writer’ rather than a successful act, seems to 
import back in that metaphysical baggage that both Austin and Neufeld were 
keen to abandon, and therefore to render the concept of ‘success’ unclear171. 
On this account, illocutionary force seems to equal intention. (It is also 
noteworthy that Neufeld refers to ‘a speech act attempted by a writer’; 
although he has already defended this blurring, ‘speech act’ in this context 
seems the wrong phrase.) 
 
Neufeld is subsequently quite clear that Austin defended both the idea that 
language was an action not a description, and that utterances are successful or 
                                                                                                                                                        
happened when this has been done”, as discussed in section 4 of this chapter (see Words in 
Action op cit p86), and is equally insufficient. 
168 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p43. He does , however, reference the 
work of Pratt, Lanser, Ohmann and Hancher  in footnotes on p42, and the Semeia edition on 
Speech Act theory. 
169 “According to Austin all utterances were the product of an illocutionary act, that is, “the 
performance of an act in saying something as opposed to the performance of an act of saying 
something”” Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p44, quoting How To p 100.  
170 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p44 
171 See the discussion of intention in the next chapter of the thesis.  
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not depending on the circumstances of their utterance172. He notes Austin’s 
discussion of the various infelicities that can arise and suggests that “the rules 
that Austin isolated determined whether an act of speech had come off 
properly, i.e., whether its uptake had been successful”173. The concept of 
uptake, which is not expanded upon by Neufeld, is discussed in detail in 
chapter five of this thesis, being central to the illocutionary-perlocutionary 
distinction174.   
 
Neufeld notes Austin’s other conditions for illocutionary success, and he 
concludes from this that it is not possible to say ‘I am in the light, but I hate 
my brother’ “because no established convention would permit such a claim to 
be successful”175. Or, you cannot say “we have fellowship with him” (1 John 
6) if you “walk in darkness” because there is “no evidence of a circumstance 
or convention that legitimately sanctioned such a wide gulf in speech and 
conduct”176.  
 
However, Neufeld also notes that “the social and religious milieu of the 
confessions and ethical assertions are not apparent enough to determine their 
success on the basis of convention and circumstance”177, but nonetheless he 
remains confident that  
 
even though the social horizon escapes us in 1 John, it is possible to re-
contextualize the confessions within the immediate linguistic world of a 
potential speech act circumstance that the author of 1 John creates. The success 
or failure of the confessions and ethical exhortations depends upon this speech 
act circumstance and its conventions (the immediate linguistic context). The 
purpose is to transform the speech and conduct of the readers.178  
 
Again, there does seem to be a tension between a recognition of the 
importance of context for illocutionary or speech act success, and the stress on 
the importance of the literary text against the historic context of its setting. 
Neufeld argues that the inadequacy of our contextual historical knowledge 
both requires and allows us to simply (in Thiselton’s words) ‘appropriate’ or 
‘make our own’ the text, without thereby worrying that the illocution of the 
                                                     
172 “Utterances are appropriate or inappropriate relative to the conditions of the utterance 
rather than true or false in relation to a reality that underlies all conditions. Performative 
language, he [Austin] said, was related to these conditions of appropriateness and 
inappropriateness where the circumstance of the utterance made clear whether it had been 
successfully performed. In the utterance of something, certain conditions or rules must be 
true in order for a performative to be successful.” Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis 
of 1 John, p 47, though I am not sure that ‘true’ is quite the right word here. See also ‘Acts of 
Admonition and Rebuke: A Speech Act Approach to 1 Corinthians 6:1-11’p390. 
173 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 47 
174 Neufeld also refers to uptake without further explanation in ‘Acts of Admonition and 
Rebuke: A Speech Act Approach to 1 Corinthians 6:1-11’ p392. 
175 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 48 
176 Ibid  
177 Ibid  
178 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 49 
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author is lost or refashioned. To divorce the speech act circumstances that the 
author of 1 John creates in the reader, from his own social and historic 
circumstances within which he created the text, looks rather like having one’s 
cake and eating it. 
 
Neufeld is aware of this problem. He has already noted that “a major problem 
to overcome, however, is the lack of a discernable social horizon in 1 John to 
help ascertain the force of the confessions”179. His solution is to refer to “the 
constitutive function of “religious Language””180. He suggests that 
 
in texts where non-referential speech acts are predominant, the meaning of the 
passages escapes the closed system of conceptual semantics. In 1 John the 
governing semantic horizon is determined by the self-involving character of the 
illocutionary force of the speech act. These speech acts lie at a deeper self-
involving level, where meaning is not derived from the reconstructed historical 
realities of the text, but from the illocutionary force of the word that is 
constitutive of the person of faith.181 
 
His point here is that although we don’t know enough to talk about the 
conventions and circumstances that make the acts of 1 John effective in their 
original context, nonetheless these acts operate at a “deeper self-involving 
level”, of personal essence, and this can be addressed as a universal. So, by 
virtue of the religious and illocutionary language in use here there is a sort of 
universal human illocution going on.  
 
He defends and develops this position further by discussing first Derrida and 
then Evans. With regard to Derrida he asserts that “what is important for our 
purpose in this discussion is not Derrida’s insistence that language is 
autonomous and independent of the subject or that illocutionary force stems 
from the constitutive function of language itself, but that language and the act 
of writing dialectically interact to constitute the writing subject.”182 This seems 
to be an inadequate summation: it is more the case that Derrida denies the 
existence of illocutionary force at all, because it is for him far too redolent of 
the ‘metaphysical lure of conscious intention’183, and that the writing subject 
is effaced. Certainly, Neufeld doesn’t demonstrate that his view of Derrida is 
accurate; he simply asserts it.  
 
Likewise, I don’t agree that for Austin the self is constituted by illocutionary 
force, as he appears to suggest, again without adequate demonstration: 
Neufeld simply claims that Derrida’s insight  
 
permits the perception of text as language and at the same time to recognize the 
act of writing as constitutive. The significant debate between speech act theorists 
                                                     
179 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 49 
180 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 49 
181 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 50. 
182 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p51 
183 See the detailed discussion of Derrida’s view of Austin and intention in the next chapter. 
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and Derrida regarding intentionality, conventions and the constitutive function 
of language has demonstrated that speech acts should be considered as 
operating on two levels; at a social level, e.g., in some narrative texts whose 
existence is given, and at a deeper constituting level, e.g., in certain non-
narrative texts where the illocutionary force constitutes the self. For my purpose 
and because of my interest in speech act circumstance and convention and 
implicature, the iterability of writing must give consideration not only to the 
repeatability of linguistic elements but also to the repeatability of the ‘rules’ 
which govern any linguistic system whether spoken or written.184   
 
He doesn’t however, explain how the Derrida-Searle debate (discussed in the 
previous chapter of this thesis), or other similar debates, demonstrate this 
two-tiered nature of speech acts, nor is the nature of the speech acts proposed 
clear to me. There is no explanation of how speech acts operate at a social 
level in some narrative texts, nor what it means to say that the existence of 
such texts is a given: one must ask, ‘given in what sense, or compared with 
what?’ Neither is there an explanation of how illocutionary force constitutes 
the self in deeper level, non-narrative texts, nor any suggestion of which texts 
this involves.  Presumably, reading is involved in some way, but this is not at 
this point made clear.  
 
Lastly, the repeatability of the ‘rules which govern any linguistic system’ is 
not expounded upon, except by reference to John Searle’s response to 
Derrida. Neufeld’s reference to Searle here suggests that he, like Seale, might 
not have fully grasped the implications of Derrida’s notion of ‘iterability’ 
which, as a concept, expresses a view of the fundamentally ‘un-tethered’ 
nature of writing and language: textual autonomy expanded! Derrida argues 
that linguistic elements are infinitely (or indeterminately) repeatable, and that 
no rules can fully govern this185. The nature of the ‘rules’ which govern a 
linguistic system, and the extent to which they may or may not be repeatable, 
is not clear cut: as Austin himself noted, it is necessary that rules be flexible, 
and thus it may be better to think of them as guidelines, or as conventions, or 
in some other fashion entirely186. 
 
Neufeld then moves on to Evans, and his idea of the self-involving nature of 
religious language to which we have already referred. Having accepted 
Evans’s idea he concludes in respect of 1 John that   
 
speech act theory underscores that the propositional content and meaning of 
each of the passages may also be determined on the basis of their illocutionary 
force. Derrida’s conclusion that the act of writing is constitutive of the writing 
subject is important and when linked with Evans’s theory of religious language 
makes it possible to talk about the self-involving character of such language. 
                                                     
184 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p52 
185 See the previous chapter of this thesis 
186 Austin referred to the necessity of allowing for agents “getting away with things” [How To 
p30]  when new conventions are initiated. Indeed he notes that “in ordinary life, a certain 
laxness in procedure is permitted – otherwise no university business would ever get done!” 
How To p37. 
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Speech acts with the illocutionary force of a commissive, an expressive, a 
representative, and a directive and their implicature play a primary role in 
making explicit intention and attitude. Austin’s two conditions of an 
appropriate circumstance and linguistic convention help to determine the 
kinds of speech acts possible within the limits of certain speech circumstances. 
These insights open a new way of analyzing and setting out the performative 
aspects of the language of 1 John.187 
 
One of the odd points to note here, though, is the fact that the speaker is 
always involved in some way in the utterance, such that the same words 
could, depending on our estimation of the speaker’s stance, mean all sorts of 
different things. In this sense any speech act is self-involving, whether it is 
perlocutionary, illocutionary, or whatever, and the manner in which we take 
it to involve the utterer depends on the context: is this ironic, sincere, 
heartfelt, dangerous, sarcastic, a performance, or some other form of act?  
 
Religious speech acts are (or may/ought to be – one can of course be 
insincere) self-involving in a particular way, but it is not obvious that this has 
any special relationship to the existence of illocutions, nor does Neufeld 
demonstrate this. ‘Illocutions’ will certainly be infelicitous or unsuccessful or 
whatever, if the utterer appears to undermine them by his or her own 
attitudes, such as the example of a bridegroom leering at the bridesmaids, but 
the consequences of that will vary depending on the specific act involved188, 
and this requirement is not unique to ‘illocutions’. Being involved is not the 
same as being constituted by an act, but in all cases this is a question of 
reception: of how the act was taken, and of what we (the ‘audience’) think 
you (the utterer) were doing. 
 
There is also a distinction between speakers/hearers, and writer/readers, in 
this sense of self-involvement, simply because of the different ways in which 
each are present in the utterance. Although Botha has considered this, 
Neufeld does not examine the question of presence at all. The ‘expressive’ that 
is uttered by a person in a context in which we are present, has a different 
‘force’ (or, possibly, ‘meaning’), from the same words written in a text, even if 
in both cases the words are identical.  
 
It may well be, that we hear the person say “he who says he is in the light and 
hates his brother is in the darkness still”189, and agree; and that we read the 
writing, and agree; and that in each or either case we also commit ourselves to 
a view or a ‘side’ in a dispute, or to a way of life. But the way in which we are 
involved differs depending on, for example, the kind of context presumed. If 
we read the text aloud, or if we hear the text read aloud in a public gathering, 
our agreement or disagreement will be constitutive of our self (as seen by 
                                                     
187 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p56 
188 Which is why the words ‘infelicitous’ and ‘unhappy’ are so hazy and unspecific: a leering 
bridegroom may be infelicitous, but still married if he says the right words, for example. 
189 1 John 2:9 
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others and possibly ourselves) in different ways from a private reading or 
reading-aloud in our own room, where our response is a rather more private 
matter.  
 
Religious language is potentially self-involving, but this depends on the 
context: we may simply be attending a gathering or reading a text without 
being or feeling ourselves to be ‘members’, for example190. There is indeed a 
sense in which it is our taking of the language as self-involving that makes it 
religious. If we heard or understood the language as being the deluded 
ranting of a marginalised or heretical figure, they would not be self-involving 
in the same profound ‘religious’ way, although there would still be an 
element of self-involvement: we would hear and condemn.  
 
The specific kind of self-involvement that Neufeld imagines, in which words 
‘strike home’ into the heart of the hearer or reader, is merely one particular 
type of religious response, which is the product of, and a factor in producing, 
one particular religious reading context. Neufeld himself acknowledges this 
in his article ‘Acts of Admonition and Rebuke: A Speech Act Approach to 1 
Corinthians 6:1-11’, where he discusses the possibility that the congregation at 
Corinth will not respond to Paul’s utterances in the way Paul asserts to be 
appropriate191.  
 
To re-iterate, I am not necessarily quarrelling with his description either of the 
possible effects of 1 John, nor of this as a description of the author’s intention. 
However, other readings of this are possible in other contexts, and it is also 
important to ask, ‘if this is a ‘language game’ of confession, why isn’t that ‘all’ 
that it is? Why is it necessary to introduce the additional category of 
‘illocutions’?’ Aside from the difficulty of encapsulating this kind of language 
within a definition of illocutions that enables them to be distinguished from 
perlocutions, it simply appears unnecessary to try at all, when a concept of 
language games of confession, or simply, of particular kinds of speech act, 
would do equally well. 
 
Neufeld also fails to ask how it is that these transforming effects are 
produced. As I suggested above, the language-game is a factor, not primarily 
of the text that is read, but of the context in which the text is read, and which 
firstly proclaims the text to be Scripture, and secondly reads the text in this 
‘personalized’, individualized way (the point being that not merely is this a 
Christian context, but it is a particular Christian reading; one of many possible 
ones). Neufeld does not appear to consider the nuances from the reader’s 
point of view. In a somewhat absolutist manner he asserts that  
 
                                                     
190 I.e. we do not imagine ourselves to be being addressed here – we are not the ‘implied 
reader’, as it were. 
191 ‘Acts of Admonition and Rebuke: A Speech Act Approach to 1 Corinthians 6:1-11’ p391-2 
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hearing or reading the text is a transactional event that entails acceptance, 
commitment, and a redescription of the hearers/readers religious and ethical 
orientation. The experience of hearing (and reading) the text of 1 John produces 
in the hearers/readers a related life stance and attitude that leads to belief, 
imagination and effective involvement in the states of affairs to which the author 
has committed himself. In other words, it invites the addressees to join the 
author in contemplating what has been written, evaluating it, and then 
responding to it.  
 
In summary, the act of writing constitutes the self and is homologous to Austin’s 
illocutionary act (the act performed in saying something), and that [sic] the 
written text (homologous to Austin’s locutionary act) becomes the 
communicative transaction (text as language or the written medium). ... It is 
possible to isolate the illocutionary force of the Word upon which is founded the 
self of the person of faith. The author uses these speech acts to make plain his 
religious and ethical orientation.192   
 
It does seem highly problematic to assert so confidently that the act of writing 
is an illocutionary act ‘piggy-backing’ on a locutionary one. The ‘religious’ act 
of taking the text as an order, a command, etc, is perfectly common and 
coherent, but what is less clear is why this one possible response allows or 
requires us to describe the act of writing as an illocutionary act.  
 
The ‘force’ of an illocutionary act (taking Austin’s terms without quibble for 
the moment) ‘transforms’ the locutionary abstraction into a speech act with 
specific meaning in a context, based on various conditions. There thus 
appears to be a parallel with the understanding of a text. But it is not clear 
what makes this an illocutionary act, rather than either a perlocutionary one, 
or simply the act of writing as normally conceived193.    
 
Neufeld begins his fourth chapter with a commentary on 1 John. Here, he 
asserts that  
 
the language of the incipit [verses 1-4] with its profusion of sensory verbs shifts 
the focus away from the task of defining the specific content of the message 
proclaimed to determining the illocutionary forces involved in the act of 
proclaiming the message. The different illocutionary forces present in the act of 
proclamation make plain the thrust and content of the message. A specifically 
defined community, either of supporters or of adversaries, is not required to 
make sense of this message.194   
 
Neufeld appears to be imagining that ‘proclamation’, as a specifically 
religious kind of illocution, transcends context. What seems clear here is the 
assumption that this kind of illocution exists in the intention of the speaker.  
 
                                                     
192 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p59 
193 One could for example make a convincing association between the textual locution and E 
D Hirsch’s idea of ‘meaning’, and the illocution and Hirsch’s idea of ‘significance’ – see 
chapter six. 
194 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p65-66 
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This question concerning the nature of illocutions, and the point at which they 
can be said to exist, is one of the most important questions that will be 
addressed in the next two chapters of this thesis. It is a confusion that exists in 
Austin’s own work. Can we talk about an illocution at the point when it is 
uttered, or only after it has been heard, recognised, and/or complied with? 
Neufeld’s ‘proclamation illocution’ is clearly one that only needs uttering to 
exist, but he is also aware of the need for illocutions to be contextually 
appropriate, and these two assumptions appears to be slightly contradictory. 
Is the Gospel proclaimed if no-one hears or understands, or if they take the 
proclaimer to be a madman? 
 
It ought also to be noted that in this quote, recognising the illocution is a 
question of ‘making sense of’ the message, and thus that illocutionary force 
here is equivalent to meaning195. It is not clear whether this ‘making sense of’ 
is a precursor to or simultaneous with ‘being constituted by’.  
 
The sense that Neufeld is actually describing perlocutionary acts rather than 
illocutionary ones is reinforced when Neufeld refers, as he regularly does, to 
the author’s convincing the readers196, which seems to be a perlocution: one 
could say, ‘I was convinced’, but not ‘I am convincing you’197. He also notes 
that what the hearers have heard from the author “has forced upon them a 
perception of Christology and ethics about which they must make a conscious 
decision – the perlocutionary effect: by warning and encouragement he may 
persuade them to accept his views.”198 This seems to be an accurate 
assessment of the entire letter as a coherent whole: as, if you like, a text-act. It 
takes serious account of the whole text as a finished, intended whole. 
However, what as a description it fails to do, is demonstrate the usefulness or 
applicability of Austin’s speech act categories, or their coherent application. 
 
Given this, there is an irony in Neufeld’s reference, in ‘Acts of Admonition 
and Rebuke: A Speech Act Approach to 1 Corinthians 6:1-11’, to “a potential 
confusion between illocutions and perlocutions in rhetorical approaches”199. 
Here he follows Wolterstorff’s suggestion in Divine Discourse200 that 
                                                     
195 See also p93: “the illocutionary forces of the antithetical slogans reveal that they represent 
the views of the author and not the opponents he is trying to correct” and “the illocutionary 
forces also reveal that it is the author’s desire to turn the readers away from potentially false 
views of God”, for more examples of the equation of force and meaning. 
196 See for example p93: “Since it is impossible to escape the dire consequences of acts of 
speech spoken in the domain of darkness, the readers are convinced to adhere to views about 
God, light, love and sin which cohere with God’s realm of light”, or p126: “Right confession 
in the context of orthodoxy versus heresy takes a secondary place to the author’s primary 
intention of convincing the readers to confess, deny, and believe what he himself confesses, 
believes, and denies”. 
197 See chapter one of this thesis, pages 23-24. 
198 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p129 
199 ‘Acts of Admonition and Rebuke: A Speech Act Approach to 1 Corinthians 6:1-11’ p395 
200 N Wolterstorff, Divine discourse: Philosophical reflections on the claim that God speaks 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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“persuasion is not an illocutionary act but the effect or consequence of that 
act. ... Acts of community persuasion, when brought about by illocutionary 
acts, are perlocutionary acts”201.  
 
This both illustrates the confusion between the two sorts of act, and the 
confusion over the point at which an illocution can be said to exist; and also 
suggests very much that Neufeld ought on his own account to regard 1 John 
as a perlocution not an illocution. At the very least, it ought to be the case that 
the self-involving effects that are the aim of the authors’ speech acts ought to 
be recognised as perlocutionary rather than illocutionary acts202. 
 
Neufeld concludes his work by outlining what he has attempted to achieve. 
He suggests that  
 
new definitions of textuality permit interpreting a text in terms not only of its 
historical roots but also in terms of its rhetorical power to transform the readers’ 
expectations, speech and conduct. Such an understanding of textuality does not 
divorce the text from the historical moment that gave it life, but the potential 
meaning of a text is more than the sum-total of that historical moment. A text 
continues to give life long after its birth, and that life-giving quality is inherent to 
the text in what I have suggested is the text’s power to create reality rather than 
reflect it. The ‘boasts’, ‘denials’, and ‘confessions’, although written discourse, 
nevertheless represent significant speech acts that constitute the self of the 
speaker. 
 
Written texts functioning as speech acts, however, usually require a clearly 
defined historical context to determine their force. ... Here I looked to the text 
itself to provide clues to the way in which the ‘boasts’, denials’, and ‘confessions’ 
were to be taken. I believe that the author in an imaginative and creative 
outburst created a linguistic context of an apocalyptic kind in which the boasts, 
confessions and denials make sense. In a clear and forthright manner the readers 
are familiarized with a type of speech that is totally unacceptable from the 
author’s point of view. So while some may have tossed about unacceptable 
confessions, the speech acts inform the readers of what these people, and also 
the readers for that matter, might become if they were to continue to speak 
inappropriately. The readers would become alienated from God and walk in the 
darkness as antichrists and false prophets. The readers are warned not to utter 
Christological nonsense, because speech is important in the formation of the 
reader’s self and this in turn will effect changes in their religious and ethical 
orientation.203 
 
This description of the text as an artefact of religious language, or as viewed 
in a religious language-game, is interesting and suggestive. There are, though, 
significant problems in allying this to the kind of detailed speech act 
interpretation Neufeld also attempts.  
                                                     
201 ‘Acts of Admonition and Rebuke: A Speech Act Approach to 1 Corinthians 6:1-11’ p395 
202 As Neufeld himself notes, “Paul used speech acts of admonition and rebuke with the 
illocutionary force of the directive and expressive to provoke a transformation of conduct”, but 
this transformation must be a perlocutionary effect - ‘Acts of Admonition and Rebuke: A 
Speech Act Approach to 1 Corinthians 6:1-11’ p398-399. 
203 Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p133-134 
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In terms of the two poles of use I described earlier, Neufeld is involved in 
both: he describes the text as a speech act containing illocutions, and as part of 
this description, also depicts the speech acts the text ought to or intends to 
have on the reader204. Of all the texts thus far considered, Neufeld’s book is 
the most heavily Speech Act influenced. However, the nature of 1 John as an 
address rather than a narrative alters the kind of speech act analysis it 
sustains: it is one act, rather than a narrative containing potentially many 
layers of action, and while it therefore lends itself more easily to a reader-
response angle, this does not combine easily with a somewhat inconsistent 
use of illocutions and perlocutions.  
 
Biblical Speech Act exegeses:                                                                                                                                                 
5h. B Gilfillan Upton, Hearing Mark’s Endings: Listening to Ancient Popular 
Texts through Speech Act Theory (Biblical Interpretation Series Volume 79)205 
 
Gilfillan Upton announces in her Introduction that 
 
my overall purpose is to argue that popular texts of late antiquity were 
designed to be read aloud to a listening audience, something more often 
assumed than argued, and that some forms of literary analysis, especially 
speech act theory, might be appropriate to exploring texts on the interface of 
oral and written language. I argue that speech act theory, which is based on the 
ordinary language philosophy of J.L. Austin (1962), because of its emphasis on 
language as a performance, is a potentially fruitful method to apply to the 
Gospel of Mark, typified by the various endings known to be present in 
different early Christian communities.206 
 
Given this, she argues that it is necessary to consider the role of the “lector” as 
well as that of the author and reader. She cites the work of Grice, Pratt and 
Petrey, and asks questions about the extent of literacy, and the degree of 
aloud compared with silent reading in the first century, and the nature of the 
“’authorial audience’”207. She concludes that “a major component of my 
hypothesis then, is that reading, and indeed writing, in antiquity was aimed 
at the ear rather than at the eye. I am arguing this case in opposition to many 
modern studies on the phenomenology of reading, which concentrate on 
reading as a private, visual process.”208 
                                                     
204 As he concludes: “The power of the written word to transform the orientation of the reader 
does not lie in carefully argued theological propositions, but in acts of speech with the power 
to change the self of the speaker. Specific speech acts of the directive, representative, commissive, 
and expressive kind shift the critical task from determining the meaning of the statements to 
understanding what they do. The language of these statements is a form of power and action 
that stresses the constitutive and self-involving character of the act of reading.” Reconceiving 
Texts as Speech Acts: An analysis of 1 John, p 134. I’m not sure of the difference between 
‘meaning’ and ‘understanding what a statement does’, though. 
205 (Leiden, Brill, 2006) 
206Hearing Mark’s Endings op cit page xv. 
207 Hearing Mark’s Endings p16 
208 Hearing Mark’s Endings p47 
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She then turns, by way of a comparison, to Xenophon of Ephesus’s An 
Ephesian Tale, and having examined a section of that work, she concludes that  
 
I have shown that the figures and mechanisms used by the author find a natural 
home in the rhetorical languages of late antiquity. This does not mean to say that 
the work was written as a speech; rather that it makes most sense and 
impression in an environment in which it would be read aloud to a listening 
audience, an audience which would be helped rather than hindered by the kinds 
of repetition that are found here. Recapitulations, oracles and their fulfilment 
and frequent reminders of the complex plot all have their place in a work 
intended to be heard rather than read in a modern, silent, individual way.209 
 
Having demonstrated this in a ‘control’ work, she then examines Mark 15:40-
16:8 for evidence of the same tropes, not on the assumption that the two texts 
share a style, but simply that they are both intended to be read aloud. She 
concludes that “enough has been discovered ... to show cumulatively that the 
very features in both texts that make them look clumsy and ill-structured to 
the modern silent reader’s eye may well be those which rendered it 
intelligible to an ancient audience composed of ‘listening ears’”210.  
 
Having demonstrated the ‘orality’ of Mark’s Gospel, she then explores some 
hermeneutical approaches which take this spoken-ness seriously. She makes 
the interesting and significant point that one of the benefits of Speech Act 
theory is that “it takes conventions at the time of production and first 
reception as seriously as those of a modern readership or audience. This 
seems particularly relevant in a situation in which much of the uptake of 
these narratives has been, and continues to be, aural, because of the 
ecclesiastical/liturgical context of their dominant use.”211  
 
Her conclusion is that she is interested in Speech Act theory because it 
provides 
 
a model which will help connect, by means of communication theory, the 
experience of an original audience construct (the implied audience), with its 
emphasis on aurality and rhetoric, and those experiences of a modern audience 
which resonate with this approach. From this view-point, it seems that a 
development of speech act theory, combined with some insights from narrative 
theory and ancient rhetoric, may be of value. There is, of course, a need to modify 
certain of the original insights of speech act theory, which was an ordinary 
language model, to apply to written texts; given the nature of the popular text in 
antiquity, however, I believe that the pros outweigh the cons, and by taking 
seriously the conventions of production as well as consumption, historical context 
as well as the modern reader, fresh light might be shed on the endings of Mark 
along with other ancient popular texts.212  
                                                     
209 Hearing Mark’s Endings p64 
210 Hearing Mark’s Endings p78 
211 Hearing Mark’s Endings p85 
212 Hearing Mark’s Endings p88-89 
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She is thus interested in Speech Act theory as one tool among several, 
specifically because of the ‘aurality’ of the work in question. In this respect, 
she circumvents some of the questions about the applicability of speech acts 
and illocutions in a textual context, which I have raised elsewhere. 
 
In her discussion of Speech Act theory, Gilfillan Upton refers to Pratt, Petrey 
and Botha, and introduces Austin’s three classic speech acts, the locution:  
“the act of producing a coherent and acceptable grammatical utterance”213; 
the illocution, which “represents the act of producing a force which is a 
combination of language and social practice i.e. what the speaker does by 
uttering a particular locution”214; and the  
 
so-called perlocutionary act, by which, ideally, the speaker achieves certain 
intended effects on his or her audience [and which] is, I believe, of particular 
interest to those who study religious texts. Those who read or listen to canonical 
writings do so from within a particular community with its own conventions and 
context, and experience or anticipate some reaction which may or may not bear 
much relation to the perlocution intended by the original text or performance.215 
 
Interestingly, she here implies a perlocutionary nature for texts, and equates 
that to the religious context, although there are some difficulties with the idea 
that the perlocution concerns intended effects. Indeed, she goes on to note the 
flexibility of perlocutions and the potentially unintended nature of the 
possible effects of speech acts216. 
 
Gilfillan Upton then embarks on a speech act reading of Xenophon of 
Ephesus, using in addition Grice’s maxims, and in the following chapter 
provides a similar speech act reading of Mark16:1-8. A speech act reading of 
the longer ending (16:9-20) follows in the succeeding chapter, and a reading of 
the ‘shorter ending’ after that. In these analyses, she examines the speech acts 
that occur in the narrative, as others have in work we have previously 
surveyed. Making various salient points, she describes speech acts within the 
narrative in speech act terms, and also extends the applicability of speech act 
forces to the readers, again as others have for other texts. 
 
The idea of reading-aloud producing illocutions is an interesting one, which 
could perhaps do with some more fleshing out: it would depend on the 
hearer recognising the authority of the speaker, and accepting the speech act 
as directed at themselves, in the way that St Antony the Great is said to have 
done. According to tradition, he heard read during the Liturgy the story of 
Jesus and the young man in Matthew’s Gospel, and took as a command to 
himself Jesus’ advice to the young man "if you would be perfect, go, sell what 
                                                     
213 Hearing Mark’s Endings p92 
214 Hearing Mark’s Endings p92 
215 Hearing Mark’s Endings p92-93 
216 Hearing Mark’s Endings p93 
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you possess and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and 
come, follow me."217 In this case, Antony responded to Jesus’ textual 
‘illocutionary’ command, and there are from Christian tradition other similar 
examples218.  
 
However, their rarity is part of the point: most people who heard the same 
Gospel reading as Antony did not respond in the same way, either then or 
since. It should also be noted, of course, that Antony heard the Gospel read 
aloud liturgically, in a specifically Christian worship context, as a believer. 
This is a different reading-aloud from the reading aloud of the Gospel to a 
group who have gathered to hear the Gospel read by appointment, as 
something new or interesting, or again from the crowd who might gather 
around an itinerant preacher or story-teller in the public market. 
 
Even in the case of St Antony, and certainly in the case of other hearers, it is 
not clear what if anything makes the response to hearing the Gospel a 
response to an illocutionary act. The very fact that it was taken as a command 
by one person, reminds us that it was not taken so literally, or personally, by 
most. This militates against an easy ascription of illocutionary status to the 
words of Jesus read aloud: can an act be an illocution for someone, but not for 
others? It is also not clear in most of these discussions about speech acts and 
biblical hermeneutics, whether a command needs to be obeyed for it to be a 
command, and what effect this has on the nature of illocutions: this is to 
wonder again about the relationship between illocutions, illocutionary effects, 
and perlocutions which is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters219.  
 
It is certainly possible to imagine the “stark choice of response” being 
presented to hearers hearing the short ending of Mark’s Gospel for the first 
time, and their being left with a kind of “perlocutionary shock”220. This, 
though, is due to the (possibly) perlocutionary nature of the speech act of 
‘reading aloud’. Importantly, the situation will be different when the hearer 
hears the Gospel read for a second time221. 
 
The idea, mentioned by Gilfillan Upton, that saying ‘amen’ is an illocutionary 
act is intriguing, but it is confusing to suggest that doing so at the end of the 
Gospel also amounts to bringing about “the desired perlocutionary effect ... of 
                                                     
217 Matthew 19:21 RSV 
218 St Augustine is said to have recognised an illocutionary command in the children’s chant 
“take and eat”, though this is not a Scriptural phrase, for example. 
219 Gilfillan Upton notes that Jesus commands “both the disciples and the implied audience” 
(Hearing Mark’s Endings p165). By this she means that the author’s intention is to issue a 
command to the hearers they anticipate will hear the Gospel. The difficulty is that this is only 
an illocution, given the nature of illocutions, if we accept Jesus’ authority, which the text is 
trying to propose, so that the text is of necessity both a perlocution and an illocution. 
220 Hearing Mark’s Endings p152 
221 The important fact of re-reading as a context is referred to in chapter seven of this thesis. 
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declaring the narrative to be both finished and in some sense true”222. In fact, 
as is the case with many of other works considered in this section, the 
interesting approach taken does not for the most part depend on, or use 
entirely consistently, the illocutionary and perlocutionary concepts.  
 
As with several other scholars, Gilfillan Upton has also quite extensively used 
Gricean maxims and implicatures, and although I do not find them helpful, it 
would stray beyond the confines of this thesis to discuss them. However, in 
terms of the poles of use I proposed at the start of this section she is interested 
in both: in describing illocutions and other speech acts in the text, and in 
describing their actions upon the hearers. The fact that she is imagining an 
aural context makes this relationship in some ways more straightforward, but 
in the end inconsistencies in her use of speech act terms render those details 
rather un-illuminating. 
 
Biblical Speech Act exegeses:                                                                                                                       
5i. J W Adams, The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55. 
(Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 448)223 
 
Adams begins his study by suggesting that “certain utterances include an 
illocutionary force or forces that personally involve a speaker and/or hearer 
in extralinguistic actions prescribed in the propositional content that brings 
about a state of affairs in the world”224. He notes that meaning involves more 
than simply propositional content, but also involves speech acts in situations 
of communicative action.  
 
In a manner similar to that of other scholars we have considered, but perhaps 
more explicitly, he suggests that  
 
certain types of communicative action draw in the reader as a self-involved 
participant with the text. In some instances the reader is the recipient of a 
promise, or a warning, or is commissioned to a task. In other cases, the reader 
becomes the speaker who confesses, prays, laments and so on. Such self-
involvement includes extralinguistic action expressed in the propositional 
content of the utterance. Prescribed entailed action extends beyond the world of 
the text and thus has transforming implications for the reader/speaker and 
reality. As a self-involved participant in the text, the reader becomes an essential 
and indispensable factor in the process of interpretation.225 
 
As a description of the implied aim of religious texts, perhaps, or of the 
author’s assumed intention, this appears plausible: as we have noted before, 
however, this is a description of one particular reading context.  
 
Adams also notes that  
                                                     
222 Hearing Mark’s Endings p170 
223 (New York, T&T Clark, 2006) 
224 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p1. 
225 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p3 
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Regarding the transferability of speech act theory to biblical interpretation, much 
work has already been done to demonstrate that the notions of speech act theory 
can be applied to written texts. For speech act theorists, the relationship between 
the performative utterances of a speaker/hearer and the writer/reader is a 
natural one. As Richard S Briggs correctly concludes, “Broadly speaking, speech-
act theory is well suited to any communicative action” [‘The Uses of Speech Act 
Theory in Biblical Interpretation’, Currents in Research: Biblical Studies 9 (2001) p 
236]. Briggs has most recently re-examined the now-famous debate between the 
philosopher/literary critic Jacques Derrida and speech act theorist John R Searle 
– whether a theory that focuses on speech acts between a speaker and hearer can 
in turn be applied to communicative acts embodied in texts which pass from 
writer to reader – and further demonstrates that the discipline legitimately and 
logically applies to texts. [citing Word in Action p73-86 and ‘The Uses 
of Speech Act Theory in Biblical Interpretation’, op cit p236-238]226  
 
This account doesn’t seem entirely accurate: it is certainly not true that for 
Austin or Searle “the relationship between the performative utterance of a 
speaker/hearer and the writer/reader is a natural one”! Moreover, neither the 
Derrida-Searle debate, to which others have already referred, nor Briggs’s 
own description of it, in any way demonstrate that ‘speech act theory can 
apply to texts’. More work is required to demonstrate this than simply this 
reference and assertion.  
 
Adams also refers to the Semeia article on Speech Act theory and notes that 
the majority of the contributions were theoretical not practical and concerned 
with the rethinking not just the refinement of exegesis. He notes that he is 
interested in the latter, rather than the former, and thus in terms of my two 
transient ‘poles’, he is presumably particularly interested in describing speech 
acts within a text. 
 
He views the particular usefulness and contribution of Speech Act theory as 
manifested when it is  
 
used to identify performative utterances or strong illocutionary acts that 
include linguistic and/or non-linguistic convention, self-involving 
extralinguistic stance and/or action, and entail transformative effects in the 
world. In contrast, it has been argued that speech act theory aligns with the 
concepts and goals of rhetorical criticism. Theorists include in their discussion 
on speech acts the aspect of perlocutionary effects; however, the central feature 
of speech act theory is the illocutionary act. Further, perlocutionary effects are 
dependent upon illocutionary acts, not vice versa. According to speech act 
theorists, meaning is found in the linguistic illocutionary act whereas the 
perlocution occurs outside of language and concerns the non-linguistic 
psychological effects of illocutionary acts transpiring within the 
listener/reader. Hence, the actual study of meaning centers on illocutions, not 
perlocutions. Attempting to determine the intended perlocutionary effects of 
an utterance can provide insight for interpretation, but such analysis occurs 
primarily through an examination of the illocutionary acts employed in 
                                                     
226 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p3-4 
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language. Consequently, when utilizing speech act theory solely to identify the 
persuasive dimension of a text the central notions of speech act theory are 
actually disregarded. Exploring the performative nature and specifically the 
various illocutionary acts within a biblical text extends well beyond identifying 
persuasive aspects in speech or texts.227 
 
This is a very interesting description of Adams’s assumptions about Speech 
Act theory, particularly in the light of the conclusions we have drawn about 
some other approaches. However, it rather simplifies the relationship 
between ‘perlocutionary effects’ and ‘illocutionary acts’, and between 
‘illocutionary acts’ and ‘meaning’, as discussed at considerable length in 
chapter five of this thesis.  
 
It also implies that perlocutions are non-linguistic, and while this may be true 
for some, it is not true for all, by any means. Certainly for Austin 
perlocutionary acts can be ‘intended’ not merely ‘possible’228. One can 
certainly talk of the illocutionary power of acts that have already been 
described in the text, and that have therefore ‘happened’. However, to talk of 
illocutions in the text-reader relationship is far more problematic. 
 
Adams illustrates here the implicit assumption, not unique to him, that the 
meaning of an utterance or phrase is begotten, and could be in practice found 
in a dictionary229, while what actually happened (which he terms ‘the 
perlocutionary effect’, and which is the actual meaning of what was in fact 
uttered or occurred) is less important! Meaning here is equivalent to 
intention, and this has at least two problems: the first is the question of how 
we discern intention – the answer is that it is only distinguishable from simple 
meaning if there appears to be a discrepancy which the audience recognises 
as such; intention is therefore a descriptive not predictive concept230: and the 
second is that Austin himself is trying to eliminate this concept of ‘inward 
intention’ right at the beginning of his linguistic theory. 
 
 However, as Adams’s own work will illustrate, the ‘dictionary meaning’ only 
gives you a place to start. It doesn’t tell you what a phrase (or act) actually 
meant in that past conversation or text, nor can it predict what it will mean in 
a conversation about to happen, or a text about to be written.  
 
Adams then considers various approaches to Isaiah 40-55, reflecting on the 
nature of real authorship. He concludes that “despite the difficulties raised by 
the final form of Isa 40-55, interpreting the material as it presently stands 
remains more profitable and deals more concretely with the text itself. Thus, 
                                                     
227 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p7-8 
228 See for example How To 2 p118. 
229 Although it will become apparent later on that he does not necessarily hold this view: he 
refers to the reader involving themselves with the text, “whereby meaning is determined” – 
p61. 
230 See the next chapter of this thesis.  
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this study understands the contents of these chapters as arranged deliberately 
and orderly ... producing an overarching intentional message.”231  
 
Moreover, Adams intends to consider this material not just ‘as it is’, but as a 
performative utterance. He explains  
 
Performative utterances occur within the world of the text between speakers and 
hearers and, in other instances, the text itself addresses the reader and invites 
self-involvement. 
Much of the language of Isa 40-55 can be seen as performative as it contains 
various types of illocutionary acts and elicits the self-involvement of the 
hearer/reader. This being so, the notions expressed within speech act theory 
become an important and crucial way to gain further insight into Isa 40-55. As 
mentioned above, the dominant use of speech act theory has focused on the 
perlocutionary effects or persuasive consequences of language. In contrast, 
speech act theorists claim that meaning is found in the illocutionary act while 
perlocutions derive from such utterances. I will focus on the performative 
dimension of chs. 40-55 and specifically on the illocutionary acts, their intended 
perlocutionary effects, and the self-involving nature of the text.232  
 
Adams is aware of the difference in Austinian terms between an illocution 
and a perlocution, and is consistent in his attempts to distinguish them, 
although as I have noted, the categories themselves are in fact dubious, as will 
be demonstrated later in this thesis.  
 
In particular, the divorce between perlocutions and meaning is problematic, 
as is the identification between meaning and force that Adams assumes: after 
all, if meaning is simply the same as force, why is it necessary to use the 
concepts of ‘force’ and ‘illocution’ at all? As L J Cohen notes,   
 
if it makes sense to discuss the meanings of English sentences, as grammarians, 
lexicographers and logicians often do, then it looks as though any individual 
utterance of ‘it is raining’ may be ascribed both a meaning, derived immediately 
from the meaning of the English sentence ‘it is raining’, and also an illocutionary 
force, depending on such variable factors as the intonation with which the 
sentence has been uttered. But on a stricter phonetic analysis here we have not 
just one sentence of spoken English, but at least two… The difference between a 
rising and a falling intonation has as much right to affect the classification of 
individual utterances into English sentences as has the difference of sound 
between ‘raining’ and ‘hailing’.233 
  
If force is subsumed into meaning, it also becomes clearer that ‘force’ is a 
quality that can only be described of an act that has happened, not predicted 
of acts that have yet to occur.  
 
The other area of importance to address, as again we have already noted, is 
the nature of illocutions that are self-involving for the audience, in a written 
                                                     
231 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p14 
232 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p16 
233 ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 14:55 (1964) p126 
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context. Some description of how read (not simply read-aloud) illocutions 
operate, and the conventional basis on which they do so, will be required234.  
 
Adams suggests that  
 
The central illocution of Isa 40-55 is Yahweh’s illocutionary act of the Cyrus 
event which is referred to throughout chs. 40-48. This section contains various 
persuasive appeals to the addressees as well as readers, but the primary focus of 
these arguments is grounded in and derives from Yahweh’s illocution. In other 
words, Yahweh’s speech act actually creates and substantiates his perlocutionary 
appeals. The central perlocutionary intention of Yahweh’s illocutionary act aims 
at the audience’s confession of Yahweh alone. Isaiah 40-55 envisions the people 
of God comprised of a confessional community.  Individuals witnessing to 
Yahweh’s supreme power actualize their becoming part of the people of God 
through their confession of him alone.235  
 
The idea of Yahweh’s illocutions is an interesting one, as Wolterstorff has also 
noted, but it requires one to identify various questions. For example, one 
must ask, which audience is Yahweh addressing, and how is he addressing 
them? Is He addressing the readers of the text, or the community addressed 
within the text (or both)? Alternatively, is the “illocutionary act of the Cyrus 
event” addressed to Cyrus (who does not know Yahweh), and if so, can an 
illocution be ‘felicitous’ if the addressed audience remain ignorant that they 
are in fact being commanded? If Cyrus carries out Yahweh’s wishes without 
realising that this is what he is doing, is this an illocution236?  
 
Related to this, are we to take the words of Yahweh as directly His, or as 
mediated through a writer: is it Yahweh speaking, or speaking through 
someone else’s speech, or through someone else’s writing, and is that 
someone creatively involved in the message, or are we to take them as a 
cipher?237  
                                                     
234 It may be that read, and read-aloud, illocutions operate on the same  conventional basis, 
but a description of that would be helpful.  
235 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p16 
236 The text suggests that Cyrus might be ignorant of his own status, and that it is others who 
are as much the aim of this explanation. Cyrus may only become aware of his status once he 
has become God’s agent: another post-facto realisation! “Thus says the LORD to his anointed, 
to Cyrus, whose right hand I have grasped, to subdue nations before him and ungird the 
loins of kings, to open doors before him that gates may not be closed: "I will go before you 
and level the mountains, I will break in pieces the doors of bronze and cut asunder the bars of 
iron, I will give you the treasures of darkness and the hoards in secret places, that you may 
know that it is I, the LORD, the God of Israel, who call you by your name. For the sake of my 
servant Jacob, and Israel my chosen, I call you by your name, I surname you, though you do 
not know me. I am the LORD, and there is no other, besides me there is no God; I gird you, 
though you do not know me, that men may know, from the rising of the sun and from the 
west, that there is none besides me; I am the LORD, and there is no other.” Isaiah 45:1-6, RSV. 
237 This is part of Wolterstorff’s debate in his book Divine Discourse. Adams seems to assume 
that Yahweh is the direct author of Deutero-Isaiah, and he ignores the question of mediation, 
as in for example his observation that “Yahweh makes this explicitly clear by using 
conventional prophetic terminology ..” p103, or “.. the intended perlocutionary effect of 
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It may be that we decide that this does not matter, but depending on how we 
decided these questions, this will affect the ‘illocutionary’ nature of the text 
acts, because these could quite well be perlocutions, attempting to persuade 
us that in these acts we hear the words of Yahweh. Their illocutionary status 
is not immediately obvious, and this therefore weakens their standing as 
illocutions, since illocutions are of course conventional. They exist on the basis 
of social conventions: if these do not exist, there can be no illocutions.  
 
Adams’s mention of “a confessional community” is also highly significant, in 
the sense of establishing the existence of conventions without which the 
illocution cannot operate – and it is consistent to see a response as enfolding 
one into a community, although once again this illustrates the illocution’s 
contextual dependence. But an invitation to subscribe does not seem like an 
illocution, and certainly is only be half-complete until it is accepted238.  
 
A reader presumably witnesses to Yahweh by a confession of faith, by an 
acceptance of these words as Yahweh’s, and an acceptance of them as true. 
However, it is not clear what it means for a reader to “actualize their 
becoming part of the people of God”? Again, this slight confusion about 
‘success’, ‘felicity’ and ‘uptake’ indicates a problem with Austin’s categories 
here, and clouds over the central issue of how reading is an self-involving act 
that changes one. To ‘actualize my becoming part of the people of God’ 
suggests that I was already implicitly part of the people of God, but needed to 
engage with it: it has shades of the need to be ‘born-again’ in the Spirit. Given 
the original context of the text, one must also ask whether such an 
opportunity was intended then to be open to gentiles and the 
uncircumcised239.  
 
Adams answers some of the questions by suggesting that ambiguities in the 
text create 
 
an openness appears that naturally draws in the addressees/readers and 
invites them to identify with and become self-involved with it. Such openness 
especially arises with the servant passages and in particular the final three. 
These units not only contain illocutionary utterances, but also include the 
dimension of self-involvement. Engaging with these servant passages, the 
addressees/readers involve themselves and become the speaker who utters 
and confesses illocutionary acts that thereby commits them to certain 
extralinguistic entailments and obligations. In short, the Cyrus event intends to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Yahweh’s declaration of the Cyrus event ...” p102. It could well be that the whole text of 
Deutero-Isaiah, can be taken as Yahweh’s speech act, in a creative, poetic, or novelistic way 
(which on the face of it could not therefore be illocutionary). However, this text, or much of it, 
appears to be in dialogue form. This leads one to ask can illocutions be dialogic?  
238 Which leads us again into the difference between attempt and achievement discussed in 
chapter five of this thesis. 
239 ‘Actualization’ crops up repeatedly in Adams’s work, see pages 155, 198, 205 and 213, for 
example.  
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prompt the addressees to confess Yahweh alone and thereby adopt the role of 
his servant and become Israel, the people of God.240 
 
It is thus the case that for Adams, readers are ‘invited in’ by the text to take on 
a specific role with various obligations and expectations. The difficulty is that 
even assuming that Adams is absolutely correct in his description of how the 
text is intended to – and often does – work, there is no certainty here, and no 
comeback if it does not happen with a particular reader. An illocution, in the 
right context, will simply work: it doesn’t depend on your state of mind or 
‘pretended internal acts’, merely on what you do: this is part of the definition. 
With the kind of reading Adams assumes, there is significantly greater 
uncertainty about the effects, which may be different for the same reader on 
different occasions, depending on their reading context, and which do not 
seem to be anything like as securely based on observable, describable 
conventions.  
 
Adams distinguishes his ideas from those of Clines on the basis that “the 
notion of self-involvement nuances Clines’s concept as the addressee/reader 
involves the self in the text by uttering speech acts and thereby adopting 
prescribed stances and entailments, not simply identifying with personae.”241 
The difference between identifying with a persona and identifying with and 
becoming self-involved with the servant does not seem substantial, however: 
there seems to be an overlap with Adams’s suggestion that “the central 
message of these chapters is a call to return or turn to Yahweh. The way the text 
describes the nature of this return is for the addressee to forsake sin, 
acknowledge and confess Yahweh as God alone, and embrace the role of his 
servant.”242 It isn’t clear why one is more illocutionary than the other243. 
 
Likewise, when Adams asserts that  
 
while Yahweh addresses and taunts the idol-gods, Jacob-Israel, the nations, and 
the readers are listening. Every listener includes him/herself among the 
ambiguous and open “we/us/our” witnesses and becomes challenged by 
Yahweh’s claim that he declared the Cyrus event. The perlocutionary effect, 
though, remains contingent upon each witness’ evaluation of Yahweh’s 
assertion,244 
 
it would appear that ‘being challenged’ isn’t an obvious illocution, and could 
equally be a perlocutionary effect. Not everyone who hears will automatically 
be challenged; some might just shrug their shoulders, while others are already 
committed245.  
                                                     
240 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p17 
241 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p89 
242 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p91 
243 And Clines of course isn’t claiming that ‘his’ act is an illocution 
244 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p141 
245 In the same way, Adams notes on page 153 that: “Yahweh’s declarative operates through 
the extralinguistic institutional authority of Yahweh himself as the creator of Israel that also 
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Adams provides a fairly comprehensive survey of various approaches to 
speech act theory, and the idea of self-involvement in Evans, Thiselton and 
Briggs, identifying some of the problems with speech act theory that this 
thesis has also noted. He concludes that “the term ‘speech act’ properly 
functions as the governing concept that every utterance to one degree or 
another constitutes the performance of an action.”246 For him, the crucial 
phrase is that utterances ‘count as doing’ something. All performatives are 
utterances (or “communicative actions”) that count as doing something, but 
in particular, for Adams, there is a distinctive performative category of 
linguistic utterances “that may or may not involve non-linguistic 
conventions”247. 
 
Following Briggs, Adams suggests that speech acts operate on spectrum, with 
weak ones such as locutions and constatives on one end, which are more-or-
less ‘purely’ linguistic, and strong ones at the other, where the linguistic and 
non-linguistic are in play together. “The self-involvement of the speaker 
comprises the central characteristic of illocutionary acts as utterances place to 
one degree or another the speaker under certain public and social obligations 
and commitments.”248 These speech acts can be distinguished from 
perlocutions, because “when an illocution is uttered with desired 
perlocutionary effects it seems best to describe these effects as triggered or 
intended by the illocution. The effect lies outside language proper and is left 
up to the decision making processes within the hearer whether or not to 
respond appropriately.”249 
 
It is not clear, though, what distinguishes an effect that lies ‘outside language 
proper’ from the non-linguistic element of strong illocutions. In particular, the 
suggestion that speech acts are ‘counted as’ actions seems to be dubious on a 
number of levels250. It assumes that the act exists before it is recognised for 
what it is, and that the recognition is a confirmation of an act and a meaning 
that pre-existed this recognition. It also describes incorrectly the process itself: 
in general terms we don’t ‘count as’, we simply recognise.  
 
As Wittgenstein noted, we don’t take a fork as a fork, we simply say ‘this is a 
fork’251. In the same way, we don’t count something as something, we either 
                                                                                                                                                        
presupposes the brute fact that he is God. Through Yahweh’s supernatural institutional 
utterance, the confessors create the state of affairs that they constitute his servant and Israel.” I 
dispute the notion that Yahweh’s being God is a brute fact – aside from whether or not these 
exist, I would suggest that ascriptions of divinity are highly institutional – and again note that 
readers involve themselves by adopting a stance.  
246 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p45 
247 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p45 
248 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p45 
249 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p44 
250 As Adams notes, the idea of ‘counting as’ does not originate with him. 
251 Phil Inv IIxi p195, referring actually to cutlery generally!   
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recognise it as something (which that act of recognition makes it), or we are 
uncertain. To suggest that we ‘count’ it as, implies that this is a conscious and 
‘secondary’ process, rather than part of our inherited pre-linguistic culture 
(which is itself deeply linguistically formed). For the same reason, the idea 
that some utterances are not ‘conventional’ in anything other than a linguistic 
sense also seems highly suspect252.  
 
The apparently simply linguistic ‘illocutionary’ utterance “I promise” 
depends on a social concept of ‘promising’, and the assumption that people 
will keep not break their word. It is perfectly possible for there to be societies 
in which this assumption does not hold, at least for different castes or groups 
addressing one another, so that if someone from one caste or group says to 
someone from a different one “I promise”, both sides will nonetheless 
typically take this as simple politeness, with no expectation that any 
commitment is involved. Thus even the simple linguistic promise is also non-
linguistic.  
 
Equally, to say “that is a horse”, is not a purely linguistic act, as I note in 
chapter seven of this thesis. Commonplace objects and commonplace 
observations are only ‘ordinary’ in the right context; they can be 
extraordinary in different contexts. Moreover, the concept of language itself – 
that these sounds ‘mean’ this – is highly conventional. Language itself is a 
complex non-linguistic phenomenon, or at least it is a phenomenon of culture 
and society as well as of phonemes! 
 
It is interesting that Adams also notes that ‘self-involvement’ is a 
characteristic of speech act theory more generally. He also notes, having 
discussed the work of Briggs, Thiselton and Evans, that  
 
certain self-involving utterances that do not necessarily contain any other 
illocutionary markers or non-linguistic conventions can count as strong 
communicative action. This correlates with the above conclusions that certain 
utterances can be classified as performatives or as strong illocutionary acts 
because of clear extra-linguistic, self-involved stances or actions expressed or 
assumed in the linguistic content.253   
 
The difficulty here, aside from a certain circularity254, is that if we can count 
anything that looks self-involving as an illocution, why do we need both 
categories? Can’t we simply talk about utterances that are in a particular 
context recognised, or ‘usually’ or ‘properly’ recognised, as being self-
involving? The category of ‘utterances that we recognise as being self-
involving of the speaker’ is one that, like the concept of ‘meaning’ itself, is 
based on a dialogic response between utterer and audience, and it doesn’t 
                                                     
252 This point is made again in chapter five of this thesis.  
253 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p62 
254 Acts that imply self-involvement are illocutions; illocutions are acts that require you to be 
self-involved. Ostensive definition is sometimes necessary and helpful, but perhaps not here.  
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seem to require the conceptual apparatus of ‘illocutions’. If we recognise an 
utterance as being self-involving, then that is what it is, we don’t really need 
to call it an illocution as well, and doing so doesn’t appear to add anything to 
our analysis. 
 
The superfluity of this kind of ostensive definition is again illustrated when 
Adams suggests, in his more detailed textual analysis later on255 that the  
 
illocution here is a multidimensional declarative-directive-expressive-
commissive expressed through a personal confession. This illocution may be the 
strongest type of speech act one could possibly utter, as it combines naturally 
strong illocutions (declarative, directive, and commissive); yet spoken through a 
personal confession, the utterance becomes even stronger. Although this 
utterance is a single confession, it contains the expressions of two different 
speakers. This phenomenon has not been discussed in detail, if at all, by speech 
act theorists. What occurs here is a type of single interdependent speech act.256 
 
Here again it would seem easier and simpler to abandon the attempt to fit 
everything into a distinctive category which needs continual refashioning to 
include what must be included and exclude what doesn’t fit. 
 
Indeed, on this subject of exclusion and distinction, Adams’s attempts to 
distinguish illocutions and perlocutions are also ultimately unconvincing. The 
“social and public obligations” of a self-involving illocution do not necessarily 
seem distinguishable from perlocutionary effects which lie “outside language 
proper” (whatever that means), particularly since it is surely in both cases up 
to the hearers to decide whether to respond “appropriately”.  
 
Later on Adams will aver that the verse he is assessing 
 
expresses an interdependent self-involved illocutionary act uttered by Yahweh 
and the speaker. Both speakers mutually adopt a particular stance and commit 
themselves to certain entailments. In order for the utterance to operate 
successfully, each speaker must fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of the 
illocution. If one of the speakers fails in his speech act, then the utterance is 
infelicitous. This phenomenon is highlighted by Patrick’s notion of performative 
transactions. In order for the speakers actually to experience the force of 
Yahweh’s illocutionary act, they must first take a step of faith by embracing the 
call of the servant. This step puts the onus on Yahweh to fulfill his speech act. 
The public domain becomes the arena wherein the interdependent self-involved 
utterance is demonstrated and tested.257  
 
Aside from the question as to what the successful operation of an utterance 
involves – this appears to be another euphemism like infelicitous, used to 
avoid specifying the point at which meaning is created – the impression is 
clear that illocutions do require that some consequences be ‘fulfilled’. 
                                                     
255 Specifically here concerning 49:3 
256 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p152 
257 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p153-154 
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However, to suggest that an utterance becomes infelicitous if obligations are 
not fulfilled, does seem to come dangerously close to asserting that an 
utterance depends on ‘inward intention’, and therefore to come close to 
contradicting Austin’s own insistence that utterances cannot be 
‘posthumously overturned’258, since an illocution depends on the 
circumstances that were apparently in place when it was uttered, not on 
hindsight.  
 
Once again, I have no difficulty with Adams’s identification of various 
illocutionary actions within the texts (although I might not agree with the 
classification scheme or with every example that he cites)259, but I am not 
convinced that he has successfully shown how the relationship between text 
and reader is illocutionary.  
 
Like all the similar suggestions of self-involvement we have discussed in this 
section, I accept without reservation that it is possible to read religious (and 
possibly other) texts in this self-involved way, or that to read these texts in 
this way is to make them religiously significant, but this highlights the 
difficulty. To describe the texts as self-involving in the manner of Adams, 
puts the onus on the text, and suggests that because the text is a certain sort of 
text, it can, should be, and is read in this way. But this is to put the 
relationship the wrong way round (the cart very much before the horse). It is 
in fact the case, that texts are self-involving not because some, uniquely, 
demand this, but because I demand it of them in my reading context. The 
illocutionary category works from the wrong end, as it were.  
 
                                                     
258 “for he does promise: the promise here is not even void, though it is given in bad faith. His 
utterance is perhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless wrong, but it is not a lie or 
a misstatement. At most we might make out a case for saying that it implies or insinuates a 
falsehood or a misstatement (to the effect that he does intend to do something): but that is a 
very different matter” How To  p11. Alternatively, one could introduce a kind of timescale, 
distinguishing between immediate obligations, and more distant ones, which is more or less 
what Austin does – see chapter five of this thesis. 
259 Adams suggests that “in conjunction with theses forces, Yahweh implicitly utters 
directives to the addressees”, p130, and I am not sure about the possibility of implicit 
illocutions. On the same page he states that “Yahweh utters a directive illocution to the idol-
gods to substantiate the claim of divinity”. Here, I wonder whether or not the idol-gods 
actually exist, and whether or not Yahweh believes that they do. If they do exist, does 
Yahweh have the ‘conventional’ authority to direct them? If they are not real, can they be 
directed? Who needs to exist for this to be an illocution – can I direct Noddy to appear before 
me, and is this simply a question of my authority, or does the unreality of Noddy matter at 
all? This is part of the same debate about illocutionary consequences – can you issue an order 
if there is no-one to whom it relates? It also again begs the question of the textuality of 
illocutions. An order can be textual – it can be ‘signed and sealed’. Can it be directed to ‘a 
reader’? If I were handed an order from the Major-General of the local militia, would I obey 
it? If I did not, would it still be an order? He also suggests that “the perlocutionary effect of 
the successful speech act challenge consists in providing clear evidence that the idol-gods are 
indeed divine”, pages 132-133: I disagree: surely the challenge proves that the gods do not 
exist? 
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This can be demonstrated when, for example, Adams notes that  
 
the speaker is transformed by Yahweh’s illocutionary act and, as his servant, the 
speaker has the assignment of operating as his illocution. The commissive 
dimension is expressed by both Yahweh and the speaker. For Yahweh, the 
speaker is “my servant, my light, my salvation.” For the speaker, the force 
obligates her/him to fulfill Yahweh’s directive. As Yahweh’s light and salvation, 
the speaker transforms the world by embracing the declarative-directive 
dimensions of his illocution. The speaker is Yahweh’s speech act! Yahweh’s 
commissive-declarative-directive illocution is also an interdependent self-
involved utterance that transactionally depends upon both Yahweh and the 
speaker to bring about its actualization.260  
 
Here, Adams both wants to retain the author-centred, begotten not created 
aspect of the illocution, while at the same time recognizing that the self-
involving and transactional nature of the speech act requires actualization, a 
word the oddity of which I have noted before, and which here represents the 
acknowledgement that no speech act that is an ‘interdependent transaction’ 
requiring such co-creative ‘actualisation’, can also be an illocution. No reader 
can be automatically, or even ‘conventionally’, ‘obligated’ to become an 
illocution (whatever that means), unless they are reading from a context that 
allows or expects this, and in which they have already recognised the text as 
‘religious’. 
 
Likewise, when Adams notes that 
 
each speaker who self-involvingly adopts the open call of Yahweh’s servant is 
now under the obligation to operate as Yahweh’s light and salvation. The 
confessor will accomplish this by functioning in the roles of both prophet and 
king. As a prophet, the speaker brings light to those who are blind and in 
darkness. As a king, the speaker brings justice to those who are oppressed. 
Specifically, the speaker is to point to Yahweh, the true light (60:1-3, 19-20), the 
true God, and to his Torah. The speaker is to direct people to Yahweh, the only 
real savior (45:21-22),261  
 
I wonder whether this is a Jewish-specific illocution? The saviour to whom 
the speaker is ‘illocutionarily obliged’ to direct people is Yahweh, but are we 
to imagine that this is Yahweh as giver of the Law and covenantor with Israel, 
or Yahweh as Father of the ‘new Israel’ which ‘is’ the Church worshipping the 
messiah Jesus? Who can incarnate Israel? A Christian would doubtless say ‘I 
can’. Would the author of this text – if human – agree? And does that matter? 
Whose illocution is this? 
 
The question of whose illocution this is comes again to the fore when Adams 
suggests that, in relation to verse 53:1,   
 
                                                     
260 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p155 
261 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p155-156 
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the declarative dimension builds upon his previous illocutions that the speaker 
constitutes his servant and Israel, his light and salvation. In this poem the 
suffering and death of Yahweh’s arm/servant constitutes his salvation and light. 
The servant who embraces this assignment will simultaneously fulfill the 
directive and declarative dimensions. The extralinguistic actualization of 
Yahweh’s illocutionary act will bring about a transformation in the world. The 
servant is Yahweh’s illocutionary act. The servant constitutes Yahweh’s promise 
of salvation! This promise is realized through the interdependent self-involved 
utterances spoken by Yahweh and his servant. Upon the fulfilment of this vision 
the servant will realize to the fullest extent Yahweh’s promise that he will wipe 
away transgressions and remember them no more (43:25).262  
 
Here, it does seem as though the embodied illocutionary act has in fact 
become incarnate in one particular person, a figure traditionally seen as 
associated with the servant in Christian apologetics. Possible, and Divinely-
intended, associations between the crucified messiah and the suffering 
servant are perfectly legitimate in a Christian context, but can it be the case 
that a particular person represents this illocution uniquely, and in what sense 
then is this, and this person, an illocutionary act?263  
 
The creeping sense of illocutionary uniqueness (which surely undermines the 
entire illocutionary act concept) is evident also when Adams discusses the 
idea of the servant as םשא, which is transliterated as a-sham or guilt-offering. 
This seems to have in mind a very particular historical event, to which it is 
quite possible the passages do indeed refer, but this is of course heavily 
disputed, and depends very much upon one’s reading context and 
assumptions. When read aloud in the Liturgy of Good Friday, these passages 
are very different in meaning to their presence in a Jewish commentary. The 
Liturgical reading of these texts in conjunction with the remembrance of the 
crucifixion of Jesus ‘actualizes’ the text in a very different way to the way in 
which they might be actualized if read at Yad Vashem264.  
                                                     
262 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p198 
263 Given that “the Word became flesh”, there are all sorts of suggestive parallels and 
associations to be made in identifying Jesus as an illocution, but the idea that it is one 
particular reader who ‘actualises’ this text has slightly ‘magical’ overtones.  
264 On page 205 Adams notes that “in speech act terms, the servant’s death is an םשא  [a-sham: 
guilt-offering] which operates through the extralinguistic convention of the sacrificial 
legislation. But the sacrifice performs its intended expiatory purpose only when accompanied 
with the linguistic confession of sin. Thus, the institutionally required confession in 
conjunction with a םשא creates the states of affairs that the speaker is counted as forgiven.  
The servant’s death as םשא is the provision of forgiveness, but the accompanied speech act of 
confession transforms the speaker as forgiven. Through the self-involved confession of sin 
speakers separate themselves from sinful acts and receive forgiveness of that sin. Following 
Briggs’ discussion on forgiveness, through this speech act Yahweh removes the institutional 
fact of sin, which also changes the brute facts. Thus, the identity of the sinful person is 
refigured. In other words, the confessor’s identity as rebellious is changed to forgiven. As a 
result, the sickly condition of the confessor has been transformed into health and vitality. 
Yahweh has not been persuaded to forgive nor are confessors merely convinced of their 
forgiveness. Rather, Yahweh’s servant has actualized their illocutionary act that brings about 
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Adams notes this; he recognizes that these texts are differently self-involving 
for the Jewish community and given their history265. However, his reading of 
these ‘servant-texts’ becomes so very specific that, while I as a Christian have 
no problems with the reading, I do have difficulty with the idea that his 
reading has identified illocutions. (I should also note that while Adams 
describes sin as an institutional fact, he also seems to imply that it has ‘brute’ 
consequences of sickliness. Aside from the question of the stability of the 
categories of brute and institutional266, this seems uncertain.) 
 
The illocutionary act that the servant has actualized to transform the 
confessor is presumably that of atonement. But the rather convoluted series of 
events in which the confessor’s illocutionary act of confession together with 
the servant’s a-sham equate to a transformation in the confessor and the 
world, seems designed to guard against any suggestion that substitutionary 
atonement is in fact a perlocutionary act.  
 
The perlocutionary nature of substitutionary atonement has a plausibility 
since, if Yahweh’s position towards us has not changed, a change in our 
attitude to Him (i.e. a perlocution: we have been persuaded that we are 
forgiven) seems the most straightforward alternative. Undoubtedly, such a 
‘perlocutionary’ description seems to seriously underestimate the historically-
rooted, paradigm-changing universality of atonement. To describe a ‘once-
for-all’ sacrifice as an illocution, however, stretches both concepts 
significantly, and whatever the true nature of Christ’s atonement, the 
suggestion that we are dealing here with an illocution serves primarily to 
make the text harder to understand rather than easier.  
 
In his conclusion, Adams notes that  
 
I have suggested that the prophetic strategy of these chapters is a call to return 
to Yahweh. This occurs by forsaking sin, acknowledging and confessing Yahweh as 
God alone, and embracing the role of his servant. The way that the 
addressee/reader engages with this prophetic strategy is by closely following 
the text’s literary structure and performative nature. Self-involved 
addressees/readers of Isa 40-55 utter speech acts whereby they adopt 
particular stances and obligate themselves to specific entailments. This is 
especially seen in the servant passages. One of the unique outcomes of this 
study is the notion of a single interdependent illocutionary act spoken by two 
different speakers. In certain instances, Yahweh and a speaker utter the same 
illocutions and thereby place themselves under particular obligations to fulfill 
that utterance. By uttering the illocution the addressee/reader constitutes 
Yahweh’s illocutionary act. If either Yahweh or the speaker fails in the 
actualization of the illocution, it becomes infelicitous. Speech act theory has 
                                                                                                                                                        
a transformation in the world whereby one can become transformed as forgiven and restored 
through personal confession of sin and the servant’s םשא sacrifice.”  
265 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p214 
266 Which are discussed in a footnote relating to Anscombe’s article in chapter five of this 
thesis 
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also shed further light on why the servant’s sacrifice in ch. 53 is identified as an 
a-sham. This special type of sacrifice requires a confessional component which 
is exactly what the addressee/reader is implored to do in vv. 1-11aα. Another 
important discovery is the self-involving nature of rhetorical questions. Speech 
act theorists have discussed the illocutionary dimension of both real and 
rhetorical questions but not from the perspective of self-involvement or 
evaluating their force along a spectrum of strengths. With a strong self-
involving rhetorical question the speaker typically expresses an assertive-
expressive-directive illocution that naturally also includes a commissive 
dimension. The hearer either co-expresses that illocution through self-
involvement or offers a contrasting assertion with both including non-
linguistic stances and entailments.  
The self-involving nature of the Biblical text, however, is not a new 
phenomenon as countless generations of readers have recognised this dynamic 
dimension in one way or another.267  
 
However, several questions remain unanswered satisfactorily in his study. 
Although I find valuable Adams’s stress on the importance of the ambiguities 
of the text and the effect they have on the reader, I don’t believe that Adams 
has conclusively identified the nature of the relationship between the 
prophet/author, Yahweh, a reader such as you or I, and the one who is the 
servant. The illocutionary obligations imposed by the text are not depicted 
coherently as illocutionary effects rather than perlocutionary ones, nor is the 
distinction between reading and speaking the texts adequately addressed268.  
 
It is not clear here, as in the other texts considered, why the category of 
illocutions is a helpful linguistic superstructure, particularly since Adam’s 
rigorous attempts to distinguish perlocutions from illocutions serve primarily 
to make explanations of the ‘readerly’ speech acts he identifies more 
complicated and tortuous than they might otherwise have needed to be. Also, 
his description of the servant and the speaker as Yahweh’s illocution, while 
suggestive, is hard to equate with the concept of the illocution as a 
conventional linguistic act, and requires more exploration than it receives.   
 
The language of actualization (not unique to Adams), like that of felicity and 
unhappiness, becomes a way of evading serious consideration of what it is for 
an illocution to exist, and the suggestion that Yahweh's illocution might fail, 
while interesting, also needs more consideration, both theologically269 and 
linguistically.  
                                                     
267 The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40-55 p213-214 
268 There are many different types of reading in different contexts, and Adams too easily slips 
into a reading-aloud context, as in this passage, where the reader utters any number of acts. 
This is a perfectly legitimate context, but it is only one! 
269 See indeed Isaiah 55:10-11: “For as the rain and the snow come down from heaven, and 
return not thither but water the earth, making it bring forth and sprout, giving seed to the 
sower and bread to the eater, so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth; it shall not 
return to me empty, but it shall accomplish that which I purpose, and prosper in the thing for 
which I sent it.” RSV 
I am in sympathy with the suggestion that in the act of creation God made Himself open to 
misunderstanding and vulnerability, but I don’t think Adams has expressed this adequately 
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That the language of the Bible is performative I in no way wish to deny. Nor 
do I dispute the depiction of speech acts within the texts, though I am 
unconvinced that Austin’s speech act categories add much to the debate. 
However, the attempt to describe the ‘reader-text relationship’ in 
illocutionary terms, while interesting, is ultimately a failure, because it 
ignores the contextual element to  the illocution, and is unaware of significant 
flaws in the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction itself. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As I noted in the previous chapter of this thesis, Stanley Fish observed that 
Speech Act textual analysis “will always be possible, it will also be trivial, (a 
mere list of the occurrence or distribution of kinds of acts)”270. Fish suggested 
that this was because most texts (unlike Coriolanus) were not about the 
conditions of speech. The examination of various Biblical Speech Act 
criticisms has illustrated his perception, to a degree.  
 
It is quite possible, and sometimes helpful and revealing, to identify speech 
acts occurring in Biblical texts. These can sometimes identify subtleties of 
story and meaning that might otherwise elude the reader. But this is always to 
describe completed acts – things that have already been recognized and have 
happened. This kind of analysis can be an accompaniment to other sorts of 
criticism, focusing on aspects of Biblical style and narration. 
 
However, several of the Biblical hermeneuts under consideration in this 
chapter have not limited themselves to this kind of descriptive elucidation. 
Rather, they have sought to use Speech Act theory to describe how it is that 
the reader and text interact. The nature of this relationship makes this kind of 
criticism inevitably predictive, since it is describing current and future 
relationships, not merely those depicted in the past. In straying into this 
territory, Speech Act theory becomes very much less helpful, because as a 
theory it carries in some inadequate assumptions about how meaning is 
created, and its ‘predictability’.  
 
This discussion of Speech Act theory and Biblical hermeneutics has illustrated 
the variety and sophistication of the approaches on offer. This very variety 
however illustrates one of the problems, particularly with the ‘predictive’, 
reader-involved end of hermeneutics. The confidence with which some 
scholars equate texts with perlocutions and others with illocutions suggests 
                                                                                                                                                        
in theological terms, and it is one with which, I think, Vanhoozer would disagree, while 
adopting a Speech Act perspective – see his Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, 
and Authorship (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
270 ‘How to do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism’, 
MLN 91:5 (October 1976) p1025. 
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both a certain inherent confusion in the terms themselves, and also the 
superfluity of them as descriptors and predictors. Particularly in the reader 
end of hermeneutics, but also in the more descriptive ‘textual’ end, it can be 
questioned whether or not the detailed categories of Speech Act theory in fact 
add anything at all to the analysis. The extra layer of concepts seems prone to 
cause more confusion, special pleading and disagreement as to terms and 
scope. It does not seem to add anything to call an order, confession, or 
command, an ‘illocution’ as well. 
 
The conceptual uniqueness that illocutions do supposedly possess lies largely 
in their conventionality, used here to mean both their predictability and their 
‘existence-through-convention’. But the assumption of predictability relies 
firstly on the assumption of a saturated context of convention, which is a 
circular assumption and therefore of no predictive merit whatever; and 
secondly on the assumption that meaning exists before the utterance is 
recognised. Meaning must therefore exist intangibly prior to the production 
of the utterance. The illocution cannot be divorced from these assumptions: if 
it is, it becomes indistinguishable from a perlocution.     
 
Thus the fundamental flaw within Speech Act theory that lies hidden beneath 
Austin’s desire to exclude “parasitic” uses of language from his theory has, in 
fact, a very significant impact on Speech Act theory’s attractiveness as a 
Biblical hermeneutic, and its coherence as a linguistic model. This flaw 
concerns the question of intention.  
 
The illocution as a concept distinct from the perlocution assumes inevitably 
that meaning is begotten not created. This meaning could only reside in 
conventions if these could be guaranteed to work to produce ‘successful’ 
illocutions every time: if the context were always saturated. Given the 
impossibility of this, the only other repository for ‘begotten’ meaning is 
authorial intention, which Austin has specifically excluded from his theory, 
but which in Austin and his successors creeps back in as a consequence of the 
‘begotten-ness’ of meaning in the concept of the illocution. The next chapter 
therefore demonstrates that the question of intention is a fundamental 
contradiction within Speech Act theory that renders it inconsistent, and 
ultimately incoherent. 
 
Thereafter, chapter five discusses the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction, 
and the foundations on which this distinction rests. Here it is demonstrated 
that this distinction, too, cannot withstand detailed scrutiny. Speech Act 
theory is shown to be inadequate not just as a hermeneutic, but as a theory of 
language. It cannot be coherently used to defend an idea of meaning and 
revelation, and should be abandoned as a tool. This does not however mean 
that revelation and meaning are forsaken concepts: they simply need re-
appraisal, as will be indicated in due course. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: INCOHERENCIES IN INTENTION IN 
SPEECH ACT THEORY 
 
1. Introduction.  
 
The previous chapter examined some of the ways in which Speech Act theory 
has been used as a Biblical hermeneutic. In addition to some doubts about the 
way in which Speech Act theory is used as a hermeneutic tool, during the 
discussion of its use it became increasingly clear that at least two issues were 
raised of more fundamental significance in respect of Speech Act theory.  
 
These were, firstly the difference between the illocution and the perlocution, 
which Austin himself suggested “seems likeliest to give trouble”1, a 
prediction not generally born out in subsequent work, and also to a degree 
the question of intention and Speech acts, and in particular the point at which 
an act might be said to exist, and hence the point at which it has meaning. 
This of course is a return to the original doubt raised about Speech Act theory: 
that it uncritically adopts a view of meaning as begotten not created: it 
assumes a sender view of meaning.  
 
Before continuing with an assessment of Speech Act theory and hermeneutics 
it is necessary to consider these two particular aspects of Speech Act theory: 
the relationship between the illocution and the perlocution, and the question 
of intention. Both examinations will demonstrate inherent and basic flaws in 
the theory, which have not generally been adequately appreciated by 
adherents since Austin, although in both cases Austin himself seems to have 
had at least an inkling of potential problems. The second area examined, in 
the following chapter, is the question of Austin’s distinction between 
illocutions and perlocutions. The first area to be dealt with is that concerning 
intention, to which the rest of this chapter is devoted.  
 
As I have already noted in chapter one of this thesis, other theorists have 
proposed versions of Speech Act theory, in addition to or in development of 
that first suggested by Austin, in particular Paul Grice, William Alston and 
Francois Recanati. If Searle has become the Elisha to Austin’s Elijah, each of 
these theorists has developed a divergent take on the basic idea that speech is 
not, or not primarily, descriptive, but is performative2. To this extent, I agree 
with them all. However, the question of intention and the illocution is an area 
where they all fail to be consistent. There are various different approaches to 
                                                     
1 How To p109. As I also mentioned in chapter one of this thesis, P N Campbell, in his ‘A 
Rhetorical View of Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts’, Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 59:3 (1973) 284-296, notes the fact that for the most part Austin’s prediction has not 
been borne out in subsequent studies. 
2 Perhaps they are the Sons of the Prophets? 
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the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction, but the question of intention 
remains a persistent thorn. 
 
In this chapter, reference is made to the work of Kevin Vanhoozer, one of 
those users of Speech Act theory as a Biblical hermeneutic whose interest is in 
the possibility that the concept of the illocution assumes that its meaning is 
predetermined by the speaker, and guaranteed by its ‘operating conventions’. 
For Vanhoozer, and others, this idea then provides a theoretical basis for a 
view of Scripture as God’s self-authored revelation, in which God conveys 
His own meaning through the text, without contamination or mediation. In 
an illocution, it would appear that intention is enacted as meaning without 
mistake or misunderstanding.  
 
However, the position in Austin’s own exploration of the theory in How To is 
rather more complex than this. At the start of How To Austin discusses the 
idea of intention and actions, and he acknowledges that intention is only 
visible in what is realized as being done. This is to recognize, at least 
implicitly, the part played by the audience, hearer or reader, in the existence 
of the act, and indicates that Austin would disagree with the suggestion that 
intention can be conveyed without the need for the creative participation of 
the reader/listener. Austin does not, however, maintain this position 
subsequently, for reasons which will be outlined.  
 
2. Intention in Austin: the Theory.  
 
Austin alludes to the meaning of intention early in How To, but in a somewhat 
elliptic manner, as was often his fashion. That his line of thought at this point 
is not clear or consistent is evidenced in one direction by Derrida’s discussion 
of How To, and in another by the way in which Austin and others discuss 
intention and meaning subsequently.  
 
Derrida discusses Austin’s view of intention in Sec3, and subjects it to some 
searching and often well-founded criticism. As already noted in chapter two 
of this thesis, I agree with Derrida’s accusation that one of the “essential 
elements – and not one among others” in Austin’s vision of “the total context” 
of a speech act, is “consciousness, the conscious presence of the intention of 
the speaking subject in the totality of his speech act. As a result, performative 
communication becomes once more the communication of an intentional 
meaning”4.  
 
                                                     
3 Limited Inc (Evanston IL, Northwestern University Press, 1988): Sec p13ff 
4 Limited Inc (Sec) p14. See also W Cerf, ‘Critical Review of How to Do Things with Words’, in 
K T Fann (ed.) Symposium on J L Austin (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969). Cerf, 
correctly I think, implies that Austin’s use of the phrase ‘performing an act’ is itself an 
example of this ‘metaphysical smuggling in’ of the Aristotelian and Cartesian “metaphysical 
pigmentation” (p367) of “the Cartesian cogito” (p366). 
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However, I do not agree with Derrida that Austin intends this result. I agree 
that this is part of the mechanism of explicit performatives and of illocutions 
in particular, as they will unfold in Austin’s discussion. However, in his first 
lecture Austin has attempted, albeit rather opaquely, to dismiss this very 
suggestion5.  
 
Nonetheless, Austin is unable to maintain the definition of intention he has 
obliquely proposed, but in subsequent lectures slides back into the views 
Derrida attributes to him. Thus, my re-readings of How To have identified an 
‘intention’ made evident in Austin’s text (although admittedly opaquely 
evident), which is thereafter implicitly subverted. However, my readings 
have identified no explicit rejection of the initial theory, but only subsequent 
suggestions and proposals that are inimical to it, and thus I understand How 
To as a series of texts in which Austin sets out (and hence ‘intends’ to state) a 
position on intention that becomes untenable without being explicitly6  
repudiated. My readings therefore identify an unfulfilled intention in How To. 
Whether or not this intention actually exists in How To, or is ‘simply’ the 
product of an eccentric reading, remains to be determined7.  
 
Returning to Austin’s description of intention, Derrida is not quite fair to 
Austin8. As part of his suggestion that Austin assumes the necessity of “the 
conscious presence of speakers or receivers [9] participating in the 
accomplishment of a performative, their conscious and intentional presence in 
                                                     
5 Before elaborating this point, but in tandem with this discussion, I should acknowledge my 
own use of the word ‘intends’ in this paragraph. It could be argued that the use of this word 
here, at the beginning of an argument about the meaning of the word and its usage, is either 
lazy or foolhardy or both. I use it ‘deliberately’: after deliberation, and with the 
acknowledged intention that it be noticed. My readings of How To  have brought me to the 
view that Austin does not proceed on the basis of an unspoken assumption affirming the 
existence of ‘the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking subject in the totality of 
his speech act’, as Derrida suggests. Rather, Austin acknowledges and dismisses a concept of 
intention based on ‘the intention of the speaking subject’, insofar as that requires that 
“communication becomes once more the communication of an intentional meaning”: Limited 
Inc (Sec) p14. 
6 and therefore I could write ‘consciously’ 
7 It may never be finally and authoritatively decided, but a scholarly or readerly consensus 
may emerge, which is the closest we can get, while itself not static or final. Certainly Jonathan 
Culler agrees with my interpretation of Austin: “in order to arrest or control this process 
[whereby it can be demonstrated that for an illocution to be effective is context-and-hearer-
dependent], which threatens the possibility of a successful theory of speech acts, Austin is led 
to reintroduce the notion, previously rejected, that the meaning of an utterance depends on 
the presence of a signifying intention in the consciousness of the speaker”: J Culler, 
‘Convention and Meaning: Derrida and Austin’, New Literary History 13:1 (Autumn 1981) p23. 
8 As R Rorty also suggests, ‘Deconstruction and Circumvention’, Critical Inquiry 11:1 
(September 1984) footnote 3, reference made on p2, expanded on p21.   
9 This is a noteworthy word. It is of course one chosen by the translators of this essay, Samuel 
Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, but it implies a curiously passive relationship between the 
speaker and the hearer. From the context, it is Derrida’s description of Austin’s assumption 
about the relationship between hearer and utterance. In this case, it is interestingly accurate, 
as will be explored subsequently.  
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the totality of the operation, [which] implies teleologically that no residue 
escapes the present totalization”10, Derrida quotes half a paragraph of 
Austin’s first lecture, from pages eight and nine of How To.  
 
Derrida then locates in Austin the values of “an exhaustively definable 
context, of a free consciousness present to the totality of the operation, and of 
absolutely meaningful speech master of itself: the teleological jurisdiction of 
an entire field whose organizing center remains intention”11, for which he 
refers12 to pages ten to fifteen of How To, which comprise the concluding part 
of the first lecture and the beginning of the second13. Derrida, however, omits 
any mention of the rest of the conclusion to Austin’s first lecture, on pages 
nine, ten and eleven of How To, and does not continue his exploration of the 
paragraph whose beginning he has previously quoted.  
 
In this paragraph Austin agrees14 that it is necessary for the successful 
performance of an utterance-act that we should be “serious”15, but he does not 
agree with the corollary suggestion16 that the spoken words are merely “the 
outward and visible sign … of an inward and spiritual act”17. He suggests, in 
respect of utterance-acts, that 
 
we are apt to have a feeling that their being serious consists in their being uttered 
as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for 
information, of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short step to go 
on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward 
                                                     
10 Limited Inc (Sec) p14 
11 Limited Inc (Sec) p15 
12 in his footnote 8 p22 
13 Although Derrida appears to include all of this under the heading of Austin’s Second 
Lecture – see the last sentence on page 14 of Limited Inc. It is interesting to compare Derrida’s 
description of this totalizing context with Dorothea Franck’s objection to the analysis of 
speech acts, previously cited: “if we talk about the speech acts which we, the analyzers, mean 
to be represented by the sentence, isn’t there a danger of circularity? If, in our imaginary 
speech situation which surrounds the uttering of the sentence, we imagine exactly those 
conditions as given which define the sort of speech act that we want to get at, then the claim 
is trivial. Or rather, we are not making an empirical, but rather an analytical claim”: D Franck, 
‘Speaking about Speech Acts’, Journal of Pragmatics 8 (1984) p88. 
14 With whom? Perhaps with his hearers as he imagines them or sees them before him as he 
speaks? We must again note the context of the lectures, which were addressed to an audience, 
but also we should note that the concept of ‘addressivity’ is important in the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, and is used with Bakhtin’s work by Oliver Davies in his A Theology of Compassion, 
(SCM Press, London, 2001). 
15 He agrees that “this is, though vague, true enough in general – it is an important 
commonplace in discussing the purport of any utterance whatsoever. I must not be joking for 
example, nor writing a poem”: How To p9 
16 Which he is presumably implying or imagining that his hearers would initially want to 
make – or that they would usually imagine as existing? Which is to say that the ordinary 
usage is wrong or unthinking in this respect at least! 
17 How To p9, referring without any acknowledgment to the definition of a sacrament found in 
the Catechism of the Book of Common Prayer of the Church of England, as “an outward and 
visible of sign of an inward and spiritual grace…”. 
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utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward 
performance,18  
 
a series of feelings, beliefs and assumptions he, by implication, does not share. 
Austin goes on to quote and translate Hippolytus: “my tongue swore to, but 
my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not*”19, and concludes that 
“it is gratifying to observe in this very example how excess of profundity, or 
rather solemnity, at once paves the way for immodality.20  Accuracy and 
morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that our word is our bond.”21  
 
Thus for Austin the meaning and effect of what is uttered reside simply in 
what is uttered; in the ‘face value’ of the words, not in an ‘inward intention’ 
giving them effect, or of which they are ‘merely outward signs’. Irrespective 
of later developments, at this stage in How To Austin advocates the view that 
the act (of speaking) is performed on the basis of what appears to have been 
performed – what one has done – rather than what one might claim 
(subsequently to the act having been performed) to have done22.  
 
‘Intention’, if the concept relates to assumptions about the mental state of the 
speaker and the like (assumptions which, as Derrida observes, are notoriously 
                                                     
18 How To p9 
19 How To p9-10. The * indicates Austin’s footnote 1 on p10, which is of considerable interest, 
which will be referred to repeatedly hereafter, and which reads “But I do not mean to rule out 
all the offstage performers – the lights men, the stage manager, even the prompter; I am 
objecting only to certain officious understudies”. The second edition of How To adds a further 
clause to the end of this footnote: “who would duplicate the play” (p10). 
20 Fish, using the 1962 first publication of How To quotes this word as “immorality”, in ‘How 
to do things with Austin and Searle’, p986. This may make more sense, and the likelihood 
that the 1970 edition of How To (reprinted in 1963 and 1965) and the Second Edition of 1975, 
are in error here is increased by the fact that the 1980 impression of the Second Edition also 
has “immorality”: which is an unacknowledged change from 1963/5 and 1975 presumably 
included as one of “a number of small corrections”: (see the “note to the 1980 impression” 
page v). However, PN Campbell, using apparently the 1962 edition, quotes “immodality”. 
(See: – Fish, ‘How to do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech Act Theory and Literary 
Criticism’, MLN 91:5 (October 1976): and - P N Campbell, ‘A Rhetorical View of Locutionary, 
Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 59:3 (1973) p295.) It is 
tempting to wonder whether this is what Fish means by different readers reading different 
texts, and if not, where the difference lies! Is it possible for one reader to point out a mistake, 
as opposed to a different reading, or do they have to be in the same community first (and if 
so, is there one that includes Fish, Campbell and myself)?   
21 How To p10. The comparison with Wittgenstein is striking here: “We say “The expression in 
his voice was genuine”. If it was spurious we think as it were of another one behind it. – This is 
the face he shews the world, inwardly he has another one. – But this does not mean that when 
his expression is genuine he has two the same”: Phil Inv I §606 (p157). 
22 Again, cf Wittgenstein: “an intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and 
institutions” Phil Inv op cit §337 p108. See also E Stenius, ’Mood and Language-game’, 
Synthese 17 (1967) 254-274: “A linguistic utterance is not as such a symptom of any particular 
(mental) state of the speaker or anything preceding it – in so far as it is, it is against the 
background of those conventional rules of language which prevail in the linguistic 
community.” p262. 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Four: Incoherencies in Intention in Speech Act Theory 
137 
unreliable and variable, and are prone to the vagaries of hindsight23), is 
irrelevant to the question of what act has actually been performed. ‘Fictitious 
inward acts’ are fictitious not because they are necessarily untrue or 
inaccurate as descriptions, but because they are irrelevant to the question of 
the identity of the act, and can only be surmised on the basis of what is 
already recognized as having been done24. They are thus the creation of the 
‘audience’, based on their assessment of the action. Meaning is ascribed by the 
‘audience’ on the basis of what they recognize as having been done; intention 
is ascribed by the audience to actors/actions that they recognize as having 
been, in outcome, different from that intended by the actor. 
 
Indeed, as Austin himself notes, if intention is only detectable in the ‘outward 
and visible signs’ of a speech act, and provided that the act is performed 
properly, without sniggering or eye-rolling or whatever, there is no necessity 
for an ‘inward and spiritual’ “backstage artiste”25 or for “certain officious 
understudies”26 to be imagined. Speculation as to the hidden ‘inward state’ of 
the speaker (which ‘duplicates the play’) is simply, Austin implies, to imagine 
“fictitious inward acts”27. The limited number of “offstage performers” 28 
                                                     
23 It is, for example, possible to ask all the following of oneself: ‘what do I really mean – what 
is my subconscious doing to my conscious - do I say I mean this, when all I am doing is trying 
unconsciously to impress my attractive neighbour or companion?’ etcetera. 
24 Thus, neither Austin nor I would want to assert that it is impossible to have ‘hidden 
intentions’. We can certainly imagine situations in which an agent has plans or motives in 
doing something, that are not apparent to the audience, or only to some of them, (see for 
example K Bach, ‘Communicative Intentions, Plan Recognition, and Pragmatics: Comments 
on Thomason and on Litman and Allen,’ in P R Cohen, J Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), 
Intentions in Communication (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1992) p390). However, these ulterior 
motives which, if planned, we can think of as hidden or private intentions, prove only that 
Knapp and Michaels (‘Against Theory’, Critical Inquiry 8:4 (Summer 1982) 723-742 and 
‘Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction’, Critical Inquiry 14 (Autumn 1987) 49-
68) are wrong, and that intention is therefore distinct from meaning. Moreover, while these 
hidden motives are real, we must notice that they have the same existence as stories that have 
never been written, private fantasies, and dreams: all of these things may affect what we do 
and could, in principle, be identified by others, but may not be identified (even by ourselves), 
and unless they are publicly recognised, they do not have an actual existence (as opposed to a 
theoretical or imaginative existence, similar to the dictionary-meaning of words, or to 
Austin’s locution). This is one of the problems with Austin’s terms, in fact: they do not 
address the similarities and differences between ‘to pretend’ and ‘to perform’, and the point 
is that the difference may never be apparent, even to the actor, and if not apparent, it has no 
existence. Intention is only present if it is identified (even if only to oneself): hence Thomason 
is right to suggest (in ‘Accommodation, Meaning, and Implicature: Interdisciplinary 
Foundations for Pragmatics’, in P R Cohen, J Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), Intentions in 
Communication (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1992)) that ‘hidden intention’ involves ‘having a 
plan’, even if it is very ill-defined – it is this having a plan that allows me to recognise an 
intention (as opposed to some kind of conscious or unconscious motive). By public 
recognition here, I mean that these motives are incorporated into the stories we tell about and 
to ourselves by virtue of which we establish and affirm meaning – see chapter 8 of this thesis. 
25 How To p10 
26 How To footnote 1 p10, already referred to. 
27 How To p10 
28 How To footnote 1 p10 
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whom Austin admits as admissible elements of the speech act - “the lights 
men, the stage manager, even the prompter”29 - are I suggest visible or verbal 
signs such as eye-rolling, blushing, gesturing, etcetera, all of which are 
potentially observable, and which go towards establishing that ‘intention’ 
which we can observe on the basis of what we recognize was done30. In this 
context, Austin’s reference to ‘seriousness’ as a requirement31 is also a 
reference to a phenomena that is ‘outward’. Seriousness, like intention, is 
detected on the basis of what is said and how it was said, rather than by 
reference to the speaker’s hidden interior feelings at the time.  
 
Derrida is correct to accuse Austin of subsequently employing the concept of 
seriousness as a kind of organising and excluding principle in relation to 
types of speech act in context32. However, the fact that Austin does so, is not a 
function of the potential ‘outwardness’ of the concept of seriousness, but 
because, as Derrida alleges, Austin is ultimately unwilling to abandon the 
“philosophical ‘ideal’ - [of] the presence to self of a total context, the 
transparency of intentions, the presence of meaning … to the absolutely 
singular uniqueness of a speech act”33. 
 
Austin thus requires “an exhaustively definable context”34, which would be 
undermined by the consideration of “parasitic”35 forms of discourse, and the 
implicit recognition of their admissibility. It is this search for a begotten 
existence of utterance meaning that Derrida criticises, and which leads to the 
undermining of Austin’s initial attempt to banish the concept of ‘interior’, 
authorising intention.  
 
                                                     
29 How To footnote 1 p10 
30 Again, the similarity with Wittgenstein is striking: “the most explicit expression of intention 
is by itself insufficient evidence of intention” Phil Inv I §641 (p165), and “Meaning is as little 
an experience as intending…For the contents (images for instance) which accompany and 
illustrate them are not the meaning or intending. 
The intention with which one acts does not ‘accompany’ the action any more than the thought 
‘accompanies’ speech. Thought and intention are neither ‘articulated’ nor ‘non-articulated’; to 
be compared neither with a single note which sounds during the acting or speaking, nor with 
a tune.” Phil Inv IIxi p217. 
31 How To p9 
32 Limited Inc (‘Sec’) p17ff 
33 Limited Inc (‘Sec’) p17. Searle, too, is unwilling to abandon this concept: “in serious literal 
speech the sentences are precisely the realizations of the intentions: there need be no gulf at all 
between the illocutionary intention and its expression. The sentences are, so to speak, 
fungible intentions”: ‘Reiterating the Differences: A reply to Derrida’, Glyph 1 (1977) p202. My 
dictionary defines ‘fungible’ as “(often plural) moveable perishable goods of a sort that may 
be estimated by number or weight”, derived from the Latin fungi – to perform (Collins 
English Dictionary, Complete and Unabridged, (Glasgow, HarperCollins, 2004)): I assume 
Searle is intending to refer to intentions as moveable or performed, rather than as perishable 
or as the subject of an estimate. 
34 Limited Inc (‘Sec’) p15 
35 How To p22 and p104 
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In Austin’s initial lecture, however, it is not obvious, pace Derrida, that his 
explorations of performative speech will ‘go down this route’. In fact, at the 
end of his first lecture36, Austin notes that, having initially excluded the 
category of “fictitious inward acts” such as the interior, hidden state of 
mind37, those things which nonetheless are “normally required to accompany 
an utterance such as ‘I promise that …’ or ‘I do (take this woman …)’”, things 
such as not leering at the bridesmaids or being drunk, do not in fact describe 
the utterance, and thus do not by their absence make it false, “but rather that 
[in such a case] the utterance - or rather the act*, e.g. the promise - was void, 
or given in bad faith, or not implemented, or the like.”38  
 
Thus a performative speech act has still occurred; an act has been performed. 
Even a promise, which seems, as Austin suggests, to be of all performative 
acts the most susceptible to being merely an ‘outward sign’ of an ‘inward 
state’, is not false if it is performed insincerely, if by false it is meant that no 
promise was made: 
 
for he does promise: the promise here is not even void, though it is given in bad 
faith. His utterance is perhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless 
wrong, but it is not a lie or a misstatement. At most we might make out a case for 
saying that it implies or insinuates a falsehood or a misstatement (to the effect 
that he does intend to do something): but that is a very different matter.39 
 
Thus performative utterances can be said to be the effective performance of 
actions by virtue of the conventions in and through which they are effective, 
rather than because of the interior intentions that they reveal or describe. 
Performative acts themselves must be recognized based on ‘outward signs’ 
and on words uttered, not on surmises about “fictitious inward acts”40. This 
does not, however, necessarily imply that they are in any sense 
‘guaranteeable’. It is always possible that, in any specific case, the conventions 
do not operate, because the audience recognises something amiss. Just 
because an insincere promise remains a promise, it does not automatically 
follow that all instances of saying “I promise” are promises41. 
 
It is thus the case that for Austin here, meaning and intention overlap but are 
not identical. Meaning is what we recognize as being the identity and 
description of the act: ‘what was done’. Intention is what we identify as being 
the aim of the actor, distinguishable from the meaning of the act if we agree 
that there is an apparent discrepancy, and otherwise generally assumed to be 
                                                     
36 How To p10 
37 “who would duplicate the play”: How To 2 p10. 
38 How To p11. Austin also notes at * (in footnote 1) that “we shall avoid distinguishing these 
precisely because the distinction is not in point”, an observation which he further discusses 
subsequently, while seeking to confirm the homogeneity of utterance and act. 
39 How To p11 
40 How To p10 
41 As J Schleusener notes: “A promise is only a promise, after all, until it becomes absurd or 
unkind to say so”: ‘Convention and the Context of Reading’, Critical Inquiry 6:4 (1980) 678. 
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identical to the meaning of the act42. Both are recognized as part of our 
ongoing communicatory dialogue, and neither is absolutely fixed. ‘What is 
done’ depends on what is recognized as having been done (and ‘what was 
intended’ also depends on being recognized). 
 
However, having established that intentions are only visible in what is 
recognized as having been done, Austin subsequently undermines this idea in 
many places, such as when he discusses sincerity and the ‘gamma 
conditions’43, or “polite phrases”44. These discrepancies are discussed in more 
detail in the subsequent sections, because they lie at the heart of the failure of 
Speech Act theory as a project: its view of intention and action is inherently 
inconsistent, which makes it incapable of defending the exclusive role of 
authorial intention in meaning on which ideas of revelation are often 
implicitly based. 
 
3. Intention in Austin: Some discrepancies in practice.                                                                                           
3a: The Problem of Sincerity 
  
This particular problem occurs when Austin begins to explore the exact 
nature of the status of ‘botched’ acts. He is clear in his second lecture that 
various external circumstances are necessary for the ‘happy’ or ‘felicitous’ 
completion of an explicit performative, the concept that effectively predates 
the illocutionary act. These are “the existence of “an accepted conventional 
procedure having a certain conventional effect” (condition A.1); that “the 
particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for 
the invocation of the particular procedure invoked” (A.2); that “the procedure 
must be executed by all participants both correctly (B.1) and completely (B.2)” 
and that if the procedure is “designed for use by persons having certain 
thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct 
on the part of any participant, then [the participant] … must in fact have those 
thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct 
themselves,* (Γ 1)”, and finally that the participants “must actually so conduct 
themselves subsequently” (Γ 2)45. 
 
However, already at this stage there are a number of indications of things ‘not 
quite right’, which will later lead to a variety of difficulties. The first problem 
                                                     
42 Thus I think that Austin disagrees, correctly, with Fish when he in passing suggests that 
“the meaning and the intention … of the utterance” “are the same thing”: ‘With the 
Compliments of the Author’, in H A Veeser (ed.), The Stanley Fish Reader, (Blackwell, Malden 
MA, 1999) p57. 
43 How To p15 
44 How To p81 
45 How To p14-15. The asterisk in the quote above indicates footnote 1, in which Austin notes 
that “It will be explained later why the having of these thoughts, feelings, and intentions is 
not included as just one among the other ‘circumstances’ already dealt with in (A)”, and this 
explanation is presumably contained on pages fifteen and sixteen. 
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is the extent to which the “accepted conventional procedure”46 is a ‘totalizing 
context’ in Derrida’s phrase; the extent to which it is an objective form which 
has a guaranteed effect on any particular speech act. What, for example, does 
Austin mean by “having a certain conventional effect”47? My reading 
identifies ‘certain’ here as synonymous in this instance with ‘particular’. It 
could, however, be regarded as synonymous with ‘guaranteed’, which would 
give the condition a different flavour.  
 
The question of the fixity of conventions themselves is also open to question: 
Austin is aware of the possibility of “getting away with things”48 and thus of 
the fluidity of conventions and that they may sometimes be broken or 
amended. However, he gives the impression on occasions that the existence of 
conventions guarantees a result, on the assumption that there is no such 
fluidity.  
 
Austin then suggests that a breach of his A and B conditions means that “the 
act in question ... is not successfully performed at all, does not come off, is not 
achieved. Whereas in the two Γ cases the act is achieved, although to achieve 
it in such circumstances, as when we are, say, insincere, is an abuse of the 
procedure.”49 The breaches of the A and B conditions, where there is no 
successful completion of the act, are described by Austin as “MISFIRES”: the 
breaches of the Γ conditions, where the act is done ‘immorally’, are described 
as “ABUSES”. ‘Misfires’ result in procedures that are described by Austin as 
disallowed or botched; and acts that are described as “void or without 
effect”50, “purported” or merely ‘attempted’. ‘Abuses’ result in acts that are 
described as “‘professed’ or ‘hollow’ rather than purported or empty, and as 
not implemented, or not consummated, rather than as void or without 
effect”51.  
 
Thus the A and B conditions, if broken, do not produce acts, while the Γ 
conditions do produce acts, but ones which seem to Austin to be flawed. (It is 
necessary to note that Austin’s description of “Misfires” is not necessarily as 
clear cut as this in practice, as L J Cohen suggests52.) Moreover, what Austin 
here calls a ‘purported’ or ‘attempted’ act could be described simply as an 
unintended act53. 
 
                                                     
46 How To p14 
47 How To p14. 
48 How To p30 
49 How To p16 
50 How To p16 
51 How To p16 
52  ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’ The Philosophical Quarterly Volume 14 Issue 55 (April 1964) 
p118-137. 
53 See the discussion of the difference between attempt and achievement in Chapter five of 
this thesis. 
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However, the Γ conditions seem to echo Austin’s previous suggestion that we 
must ‘be serious’ in our utterance54. This in turn suggests that it must be the 
case that sincerity, just like intention or seriousness, can only be assessed on 
the basis of the appearance and assessment by the audience of the speaker’s 
performance of the act, in its context55. ‘Sincerity’ can no more be a question of 
“fictitious inward acts” or conditions, than can ‘intention’ or ‘seriousness’. 
Austin’s description of the Γ conditions, therefore, contradicts his previous 
suggestions with regard to intention and the ‘fictitious’ nature of inward acts. 
 
Whether or not Austin’s condition Γ 1 has been breached56 is unlikely to be 
known until later (if ever). This condition can only be invoked either if the act 
has been performed in a manner suggesting that something is wrong, in 
which case the extent to which it has actually been felicitously performed will 
be contemporaneously debatable and debated; or if the act is later being 
challenged, probably as a result of hindsight. In this latter case, the act was 
performed successfully at the time when it was performed, just like the 
‘insincere’ promise Austin has previously discussed.  
 
Therefore the condition ought to be amended to read ‘participants must in 
fact appear to have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must give 
the appearance of intending so to conduct themselves’. A fictitious inward act 
of intending to do something is not necessary57, all that is necessary is to do 
(or say) it: it may turn out that you were not sincere, but this cannot be 
asserted except on the basis of what you do. 
 
Meanwhile Γ 258 is rendered useless as a guide to the sincerity of the act as it 
was performed, rather than as it is subsequently (and contingently) to be 
interpreted, because hindsight is a re-interpretation or a revision of the past – 
like all memory it is not an absolute statement of ‘how things were’. Writing 
about language in the essay ‘Other Minds’, Austin suggests that  
 
if we have made sure it’s a goldfinch, and a real goldfinch, and then in the future 
it does something outrageous (explodes, quotes Mrs Woolf, or what not), we 
don’t say we were wrong to say it was a goldfinch, we don’t know what to say. 
Words literally fail us: … When I have made sure it’s a real goldfinch (not 
stuffed, corroborated by the disinterested, &c.) then I am not ‘predicting’ in 
saying it’s a real goldfinch, and in a very good sense I can’t be proved wrong 
                                                     
54 How To p9 
55 As in the previous example of a groom who spends the marriage ceremony leering at or 
propositioning the bridesmaids, or someone obviously too drunk to promise or assent to 
anything. 
56 Which was that if the procedure is “designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or 
feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any 
participant, then [the participant] … must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the 
participants must intend so to conduct themselves”: How To p15 
57 This amounts to the ‘officious understudy who would duplicate the play’: How To 2 p10 
note 1 
58 That the participants “must actually so conduct themselves subsequently” How To p15 
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whatever happens. It seems a serious mistake to suppose that language (or most 
language …) is ‘predictive’ in such a way that the future can always prove it 
wrong. What the future can always do, is to make us revise our ideas about 
goldfinches or real goldfinches or anything else.59 
 
The non-predictability of language that Austin identifies here extends to our 
recognition of acts and to the identification of “abuses”, (and is again very 
closely paralleled in Wittgenstein’s later work60). Sincerity is an attribute that 
is only in question if its absence is felt, asserted or implied (in the context of 
dialogue and debate, the context which, as has already been noted, permeates 
Austin’s lectures). In that event, the sincerity of an agent becomes something 
which is not fixed or unequivocally resolvable; it becomes something about 
which a judgment has to be made, which is then itself potentially open ‘to 
appeal’61.  
 
As Austin suggests, if to say ‘I promise’ is an act not a description, it is not 
true or false as a description of an inward state, but is itself the act of 
promising, or of ‘making explicit’ the act of promising implicit in saying ‘I 
shall be there’. The strong parallels here with the traditional “catholic” view 
of the effectiveness of sacramental rituals, which also rely on observable and 
contextual factors for their efficacy, not on the ‘inward’ condition of the 
participants, have already been noted62. The Γ conditions as Austin outlines 
them fundamentally undermine the concept of intention he has previously 
expressed, because they imply a reversion to a view of ‘fictitious inward acts’ 
determining meaning. Either an act is determined by what is observed, or we 
need to revert to the idea of “fictitious inward acts” previously condemned. 
 
Intention in Austin: Some discrepancies in practice.                                                                                                    
3b: ‘Polite Phrases.’  
 
This example of Austin’s failure to retain a consistent view of intention is 
demonstrated when, having attempted to demonstrate the existence of 
explicit performatives, Austin observes that it can be difficult on occasion to 
                                                     
59 Philosophical Papers op cit p88-89. See also G E M Anscombe: “Every description 
presupposes a context of normal procedure, but that context is not even implicitly described 
by the description. Exceptional circumstances could always make a difference, but they do 
not come into consideration without reason”: ‘On Brute Facts’, Analysis 18 (1958) p71.  
60 “So I say “There is chair”. What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly 
disappears from sight? – “So it wasn’t a chair, but some kind of illusion”. – But in a few 
minutes we see it again and are able to touch it and so on. – “So the chair was there after all 
and its disappearance was some kind of illusion”. – But suppose that after a time it 
disappears again – or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for 
such cases – rules saying whether one may use the word “chair” to include this kind of thing? 
But do we miss them when we use the word “chair”; and are we to say that we do not really 
attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible 
application of it?” Phil Inv I §80 p38.  
61 The metaphor of judgment is always in the background, and is discussed in more detail in 
chapter Five.  
62 In chapter one. 
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distinguish even an explicit performative from a descriptive or constative63. 
He notes that some phrases “may even trade on this ambivalence”64, and 
accordingly looks for tests to clarify the connection between performatives, 
half-descriptives (those phrases which are ambivalent, not being performative 
nor just descriptive) and descriptives. In this endeavour, he encounters a 
number of insurmountable problems in trying to retain a distinction between 
performatives and “polite phrases”65 which are “very numerous conventional 
expressions of feeling … which are certainly nothing to do with 
performatives”66.  
 
Austin, attempting to distinguish them on the basis of their ‘sincerity’, cannot 
do so simply by asking ‘how is it taken?’, since this would weaken the 
reliability of the explicit performative, by causing it to rely on its reception. In 
this case, it would be we, the ‘receivers’, who identify, from an actual 
performance, whether or not an act has been performed; and thus even a 
performative act would not in fact ‘have to be taken’67 as a performative act: it 
would depend on ‘how it was taken’. Although the conventions might appear, 
to the speaker, to be in place, they might not so appear to the audience, and 
they would refuse to recognise the order as an order. It would not, then, be 
possible to know what acts had happened, until they were performed and 
recognised (or not). Illocutionary force would then depend on reception, and 
would become indistinguishable in practice from meaning pure and simple. 
 
This would, then, eliminate the distinction Austin begins to draw as early as 
his third lecture between “explicit” and “implicit”68 performatives, a 
difference based on the grounds that explicit performatives, whether opposed 
to the implicit performative or later to the “‘primary performative’”69, are 
those forms of speech which “made explicit what action it is that is being 
performed in issuing the utterance”70. Implicit performatives are fallible, 
because they do not have to be taken as the acts that they are: “The person did 
not take it as a promise: i.e. in the particular circumstance he did not accept the 
procedure, on the ground that the ritual was incompletely carried out by the 
original speaker”71. Moreover, “the point is not here just that the audience did 
not understand but that it did not have to understand, e.g. to take it as an 
order.” 72  
                                                     
63 How To p77 
64 How To p78 
65 How To p81 
66 Such as ‘I have pleasure in calling upon’ or ‘I am sorry to have to say’: How To p80-81 
67 Compare the difference between misunderstanding and the missing of performative ‘force’: 
“The point is not here just that the audience did not understand but that it did not have to 
understand, e.g. to take it as an order” How To p33. 
68 How To p32 
69 How To p69 
70 How To p69 
71 How To p33 
72 How To p33 
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Indeed, for Austin “such a performative formula as ‘I promise’ makes it clear 
how what is said is to be understood”73. He suggests that “the explicit 
performative must be a later development than certain more primary 
utterances, many of which at least are already implicit performatives”74, and 
he goes on to identify some of the ways in which the force of performative 
utterances can be implicitly conveyed.  
 
Austin concludes his list by noting that “in a way these resources are over-
rich: they lend themselves to equivocation and inadequate discrimination; 
and moreover, we use them for other purpose e.g. insinuation. The explicit 
performative rules out equivocation and keeps the performance fixed, 
relatively.”75 The explicit performative, then, is that which has to be taken as it 
was meant to be taken by the speaker. However, if the unequivocal and fixed 
nature of the explicit performative is to be defended (so that the audience has 
to understand76), there must be some guarantee as to how it will be taken, 
before it is in fact taken as anything, so that the audience will know what the 
speaker meant, by knowing the intention that ‘underlies’ his words. And, 
moreover, the act must in some sense exist before it is done, and before it has 
been heard: it must be begotten, not created.  
 
The difficulty is that it seems then hard in these circumstances to ascribe any 
other meaning to intention than the picture of it as ‘inward’ previously 
condemned. If the possibility of error is to be eliminated, and the audience 
“has” to understand, then they are understanding an act that exists in its 
entirety without their need to recognise it, and thus before they recognise it. 
The act here seems to exist before the words are spoken, and is thus 
performed first by “fictitious inward acts”77, and it is this act whose 
conventions render it ‘unmistakeable’. Austin is a prisoner of his 
presupposition that the meaning of an utterance is provided by the speaker 
and brought to the context: for Austin, the meaning of a sentence is ultimately 
‘inward’, established by the intention of the author, and this necessarily 
identifies intention as internal also. Alston, Recanati, and many other theorists 
both post- and pre-modern are victims of the same presupposition. 
 
Austin in fact notes that “polite phrases” 78 are not performative because “to 
be a performative utterance, even in these cases connected with feelings and 
                                                     
73 How To p70 
74 How To p71 
75 How To p76. This qualifying ‘relatively’ is interesting: can something be ‘relatively’ 
guaranteed? Austin seems, here, to be undercutting his own assurance, not untypically. He 
does not elaborate on this notion of the relative fixity of the explicit Performative, nor give 
any indication of the factors that might influence this recognition of relativity. 
76 “The point is not here just that the audience did not understand but that it did not have to 
understand, e.g. to take it as an order” How To p33. 
77 How To p10 
78 How To p81 
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attitudes which I christen ‘BEHABITIVES’, is not merely to be a conventional 
expression of feeling or attitude”79. This too is a rather puzzling assertion: 
particularly Austin’s use of the phrase “merely to be a conventional 
expression”, with its suggestion that intention and convention are not the 
same.  
 
Indeed, Austin here notes that he is “uncertain” about “the exact nature”80 of 
the distinction he is attempting to draw between performatives and these 
“conventional expressions of feeling”, and the editors of the first edition of 
How To note, following Austin’s suggested examples of these ‘conventional 
expressions’, that at this point there is a “marginal note in manuscript: 
‘Further classification needed here: just note it in passing’”81 which further 
underlines Austin’s own uncertainty. The difficulty is obviously that there 
seems to be no easy way of differentiating these “polite phrases” from 
genuine performatives without relying on an ‘inward state’ concept of 
intention along the lines of that which Austin has previously rejected.  
 
One might in particular ask what is so “merely” about ‘conventional 
expressions of feeling or attitude’, since politeness itself is a conventional 
performance very similar to ‘making obeisance’. To regard it as ‘insincere’ is 
to fall into the trap of identifying intention as inward and, more 
fundamentally, of assuming a rather self-enclosed individualism; it is a 
perfectly proper part of normal conventional relations82. If ‘conventions’ are 
‘merely’ anything, this casts some doubt on the true meaning and 
effectiveness of convention-based performatives, which will then have to rely 
on an additional “backstage artiste”83 of inward intention for their 
effectiveness. 
 
We can certainly ask “did he really?”84 mean the performative sentence he 
uttered. However, as with sincerity and promising earlier, all we can answer 
is whether or not he appeared to mean it: the proof of the pudding will be in 
the eating, in what actions occur as a consequence. This does, however, 
                                                     
79 How To p81. It should be noted that Behabitives is the name for one of the tentative 
classifications of illocutionary speech acts which Austin will propose in his twelfth lecture on 
p150. 
80 How To p80 
81 OUP edition edited by J O Urmson, first published 1962, reprinted 1963, edition used 
printed 1970 (see Bibliography) p81. 
82 In particular it is worthwhile noting R Finnegan’s observation that “’thanking’ … is not … 
to be analysed principally in terms of an inner feeling of gratitude, for this need not enter into 
the situation at all. Though the Limba are clear that thanking is a source of satisfaction to both 
speaker and receiver … this is a result of the thanking rather than its cause or its essence. 
Rather, Limba thanking is an act of commitment: an institutionalized way of acknowledging 
some transaction or relationship between people”: ‘How to Do Things with Words: 
Performative Utterances among the Limba of Sierra Leone’, Man, New Series 4:4 (December 
1969) p544: if this is true among the Limba, is it not also possibly true among the English? 
83 How To p10 
84 How To p84 
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weaken the ‘guaranteeability’ of meaning conveyed, and indeed would seem 
to make the meaning of an utterance dependent in part on its reception, 
unless meaning is to remain solely an ‘inward’ property of the utterance, 
known only to the speaker, and with the potential to be forever unrecognized. 
 
Austin however does not notice this apparent discrepancy in respect of 
intention; indeed he goes on to attempt to distinguish “cases of suiting the 
action to the word”85 from performatives. There is, however, a strong 
resemblance between these and saying ‘Salaam’ as one bows, which was 
previously determined by Austin to be performative not descriptive86, and 
which was described as a way of making “plain how the action is to be taken 
or understood”87 just like the addition of ‘I promise’ to ‘I shall be there’.  
 
Thus the reason that Austin encounters a problem when it comes to some 
half-descriptives and ‘polite phrases’, is because he uses inward intention to 
help distinguish between what is sincere and what is insincere. ‘Inward’ 
intent has an implicit role in helping to avoid having to abandon the 
guarantee of explicit performatives (which will later become the convention-
backed security of illocutionary ‘uptake’ as distinct from the free-for-all of 
perlocutionary effects and consequences). Austin sees it as possible and 
necessary to be able to distinguish between polite phrases and performative 
utterances on the grounds of what the speaker feels and intends, rather than 
simply on the grounds of what the audience recognizes. This though 
presupposes some things about the ease with which even speakers 
themselves can identify their ‘inward intention’. It involves making the 
speaking individual responsible for the creation of meaning, rather than the 
hearing and receiving community within the shared conventions of which the 
speaker is operating88. It also totally contradicts Austin’s starting position on 
the nature of intention. 
 
Intention in Austin: Some discrepancies in practice.                                                                                                   
3c: Conclusion 
 
The latter view of an intention-conveying speech act is at variance with 
Austin’s initial view of intention. Austin’s initial description of intention 
suggests that it is detectable only on the basis of what is seen to have been 
done: intention does not precede and make meaningful action, but is deduced 
by the hearer from the action89. The hearer or recognizer of the act thus has a 
partially creative role, and the speaker or initiator cannot say “my tongue 
                                                     
85 How To p81 
86 How To p70, and see previous paragraphs 
87 How To p70 
88 The speaker, indeed, may be operating in this community and context without even being 
aware of the extent of their dependence on this cultural-linguistic community. 
89 And is thus, again, comparable to Wittgenstein, or at least Fergus Kerr’s view of him: 
“Intention, for instance, is embedded in a situation, in human customs and institutions”: 
‘Language as Hermeneutic in the Later Wittgenstein’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 27 (1965) p505.  
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swore to, but my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not”90, because 
“accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that our word 
is our bond.”91 The speaker is committed by what we the audience recognize as 
having been done.  
 
When it comes to illocutions, however, the boot is fixed to the other foot. In 
Austin’s view, the hearer or recognizer is compelled to recognize an 
illocutionary act whose nature and identity has already been fixed and 
established by the speaker’s intention, before it is spoken: this is the basis of 
the distinction between illocutions and perlocutions. Austin, like Searle and 
Alston and many others, assumes that the meaning of an illocutionary 
utterance can in theory be predicted before its use in any particular context, 
and is provided solely by the speaker making use of predictable conventions.  
 
There is thus a fundamental incompatibility between the view that intentions 
are recognized in what is done, and the view that an illocution exists 
irrespective of any consequences. It is only possible if the act of recognition is 
identified not as an act, but as an inevitable part of the initial illocution, or if 
the illocution is imagined as having happened once it has been spoken, 
irrespective of what happens thereafter, and whether anyone hears it or not. 
Austin and his followers tend to adopt the view that the recognition of 
illocutions is not a consequence of the act: this enables them to imagine that 
an unambiguous transmission of authorial intention is possible, irrespective 
of what happens thereafter.  
 
This, of course, is precisely where the attraction of a Speech Act hermeneutics 
lies for some Biblical scholars: if an unambiguous transmission of authorial 
intention is possible, this makes it possible to depict God’s Biblical revelation 
as a kind of illocutionary speech act, begotten not created. Alternatively, if an 
unambiguous transmission of authorial intention is not possible, this too will 
have implications for an understanding of revelation. This possibility is 
examined in the succeeding section, in the work of Kevin Vanhoozer. 
 
4. The Sender View of Meaning.                                                                                                                                                                
4a: Introduction 
 
All of these difficulties flowing from the inheritance of a sender view of 
meaning and a confused treatment of intention are visible in the work of 
those who use Speech Act theory as a Biblical hermeneutic. Austin’s 
‘outward’ view of intention, while often commended by his followers, is not 
adhered to in practice, wherever meaning is identified with the speaker alone, 
and as ‘begotten not created’. It is the apparent ability of Speech Act theory to 
provide conceptual support for this idea of meaning as ‘begotten’ that makes 
                                                     
90 How To p9-10.  
91 How To p10 
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it so attractive to its users: it enables them to buttress the idea of God as in 
sole authorial control of His revelation.  
 
In this case, it is as Derrida indicates, necessary to imagine that the speaker 
alone establishes meaning, and brings the utterance with its meaning fully-
established, to the context, to which it is presented as fully-formed. If one 
assumes that ‘meaning’ is established solely by the author, as one must if the 
meaning of a phrase is to be established before it is even uttered, then one is 
obliged to have recourse, somewhere along the line, to ‘inward’ intention as 
the basis of this ‘meaning’. The only alternative, at least if one is working from 
an individualist assumption in respect of personality, is that ‘meaning’ is 
entirely contingent and ‘up for grabs’92.  
 
The Sender View of Meaning.                                                                                                                                                        
4b: Intention, Authorial Authority, and Meaning in the pebbles of a beach 
 
This outlook is evident in the work of Kevin Vanhoozer, who asks early on in 
Is there a Meaning is this Text?93 (hereafter abbreviated to Is There?) “is there 
something in the text that reflects a reality independent of the reader’s 
interpretive activity, or does the text only reflect the reality of the reader?”94. I 
absolutely agree that this is a serious question, but I disagree that it is an 
either/or question. For Vanhoozer, however, one’s position on the possibility 
of independent hermeneutic knowledge is either hermeneutic or “hermetic”95: 
a result of his adopting the sender view of meaning.  
 
Vanhoozer quotes with approval the view of Annette Barnes that texts are 
either “self-subsistent repositories of meaning responsible for the experience 
readers have of them” or are “the end-products of reading experiences, 
objects themselves constituted by such experiences”96. This is far too 
simplistic. It supposes an entirely false dichotomy97 when there are 
intervening positions, and assumes an entirely sender-based view of reader 
and text98. Although Vanhoozer uses the concept of adequacy extensively, his 
                                                     
92 What Stanley Fish refers to as “theory fear” – “the fear that [victims] … will abandon 
principled enquiry and go their unconstrained way in response to the dictates of fashion, 
opinion, or whim”: ‘Consequences’, in The Stanley Fish Reader, op cit p94. 
93 Is there a meaning in this text? The Bible, the reader and the morality of literary knowledge 
(Leicester, Apollos, 1998). Hereafter abbreviated to Is There? 
94 Is There? p15 
95 Is There? p27. His depiction of “the hermeneutical non-realist” (Is There? p58) as believing in 
interpretations not facts, and of denying the author, is simplistic and sweeping. He imagines 
that there is a binary opposition between belief in author/meaning and belief in 
interpretation/meanings that do not refer. He doesn't escape from this box: one can either 
believe in God or anything, it would appear: Is There? p59.  
96 Is There? p110 
97 Of the sort Derrida spent his academic career revealing. 
98 As Thiselton notes: “the choice between (1) a single determinate meaning based on 
reference and representation, and (2) a radical indeterminacy that sweeps aside reference and 
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idea of it presupposes communication as comprising discrete agents 
conveying guaranteed messages of meaning. 
 
Intention plays a crucial role in the defence of authorial agency mounted by 
Vanhoozer and Ward. In discussing Ricoeur’s idea of the sense of the text, 
Vanhoozer suggests as an example the idea of waves on a beach causing 
pebbles to spell out ‘To be or not to be’99 and notes that 
 
the point of this example is that “the sense of the text” is logically inseparable 
from “the intention of the author.” Unless we are able to relate a set of signs to 
someone who intends to convey meaning through them, we are not even able to 
determine whether they have sense potential. For the range of possible meanings 
of a word depends, minimally, on what language is being used, and when. In 
other words, the meaning of a word sequence depends on our ability to relate it 
to a historical author.100 
 
While quite correctly identifying the recognized presence of a communicating 
agent as a necessity for the recognition of meaning, this nonetheless misses a 
crucial aspect of ‘sense potential’ that Vanhoozer skates over with a “we are 
able”. It also over-identifies, perhaps even conflates, “our ability to relate it 
[text-meaning] to a historical author” with “the intention of the author”.  
 
I quite agree that as readers, we suppose that that which we read is an act of 
communication, or that it is intended to communicate101. We thus, in 
identifying something as a text, have already assumed the existence of an 
author. However, Vanhoozer’s example clearly illustrates the extent to which 
a reader or reading community can create reading contexts, and thus create 
texts. If waves rather than a communicatory agent produced a pattern of 
pebbles spelling out ‘To be …’ and someone came across them and 
recognized the pattern as a sentence in English, they might well ascribe 
textuality to it, or even recognize it as a quotation, if they knew Hamlet. They 
might indeed react in all sorts of ways, from seeing it as a supernatural 
message, to believing it to be a ‘candid-camera-style’ hoax.  
 
The crucial point is that they would be quite likely to take something that was 
‘objectively’ not a communication on Vanhoozer’s criteria, because it was 
produced accidentally and with no communicatory intention, and turn it into 
an intentional act by receiving it as such. Thus ‘we are able’ as readers to 
                                                                                                                                                        
representation provides a contrived, artificial and misleading alternative”: Thiselton on 
Hermeneutics op cit p615. 
99 In which he copies the suggestion and conclusions of S Knapp & W B Michaels in their 
seminal essay ‘Against Theory’, published originally in Critical Inquiry 8:4 (Summer 1982), 
who imagined an observer seeing the waves produce a Wordsworth sonnet, as a 
demonstration that meaning is identical to authorial intention (p728).  
100 Is There? p109 
101 As, for example, Louise Rosenblatt also demonstrates: The Reader, the Text, the Poem: the 
Transactional theory of the Literary work, (Carbondale IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 
1978) 
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ascribe intentions to things that seem to us to be intentional, whether or not 
they in fact were produced by an intending agent.  
 
In Knapp’s and Michael’s example, which Vanhoozer has adapted, the 
observer witnesses the tide creating the second stanza of a Wordsworth 
poem, having previously stumbled across the first. They conclude that the 
observer “will either be ascribing these marks to some agent capable of 
intentions … or you will count them as nonintentional effects of mechanical 
processes” but that in the second case they would no longer be words but 
would be “marks”102. This is firstly quite incorrect: the words are clearly 
words to a speaker of English, whether produced accidentally or not – they 
may be words produced accidentally, but words they recognisably are103. As 
W C Dowling notes, that one term may entail another is not to say that they 
are identical:  
 
by simply collapsing one term into the other in the way they do [meaning into 
intention], Knapp and Michaels in effect deprive one or the other term of any 
independent function. Yet in this sort of situation, one ought to bear in mind 
Wittgenstein’s injunction that if everything behaves as though a sign has 
meaning, then it does have meaning. “Intention” and “meaning” behave, at any 
rate, as though they had independent meanings,104 
                                                     
102 Critical Inquiry 8:4 (Summer 1982)p728. 
103 “They say that the marks are not words, sentences, poetry, language, and so forth, but 
merely resemble those things. To say this ... is quite radically to deny that the forms of 
language possess any defining power; it is also to deny that wherever those forms exist there 
is inescapably a question of interpretation, even if not an easy one … To suppose … that the 
authentic property of the sentence is conferred on it by interpretive belief, irrespective of 
conventional form, is to be reborn into a condition of “true belief” extreme even in these times 
for solipsistic intransigence. Alternatively, the supposition that forms are merely empty 
betrays an obliviousness of the socially constructed and consensual nature of linguistic 
significance”: J Crewe, ‘Toward Uncritical Practice’, Critical Inquiry 9:4 (June 1983) p756. See 
also A Rosmarin: “they argue that language and intention are inseparable because words, 
once separated from intention, are no longer really words … Now, how do Knapp and 
Michaels know this? Well, of course, they don’t”: ‘On the Theory of “Against Theory”’, 
Critical Inquiry 9:4 (June 1983) p781. 
104 W C Dowling, ‘Intentionless Meaning’, Critical Inquiry 9:4 (June 1983) 784-785. Knapp and 
Michaels deny collapsing the one into the other in ‘Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction’, Critical Inquiry 14 (Autumn 1987) footnote 2 p49, on the grounds that “not all 
intentions are intentions to mean”. This does not address the problem, however, that in the 
case of texts, they can mean what we interpret the author as not having intended. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff also makes this point: “to aim at discerning the illocutionary act that someone 
performed is not to be identified with aiming to discern the illocutionary act that he or she 
intended to perform. Rather, it’s to aim at discerning the one that he or she did perform, 
whether or not it was intended”: ‘The promise of Speech-act theory for Biblical 
Interpretation’, in  C Bartholomew, C Greene and K Möller (eds.), After Pentecost: Language 
and Biblical Interpretation. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2 (Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 2001) 
p82. He doesn’t, however, notice here that to divorce intention from meaning, while in 
accordance with Austin’s own aims, poses its own problems for the illocutionary-
perlocutionary distinction. Indeed, he goes on to assert that “illocutionary acts are  ... open-
ended” (p89), which would seem to call into question significant elements of their 
distinctiveness as conventionally-based acts. 
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and they behave in these ways in the uses to which speaking communities put 
them. 
 
Secondly, I suspect most people actually in this situation would be amazed (in 
Austin’s phrase, they ‘wouldn’t know what to say’105), and their decision as a 
reader of English whether or not to opt for a sentient agent (and hence 
intention and meaning) or an accidental process (and perhaps therefore no 
intention only meaning) demonstrates precisely that the determination of 
meaning lies, at least in part, in the hands of the reader who makes this 
decision: it is impossible to imagine that words which held a meaning 
moments earlier have that meaning suddenly expunged from the observer’s 
brain as the tide recedes106. As Hirsch notes in his comments on Knapp’s and 
Michaels’s argument, “text-authorship and meaning-authorship are not the 
same”107, indeed “we do not always understand by a text what we believe its 
author meant in composing it. The empirical claim of Knapp and Michaels 
seems to be false”108. 
 
In a reverse of the situation as Vanhoozer describes it, someone might spell 
out in pebbles on a beach the message ‘Please rescue me’, which is seen by 
others but not recognized as a communication or even as an act, because they 
do not understand English, or have no concept of writing at all109. Pebbles 
spelling out ‘To be...’ are a message because we have created and receive 
writing. The point therefore is not that the sense of the text presupposes the 
text as a created entity, but that the sense of the text or of the author is itself 
created or received by the ‘audience’, and can even be created in the total 
absence of an author in certain circumstances.  
 
                                                     
105 Philosophical Papers p88-89 
106 It is interesting that Knapp and Michaels seem to be victims themselves of the sender view 
of meaning: ‘A Reply to Richard Rorty: What is Pragmatism?’ Critical Inquiry 11:3 (March 
1985): “the choice between our position and the formalist position is a choice between reading 
a text as the expression of its author’s intention and reading a text as the expression of no 
author’s intention. But for both Rorty and Hirsch there is … a third possibility: reading a text 
as the expression of an author’s intention”: p468. This possibility, though, can be discounted 
because “disagreement about the meaning of a text depends not on the possibility of different 
kinds of intention – on the logical choice between what its author intended and what an 
author intends – but only on the empirical difficulty of deciding what its author intended. … 
[Therefore] the only alternative to the intentionalism of “Against Theory” is a formalism that 
imagines the possibility not of two different kinds of intended meaning but of meaning that is 
not intended at all” – p469. The possibility that meaning is created in a ‘partnership’ is 
entirely unconsidered: a bit odd, considering their own collaboration.  
107 ‘Against Theory?’ Critical Inquiry 9:4 (June 1983) p745 
108 ‘Against Theory?’ op cit p746 
109 They would thus not see writing, but only a jumble of stones. We can only say, as 
Vanhoozer would want to assert, that this misses the intention of the writer, because we have 
recognized that intention (or think we have – ‘please rescue me’ could be a joke or an 
accident). 
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Moreover, it is important to note that we can only say ‘This is not 
communication’ in Vanhoozer’s example because, according to his 
description, we know that ‘the message’ has been created accidentally; in 
other words Vanhoozer has told us this, or, if we are pretending that this is 
real, we must have seen the waves create the message by chance. Unless we 
already know this, we cannot say that this is not a message; we simply have 
no basis for reaching this conclusion, and even if we do, as in Knapp’s and 
Michaels’s example, we then have to decide for ourselves what to say, and 
our decision will be decisive110. As Herbert H Clark has suggested in a 
conversation with Alain Trognon 
 
the notion “what the speaker means” is replaced by “what the speaker is to be 
taken to mean”. The change is small, but radical. The idea is that speakers and 
addressees try to create a joint construal of what the speaker is to be taken to 
mean. Such a construal represents not what the speaker means per se – which can 
change in the very process of communicating – but what the participants 
mutually take the speaker as meaning, what they deem the speaker to mean.111 
 
The Sender View of Meaning.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
4c: Kevin Vanhoozer on Intention, Authorial Authority, and Meaning 
 
Vanhoozer begins his ‘resurrection of the author’ in Is there a Meaning in this 
Text? by asserting that “a word or text only has meaning (noun) if some 
person means (verb) something by it”112. This is quite inaccurate and entirely 
at variance with the implications of Speech Act theory, as identified in 
relation to the waves forming pebbles on the beach. Speech Act theory should 
rather be understood as implying that an utterance only has meaning if it is 
understood as being an utterance: if others recognize it as such. As Black, as 
précised by Wright argues, “the interpretation of the message performed in 
accordance with our learned linguistic behavior logically precedes the 
recognition of the intention to utter the message; therefore, understanding of 
that message cannot be by means of any such recognition. It is rather that the 
recognition comes as a result of understanding the message.”113 
 
                                                     
110 This argument contains the same basic flaw as the ‘Argument from Design’ which suggests 
that the existence of God can be proved by an examination of Creation; this is only the case if 
as a minimum one has some idea of what God is already, and therefore some idea of what 
would constitute evidence of His/Her/Its work, and therefore of what a Divine Design might 
resemble. This is not to say that one cannot find God in His Creation, of course, merely that to 
do so, one must first know of God from His agents of revelation (be they any combination of 
the Spiritual, Sacramental, Familial, Ecclesial or Scriptural).  
111 Clark, quoted in A Trognon, ‘Speech Acts and the logic of mutual understanding’, in D 
Vanderveken and S Kubo (eds.), Essays in Speech Act Theory: Pragmatics and Beyond New Series 
77 (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002) p132. 
112 Is There? p202 
113 E Wright, ‘Derrida, Searle, Context, Games, Riddles’, New Literary History 13:3 (Spring 
1982) p464. 
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That communication occurs, and that we are engaged in dialogues of 
communication that, in practice, entail responsibilities, I agree. That any act of 
communication is one-way, I absolutely dispute, as also the implication that 
the communicating agent is an ‘individual agent’114. Vanhoozer here veers 
towards identifying meaning as related to or conceived in a kind of private 
language; however it is highly unlikely that a completely isolated person can 
‘mean’ anything, unless they are at the least part of a recognizing and 
affirming cultural environment. One cannot have a private language or 
private meaning115.  
 
That Vanhoozer is of necessity stuck with the concept of ‘inward-intention’ as 
the only guarantee of illocutionary meaning, is illustrated when he quotes 
Searle’s definition of a promise as requiring that “the speaker intends his or 
her hearer to recognize the utterance as counting as a promise”116. This seeks to 
distinguish that which is brought to a context within the utterance like the 
message in a bottle, from the actual utterance spoken and received117.  
 
It is also illustrated when Vanhoozer writes that “when confronted with 
apparently meaningful human behavior or intelligible signs, we cannot help 
but attribute intentionality” or that “intention pertains to what authors are 
                                                     
114 A metaphorical entity that should, I think, be treated with great caution, and is itself highly 
presuppositional. As M Rosaldo notes “in focusing on the ways “intentions” are embodied in 
all acts of speech, speech act theorists have failed to grapple with some of the more exciting 
implications of their work. They think of “doing things with words” as the achievement of 
autonomous selves, whose deeds are not significantly constrained by the relationships and 
expectations that define their local world… it fails because it construes action independent of 
its reflexive status both as consequence and cause of human social forms”: ‘The Things We 
Do with Words: Ilongot Speech Acts and Speech Act Theory in Philosophy’, Language in 
Society 11:2 (August 1982) 204.  
115 “It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone 
obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a 
report was made, an order given or understood; and so on – To obey a rule, to make a report, 
to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). 
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. to understand a language means 
to be master of a technique.” Wittgenstein: Phil Inv I §199  (p81). See also “hence also ‘obeying 
a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not 
possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the 
same thing as obeying it.” Wittgenstein: Phil Inv I §202 (p81). 
116 Is There? p210 
117 In this respect I agree with Briggs who illuminates very clearly the difference between 
Austin and Searle concerning ‘intention’, quoting Austin’s dismissal of a “‘mental states’ 
philosophy of mind” such as he finds in Searle, and suggesting that “understanding is less a 
mental state than something like an ability, or a competency” (Words in Action p54), the idea 
of competency having “proved a fruitful category in literary theory, cf Jonathan Culler, 
Structuralist Poetics” (p54 footnote 82). He also accepts Jerrold Sadock’s point “that the 
different (illocutionary) points of a speech act are not mutually exclusive, but rather co-exist 
with one point usually being primary” (p58). This however still seems to assume the 
sentence-as-carrier-of-meaning view of utterances. It should be noted that for Searle the 
utterance is pre-spoken, while I assume that an utterance is that which is spoken in a specific 
(any) context, and thus cannot be systematic – it is the sentence in its particularity. 
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doing in tending to their words”118. More specifically, it is illustrated not by 
what he writes, with which I often agree, but by what he does not write, 
which is an acknowledgment of the activity and dynamism of our 
interpretation or realization, so that intention is not something obvious and 
self-evident, but something created by an exchange119.  
 
Vanhoozer’s too-limited concept of intention is also illustrated when in 
recounting the Searle-Derrida exchange, Vanhoozer supports Searle’s 
suggestion that “my using the same words … on one occasion to mean 
something different from what my friend meant on another does not evacuate 
my speech act (or his) of determinate meaning”120, while ignoring Derrida’s 
point that this very iterability means that there can be no pre-utterance 
guarantee of meaning in any particular instance121. Meaning is determinable, 
not determinate. We certainly read and hear utterances as x, y or z, and 
assume (unless challenged) that our interpretation of the utterance is that 
which was ‘intended’ by its creator, but we have no guarantee that we are 
correct, nor normally do we seek for or expect such a guarantee. The ‘work’ in 
this sense is all done by the audience, not the speaker. Meaning, indeed, is not 
a static quality. 
 
As is the case with the concept of ‘judgment’, the exact meaning of the idea of 
a guarantee has an importance; is a guarantee an absolute and immutable 
property, or does it have an element of contingency, and if so, how much? 
This refers, to some extent, back to the question of the extent to which Austin 
envisaged his theory as being complete (excluding its pre-emptive exclusions, 
of course), and to the uncertainty over his use of phrases such as  “having a 
certain conventional effect”122, or “fixed, relatively”123. Moreover, the nature 
of communication itself, and of meaning, is greatly affected by 
presuppositions about who it is that is doing the communicating, and what it 
is to be ‘I-who-acts’. The direction in which we travel depends on the places 
from which we start124.  
                                                     
118 Vanhoozer, entry on ‘Intention/Intentional Fallacy’ in ‘Dictionary for Theological 
Interpretation of the Bible’, entry beginning on p327, quote from first column p329. 
119 This is very similar to the realisation that we are inclined to see human faces in cloud 
shapes, on mountains, or in the landscape of Mars, where there are none. This inclination 
does not mean that there are no real faces, but simply that we may need to check our 
assumptions when we ‘recognize’ a face. 
120 Is There? p212 
121 Both Derrida and Searle, I think, are guilty of falling into the trap Cameron identifies, 
using his own idiosyncratic description of acts: “It is above all in the case of speech acts that 
we tend to become hypnotized by the material tokens [in the case of speech, the words], and 
pay but scant attention to behaviour-tokens [what is done]”: J R Cameron, ‘Sentence-Meaning 
and Speech Acts’. The Philosophical Quarterly 20:79 (April 1970) p109.  
122 How To p14 
123 How To p76.  
124 It is worth noting too that mistakes are as much instances of the speaker’s failure to 
recognize how his words would be taken, as of the hearer’s failure, in the context of an 
immediate activity like speaking – as, for example, when speakers cause offence. 
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The Sender View of Meaning.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
4d: Intention, Action and Consequences: Illocutions, Perlocutions, and 
Arson 
 
In Is There? Vanhoozer records that the legal view of someone who set fire to a 
rival’s house, thereby unintentionally killing some of the occupants, was that 
she was guilty of murder “because the court ruled that an agent’s intention 
includes what is a likely or highly probable consequence of an action”125. Thus 
even though the arsonist (a Mrs Hyam) “insisted that she did not intend to 
injure or kill”126, the Court found her guilty of murder (rather than accidental 
manslaughter), confirming that in this instance the agent was regarded as 
being responsible for, and as having intended, the consequences of their act, 
assuming that they were ‘reasonably foreseeable’127 to the agent themselves.  
 
According to Vanhoozer, the Court decided that the arsonist was a murderer, 
even though she did not ‘intend’ to murder, because she did foresee the likely 
consequences of her action. She committed not arson, or merely arson, but 
also murder, rather than manslaughter; not because murder was her intent, 
but because she recognized that her act was likely to have certain 
consequences, and thus might entail death, and went ahead anyway, allowing 
the Court to ascribe ‘murderousness’ to her128. The Court recognized her act 
as murder, despite her protestations to the contrary, because of their opinion 
as to what she had in fact foreseen as to its likely consequences.  
 
The judgment of the Court was thus based on its assessment of the actions of 
Mrs Hyam, and on the way in which her particular actions could be 
reasonably interpreted129. The Court decided, based on what she did, that Mrs 
Hyam was well aware of the possible risk of death to which she was exposing 
the people in the house, and that therefore whether or not she intended 
actually to kill anyone, she was guilty of murder. To be guilty of murder, it 
was not necessary that Mrs Hyam intended to take life, but merely that she 
was aware of the possible consequences of what she did. Her ‘intention’, 
                                                     
125 Is There? p255 
126 Is There? footnote 252 p278 
127 Compare this with L J Cohen’s suggestion that “for a speaker’s utterance to be a warning 
in the happy-or-unhappy sense what is required is that it should be of a kind that he could 
reasonably expect to secure uptake”: ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 
14:55 (1964) p129, which criteria must presuppose ‘how it is received’. 
128 It is relevant to note that according to Lord Hailsham, Mrs Hyam made sure that her ex-
lover was not in the house before setting it alight, and having begun the blaze in the middle 
of the night, made no attempt to alert anyone, but went home to bed: these facts were taken 
by the jury in the Crown Court as constituting evidence that she was well aware of the 
possible consequences of her actions, and did not attempt to mitigate them in any way.  
129 It is important to remember that this is a decision based on what the Court, or other 
audience, thinks is reasonably likely, and is not itself guaranteed; it may be overturned on 
appeal, or subject to extensive criticism in the press – see the subsequent discussion about 
Jennifer Hornsby’s example of ‘uptake’ in chapter Five. 
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therefore, is not simply her own aim or motive, but also that which she had 
foreseen as a risk and did nothing to prevent. 
 
In fact, Vanhoozer somewhat oversimplifies the situation of this case, heard in 
the House of Lords (as it then was) as Hyam and Director of Public 
Prosecutions130, on appeal (by the defendant Mrs Hyam) from Regina v Hyam. 
The brief digest at the beginning of the report notes that it was held, when 
dismissing the appeal, “that a person who, without intending to endanger 
life, did an act knowing that it was probable that grievous, in the sense of 
serious, bodily harm would result was guilty of murder if death resulted”131. 
However, two of the five law Lords (Diplock and Kilbrandon) dissented from 
this judgement, and as it notes tersely in the report “their Lordships took time 
for consideration”132.  
 
It is also worthwhile noting that Lord Hailsham, while dismissing the appeal, 
notes that “I do not … consider, as was suggested in argument, that the fact 
that a state of affairs is correctly foreseen as a highly probable consequence of 
what is done is the same thing as the fact that the state of affairs is 
intended.”133 However, he goes on to ask  
 
but what are we to say of the state of mind of a defendant who knows that a 
proposed course of conduct exposes a third party to a serious risk of death or 
grievous bodily harm, without actually intending those consequences, but 
nevertheless and without lawful excuse deliberately pursues that course of conduct 
regardless whether the consequences to his potential victim take place or not? In that 
case, if my analysis be correct, there is not merely actual foresight of the probable 
consequences, but actual intention to expose his victim to the risk of those 
consequences whether they in fact occur or not,134 
 
a willingness which allows the description murder, not manslaughter. This 
opinion, as I have said, was contested by a minority of the Court, but one of 
the things on which all were agreed was that the proper test was a subjective, 
not an objective test: in other words, that it was necessary to establish what 
Mrs Hyam had foreseen, not what a ‘normal person’ would have regarded as 
being foreseeable135. 
 
Vanhoozer however follows his description of this case by suggesting an 
intention-based distinction between “results (illocutions)” and “foreseen or 
desired consequences (perlocutions)” which is quite at variance with the view 
                                                     
130 [1975] A.C. 55. 
131 [1975] A.C. p55 paragraph F 
132 [1975] A.C. p64 H: in fact, the case was heard on January 15th-17th, and judgement given on 
March 21st, with all five Law Lords responding, although Lord Hailsham in the majority gave 
much the longest judgement. 
133 [1975] A.C. p 75 B. 
134 [1975] A.C. p 77 D-F 
135 See for example [1975] A.C. p 95 E-G. 
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of ‘foreseen’ consequences defining an act that is required by the very 
example he cites. Vanhoozer suggests that  
 
for legal and for literary reasons, I believe that it is important to distinguish 
between intended results (illocutions), foreseen or desired consequences 
(perlocutions), and consequences neither intended nor foreseen (accidents). It is 
true that authors often hope to achieve something by their communicative acts 
over and above understanding. However, as we noted earlier, authors are not in 
control of these further, perlocutionary, effects. Moreover, the consequences of 
communicative actions are often unforeseen. The author’s communicative act is 
never the sole causal factor in bringing about a perlocutionary effect. Only the 
illocutionary, therefore, refers to something intrinsic to the action.136 
 
There are a number of problems with this view, aside from the questions of 
foreseeability and intention discussed in the previous paragraph.  
 
Firstly, how can an intended result be achieved irrespective of the reader’s 
context, which will affect their ability to ‘see’ what the author is saying?137 
Secondly, we can surely only tell whether or not a result was ‘intended’ by 
recognizing and assessing, from our own standpoint, the action and the actor. 
The conventions that make illocutions effective are not universal or 
acontextual, as so often seems to be assumed: a lot will depend on the specific 
context of the case: “when people say that a man must be taken to intend the 
natural consequences of his acts, they fall into error: there is no ‘must’ about 
it; it is only ‘may’”138. 
 
Thirdly, it was the foreseen perlocutionary consequences of the arson attack 
that ‘made’ the arson attack a murder as well as arson, not simply arson or 
manslaughter. In this instance, therefore, the ‘perlocutionary’ effect was 
absolutely ‘intrinsic to the action’; to the act’s being identified as, and thus 
being, the act that it was. The death of some of the occupants of the house was 
not “desired” by Mrs Hyam, but it was, based on what she did, apparently 
foreseen by her; and because it was the Court’s opinion that she had foreseen 
this risk, this foreseen (and indeed foreseeable) consequence determined what 
act was committed.  
 
Mrs Hyam’s illocutionary act (if such it can be called) was arson with intent to 
frighten. Her perlocutionary act was murder, but it was this ‘perlocutionary 
element’ that defines the entirety of what she did. She did not, apparently, 
                                                     
136 Is There? p255. 
137 “the search for the purely linguistic or the irreducibly logical, apart from a particular 
context, seems doomed to failure”: Smith and McClendon, ‘Religious language after J L 
Austin’, Religious Studies 8:1 (1972) p57, or E Weigand: “There is … no individual speech act 
which stands alone and is autonomous. Language use cannot be described from the speaker’s 
perspective alone. The assumption that all speaker contributions are directed at someone, 
only demonstrates the deficiency of the monologic point of view”: E Weigand, ‘The Dialogic 
Principle Revisited’, Dialoganalyse III:1 (1991) p89. 
138 Lord Denning, in Hosegood v Hosegood (1950) 66 TLR (Pt 1) 735, quoted by Lord 
Hailsham [1975] A.C. p74 H-p 75 A 
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have murder as her aim, but was guilty of it nonetheless: and indeed, the very 
existence of both “murder” and “manslaughter” are contextual, and decided 
upon by third parties: we do not allow the agent to determine which act 
occurred. 
 
It is also noteworthy that Vanhoozer’s suggestion that perlocutions are 
“foreseen or desired consequences” is at variance with Austin’s own 
definition of perlocutions as being essentially unpredictable by contrast with 
the predictability of conventional illocutions139. Vanhoozer’s statement that 
the author’s intended result is ‘understanding’ and is illocutionary is also 
problematic. The assertion assumes rather a lot about what ‘understanding’ 
is, and its uniformity as a response to texts.  
 
It also, of course, requires that the author must be able to predict what his 
audience will recognize as the meaning, and be able to guarantee this goal, 
since illocutions are predictable. On Austin’s definition, an illocution must be 
determinable by a neutral third party (a judge), which is possible only on the 
basis of unvarying or absolute conventions, and excepting “infelicities” and 
all the other ‘ills that acts are heir to’. However, these can never be entirely 
outflanked, and the further divorced are reader and author, the harder this 
gets, even assuming ‘good will’140.  
 
The Sender View of Meaning.                                                                                                                                                                        
4e: The Assessment of Intention: the work of R A Duff and R Gibbs 
 
Vanhoozer’s own example of the arsonist is taken from R A Duff’s legal 
textbook Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the 
Criminal Law141. Interestingly, Vanhoozer’s approach to the nature of 
intention, while sharing some surface similarities with those of Duff, travels 
in a very different direction, and sits in a rather different context. Intention, 
Agency and Criminal Liability is on the one hand a description of the varying, 
and occasionally somewhat contradictory, approaches to intention made by 
the English courts (with a few excursions into Scotland). It is also, however, a 
prescriptive work of judicial philosophy, arguing that the ‘inward states’ or 
‘Cartesian’ image of intention generally adopted by the judiciary (and in 
common parlance even among philosophers) is incorrect. It also argues that 
intention itself is a two-pronged concept, and it advances arguments about 
the direction English law should take based on these contentions.   
 
                                                     
139 “Any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off … by the issuing … of 
any utterance whatsoever”: How To p109. “Illocutionary acts are conventional acts: 
perlocutionary acts are not conventional”:How To p120. “A judge should be able to decide … 
what locutionary and illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts 
were achieved”: How To p121. 
140 It should also be noted that, as in Hyam, Judges do not always agree: this is also the 
situation in the Plessy case discussed in chapter six. 
141 R A Duff: Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability, Blackwell 1990 
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Duff argues that there are no “distinct and hidden mental states”142 and that a 
person’s intention does not refer to an ‘inward state’ which can at best only be 
‘second-guessed’ on the basis of what they did, but instead is entirely 
describable on the basis of what is seen to be done. This argument is not only 
entirely in tune with Austin’s own initial arguments, but is also an argument 
with which both Vanhoozer and I would agree. However, Duff also suggests 
that there are in fact two aspects to the concept of intention.  
 
Interestingly, in the light of the work of Mikhail Bakhtin to be discussed later, 
Duff suggests that “to hold someone responsible for an effect, to portray it as 
the result of her intentional action, is to hold her answerable for it; she may be 
asked to explain or to justify her action as thus described”143 and that “the 
concept of intention does extend beyond the paradigm of intended agency: it 
includes, as being brought about intentionally, effects which the agent does 
not act with the intention of bringing about, but which are properly ascribed 
to her as their responsible agent.”144 
 
He thus distinguishes that which the agent intends – which he defines as 
those things forming part of an agent’s own reason for acting – from that 
which we may say that the agent brings about intentionally, which “depends 
not on whether she [the agent] thinks it is relevant to her action, but on 
whether we think it is something to which she should attend as a reason 
against [or presumably for] acting thus; and we may disagree with her about 
                                                     
142 Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability p127 
143 Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability p78. (For Bakhtin’s idea of answerability see chapter 
seven of this thesis 
144 Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability p79. In this he echoes Lord Hailsham in the Hyam 
case. M E Bratman, in ‘What is Intention?’ in P R Cohen, J Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), 
Intentions in Communication (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1992), discusses the dilemma 
encountered by a Strategic Bomber, and initially suggests that “there is no room here for a 
distinction between intended and merely expected upshots” (p25), a conclusion he 
subsequently seeks to avoid by suggesting that intention is distinct from choice. Duff’s 
solution, creating a distinction between the intended and the intentional, is essentially the 
same distinction (indeed, J F Allen describes Bratman as establishing a difference between 
“doing something intentionally and intending to do something. The former case might be 
paraphrased as deliberately doing an action” p71) although Bratman and Duff approach the 
question almost ‘from opposite sides’: Duff is considering the question of the responsibility 
that ‘we’ will attribute to the agent in a legal setting, while Bratman considers only the view 
of their actions that the agent could offer as an excuse. If Strategic Bomber were to be 
prosecuted, it seems likely that he would be held responsible for deaths he did not choose but 
recognised were likely to arise: this, though, is a question of morality and culpability, as Duff 
would recognise (and it would, one assumes, and leaving aside questions of jurisdiction, be a 
question of factors such as ‘did Strategic Bomber seek to mitigate the loss’, ‘was the benefit 
sufficient defence’ etc.) In the following article, Cohen and Lévesque follow Bratman: “we 
will develop a theory in which expected side effects are chosen but not intended”: p37. See P R 
Cohen and H J Levesque, ‘Persistence, Intention, and Commitment’, and J F Allen, ‘Two 
views of Intention: Comments on Bratman and on Cohen and Levesque’, in P R Cohen, J 
Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 
1992).  
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this”145. That which the agent brings about intentionally, is thus that which 
we regard as having been intended, although the agent themselves may 
dispute this146.  
 
It is important to note that both in respect of those things that are ‘intended’ 
and those that occur ‘intentionally’, the circumstances in which they are 
identified are assumed by Duff to be subsequent and dialogic. That which 
was ‘intended’ can be identified because it comprises the reasons that an actor 
would give if they were asked to explain or justify their action, but an act so 
described is not thereby rendered completely explicit; there may be ‘reasons’ 
hidden from even the actor (in the ‘subconscious’)147, and the reasons given 
will need to be accepted as plausible by the audience before they define the 
act performed148.  
 
This is even more the case for that which is ‘intentional’: the category is 
explicitly dialogic, as Duff notes; “our description of her action as an 
intentional killing, however, depends not just on the fact that death ensues, 
but on our judgement that she is fully responsible for that effect. She might 
dispute that description … and our grounds for rejecting … [her] claim are 
moral, not purely factual.”149  
 
This explicitly introduces the moral element which also operates, 
unrecognized, in the work of Jennifer Hornsby discussed subsequently150. The 
occurrence here of the concept of judgement is also highly significant; as Duff 
observes, “ascriptions of intentional agency do not describe neutral facts: they 
express normative judgements of responsibility, in which we may 
disagree”151, and given that even the intended elements of acts (since any act 
                                                     
145 Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability p84 
146 As Thomason puts it: “Plans are wholes constituted of intentions, and we recognize 
intentions by fitting them into recognized plans. … Any good account of speaker meaning … 
should connect acts of meaning to planning and plan recognition” R H Thomason, 
‘Accommodation, Meaning, and Implicature: Interdisciplinary Foundations for Pragmatics’, 
in P R Cohen, J Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication (Cambridge MA, 
MIT Press, 1992) p342.  
147 The ‘real’ reasons may be an inseparable mixture of emotions and memories etc, and may 
be acknowledged or may not, in later years – the timing of the challenge is important. 
148 As Tsohatzidis puts it: “Searle’s linguistic arguments for the existence of these necessary 
connections [between mental states and illocutions] all fail, and … the assumption of a merely 
default connection between types of speech acts and types of mental states – that is, of a 
connection that licenses the interpretation of such an act as an expression of such a state as 
long as there are no indications to the contrary – suffices for explaining all the linguistic facts 
that Searle was interested in explaining, as well as many facts that he fails to explain”: ‘The 
gap between speech acts and mental states’, in S L Tsohatzidis (ed.), Foundations of Speech Act 
Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (London, Routledge, 1994) p232. 
149 Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability p81-82. Although of course, moral beliefs are facts as 
well, not a different category of thing. 
150 In chapter Five 
151 Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability p84 
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has both intended and intentional elements to it) are part of this debate, it is 
clear that  
 
to discern an agent’s intentions is to grasp the relation between her action and its 
context (including what else she does); what she will count as success or failure 
in what she does; and the truth of a range of hypotheticals about what she would 
do if …; and we may be uncertain or mistaken about her intentions in so far as 
we are ignorant of or mistaken about any of these matters.152 
 
However, if we are mistaken about her intentions this is not because we are 
ignorant of what has been going on in “a mental realm which is, in principle, 
hidden from us” but because  
 
we are mistaken or deceived about the meaning of her actions; and that meaning 
is, in principle, discernible in the larger pattern of her actions and her responses 
… in trying to understand a person’s actions …, I am trying to see what they 
mean; to discern the pattern of which they are a part, their relation to their 
context, and the direction in which they are moving.153  
 
This process of discernment is, to re-iterate, a dialogic one, in which the 
identification of what was intended, and of what is described as intentional, is 
through a collective negotiation between the actor and their audience, on the 
basis of their relationship in a culture that already exists and makes the 
recognition of meaning achievable154. The meaning of the act undertaken in 
context consists in an appreciation, perhaps through negotiation, of what the 
actor intended (which cannot just be asserted, but which must be accepted as 
plausible or reasonable, and which may of course be incorrect or self-
deluding) and of the additional intentional consequences which we the 
audience agree or believe are inherent in the act. However, as Duff notes 
several times, this is not a guaranteed process – disagreement may be 
inescapable155. 
                                                     
152 Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability p131 
153 Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability p132. Compare also Gibbs’s suggestion (see 
succeeding paragraph) that “understanding [of meaning] is not simply a private mental act, 
however, but a social achievement taking place in the public domain” Intentions in the 
Experience of Meaning op cit p327. 
154 Thus I agree with M Hesse that “the aim of hermeneutics must be to discover an author’s 
prior beliefs in order to give probabilities to hypotheses about his intentions” M Hesse, ‘Texts 
without Types and Lumps without Laws’, New Literary History 17:1 (Autumn 1985) 42, 
(although understanding is not necessarily this ‘tortuous’). This is what Thomason means, I 
think, by “the mutuality of the conversational record”: Thomason, ‘Accommodation, 
Meaning, and Implicature: Interdisciplinary Foundations for Pragmatics’, op cit footnote 24 
p345, expanded on p361. 
155 Cf J Culler: “intention is perhaps best thought of as a product. … Intentions are not a 
delimited content but open sets of discursive possibilities – what one will say in response to 
questions about an act”: J Culler, ‘Convention and Meaning: Derrida and Austin’, New 
Literary History 13:1 (Autumn 1981) 28. Knapp and Michael demonstrate the fundamental 
inadequacies of their own position on intention (‘Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction’, Critical Inquiry 14 (Autumn 1987)) when they note that “the reason a speaker 
who pretends is nevertheless taken seriously is not that his intentions don’t matter but simply 
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This view has some interesting similarities to the proposal made by Raymond 
Gibbs156.  Gibbs suggests that while the absence of author-authority in writing 
is greater than in speech157, nonetheless this is clouded by the necessity that 
the realization of an act as communicatory by the hearers or readers, involves 
the realization of it as ‘intended’, and thus there is an assumption of presence 
in reading a text158. He proposes the idea of “hypothetical intentionalism”: 
 
The most common way of understanding written language and artworks is in 
terms of hypothetical intentions. Hypothetical intentionalism holds that people 
find language and artworks meaningful without necessarily knowing the actual 
beliefs and intentions of the person(s) creating the artifact. Readers and 
spectators form meaningful interpretations of what is written or created by 
reconstructing an idealized version of what someone has said, written, or created, 
given the artifact … and an understanding of the conditions under which the 
artifact was created.  
 
Whether language and art are understood by recovering a person’s subjective 
intentions, or by forming hypothetical intentions … depends on a large variety of 
factors. The most important of these is the extent to which sufficient common 
ground exists to allow speakers and listeners, authors and readers, artists and 
observers to infer agents’ actual intentions …  
 
People infer loose implications of utterances, texts and artworks not always 
because their authors explicitly intended such meanings to be understood … 
Many aspects of poetic and literary language, as well as of artworks, are best 
understood in terms of the communication of weak implicatures, which are 
                                                                                                                                                        
that he is held to have had the intention that in these circumstances ordinarily goes with these 
sounds” (p63), that “the choice between the alternatives [in deciding what act was 
performed] is a purely social one and has nothing to do with the relation between meaning 
and intention” and that “in both cases, the speech act the speaker will be held to have 
performed will be determined by the intention he will be held to have had” (p64), without at 
any point noticing that this makes intention a socially-determined phenomenon – my 
underlining throughout.  
156 R Gibbs Jr, Intentions in the Experience of Meaning (Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 
1999) 
157 Or perhaps some forms of it, since Gibbs seeks to erode the binary distinction between 
writing and speech as genres, in a way I support: he suggests that “rather than drawing a 
rigid distinction between spoken and written language, it makes better sense to differentiate 
between four kinds of discourse: unplanned spoken, unplanned written, planned spoken, and 
planned written. In any culture, spoken and written language crossfertilize each other so the 
particular features which distinguish each are constantly changing”: Intentions in the 
Experience of Meaning p180-181 
158 He notes that “the common ground that accumulates between author and reader 
constrains people’s understanding of an author’s text. None of this dictates that readers must 
know something about the author’s actual mental state or attitudes at the time a written text 
was composed. Instead, readers knowing something about an author, and their assumption 
that the author believes people bring this information into the act of reading, influences how 
readers interpret what is written” Intentions in the Experience of Meaning p186, and that “a 
sense of the author, real and implied, permits the reader to analyze how a text is exerting its 
influence” Intentions in the Experience of Meaning p187. See also Louise Rosenblatt’s 
description of ‘transactional’ meaning described in chapter seven. 
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meanings not explicitly represented in the minds of speakers, writers, and 
artists.159 
 
Thus, for Gibbs “interpretation is a collaborative, coordinated activity where 
all participants have a role in determining the intentional meaning of what is 
said, written or artistically created.”160 He suggests that “in general, writing 
and reading are social events involving transactions similar to those that 
occur in the context of negotiations between people during conversation. 
Texts are part of an ongoing conversation within a discourse community.”161 
Meaning is ascribed on this basis. 
 
Moreover, the concept of meaning itself is not unchanging throughout all the 
genres of communication; there are generic differences in our understanding 
of the concept of meaning. There are, for example, as many different sorts of 
reading, as there are different genres of communication: different readings are 
considered culturally appropriate or required in different genres162. Gibbs 
hints at this when he posits as a hypothesis that “assumptions about 
intentionality differ depending on the human artifacts under consideration. 
Thus, people draw different inferences about communicative intentions when 
interacting with nonverbal actions, spoken language, written language, 
literary texts, legal texts, and different forms of artwork”.163  
 
However, this dialogic and ‘negotiated’ view of intention is entirely 
incompatible with the idea of an illocution, and thus with Vanhoozer’s own 
thrust in Is There? He remains committed to a sender view of meaning and to 
a non-responsive, non-consequential illocution. This same problem affects the 
work of Timothy Ward. 
 
The Sender View of Meaning.                                                                                                                                                                                      
4f: Intention in the work of Timothy Ward 
 
Ward notes in his book Word and Supplement that in respect of perlocutionary 
effects, Searle “concludes that the act of promising has no essential tie to the 
                                                     
159 Intentions in the Experience of Meaning p328-9. “Implicature” here echoes the work of H P 
Grice, who suggested that “implicature” was one of the fundamentals of conversation – see 
for example ‘Logic and Conversation’ p32ff, in Studies in the Way of Words op cit. There is also 
an echo here of A Nehamas’s suggestion that “the author … is a plausible historical variant of 
the writer [the actual human who lived, died and wrote], a character the writer could have 
been … Writers enter a system with a life of its own; many of its features elude their most 
unconscious grasp … But the author, produced jointly by writer and text, by work and critic, 
is not a person; it is a character who is everything the text shows it to be and who in turn 
determines what the text shows.” A Nehamas, ‘What an Author Is’, Journal of Philosophy 83 
(1986) 689.  
160 Intentions in the Experience of Meaning p331 
161 Intentions in the Experience of Meaning p197 
162 As Louise Rosenblatt points out with her distinction between aesthetic and efferent 
reading: see chapter seven of this thesis. 
163 Intentions in the Experience of Meaning p333 
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bringing about of an effect on the hearer”164, a conclusion with which he 
agrees, citing the example of a promise made to someone in a language they 
do not, contrary to the promisor’s assumption, understand. He concludes;  
 
I have thus neither secured the uptake nor brought about the illocutionary effect 
of my illocutionary act. This failure, though, does not mean that I did not make 
the promise, and that therefore there is no promise that I am bound to keep. I 
simply did make the promise; any person within earshot who did understand my 
language and knew of my mistake would likely assume so. Again: what if I 
shouted my promise to someone across some distance, but they never heard my 
words clearly enough to comprehend them as a promise, because they were 
carried away by the wind? That mishap would not normally absolve me of the 
responsibilities associated with the making of a promise.165  
 
Ward also criticises Fish’s views on textual meaning. He puts Fish’s argument 
into speech act terms and suggests that “Fish’s point becomes equivalent to a 
claim that only if ‘uptake’ is successfully brought about can the illocutionary 
act be said to exist. That is, an utterance only counts as the performance of a 
particular illocutionary act if someone recognizes it as such”.166 Ward’s reply 
to this argument is that “it is a quite counter-intuitive claim: speakers and 
writers do not regard the very existence of their illocutionary acts as 
dependent on others coming to understand their meaning and force – their 
effectiveness, yes; but not their existence”167.  
 
In this respect he is entirely wrong, at least if one is to take seriously Austin’s 
description of speech acts168. Austin certainly explicitly contradicts this view: 
he notes that 
 
it is obviously necessary that to have promised I must normally (A) have been 
heard by someone, perhaps the promisee; (B) have been understood by him as 
promising. If one or other of these conditions is not satisfied, doubts arise as to 
                                                     
164 Word and Supplement p83 
165 Word and Supplement p83.  
166 Word and Supplement p186. It is interesting to compare Ward’s certainty with the equal and 
opposite certainty of J Narveson: “it is plainly essential, at a minimum, that the promise be 
understood to agree to the promise. No amount of verbal ritual on the part of the promiser, 
acting by himself, will create the needed obligation” – a view he thinks Searle accepts: J 
Narveson, ‘The Agreement to Keep Our Agreements’, Philosophical Papers 23:2 (1994) 81. 
Narveson also points out, quite rightly, that a third thing is also necessary: “the Consent of 
the Community”, because “the existence of a moral obligation … involves the whole relevant 
community” (p83): this, I think, is what Austin implies by suggesting that “it might be held 
...” – see How To p22. 
167 Word and Supplement p186 
168 The various circumstances necessary for the completion of an explicit performative include 
the following: “there must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect” (condition A.1); that “the particular persons and circumstances in a given 
case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked” (A.2); and 
that “the procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly (B.1) and completely 
(B.2)”: How To p15 – my underlining. He also later notes “an effect must be achieved on the 
audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out”: How To p115-116 
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whether I have really promised, and it might be held that my act was only 
attempted or was void.169  
 
Noteworthy here are again Austin’s use of the qualifying “might”, the sense 
of dialogic participation to establish whether or not the promise was made, 
and the use of metaphors of judgment; “it might be held that”.  
 
Ward has concentrated solely on “the doctrine of the Infelicities”170 and missed 
Austin’s recognition that “as actions, [performatives] … will be subject to 
certain whole dimensions of unsatisfactoriness to which all actions are subject 
but which are distinct – or distinguishable – from what we have chosen to 
discuss as infelicities”171. Ward has overlooked the fact that a promise is, 
whether an illocutionary act or anything else, at bottom an act172. He instead 
here reverts to an interior view of intention, imagining “fictitious inward 
acts”173 rather than real ones requiring understanding174.  
 
It is in truth quite hard to imagine satisfactorily the situation Ward describes, 
without asking questions about the response of the overhearer, and what the 
promisee might do if they were subsequently told of the promisor’s ‘promise’. 
Indeed, in what circumstances might a conversation end with a promise 
unheard, but without clarificatory follow-up by either party, follow-up which 
is at least a case of ‘making-plain how the act was to be taken’ and, probably 
also necessary to establish that an act had occurred at all?  
 
Even Ward’s description assumes the existence of four separate and crucial 
audiences: the overhearer; the promisee (person receiving the promise); 
Ward’s own ‘inner voice’ – ‘himself-to-himself’ – which operates in part as an 
imagined audience (perhaps God alone) acting as conscience and judge; and 
finally ‘we readers’ ourselves, for whom this episode is imagined and 
described. I wonder too about how one would recognize the existence of an 
illocutionary act without recognizing its meaning.175  
                                                     
169 How To p22 
170 How To p14 
171 How To p21 
172 And as, for example, Smith and McClendon note, “it does seem correct to say that the 
existence of hearers and a common language is a necessary condition for there being any 
speech acts at all”: ‘Religious language after J L Austin’, Religious Studies 8:1 (March 1972), p 
57.  
173 How To p10 
174 Ward also appears to assume that an obligation can be created on a promiser irrespective 
of whether or not the promisee (person receiving the promise) wants the thing promised: see 
Narveson again “we could say that promising creates a presumption of obligation: but this 
presumption is negated if the promisee makes it clear that he wants no part of what is 
promised” ‘The Agreement to Keep Our Agreements’, op cit p81. I think it is not in fact clear 
whether a promise to do something the promisee does not want is a promise or not: I don’t 
think it is possible to determine this in advance – it depends on circumstances. As Austin 
would say, it is an “unhappy” situation. 
175 Such is certainly part of Cohen’s argument against the existence of illocutionary force (‘Do 
Illocutionary Forces Exist?’ op cit), and in this example, as in Vanhoozer’s example of the 
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If I make a promise to someone, in a language they do not understand, my act 
of promising has not been felicitously achieved. If, as Ward suggests, others 
nearby have heard, and care about the felicitous performance of my act, they 
are likely to translate. If it is in their interest that my act should not be 
successful, they will keep quiet, or indeed mistranslate. The existence of an act 
presupposes its recognition and thus that it means, and what it means; an act 
cannot be said to exist or to have existed unless it is seen or inferred on the 
basis of other recognized acts.  
 
Moreover, because in Ward’s example, he imagines the presence of others 
who have recognized the act, this crucially complicates the question of its 
felicity. It creates a situation in which some have recognized the act and 
others have not. The act is still, however, not effective without a response of 
recognition176; in the case Ward suggests, we have a confusing situation in 
which a promise might seem to have been made, but might not have been.  
 
There is no guarantee either way, and if one imagines the object of the 
promise being told later about Ward’s words carried away on the wind, he 
would probably be in some doubt about whether the promise now stood. He 
would have then to consider factors such as his knowledge of Ward and his 
likely behaviour, and might decide to speak to him again to get clarification. 
He would certainly be implicitly considering what it would be “reasonable” 
to assume, in the particular circumstances of his case. In Austin’s words, 
“doubts arise as to whether I have really promised, and it might be held that 
my act was only attempted or was void”177. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Austin sets out in the first of his lectures that became How To, a view of 
intention that seeks to ignore ‘officious understudies’ and other unnecessary 
‘backstage artistes’. He sets out, albeit obliquely, a view of intention that sees 
it as being recognised solely in what was recognised as having been done. 
This view is that to which all of those who use Speech Act theory as a Biblical 
hermeneutic ascribe, and is very similar to the view argued for by Raymond 
Gibbs and R A Duff. On this view, an agent cannot disclaim an act on the 
grounds that he did it, but didn’t, in his heart of hearts, really mean it at the 
time.  
                                                                                                                                                        
waves and pebbles previously discussed, someone  must have recognised this as a promise, 
or as an intended promise, otherwise there is no problem: a promise cannot exist if no-one has 
heard it. 
176 Substituting ‘Warning‘ for ’Promising’ would further indicate the infelicity of Ward’s 
view. Ward has confused the two senses in which some verbs can be used that Cohen 
identifies, the “happy” and the “happy-or-unhappy”, and has ignored the requirement for 
“happy-or-unhappy” usage, which is that the speaker could “reasonably expect” it to be 
understood: see ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 14:55 (1964) 
pp118-137, op cit. 
177 How To p22 
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However, in the course of his own lectures, Austin himself departs from this 
view of intention, in his efforts to distinguish between some acts whose 
meaning is guaranteed by convention, and all the rest, which are not 
guaranteed in the same way, and for which there is always the possibility of 
non-recognition. Austin’s stated view of intention, and his description of the 
uniqueness of the explicit performative or illocution, are in the end 
incompatible. If there are acts whose performance is not dependent on their 
understanding and recognition by the audience, but which are begotten not 
created, these must in some sense exist independently of their recognition, in 
some ‘backstage realm’. If the audience is not ever capable of ignoring or 
deconstructing an explicit performative, then this sort of act has an element of 
‘pre-existence’ about it: it exists before it is spoken in some ‘inward realm’ of 
the speaker, of the sort Austin has initially derided.  
 
This fundamental incompatibility is carried over into the works of Searle, 
Briggs, Ward, Vanhoozer, Alston, Recanati, and probably every Speech Act 
theorist. They all defend and utilise the illocutionary speech act, because they 
all subscribe, implicitly, to a view of meaning which ignores the implications 
for meaning of the importance of the audience/readership, and ignores the 
audience’s active role in meaning creation. This ‘sender’ view of meaning 
starts from the standpoint of a single, ‘isolated’, self or agent. Communication 
begins with ‘me’, the speaker or agent, and is the process whereby I move 
‘outwards’ to another178. 
 
This means that if the author’s intention is not identical to meaning, and if 
what I say is not correctly recognized, then meaning collapses. Either 
meaning is the possession of the author and is made a property of the 
utterance by the author, or meaning is the property of each individual reader 
and thus collapses into chaos. If there are no guaranteed speech acts, then 
there can be no guaranteed transmission of meaning in any circumstances. 
 
This assumption is, however, based on a false assumption of identity and 
communication, which ignores the learning, mobile, changing element of 
identity and meaning. Moreover, it conflicts with some of the implications of 
Speech Act theory itself, especially those concerning the nature of intention, 
and the question of what makes an act recognizable as ‘an act’179. 
                                                     
178 As I noted in chapter one, this is also the assumption that lies behind much of what is 
generally called Post-modernism, except that in this case more attention is paid to the ‘chasm’ 
‘between’ me and anyone else, than to the ‘initiating’ agent, hence Derrida’s failure to 
consider all of Austin’s potentially ‘unhappy features’ of an act (How To p21ff). 
179 As P N Campbell asserts: “Austin’s … constant implication is that meaning is in the 
locution …,that meaning is in the illocution …, and that meaning is in the perlocution …At 
every turn, the move is away from the speaker and/or hearer as a source of meaning and 
toward the utterance, the message. And the move is somewhat startling, given Austin’s 
statement that “… for some years we have been realizing more and more clearly that the 
occasion of an utterance matters seriously …”. But Austin apparently did not realize the far-
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It is only possible to tell what the speaker intends, by recognising what she 
says (and ‘what she says’ depends on what we think she means), and we can 
only tell what a writer intends, by recognising what she has written (and 
‘what she wrote’ depends on what we think she means). In either case, 
knowledge of the speaker or writer will be employed, and will probably be 
helpful (although it may confuse). But the audience can always overrule the 
agent, when it comes to determining meaning, and may not necessarily 
achieve unanimity in any given case. 
 
Therefore, there is an incoherence at the heart of Speech Act theory, which 
affects the consistency and usefulness of the entire theory. In particular, this 
inconsistency in regard to intention and meaning strikes at the heart of Speech 
Act theory’s use in defence of authorial meaning and the particular concept of 
God’s Scriptural self-revelation that imagines it to be unmediated. 
 
This chapter of the thesis has demonstrated that Speech Act theory cannot be 
successfully used to defend a ‘sender’ view of meaning, and thus cannot 
support a sender view of revelation. It is not my contention, however, that 
meaning and revelation do not or cannot exist, merely that they are co-
operative creations, in which both the ‘sender’ (the speaker or writer) and the 
‘receivers’ have a role to play. I will expand on this idea in chapters six and 
seven, when I discuss the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov, 
and suggest that their work provides a much more satisfactory hermeneutic 
model for a theory of meaning and revelation, along the lines already 
outlined. 
 
However, before embarking on that argument, the next chapter of this thesis, 
as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, considers another aspect of 
Speech Act theory that implicitly underpins the idea of the sender view of 
meaning and is fundamentally flawed: the idea of uptake. Uptake is the 
description used for the way in which conventions are supposed to achieve 
illocutionary meaning without being consequential or reliant in any way 
upon the active response of the audience. Uptake provides the conceptual 
backing to the idea that illocutions, and thus also an image of revelation, are 
capable of ensuring for the sender uncontaminated transmission of his or her 
message. The concept of uptake is crucial to the use of Speech Act theory in 
Biblical hermeneutics: it is a pillar on which its usefulness rests. The existence 
of uptake defines the illocution, and thus the illocutionary, ‘begotten’ speech 
act and unmediated revelation. It is thus vital to examine this concept, as is 
done in the next chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                        
reaching significance of his statement … and we are left with a theory of meaning that is 
totally nonexperiential; … that … has, in my judgment, no relationship to communicative and 
rhetorical reality”: ‘A Rhetorical View of Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts’, 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 59:3 (1973) p291 
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CHAPTER FIVE: UPTAKE 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As was suggested at the end of the previous chapter, the concept of uptake 
describes a paradigmatic assumption underlying Speech Act theory, one 
which is crucial to the idea of the illocution. The usefulness of Speech Act 
theory as a hermeneutic, and particularly as a Biblical hermeneutic, lies in the 
suggestion that there is such a thing as an illocutionary act, which can be a 
speech act, or – it is argued by others (though not by Austin or Searle) – a text 
act1. This illocutionary act does not require any secondary or consequential 
action on the part of the audience to be completed or successful. As an act, it 
exists and is completed and meaningful, without any need for creative 
audience participation.  
 
Uptake is the name given to the unique ‘non-response to’ or ‘property of’ the 
illocutionary act that allows it to be constituted in this way. As such, it is thus 
central to Speech Act theory, and to its attractiveness to those Biblical scholars 
who seek to use Speech Act theory as a hermeneutic tool. It is uptake that 
underpins the illocution’s distinctiveness from other forms of speech act, and 
which allows the illocution to provide a ‘transmission’ of authorial meaning. 
The existence of ‘uptake’ is a fundamental assumption of the sender view of 
meaning. Uptake is therefore also the vehicle for revelation, if this is 
conceived as consisting of the unmediated messages of God: it is the response 
of creation to God – one of passive reception. It is the basis for the idea that 
the author determines meaning. 
 
The concept of Uptake, introduced by Austin, is necessarily adopted by 
Briggs, Ward and Vanhoozer, and is crucial also in the work of E D Hirsch, 
who uses it to illuminate the meaning-significance distinction subsequently 
adopted by Vanhoozer. This chapter of the thesis therefore seeks to describe 
and illuminate the idea of uptake, and in so doing outlines an essential, and 
inadequate, aspect both of Speech Act theory, and of the idea of revelation it 
is used to underpin. 
 
This analysis leads on to a discussion about the nature of understanding itself, 
and the relevance to this of the sender view of meaning. In the next chapter, 
the work of the Russian thinkers Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov is 
introduced as a way of offering an alternative to the sender view of meaning, 
the assumption that meaning is begotten not created, and the related idea of 
the isolated individual.  
 
                                                     
1 See chapters two and three of this thesis. 
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2. Uptake in Austin.                                                                                                                                                                                
2a. Uptake as a guarantor of the ‘acontextual’ Explicit Performative 
 
The first appearance of ‘uptake’ comes in Austin’s discussion of implicit and 
explicit performatives. The advantage of and role of the explicit performative 
for Austin is that it provides a theoretical mechanism for the clear 
transmission of meaning from speaker to recipients2. It is this which makes it 
different from the implicit performative. This distinction is discussed in 
chapter four of this thesis, in relation to its implications for Austin’s view of 
Intention.  
 
Austin does not note that even an explicit performative is affected by the 
circumstances of its utterance, which determine the felicity of its performance, 
and the direction or intention ascribed to it; tone of voice and accompanying 
gestures will greatly affect the intention ascribed to, and the meaning of, ‘I 
promise to be there’. Such an apparently explicit performative could be 
altered by for example laughter, shrugs, winks, sighs, a tone of exasperation, 
or if the person making the promise has their arms twisted behind their back. 
In this sense, the explicit and primary performative are the same, in that for 
both, the context of the speech act in fact affects what is recognized as the 
meaning of what is said.  
 
Some of these factors come into the categories which Austin has already 
identified and eliminated from consideration within his doctrine of language. 
As I noted in the previous chapter, the difficulty with the distinction between 
explicit and other performatives is that even ‘explicit’ performatives do not 
have to be taken as orders or whatever; in all cases, authority and conventions 
have an “essential” fluidity, and the specific circumstances of the speech act 
mean that infelicity can infect any performative. In attempting to make the 
distinction, Austin is ignoring the role of the hearer and the overall context of 
the utterance. Both the explicit and implicit performatives need to be 
understood before they are successful, and understanding is the response of 
the audience in context.  
 
Austin is himself aware of the “essential” fluidity of conventions and of the 
ever-present necessity of recognizing the possibility of “getting away with 
things”3 when new conventions are initiated. Indeed, “in ordinary life, a 
certain laxness in procedure is permitted – otherwise no university business 
would ever get done!”4 Austin also notes the possibility that “I may say ‘I 
don’t take orders from you’ … - I do not take orders from you when you try 
to ‘assert your authority’ (which I might fall in with but may not) on a desert 
                                                     
2 To adopt Derrida’s description of them. 
3 How To p30 
4 How To p37 
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island, as opposed to the case when you are the captain on a ship and 
therefore genuinely have authority.”5  
 
This implies that Austin is aware of a degree of fluidity: I might or might not 
recognize your authority on an island, and thus it is down to me, the 
audience, to make your utterance an order or an attempt. It also implies, 
however, that he sees a distinction between the uncertainty of a desert island 
context, and the certainty of ship-board life, where the captain has ‘genuine 
authority’. For Austin, there are thus illocutionary (‘afloat’) and 
perlocutionary (‘ashore’) contexts6.  
 
In practice, however, mutiny is a possibility on a ship also. ‘I don’t take orders 
from you’ can as well be said afloat as ashore, and is in either case potentially 
mutinous or heroic, with all the conventional consequences (keel-hauling, 
being put to sea in open boats, Courts martial, Pitcairn Island) that that 
implies. As Derrida would insist, there is no such thing as a guaranteeing or 
saturated context, where an utterance is pre-determined to for ever mean only 
one thing. For an act of any sort, illocutionary or whatever, to be recognised 
as an act, always requires more than simply passive absorption7. There is 
always the possibility that an act may be recognized as being something 
different to that expected (with hindsight, allegedly, or by implication) by the 
utterer or initiator8.  
                                                     
5 How To p28 
6 To adopt Derrida’s phrase, some contexts are more saturated than others. 
7 As Gadamer puts it: “there is no doubt that the recipient of an order must perform a definite 
creative act in understanding its meaning”: Truth and Method (New York NY, Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2013) p343. 
8 Two on-line articles illustrate this very point, from either side of the ‘Cold War’ divide. On 
the 14th November 2010 the BBC website contained the following story headline: “Singer 
James Blunt 'prevented World War III'”. The story about NATO troops in Kosovo ends as 
follows: “Asked if following the order [to engage Russian troops] would have risked starting 
World War III, Blunt, who was a 25-year-old cavalry officer at the time, replied: "Absolutely. 
And that's why we were querying our instruction from an American general. Fortunately, up 
on the radio came Gen Mike Jackson, whose exact words at the time were, 'I'm not going to 
have my soldiers be responsible for starting World War III', and told us why don't we sugar 
off down the road, you know, encircle the airfield instead. And after a couple of days the 
Russians there said: 'Hang on we have no food and no water. Can we share the airfield with 
you?'." If Gen Jackson had not blocked the order from Gen Clark, who as Nato Supreme 
Commander Europe was his superior officer, Blunt said he would still have declined to 
follow it, even at the risk of a court martial. He said: "There are things that you do along the 
way that you know are right, and those that you absolutely feel are wrong, that I think it's 
morally important to stand up against, and that sense of moral judgement is drilled into us as 
soldiers in the British army.": http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11753050 viewed 9th 
September 2013.  
The following story dates from the 26th September 2013, and is headlined “Stanislav Petrov: 
the man who may have saved the world”.  It includes the following: “Thirty years ago, on 26 
September 1983, the world was saved from potential nuclear disaster. In the early hours of 
the morning, the Soviet Union's early-warning systems detected an incoming missile strike 
from the United States. Computer readouts suggested several missiles had been launched. 
The protocol for the Soviet military would have been to retaliate with a nuclear attack of its 
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The fact that what Austin describes as the “over-rich resources” of actual 
language “lend themselves to equivocation and inadequate discrimination”9 
is not necessarily an indication that this makes them by comparison 
inadequate. Instead it indicates the vast complexity of speech situations and 
meanings that are part of ordinary conversation. Neither explicit nor primary 
performatives are able to “rule out equivocation”; as Derrida would insist, 
this is an ‘ill’ that is always potentially present. It can only be excluded if an 
illegitimate cordon is erected between the part of everyday speech preferred, 
and the part that doesn’t fit, in order that the part played by the recognizer 
can be largely ignored.  
 
I have already quoted Dorothea Franck to this effect,10 but the same point is 
made by Jay Schleusener, who notes that  
 
even if we resist the temptation to confuse reference with context, we may still 
imagine that ordinary speech presumes nothing more than the material setting 
in which it occurs. The most obvious defect in this view is that it omits the 
specifically social presumptions which speaker and hearer share – it leaves them 
to meet in the same place at the same time but with no common expectations 
about one another’s behavior. A more subtle and perhaps more interesting 
defect is our casual assumption that we know what we are talking about when 
we talk about the material setting of a speech act. We tend to think of a little 
scene in a little drama, and we tend to suppose that we could name all the props 
needed for a successful performance. But the analogy is incompetent. Ordinary 
speech does not follow a script, and we can never be sure of the turn our 
conversation will take. If we isolate single utterances and analyse them in 
retrospect, they may seem to require only modest staging, but if we try to 
anticipate the circumstances that might be relevant to what we say next, we find 
that there is no end to them. 
The reason for these difficulties should be obvious: the social context of a speech 
act is not an independent feature of the world as we happen to find it when we 
open our mouths to talk. It is instead a function of the way we understand our 
                                                                                                                                                        
own. But duty officer Stanislav Petrov - whose job it was to register apparent enemy missile 
launches - decided not to report them to his superiors, and instead dismissed them as a false 
alarm. This was a breach of his instructions, a dereliction of duty. The safe thing to do would 
have been to pass the responsibility on, to refer up. But his decision may have saved the 
world.” It ends as follows: “A few days later Mr. Petrov received an official reprimand for 
what happened that night. Not for what he did, but for mistakes in the logbook. He kept 
silent for 10 years. "I thought it was shameful for the Soviet army that our system failed in 
this way," he says. But, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the story did get into the press. 
Mr. Petrov received several international awards. But he does not think of himself as a hero. 
"That was my job", he says. "But they were lucky it was me on shift that night." 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24280831. Viewed 27th September 2013. 
Gadamer describes such situations as these “as an explicit refusal to obey that is not simply 
disobedience but drives from the meaning of the order and its concretization”: Truth and 
Method (New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p343. 
9 How To p76 
10 D Franck, ‘Speaking about Speech Acts’, Journal of Pragmatics 8 (1984) p88. 
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circumstances and also a function of the way we expect others to understand 
them. 11 
 
That equivocation is not the permanent condition of conversation is due, not 
to the explicitness of phrases used by speakers or to ‘uptakeable’ conventional 
acts, but to the ongoing and shared nature of communication and the strength 
of relationships between speakers (who are also listeners) within a language 
or conversation. Meaning is possible and ‘reliable’ (though not guaranteed) 
because of shared conventions, but there is always the possibility that 
something could be taken in more than one way12, and until an act is ‘taken’ 
by an audience, it does not exist as an act at all. 
 
Austin, however, in the grip of the sender view of meaning, seeks ways to 
establish the uniqueness of one particular type of act, which is to depend not 
on how it is taken, but on how it was intended. However, because he cannot 
in practice distinguish all illocutions from consequences, he finds himself 
deep in uncertainty, as the following sections will demonstrate. 
 
Uptake in Austin.                                                                                                                                                       
2b. The ‘vocabulary of acts’ as a distinction between uptake and 
understanding. 
 
Indeed, when it comes to recognizing an act as an act, Austin himself is aware 
of the positive, creative role of the act of understanding. He himself suggests 
that what we ordinarily in English describe as a physical act is not a series of 
discrete ‘minimum physical efforts’ (the minimum physical act), but is rather 
that act plus the to-be-expected and anticipated consequences. Initially, he 
observes that  
 
in general, and if the action is not one of saying something but a non-
conventional ‘physical’ action, … we can, or may like to think we can, class, by 
stages, more and more of what is initially and ordinarily included or possibly 
might be included under the name given to ‘our act’ itself as really only 
consequences, however little remote and however naturally to be anticipated, of 
our actual action in the supposed minimum physical sense, which will then 
transpire to be the making of some movement or movements with part of our 
body (e.g. crooking our finger, which produced a movement of the trigger, which 
produced … which produced the death of the donkey).13  
 
However,  
 
with physical actions we nearly always naturally name the action not in terms of 
what we are here calling the minimum physical act, but in terms which embrace 
a greater or less but indefinitely extensive range of what might be called its 
natural consequences (or, looking at it another way, the intention with which it 
was done). 
                                                     
11 J Schleusener, ‘Convention and the Context of Reading’, Critical Inquiry 6:4 (1980) 672 
12 Which in fact does frequently occur 
13 How To p110-111 
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We not merely do not use the notion of a minimum physical act (which is in any 
case doubtful), but we do not seem to have any class of names which distinguish 
physical acts from consequences: whereas with acts of saying something, the 
vocabulary of names for acts (B) [referring to illocutions such as ‘he 
urged, advised, ordered, or protested’ listed under (B) on pages 101 
and 102 of How To] seems expressly designed to mark a break at a certain 
regular point between the act (our saying something) and its consequences 
(which are usually not the saying of anything), or at any rate a great many of 
them.14 
 
Thus while, for Austin, an ‘ordinary act’ is in practice made by its 
consequences, without which it is not that act but a different one, for 
illocutions there is a divorce between the act and its consequences, which are 
in no way constitutive of the act. Thus this sort of act (the illocutionary) 
requires no audience participation or recognition to be effective: once spoken, 
it is in existence, and this is proved by the vocabulary of names we use for 
this illocutionary act15. Illocutionary acts are for Austin uniquely acontextual. 
 
Austin is correct in that in respect of ‘non-conventional physical actions’, the 
response to the question ‘what did he do’ is likely to be ‘he shot the donkey’ 
not ‘he twitched muscles in his right index finger’ or wherever. The act 
‘properly’ described in conversation is thus ‘shooting the donkey’ not 
‘twitching a muscle’ or ‘twitching his finger’ or whatever; these are merely 
‘parts’ of the action16. However, Austin’s suggestion that in respect of “acts of 
saying something, the vocabulary of names for acts (B) [see before] seems 
                                                     
14 How To p111 
15 The phrase “the intention with which it was done”, given Austin’s previous definition of 
intention, can only be discovered from the onlookers understanding of the act and of its likely 
and actual effects: this is to adopt the definition of intention which Austin adopts in the 
‘Hippolytus passage’ on pages 9-10 of How To where he insists that “our word is our bond”, 
and not merely the description of our inward state of mind. The intention of the actor is 
established on the basis of what was observed. As I argue in chapter four of this thesis, it is 
our default assumption as the audience that the actor intended what actually happened, 
unless there are grounds for thinking otherwise. To say in one’s defence ‘I didn’t mean to do 
that’ is not likely to be accepted if it is generally believed or felt by the audience (and of 
course there may be disagreements about this) that you should have taken more care, or 
anticipated the eventual outcome of your actions.  
16 See also R A Duff: Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability op cit, where he argues that an act 
is described at a different level, and is construed as being different, in different contexts, so 
that the word ‘act’ has varying contextual meanings. I would agree with this, and suggest 
with Austin that in ‘ordinary language’ the word act, in the context of the question ‘what did 
he do?’, generally means ‘the act plus its consequences’ not just the ‘minimum physical act’, 
although it is certainly possible that in some circumstances it would be proper to describe the 
‘minimum physical act’ as simply an act. See also P R Cohen and H J Levesque, ‘Rational 
Interaction as the Basis for Communication’, in P R Cohen, J Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), 
Intentions in Communication (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1992) p 225: “agents perform single 
instances of primitive act- or event-types …, but each specific act or event can realize many 
different complex actions”: they fail, however, to discern that it is recognition by the audience 
that determines, in different contexts, what act was performed.  
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expressly designed to mark a break at a certain point between the act (our 
saying something) and its consequences”17, is wrong, at least if a distinction 
exists between an attempt and an achieved act, and if circumstances affect 
felicity, both of which he has himself previously asserted.  
 
For example, in the case of ‘his having shot the donkey’, the question of 
whether he did the act or not would presumably be settled by factors such as; 
the presence of a dead donkey; his fingerprints on the gun; the statements of 
witnesses, and the like. Here the identification of the act of his shooting the 
donkey involves both whether or not he or someone else did it (was it his 
hand on the gun?), and whether or not, on the basis of what happened, he 
meant to do it18 (was there a struggle between him and someone else, was he 
aiming at a lion behind the donkey, etcetera, in other words did he ‘shoot it?’ 
or did he merely ‘hit it?’). As we might say, questions of “extenuating 
circumstances” or other “factors reducing or abrogating the agent’s 
responsibility” would be brought in19; those things referred to by Austin as 
“the normal linguistic devices of disclaiming”20.  
 
In the case of ‘his having protested at a public meeting’, the question of 
whether or not he did this act would presumably be settled by factors such as; 
his having a black eye or torn clothes; tomato juice on his fingers; the 
statements of witnesses. Here, as with the ordinary act of shooting considered 
previously, the identification of the act of his having protested involves both 
whether or not he or someone else did it (was it him at the meeting standing 
up and shouting or throwing a tomato?), and whether or not, on the basis of 
what happened, he meant to do it (was he protesting, or had he just been 
stung by a wasp or suffered a seizure?).  
 
This is, as with the dead donkey, a question of not merely describing events, 
but also understanding them (so that a witness might say, for example, ‘he 
did not protest; he stood up but what he said was in no way a protest – it 
didn’t look/sound like a protest to me’, or ‘he never protested about anything 
– he didn’t even stand up’, or ‘he was just juggling tomatoes badly’). In 
precisely the same way, the act of shooting a donkey has to be understood as 
an act. Infelicities, as Austin would observe, can affect all acts – but the same 
infelicities can affect them all, and the consequences actually entailed are the 
way in which we determine what has happened. In both cases, the shooting 
and the protest, it is the onlookers who determine what act has been 
performed, and there may be disagreement about this.   
 
Moreover, among the consequences of your shooting a donkey are; that it will 
be dead or injured; that people will believe that you did it; and that people 
                                                     
17 How To p111 
18 ‘Meant’ in this sense being equal to ‘our assessment of his intention’. 
19 How To p21 
20 How To p106 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Five: Uptake 
177 
will hold you responsible as hero or villain. These consequences are 
reasonably foreseeable and uncontroversial21. One could not, for example, 
generally say ‘I shot the donkey, but I didn’t mean to hurt or kill it – I thought 
donkeys were invulnerable’22, or ‘I shot the donkey but I am not responsible 
for shooting it’, and expect these to be accepted as reasonable defences, unless 
one also added-in additional ‘extenuating factors’ such as ‘there was a lion 
behind it at which I was aiming’. Unintentionality or ‘extenuation’ has to be 
demonstrated for a defence to be ‘successful’ in re-describing an act23.  
 
Even a defence such as ‘the gun went off in my hands’ does not destroy this 
assertion that acts include consequences, because to make such a defence is in 
practice to deny that the act of shooting the donkey actually took place at all; 
what happened was instead a tragic accident for which I cannot be held 
responsible24. It may have appeared to be an act, but its act-ness is denied, on 
the basis of what I assert to have been my ‘inward’ intention; a denial which, 
however, will only be accepted on the basis of others’ decisions as to the 
reasonableness of my defence based on their understandings of what 
happened, their knowledge of my familiarity with firearms and my ability to 
aim, etcetera25.  
 
Likewise, among the consequences of your protesting are; that a protest will 
have been made; that people will believe that you did it and hence that you 
disagreed with what was said or done; and that people will hold you 
responsible for your protest and will believe that you hold certain views or 
opinions26. As before, these consequences are reasonably foreseeable and 
                                                     
21 Although, as Lord Denning observed, there may always be circumstances in which they 
were quite properly not foreseen – see chapter four. 
22 Except in some very extreme scenarios involving, say, military schemes to genetically 
engineer armour-plated donkeys (which are not entirely beyond the bounds of plausibility – 
as witnessed to by past schemes involving bomb-carrying dogs, bats or dolphins). 
23 Which is to say, accepted as a reasonable excuse by a jury of one’s peers, whether formally 
constituted as such or not. This has been discussed in the previous chapter in relation to 
Vanhoozer’s view of Intention. 
24 It is interesting how the question of responsibility crops up re actions. 
25 The implications of the fact that we have entered here into language of ‘judgement’ and the 
Court will be reflected upon in a subsequent section. It is, however, worth recalling the 
discussion in chapter four about intention and the example of the arsonist noted by 
Vanhoozer; the following discussion is really just an extended version of the conclusions 
posited there about acts of arson, manslaughter and murder. It should also be noted, in 
respect of later discussions about recognition, that to recognise something as ‘not an act’ but 
rather an accident or a natural phenomenon or whatever, is still to recognise it as something: 
even ‘not-acts’ have to be understood. 
26 As Austin himself notes: “To do any act in a perceptible or detectable way is to afford 
ourselves and generally others also the opportunity of coming to know both (a) that we did it, 
and further (b) many other facts as to our motives, our character or what not which may be 
inferred from our having done it [and which are conventionally-produced inferences]. If you 
hurl a tomato at a political meeting (or bawl ‘I protest’ when someone else does - if that is 
performing an action) [which it must be since Austin has already defined it as an illocution] 
the consequence will probably [why probably- it will only not be if there are other 
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uncontroversial. One might say ‘I didn’t mean to protest – I didn’t think that 
standing up and saying ‘I protest’ would be seen as a protest’ or even ‘I was 
being ironic – wasn’t it obvious?’, but these defences would not necessarily be 
accepted, any more than would be those of the putative donkey-killer 
(although they might be).  
 
In these examples then, the consequences of an illocutionary act are no more 
escapable than are the consequences of shooting a donkey, and are only as 
‘distinct’ from the act as are the consequences of shooting a donkey. The 
‘illocutionary’ utterance-act of protesting seems to entail as many 
consequences as the physical act of shooting. In both cases, the consequences 
of the act, or our analyses of them as the audience, are part of making the act 
the act that it is. These identifications are both inextricably cultural and 
contextual. The distinctiveness of the illocutionary act thus appears to be an 
illusion. 
 
Austin’s assertion of the difference between a ‘non-conventional physical act’ 
and ‘the act of saying’, only survives if the ‘non-conventional physical act’ is 
held to be less than we generally, according to Austin, regard it as. In other 
words, only if it is equivalent solely to the minimum physical act, which 
Austin himself is inclined to deny, in my view correctly. If the non-
conventional physical act includes, as a single act, the ‘natural consequences’ 
of the minimum physical act, or in other words the apparent intention with 
which it was done, then the case seems to be the same as for the act of saying 
‘I protest’. Illocutions cannot then be distinguished from other, ‘normal’, 
acts27. 
 
It is therefore apparent that Austin is entirely incorrect in his suggestion that 
vocabulary requires us to distinguish illocutionary acts from consequences. 
All that has happened is that, as L J Cohen notes, some (but not all) 
‘illocutions’ can be described as either “happy” or “unhappy”. There is no 
distinction between different sorts of act based on the suggestion that some 
acts are determined by their consequences while others (illocutionary ones) 
are not. Cohen suggests in his article28 that Austin is in his description of 
illocutions confused by the existence of a select number of verbs which have 
both a “happy” and a “happy-or-unhappy” sense, and that Austin switches 
between using the different senses of the verb:  
 
We can say either ‘He concluded that ..., though he was not entitled to’ or ‘He 
tried to conclude that …, though he did not succeed’, and either ‘She named the 
                                                                                                                                                        
circumstances in play as well] be to make others aware that you object, and to make them 
think that you hold certain political beliefs [or at least oppose certain political beliefs]: but this 
will not make either the throw or the shout true or false (though they may be, even 
deliberately, misleading)”: How To  p110 footnote 2, with my interjections in [] as usual. 
27 And indeed, the idea of a ‘non-conventional physical act’ becomes rather blurred. 
28 L J Cohen, ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 14:55 (1964) pp118-
137 
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ship …, but the ceremony was invalid’ or ‘She tried to name the ship, but 
bungled the ceremony’29. There is, as it were, both a happy-or-unhappy sense of 
these verbs and also a happy one. In the former we either leave it open whether 
the attempt was successful or imply that it was not: in the latter we imply that it 
was.30  
 
In other words, some of the time it would appear from ‘normal’ English usage 
that a performative occurs irrespective of any response, while at other times it 
appears that a response is required31.   
 
Cohen himself proceeds to illustrate that even the “happy-or-unhappy”32 
usage of verbs does in fact presuppose an element of response, or rather, 
presupposes the idea that a response was reasonably foreseeable: “for a 
speaker’s utterance to be a warning in the happy-or-unhappy sense what is 
required is that it should be of a kind that he could reasonably expect to 
secure uptake … But a warning, in this sense, does not actually have to 
achieve uptake.”33  
 
This concept of ‘forseeability’ is, in conjunction with that of ‘judgement’, one 
that is crucial, and rather taken for granted in Speech Act theory as generally 
applied. In particular, its dialogic nature is not recognized. As stated in the 
                                                     
29 My footnote: We can also, of course, not know what to say, and be unsure about whether or 
not the ship was actually named or not. 
30 ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 14:55 (1964) p128 
31 ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 14:55 (1964) p129. This 
distinction that Cohen notes effectively undermines Wolterstorff’s attempt to distinguish 
illocutionary from perlocutionary acts by using what he calls the “the hereby-test” (32), which 
he uses to distinguish speaking from communication. Wolterstorff wants to distinguish “such 
paradigmatic illocutionary actions as asserting, commanding, promising and asking” from 
“transitive propositional revelation [which] consists in the transmission, the communication, 
of knowledge (or true belief) from one person to another” and is, in his scheme, 
perlocutionary.  He does this by suggesting that, in Cohen’s terms, illocutionary acts exist 
only in a happy sense. This allows him to draw a distinction between illocutionary speech 
and perlocutionary revelation, a distinction which fails with the failure of the illocution, and 
is in any case highly dubious at best on the basis of his distinction between speaking and 
revealing, which Moses’ experiences with the burning bush on Mount Horeb would seem to 
refute: here speaking seems to be a prima facie instance of revelation: “When the LORD saw 
that he turned aside to see, God called to him out of the bush, "Moses, Moses!" And he said, 
"Here am I." Then he said, "Do not come near; put off your shoes from your feet, for the place 
on which you are standing is holy ground." And he said, "I am the God of your father, the 
God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." And Moses hid his face, for he was 
afraid to look at God. ... Then Moses said to God, "If I come to the people of Israel and say to 
them, 'The God of your fathers has sent me to you,' and they ask me, 'What is his name?' what 
shall I say to them?" God said to Moses, "I AM WHO I AM." And he said, "Say this to the 
people of Israel, 'I AM has sent me to you.'" God also said to Moses, "Say this to the people of 
Israel, 'The LORD, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the 
God of Jacob, has sent me to you': this is my name for ever, and thus I am to be remembered 
throughout all generations.” (Exodus 3:4-6, 13-15 RSV translation).    
32 The usage where according to Cohen we “leave it open whether the attempt was successful 
or imply that it was not” – p128. 
33 ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 14:55 (1964) p129. 
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previous chapter, the concept of ‘forseeability’ assumes the judgement of 
others as to what is, and is not, foreseeable34, and is entirely response-related. 
It endorses the requirement that all performative acts themselves must be 
recognized, and are based on ‘outward signs’ and on words uttered. It 
stresses, too, the need for any speech act to be recognized before it can be said 
to exist. It is entirely contextual, since the context will determine what might 
be or what was foreseeable in any particular case35. 
 
However, Austin’s identification of illocutions does not consist simply in their 
being distinguishable on the basis of the ‘vocabulary of names for acts’. He 
goes on to suggest a number of other ways in which illocutions can be 
distinguished from all other acts, and these are examined in the following 
sections.  
 
Uptake in Austin.                                                                                                                                                                  
2c. The existence of ‘a regular natural break in the chain of consequences’ as 
a distinction between uptake and understanding.  
 
Austin goes on to suggest that there is a further distinction between “acts of 
saying something” (illocutions) and “ordinary physical actions”36 since  
 
even the minimum physical action … [of a ‘non-conventional physical 
act’] is, being a bodily movement, in pari materia [of the same substance] 
with at least many of its immediate and natural consequences, whereas, whatever 
the immediate and natural consequences of an act of saying something may be, 
they are at least not normally other further acts of saying something, whether 
more particularly on the speaker’s part or even on the part of others. So that we 
have here a sort of regular natural break in the chain, which is wanting in the 
case of physical actions, and which is associated with the special class of names 
for illocutions.37 
 
This also is incorrect. As I have already argued, a ‘minimum physical act’ is 
not a physical act as usually described: our understanding of what constitutes 
                                                     
34 And what was, or was not, foreseen. 
35 And alters as the conversation continues, as J Streeck suggests in his article ‘Embodied 
Contexts, Transcontextuals, and the Timing of speech acts’, Journal of Pragmatics 8 (1994) 113-
137. He believes that for a proper understanding of context “what is needed ... is an account 
of context as an interactively and intersubjectivley achieved environment of talk”, which 
recognises that “context  ... is available in the interaction” of members and “is achieved, 
attended to, and continuously monitored by participants in their moment to moment 
progression through an encounter” (116). Streeck examines some exchanges between a 
teacher and her class in a school, and proposes that “participants communicatively orient each 
other to the currently valid context” (117) and that “a current working consensus [for 
conversation], then, is a tentative claim which is retroactively validated by the orderliness and 
intelligibility of next activities that are performed on its basis” (118). This continuous re-
appraisal of context is carried out through posture and kinesics as well as through linguistic 
factors such as “style, code, rhythm, pitch etc” (119).  
36 How To p112 
37 How To p112 
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an act is not the ‘minimum physical act’ but the act with its ‘natural 
consequences’, as Austin himself agrees. Therefore, a ‘minimum physical act’ 
is only part of an act, not all of it: ‘the act’, in this context, is shooting the 
donkey, of which trigger pulling is only a part, in same way as the phonetic, 
phatic and rhetic acts38 are only part of a performative act of saying 
something identified as the speech act.  
 
Furthermore, the result of a supposedly ‘non-conventional physical act’ such 
as shooting a donkey could be either being hit by one’s neighbours (a physical 
consequence), or that they shout in protest or praise (which is not a physical 
act “in pari materia” with the shooting). Equally, the result of saying ‘I protest’ 
could be people saying ‘Hear, hear’, ‘No! Shame!’ or ‘Order! Order!’, which 
are “further acts of saying something”, or that someone hits you. Urged, 
advised, ordered, and protested, which are all illocutions, could all have as 
“immediate and natural consequences” verbal responses: urge by a counter-
urge or other verbal expression of doubt or hesitation; advise by protest; 
order by countermand or protest; and protest by the options illustrated above, 
or indeed by an order.  
 
A protest could cause the saving of a life: an order could cause the loss of one. 
A ‘non-conventional physical movement’ causes a dead donkey, by physical 
means. An order to shoot could also cause the same result. Austin’s point is 
simply affirming that ‘non-conventional physical acts’ operate physically 
while language acts operate linguistically. There is nothing more implied than 
this. A supposedly ‘non-conventional physical act’ could cause a linguistic 
response, and there is no fundamentally different sense of ‘action’ involved 
here, just different arenas of action; verbal and non-verbal. Indeed, Campbell 
is also right to suggest that “the consequences of what Austin calls 
perlocutions are very often further speech acts (as in ordinary conversations); 
also, they are very often silent verbal acts (as in responding to written 
messages); and whether or not overt, nonverbal behavior is involved, the 
symbolic process, i.e., some sort of language usage, is always present”39.  
 
Austin though suggests that  
 
the sense in which saying something produces effects on other persons, or causes 
things, is a fundamentally different sense of cause from that used in physical 
causation by pressure, &c. It has to operate through the conventions of language 
and is a matter of influence exerted by one person on another: this is probably the 
original sense of ‘cause’.40  
 
                                                     
38 Individual constitutive parts of the utterance as Austin has defined them: the phonetic is 
the uttering of “certain noises”, the phatic is the uttering of certain words, and the rhetic is 
the uttering of something meaningful, see How To p92. 
39 P N Campbell, ‘A Rhetorical View of Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts’, 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 59:3 (1973) 288 
40 How To p112 footnote 1 
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However, as a description this is true for all language acts not just 
illocutions41. Indeed, the point of the lengthy discussion of ‘the act of shooting 
a donkey’ has been to suggest that the identification of any act as an act 
involves ‘conventionality’. It is conventions and context that enable us to 
distinguish between ‘shooting a donkey’ and ‘the gun going off in my hands’, 
or which makes the act of throwing a tomato42 in fact a highly conventional 
ritual act of political disapprobation; it would be much more effective in one 
way to throw a brick at a political opponent, but a soft fruit or egg has become 
a ‘conventional’ way of breaching the conventions of the receptive stance of 
the audience43.  
 
Any physical act has conventional or contextual overtones and can cause 
effects through linguistic and cultural perceptions. Indeed, the identification 
of an act as an act rather than a random series of gestures or sounds is due to 
the context and knowledge of the onlookers or witnesses. That which makes a 
noise an act of for example Tuvan throat-singing not garbled nonsense, or 
which makes a series of movements part of a conventional social ritual (such 
as shaking hands or waving) not an involuntary convulsive fit, is the fact that 
the act is contextualised (quite possibly unconsciously). This allows us to 
understand (or realize – make real) that it is an act; that it is deliberate not an 
aimless gesturing with words or language.  
 
The fact that one of the acts that Austin examines is partly linguistic, while the 
other appears not to be, is neither here nor there: what makes them acts is our 
recognition of them, just as this also is the difference between ‘attempt’ and 
‘achievement’. This recognition is based on shared contexts and cultures, and 
is a part of the necessary background to all communication. Austin however 
concludes that language invites us to divorce the act from its consequences in 
the case of those language acts which he describes as illocutionary and thus 
conventional acts. As with explicit performatives previously, but now more 
obviously, Austin is trying to retain for illocutions a certainty of result which 
cannot be contaminated by perlocutionary unpredictability. This certainty, 
however, is unattainable in any specific contextual situation.  
 
Moreover, as already demonstrated, Austin’s division between consequences 
and acts does not exist unless one describes acts in very particular and 
unequal way: illocutionary acts must be described in a very different way not 
merely from physical acts, but also to all other uses of language such as 
perlocutionary acts, joking, reciting poetry, insinuating etcetera. 
 
                                                     
41 See for example P F Strawson, ‘Intention and Convention in Speech Acts,’ in K T Fann (ed.) 
Symposium on J L Austin (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) 385 
42 Described by Austin as “any action” i.e. not one governed by convention, in How To p110, 
footnote 2. 
43 I am indebted to Hugh Pyper for this observation. As more recent events in Iraq have 
demonstrated, shoes rather than eggs are, in some cultural contexts, the preferred and highly 
effective conventional missiles used in acts of disapproval. 
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Uptake in Austin.                                                                                                                                                           
2d. The difference between attempt and achievement. 
 
Of course, for Austin, it is ultimately necessary to distinguish illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts because, as he recognizes, perlocutionary acts are 
unpredictable and to a degree response-related, while the definition of 
illocutionary acts is that they are predictable. The speaker has a control over 
them, and a control over their meaning, which is not present for the 
perlocutionary element of an act, which Austin acknowledges is affected by 
its reception and thus its context.  
 
Austin thus also has to assert that performing a perlocutionary act is not 
directly associated with the performance of a ‘performative’ utterance, and is 
not a part of the same act. He notes that   
 
it is certain that the perlocutionary sense of ‘doing an action’ must somehow be 
ruled out as irrelevant to the sense in which an utterance, if the issuing of it is the 
‘doing of an action’, is a performative, at least in if that is to be distinct from a 
constative. For clearly any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable to be 
brought off, in sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without 
calculation, of any utterance whatsoever, and in particular by a straightforward 
constative utterance (if there is such an animal).44  
 
It is this same concern that makes it necessary also for Austin to distinguish 
“between an action we do (here an illocution) and its consequence”45, since 
consequences also, even of illocutionary acts, are not guaranteed.  
 
However, if there is a difference between ‘attempt’ and ‘achievement’, which 
is presumably un-intended on the part of the actor, the consequences of an 
illocution would seem to be a part of its essence as an act, and what make it 
an act rather than an attempt. Indeed the very concept of intention that Austin 
has previously outlined, based on what is seen to have been done, is inimical 
to the assertion that consequences have no bearing on the success of the 
illocutionary act. 
 
Austin himself is aware of this fundamental inconsistency46. He notes that 
illocutionary actions have consequences as well as perlocutionary actions, and 
he suggests that “distinctions need drawing, as there is clearly a difference 
                                                     
44 How To p109. There is, of course, as Austin will subsequently demonstrate, no such thing as 
a straightforward constative, nor is there any way of distinguishing constative and 
performative utterances on the grounds that one is a doing of something and the other is not. 
However, the fact that Austin will subsequently abandon the performative-constative 
distinction does not prevent him retaining the illocutionary-perlocutionary one. The 
implication here again is clearly that only illocutions are performative. 
45 How To p110 
46 As is Margolis: he notes that “Austin fails to distinguish satisfactorily between the 
illocutionary effect and the “perlocutionary sequel” of speaking”: J Margolis, ‘Meaning, 
Speakers’ Intentions, and Speech Acts’, The Review of Metaphysics 26:4 (1973) p688 
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between what we feel to be the real production of real effects [such as the 
speaker’s being committed by his illocutionary promise?] and what we regard 
as mere conventional consequences [such as my having been persuaded by 
his perlocutionary speech? – I presume that conventional here refers not to 
the use of conventions in a performative sense but to conventional as a 
synonym for normal, expected and unremarkable]; we shall in any case return 
later to this”.47  
 
Austin begins his attempt to draw these distinctions by noting the 
susceptibility of all acts, including locutions, perlocutions and illocutions, to 
ills such as those that make the difference between attempting to perform an 
act and achieving a successful performance. This is for him a case of 
“allowance being made for the ills that all action is heir to”48, and which 
constitute the difference between attempt and achievement. 
 
However, as Austin notes, “we must expect infelicities here”, because this 
undermines his later attempt to divide illocutionary effects from 
perlocutionary consequences. Indeed, Austin’s own recognition of the need to 
distinguish between ‘warning’ and ‘attempting to warn’49 collapses the 
distinction between illocutions such as warning, dependent on convention, 
and perlocutions such as persuading, which ostensibly are not. This is because 
what becomes central to the identity of both as ‘actual’ acts is the result achieved, 
which in either case is necessary for the “successful or consummated 
performance”50 of a performative act, and which is in both cases dependent on the 
act’s reception by its ‘audience’.  
 
Austin also notes that there are ills which make a “distinction between 
producing effects or consequences which are intended or unintended”51. 
                                                     
47 How To p102 – my words in brackets. Here I should also note that the word “convention” 
can be taken to denote something that is not “conventional” in the sense of being entirely 
rule-based, it just “is”, prior to conventions as such. This is not quite the way in which 
“convention” is used by Austin in this discussion: rather, he is using it in a more general 
sense that overlaps with the idea of cultural context or expectation, or perhaps with 
Wittgenstein’s Forms of Life. The word ‘convention’ has any number of different possible 
meanings in linguistic philosophy, rather in the way that the word judgement discussed later 
in this chapter does, and in this respect Catarina Dutilh Novaes has published an interesting 
article ‘The different ways in which logic is (said to be) formal’, Academia, 
˂http://www.academia.edu/906786/The_different_ways_in_which_logic_is_said_to_be_for
mal˃, exploring different uses of that term. See also D Føllesdal: “While ordinary games are 
usually based on conventions, agreed upon in advance, it is not equally clear what is meant 
by ‘conventional rules of language’”: ‘Comments on Stenius’s ‘Mood and Language-game’’, 
Synthese 17 (1967) 277. 
48 How To p105 
49 How To p105 
50 How To p114, of illocutionary acts. Incidentally, one might ask ‘how then are illocutionary 
acts consummated - isn’t this an action that of its essence requires two participants?’ The 
category of ‘non-consummation’ is precisely the failure which results from there being only 
one genuinely engaged participant, at least matrimonially speaking. 
51 How To p105 
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However, if it is the case that “when the speaker intends to produce an effect 
it may nevertheless not occur,”52 then this is firstly to assume that we know 
what the speaker intended independently of his action, and secondly and more 
importantly to acknowledge that the difference between ‘attempt’ and 
‘achievement’ is in the hands of the receiver or audience.  
 
This again demands recognition of the need for the audience to understand 
and correctly realize any utterance, whatever its force, before the utterance 
can be said to exist in actuality. It may be the case that, as Austin suggests, 
“we invoke the normal linguistic devices of disclaiming (adverbs like 
‘unintentionally’ and ‘so on’) which we hold ready for personal use in all 
cases of doing actions”53 in these cases. However, our disclaiming may or may 
not be accepted, depending on the audience’s understanding of the entire 
context and thus their participation in the creation of the act. 
 
It would then seem that the idea of the perlocutionary act presupposes a 
theoretical distinction between intention (‘what I intend’) and meaning (‘what 
I achieve’) that is obscured when we imagine an illocutionary act, because an 
illocution is an abstract entity in which intention is perceived without 
remainder (‘I intend exactly what I achieve’), in a way not possible for a 
perlocution54. We can compare ‘I order’ (an illocution), which appears to be 
itself the act, and ‘I persuaded’ (a perlocution), which is a description of the 
act. We can note the different tenses required; we cannot say ‘I persuade’ or ‘I 
am persuading you’.  
 
It thus appears that while we can say ‘in shouting ‘look out’ I was warning’, 
we can only say ‘in shouting ‘look out’ I was trying to frighten’. It appears that 
the illocution is ‘complete’ or ‘successful’ before the perlocution could be, 
because the warning has been performed by my shout, while the perlocution 
remains an attempt until we know whether our hearer has in fact been 
frightened55. Perlocutionary actions turned into verbs describe the effects of 
an act of saying, while illocutionary actions turned into verbs sometimes 
describe the apparent aim of an act of saying, or its pre-existent, pre-uttered 
(and therefore guaranteed) meaning56.  
 
                                                     
52 How To p105 
53 How To p106 
54 As Hornsby puts it: “where an illocutionary act is in question, there is, as it were, no 
distance between doing it and doing it intentionally: the effect characteristic of a piece of 
illocution just is the effect of a successful attempt at it” J Hornsby, ‘Illocution and its 
Significance’, in S L Tsohatzidis (ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and 
Linguistic Perspectives (London, Routledge, 1994) 194 
55 In the same way, we could say ‘I ordered him and he didn’t go’, or even, almost, ‘I ordered 
him but he wasn’t {wouldn’t be?} ordered’ but not ‘I persuaded him but he wasn’t 
persuaded’. 
56 ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’ op cit p129 
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Austin also suggests that “speaking of the ‘use of “language” for arguing or 
warning’ looks just like speaking of the ‘use of “language” for persuading, 
rousing, alarming’; yet the former may, for rough contrast be said to be 
conventional, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the 
performative formula; but the latter could not.”57 The implication here is that 
illocutionary uses of language (as in arguing or warning) are performative 
and thus based on conventions, while perlocutionary ones (persuading, 
alarming or rousing) are not. Illocutions, therefore, are ‘guaranteed by 
convention’ in a way that perlocutions are not.  
 
In fact however, both ‘illocutions’ and ‘perlocutions’ are, as acts, only 
attempts unless they are received and understood. ‘Illocutionary’ verbs, 
however, can ‘disguise’ this because of their use in both ‘happy’ and ‘happy-
or-unhappy’ senses, an option not present for ‘perlocutionary’ verbs58. We 
could in practice only say ‘in shouting ‘look out’ I was warning’ if others 
agree that this is what I was doing: if no-one accepts that I was warning them, 
they will inevitably dispute this statement. 
 
Or, as Campbell again notes,  
 
what does it mean to say that I urge someone to do or believe something, that my 
urging must have the effect of being understood as to its force and meaning, but 
that it is not intended to have an effect on the person toward whom it is directed, 
or at the very least, that such an intended effect is not a defining characteristic of 
my urging? I suggest that such a description … can mean only one thing – a 
completely speaker-centred view of the “total” speech situation, a view that 
entirely eliminates the audience. If I am aware of an audience – and I must be 
aware of them if I urge, warn them, etc. – and if I praise, blame, argue with, or 
condemn that audience it is utterly meaningless to say that I address myself to 
that audience but intend to have no effect upon that audience, … Of course, there 
is a direct contradiction between this exclusion of the audience and the notion of 
audience understanding or uptake, but that notion becomes a highly problematic 
one at this point.59 
 
It is to the concept of uptake, which will prove so important to a proper 
understanding of revelation, that we now turn. 
 
Uptake in Austin.                                                                                                                                                  
2e. The ‘understanding’ of Consequences and the ‘uptaking’ of Effects. 
 
To further complicate this picture of the apparently non-consequential 
illocution, Austin himself is forced to acknowledge that while the 
perlocutionary act is simply about producing effects, there are certain senses 
in which the illocutionary act is also concerned with the achievement of effects 
                                                     
57 How To p103 
58 As pointed out by Cohen in ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 
14:55 (1964) pp118-137 – see previous discussion. 
59 P N Campbell, ‘A Rhetorical View of Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts’, 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 59:3 (1973) p289. 
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although, he insists, this is in a different way to the perlocutionary act. He 
notes that 
 
unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been 
happily, successfully performed. This is to be distinguished from saying that the 
illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect. I cannot be said to have 
warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain 
sense. An effect must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be 
carried out.60 
 
This he seeks to distinguish from ‘consequences’, which are of course 
‘perlocutionary’ in nature. Firstly he suggests that in respect of the effects of 
‘successful’ illocutionary acts “generally the effect amounts to bringing about 
the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution. So the 
performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake”61, which is 
different to the understanding of a perlocutionary act, which brings about 
consequences. 
 
Secondly, Austin indicates that the ‘taking effect’ of the illocutionary act is 
also to be distinguished “from producing consequences in the sense of 
bringing about states of affairs in the ‘normal’ way, i.e. changes in the natural 
course of events.”62  
 
The two points are Austin’s way of suggesting that an illocutionary act is 
conventional and that the act itself is the utterance of something, which enacts 
what it says, so that to say ‘I name this ship’ is to name it, and to say ‘I baptise 
you’ is to baptise you. Things are changed by the performance of the 
illocutionary act in a direct and immediate way; there is no intermediate 
position between being named and unnamed or baptised and un-baptised, or 
between being warned and un-warned or urged and un-urged63. The 
conventions compel us to recognize that an illocutionary act has been 
performed.  
 
This is presumably what Austin means by “bringing about”. It is clear that he 
envisages this being caused by, or ‘in the hands of’, the speaker. Presumably, 
Austin imagines that the effect is brought about by a kind of enforced, 
instantaneous recognition of the speaker’s-intended-act, based on its special 
sort of conventionality, which rigidly determines the recognition it will get 
                                                     
60 How To p115-116 
61 How To p116. Since it is a question of meaning and force it is more a question of 
understanding an illocution than a locution, unless the distinction is meaningless. This may 
in fact be a misprint, so that the phrase should run “generally the effect amounts to bringing 
about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the illocution.” The effect for the 
illocution is the same either way, however. 
62 How To p116 
63 in the case of ‘I warn you that’ or ‘I urge you that’. 
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and which allows within it no space for divergence or variation64. This is 
uptake, and it is mandatory on the part of the audience. 
 
Thirdly, Austin suggests that we must distinguish between an illocutionary 
act and the response or sequel which “by convention”65 some of them invite, 
whether the response is one or two-way. He cites as examples the 
illocutionary acts of arguing, ordering, promising, suggesting and asking to, 
which are ‘one-way’, and the illocutionary acts of offering, asking whether 
you will and asking ‘Yes or no?’ which are two-way. Austin suggests that if 
these illocutionary acts initiate the conventional response or sequel, this 
response “requires a second act by the speaker or another person; and it is a 
commonplace of the consequence-language that this cannot be included 
under the initial stretch of action.”66 
 
These suggestions, however, are all incorrect. The securing of ‘uptake’ is 
simply a consequence necessary to the effective performance of the act, and 
indeed to its recognition as an act. The ‘uptake’ of an illocution is no different 
from the ‘understanding’ of a perlocution; both are necessary to our 
‘realization’ of the act, which makes the act an act, not merely an ‘attempt’. 
‘Uptake’, as a distinctly passive response guaranteed by convention before an 
utterance is uttered, does not exist. There are no unique conventions that 
produce this unique, mandated response, which requires no constructive 
creative understanding and recognition. 
 
Moreover, the assumption that ‘taking effect’ is different to producing normal 
changes presupposes a distinction between ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ 
consequences, and the ‘conventional’ ‘taking effect’ of an illocution. It is not 
clear where this distinction lies. The point about illocutionary conventions 
such as those surrounding baptism or marriage is that they are all ‘natural’ 
and ‘normal’ in their specific contexts, and rules have a certain 
(unpredictable) flexibility, as Austin has noted in respect of rugby and 
“university business” previously. Austin, unlike Searle, does not attempt to 
list exhaustively the conventions surrounding an illocutionary act, and his use 
of the concept of ‘convention’ is fluid. Thus, the difference between something 
‘taking effect’ and having consequences seems to depend on there being a 
previously established difference between a normal act and an illocutionary 
one.  
 
It appears that we can tell the difference between a ‘taking effect’ and a mere 
‘consequence’, because one is associated with illocutions while the other is 
not. However, illocutions in turn are distinguished because they ‘take effect’ 
while other acts merely have ‘consequences’: there is a certain inter-
                                                     
64 This gives substance to Derrida’s accusation that Austin’s vision of Speech Act theory 
requires an absolutely saturated and determinable context.   
65 How To p116 
66 How To p116. 
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dependent circularity here. Uptake has only one characteristic: it is what 
illocutions require. Illocutions have only one principal characteristic: they 
require only ‘uptake’67.  
 
The difference might, conceivably, be felt to exist in respect of highly 
ritualised conventions such as marriage or baptism, which ‘take-effect’ rather 
than simply ‘have consequences’68. However, this highlights one of the 
problems with How To that has been mentioned briefly in chapter one of this 
thesis: that is, the confusion between rituals and linguistic conventions. The 
relationship between them is not clearly established: in How To, Speech Act 
theory is a linguistic theory only, but some of Austin’s examples are rituals. 
This leads to some confusion between explicit performatives and ritualised 
acts with a linguistic element, a confusion which initially crops up when 
Austin includes “I do (sc. take this woman…)” as a performative, together 
with “I name this ship”, “I … bequeath my watch” and “I bet”69.  
 
The essence of a performative speech act such as ‘I promise’, is the speaking 
of convention-based words in an appropriate context. There is then very 
clearly an overlap with ceremonies and rites, which also tend to involve 
words, but in which the conventionality and ritual nature of what is done and 
of the appropriate context become more obvious.70 While it is clear that some 
of the highly ritualised conventional activities initially suggested by Austin, 
such as marriage and naming a ship71, are in one sense specifically 
‘conventional’, by which is implied that they are highly ritualised, these are 
only the ‘tip’ of a very large ‘iceberg’ of conventions or presuppositions and 
assumptions that participate in the creation of our encultured identity72.  
                                                     
67 I take this to be Grice’s point when he notes, while attacking the notion of uptake in Searle 
et al, that “his position hardly seems satisfactory when we see that it involves attributing to 
speakers an intention which is specified in terms of the very notion of meaning which is being 
analyzed (or in terms of a dangerously close relative of that notion). Circularity seems to be 
blatantly abroad”: Retrospective Epilogue to Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge MA, 
Harvard University Press 1989) p352. 
68 And where the illocutionary conditions seem to approach the definition of a convention as 
an explicit rule. 
69 All How To p5 
70 Further if, as Austin suggests in his second lecture, most performative acts are ‘procedures’ 
(See for example How To p14) such a definition would imply that all performative acts are 
conventional, undermining the distinction that Austin subsequently draws between 
illocutions and other performative acts. G J Warnock, in ‘Some Types of Performative 
Utterance’, in Essays on J L Austin by Sir Isaiah Berlin and others, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1973), asserts that Austin, and many others, have in fact confused two very different types of 
speech act: an “operative” sort of “Mark 1” performative, “linguistically quite heterogeneous 
… [which operate] in virtue of non-linguistic conventions” (p74), and a separate class of 
spoken utterances in which the speaker explicitly indicates that he is performing an action 
such as warning, which are only conventional in the sense in which all language is 
conventional (p78, 86), and that these two things are therefore quite distinct. 
71 How To p5 
72 This same possible discrepancy also underlies Austin’s later identification of other “things 
we ‘do’ in some connexion with saying something” (How To p104), which seem for him either 
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The series of acts which Austin uses to establish his initial category of 
‘performative’ acts are in fact very complex ritual actions; they are to marry, 
name a ship, bequeath a watch and bet73. All of these, with the possible 
exception of the last one, include much more than merely a ‘linguistic’ 
dimension, and all are based on a high degree of shared cultural information 
and assumptions. Marrying, naming, and bequeathing, to be ‘felicitous’ or 
successfully performed, involve other cultural rituals as an integral part of the 
whole formal and legal procedure74.  
 
All of the acts Austin begins with are performances in which words, in the 
right context, are more than descriptive. However, in the examples of 
marrying, naming, and bequeathing, the act itself cannot be isolated into any 
specific utterance or combination of words, even in the right circumstances. 
The utterances are not, or not exclusively, central to the performance of an act 
that involves a series of utterances and physical actions in a specific context 
over a period of time75.  
                                                                                                                                                        
to fall into none or more than one of the three classes of locution, illocution and perlocution; 
actions or almost-actions such as swearing. Another example is insinuation which “seems to 
involve some convention, as in the illocutionary act; but we cannot say ‘I insinuate…’ and it 
seems [,] like implying [,] to be a clever effect rather than a mere act” (How To p104-105 (my 
punctuation): according to How To 2 this line has been reconstructed, based on the notes of 
Mr George Pitcher (p167)). This is so since, according to Austin, when we swear, although we 
might say we here use language “for relieving our feelings”, there is no relation to 
“performative formulas and the other devices of illocutionary acts” since “we must notice 
that the illocutionary act is a conventional act: an act done as conforming to a convention” 
(How To p105). This, however, raises questions about the relationship between ‘to insinuate’, 
‘to act’, and ‘to achieve effects’. There seems, for instance, to be no reason why swearing is not 
a speech act whose very existence is based on shared cultural-linguistic conventions. As 
Austin notes “’Swearing’ is ambiguous” p105, footnote 1. 
73 How To p5 
74 It is not possible to delineate exactly the point at which ritualised performances can be said 
to be merely ‘linguistic’ performatives – an act can be either, depending on the context and its 
specifics (such as betting, which may or may not be done using gestures, rituals etc), and any 
speech act, since it requires the right context to be effective, has a non-linguistic, cultural 
element: “that we must admit ‘non-linguistic’ considerations may seem regrettable, but it also 
seems inevitable. As we later indicate (and as both Austin and Quine, in their different ways, 
showed) the search for the purely linguistic or the irreducibly logical, apart from a particular 
context, seems doomed to failure”: Smith and McClendon, ‘Religious language after J L 
Austin’, Religious Studies 8:1 (1972) p57. 
75 See also modern liturgical scholars on Eucharistic prayers; most would now deny that ‘the 
Institution Narrative’ is the ‘consecratory bit’ of the prayer – they would regard as 
consecratory the performance of the whole prayer in the midst of the believing community: 
“New eucharistic rites clearly see the ‘Canon’ as beginning with the Sursum corda and ending 
with the people’s Amen that rounds off the concluding doxology. Partly as a result of the 
study of Jewish liturgy .., there came a wide acceptance of the theological principle of 
‘consecration by thanksgiving’.” Geoffrey Wainwright, ’15: Recent Eucharistic Revision’, in C 
Jones, G Wainwright, E Yarnold SJ and P Bradshaw (eds.), The Study of Liturgy revised edition 
(SPCK, London, 1992) p 333. See also “The Spirit makes the crucified and risen Christ really 
present to us in the eucharistic meal, fulfilling the promise contained in the words of 
institution. The presence of Christ is clearly the centre of the eucharist, and the promise 
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Indeed, with respect to Austin’s first suggested performative utterance: “‘I do 
(sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)’ – as uttered in the course 
of the marriage ceremony”76, not only are these words not the point of 
transition from being single to being married, but they are not in fact uttered 
in the course of that ceremony77, although ‘I do’ has become a conventional 
linguistic shorthand referring to the marriage vows. The editors record that 
“Austin realized that the expression ‘I do’ is not used in the marriage 
ceremony too late to correct his mistake. We have let it remain in the text as it 
is philosophically unimportant that it is a mistake.”78 However, there is a 
philosophical significance to this mistake: it is a further demonstration of the 
fact that marriage is not in fact effected by a simple performative utterance, 
but is instead a complex cultural ritual, within which the point of transition is 
hard, perhaps impossible, to isolate with certainty79.  
 
There is in terms of ‘changes of status’ a far greater disparity between the acts 
of getting married, naming a ship, or bequeathing a watch and the act of 
promising, than there is between the act of promising, the act of insinuating 
and the act of persuading, none of which latter group is obviously more 
conventional than any other. It is not clear why insinuation or implication is 
not an act, and why ‘an effect of language’ is not recognized as being an act in 
or of language using conventions and the like, as in for example my saying of 
a single man ‘Isn’t it odd that he has never married’. This, in the right context, 
is insinuating something about him by using shared social and linguistic 
conventions80.  
                                                                                                                                                        
contained in the words of institution is therefore fundamental to the celebration. Yet it is the 
Father who is the primary origin and final fulfilment of the eucharistic event... Being assured 
by Jesus’ promise in the words of institution that it will be answered, the Church prays to the 
Father for the gift of the Holy Spirit in order that the eucharistic event may be a reality”: 
‘Eucharist: C – The Eucharist as Invocation of the Spirit’, Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry: Faith 
and Order Paper No 111, (World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1982) p13, paragraph 14.  
76 How To p5 
77 Neither in the Book of Common Prayer or in contemporary services. 
78 How To p5 footnote 2. 
79 In the 1662 Book of Common Prayer order for the “Solemnization of Matrimony” the bride 
and ‘groom declare that they will each take the other “in sickness and in health” etc (response 
“I will”), then they each recite their vows, following the Minister (“I, N, take thee, N, to my 
wedded” etc). After that, a ring is given to the bride by the ‘groom and blessed, then the 
Minister says “Those whom God hath joined together let no man put asunder”, and after this 
addresses the congregation in words which include the following: “… I pronounce that they 
be man and wife together ...” followed by a blessing. At least two and possibly more 
moments would seem to be possible contenders for the moment of ‘status change’, if a 
specific moment for such is sought. As J R Cameron notes, “although we may be able to break 
down a marriage ceremony, a trial in court, or a football match, into separate acts of 
individuals, these acts can be understood only as component parts of a larger total piece of 
action, performed by a number of distinct but co-operating agents”: J R Cameron, ‘Sentence-
Meaning and Speech Acts’. The Philosophical Quarterly 20:79 (April 1970) 99. 
80 The right context being a context in which this sentence is understood, or in which it has 
‘secured uptake’, to adopt Austin’s terminology for illocutions. The phrase ‘confirmed 
bachelor’ in obituaries used to carry similar weight, contextually. 
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Moreover, the idea that an illocutionary act such as ‘I do’ or ‘I baptize’ can be 
‘conventionally empowered’ to create a change from one condition or state of 
affairs to another is in fact a characteristic of performativity that is not 
exclusively ‘illocutionary’: it is for example part of the function of Art81 and 
Ritual82. Further, this sort of status-change is not part of the illocutionary acts 
‘I order’ or ‘I protest’, or at least not in a way any different to its presence in 
the perlocutionary acts ‘I persuaded’ or ‘I insinuated’. There is generally no 
‘happy-or-unhappy’ sense of ‘I baptise’ as there is for ‘I warn’, but this is due 
to the nature of the conventions that we recognize surrounding the ritual, not 
because one is an illocutionary verb: in Austin’s scheme, they both are83.  
 
It does seem contradictory moreover, and indeed conflicts with what Austin 
has stated elsewhere, to suggest that an order could take effect without being 
obeyed, or that the ‘Yes or no’ question is effective if no response is achieved. 
Although something will probably have been done in these instances, and as 
Cohen has noted, the “happy” use of these verbs is quite common84, the 
successful completion of even an illocutionary act cannot be achieved without 
the response, and it is thus at best questionable to assert that “it is a 
commonplace of the consequence-language that this [response] cannot be 
included under the initial stretch of action”85. Even if the response is 
described separately, it is an integral part of the one illocutionary action, 
without which the act cannot be said to have been happily or successfully 
performed86.  
                                                     
81 For example in the work of David Jones (Epoch and Artist, London, Faber and Faber, 1959), 
and Paul Ricoeur – see for example P Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of 
Meaning (Texas Christian University Press 1976) or The Rule of Metaphor (Routledge, London, 
2003). See also Hans-Georg Gadamer “In the experience of art we see a genuine experience 
(Erfahrung) induced by the work, which does not leave him who has it unchanged, and we 
enquire into the mode of being of what is experienced in this way”; Truth and Method, (New 
York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p 91, and again “the implications for the definition of 
the nature of art emerge when one takes the sense of transformation seriously” Truth and 
Method (London, Sheed and Ward, 1988), p 100 [my copy of the second edition seems to go  a 
trifle awry here]. 
82 Tom F. Driver: The Magic of Ritual, (San Francisco, HarperSanFrancisco, 1991). 
83 Indeed, ecclesiastical law concerning baptisms seems expressly designed to ensure that 
virtually any attempt will be ‘happy’, by allowing the laity to perform the ritual; the emphasis 
seems to be on assuming that it has happened, provided water has been poured or sprinkled 
and the Trinity invoked. Despite this, as Austin notes, things can still ‘go wrong’: “we might 
have the wrong name and the wrong cleric”: How To p23. It should be remembered that 
Urmson argues that speech acts are not the same thing as performatives (see chapter one). 
84 ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 14:55 (1964) pp118-137 
85 How To p116 
86 In this respect, I disagree entirely with Alston, who believes that the illocutionary-
perlocutionary divide, pace Austin is “unproblematic, since a perlocutionary act consists in 
the production of certain effects, whereas, as I will contend throughout, illocutionary acts are 
not so constituted” W P Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (Ithaca NY, Cornell 
University Press, 2000) 23-24. Such a view is only possible if ‘interior intention’, rather than 
meaning, is one’s primary concern. 
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Indeed, even in the most ‘happy-or-unhappy’ ritualised actions, there are 
many ‘infelicities’ which can arise if for example the Minister drops dead 
halfway through the service; exactly when is the marriage solemnized, the 
baby baptised, or the Real Presence consecrated? These rituals all have a 
complicated and uncertain causality, in which the language of ‘validity’ 
abounds, in long-standing and detailed legal or theological arguments. In the 
case of sacraments or religious rituals such as baptism and marriage, it is 
moreover generally argued these days that some element of consent or 
participation is necessary in order that they might be celebrated without 
dispute87. 
 
Even the most apparently ‘uptakeable’ of illocutionary acts, such as baptisms 
or naming ceremonies, require a recognition and an understanding to have 
happened88. If no-one understands what a baptism is, it cannot have 
happened. For a baptism to exist, there needs to be a community that 
understands there to be such a thing as baptism, and that it has genuinely 
happened in this case: i.e. that water has been poured and the Trinity invoked 
by someone who is themselves authorized to perform this ritual. There will 
inevitably be doubts in some cases, even surrounding a ritual such as 
baptism, which has been expressly designed by its understanding community 
to be as foolproof as possible89: this is why there is provision for individuals 
to be conditionally baptized. 
 
Indeed, according to Austin, an illocutionary act may have a “perlocutionary 
object”90 or may simply produce a “perlocutionary sequel”, but the distinction 
between a perlocutionary act and an illocutionary act with a perlocutionary 
object is not clear: as Austin goes on to note, both can be non-verbal, and 
although illocutions are conventional while perlocutions are supposedly not, 
Austin admits that “it is difficult to say where conventions begin and end”91. 
 
It should also be noted that at this point in his lectures Austin is using, as well 
as the terminology of happiness and felicity he earlier employed in respect of 
performatives, the perhaps more deceptively simple idea of ‘success’. The use 
of words such as ‘felicity’ is an indication of the complexity surrounding the 
question of the effectiveness of performatives. Austin never satisfactorily 
addresses the question of what makes a performative effective, as we have 
discussed, but he does initially note that ‘misfires’ and ‘abuses’ are still acts, 
                                                     
87 Babies need to be alive, and generally to have a baptized godparent or sponsor making 
promises for them, couples need to assent to their marriage, and in contemporary theology it 
is generally argued that the celebration of the Eucharist requires a congregation to be present 
and assent in the final ‘Amen’, or at least a community to be acknowledged – see footnote 75. 
88 As Austin implicitly notes himself – How To p23-24. 
89 Any baptized person can baptise another: all that is required is to pour water in the name of 
the Trinity.  
90 How To p117 
91 How To p118 
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although ones sitting in an ‘unhappy’ relationship to what he imagines as the 
intention of the actor (a knowledge to which he has artificially God-like or 
‘authorial’ access, of course92). Thus the language of ‘felicity’ is an 
acknowledgment of the complexity of the issue of what would count as the 
successful performance of a performative act,  
 
for he does promise: the promise here is not even void, though it is given in bad 
faith. His utterance is perhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless 
wrong, but it is not a lie or a misstatement. At most we might make out a case for 
saying that it implies or insinuates a falsehood or a misstatement (to the effect 
that he does intend to do something): but that is a very different matter.93 
 
However, the use of the phrase “successfully performed” rather elides these 
complexities, and is itself an indication of the unsatisfactory nature of 
Austin’s attempts to find a guaranteed speech act and to describe the nature 
of ‘uptake’94. 
 
Indeed, it is precisely because a perlocutionary verb so explicitly describes, or 
includes an acknowledgment of, the receiver’s actual response, that Yueguo 
Gu suggests95 that they are ineligible to be described as acts96. Observing that 
the perlocutionary act of alerting someone seems very close to the 
illocutionary one of warning them, he suggests that in this instance “the 
perlocutionary act is not even an act: it is merely a terminology which 
embraces the consequences of the illocutionary act into its name”97. Therefore, 
for Gu  
 
Austin’s notion of … the total speech act and the total speech situation are 
distortions of what actually takes place in conversation. The total speech situation 
must be interpreted in terms of social interaction, in which the speaker and 
                                                     
92 As T Cohen notes in respect of perlocutions: “the kind of situation commonly described by 
Austin, and apparently thought paradigmatic or obviously normal by him, is one in which 
what is said wears its force transparently (when enough of the story is told, as it always is by 
Austin)”: ‘Illocutions and Perlocutions’, Foundations of Language 9 (1973) p495.  
93 How To p11 
94 Austin himself notes, in the paper ‘Other Minds’, dating from 1946, and published in 
Philosophical Papers, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), that the phrase null and void he there 
uses is “(a useful formula in many cases for avoiding saying either ‘he did’ or ‘he didn’t’)”: 
p102. Y Gu also notes that Austin’s terms can indicate his uncertainty: see his article ‘The 
Impasse of Perlocution’, Journal of Pragmatics 20 (1993) 405-432, see p410.  
95 In his thesis Towards a Model of Conversational Rhetoric: An Investigation of the Perlocutionary 
Phenomenon in Conversation (Unpublished Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD, 
Department of Linguistics and Modern English Language, University of Lancaster November 
1987), and in his article ‘The Impasse of Perlocution’, op cit.  
96 R N Gaines (‘Doing By Saying: Toward a Theory of Perlocution’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 
65:2 (1979)) agrees with Gu (see for example p215), although he thinks the concept of the 
perlocution can be rescued by redefining it to include authorial intention and asserting that it 
is a part of the illocutionary act, thereby exposing himself to Gu’s criticism that he has 
committed the “perlocutionary verb fallacy” of assuming “that linguistic descriptions mirror 
and hence define acts”: ‘The Impasse of Perlocution’ op cit p425. 
97 Towards a Model of Conversational Rhetoric p36.   
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addressee, who are both socially competent agents of acts, are engaged in 
conversation. And the total speech act cannot be total without taking the 
addressee’s contribution into account.98  
 
For Gu, “to use perlocutionary verbs or expressions to bracket another agent’s 
response-acts and transform them into acts, which are then illegitimately 
attributed to S alone, constitutes the Perlocutionary-Verb fallacy.”99 
Perlocutionary effects “ought to be explained in transactional terms with the 
recognition of the audience as agents of the effects.”100 Gu also outlaws 
unintended perlocutionary effects, describing them as “the Effect=Act 
Fallacy”101.   
 
Gu’s solution is to abandon the concept of perlocutions in favour of “the 
notion of the rhetorical transaction”102, since he wishes to retain the idea of the 
illocution. At no stage does he apply his successful demolition of the agent’s 
ownership of the perlocutionary effect, to illocutionary consequences: part of 
the aim of his thesis is the protection of illocutions from being regarded as the 
causes of perlocutionary effects103. However, he unwittingly demonstrates not 
merely that perlocutions cannot simply be seen as the acts of a sender or 
agent, but also that illocutions cannot be thus described104. 
 
Uptake in Austin.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
2f. Illocutions, Judgement and Context.  
 
Austin also uses the metaphor of ‘Judgement’ to distinguish perlocutionary 
and illocutionary acts, on the grounds that illocutions are uniquely 
conventional. However, ‘judgement’ is a concept that is not absolute. It is, 
                                                     
98 Towards a Model of Conversational Rhetoric p64 
99 Towards a Model of Conversational Rhetoric p65. ‘S’ is Gu’s shorthand term for the speaker or 
initiating agent.  
100 Towards a Model of Conversational Rhetoric p70, see also ‘The Impasse of Perlocution’ p422: 
“the so-called perlocutionary effects are not in fact caused by S, but actively produced by H, 
who has the claim to the agency of the effects. Thus, the perlocutionary act cannot be said to 
be performed by S alone. It is a joint endeavour between S and H”, where H is Gu’s term for 
the Hearer. 
101 Towards a Model of Conversational Rhetoric p72, p75, see also ‘The Impasse of Perlocution’  
p423: perlocutionary “effects should not be expounded in terms of causation or the acts 
performed by S. They ought to be explained in transactional terms with the recognition of 
hearers as agents of the effects.” 
102 See for example Towards a Model of Conversational Rhetoric piii, ‘The Impasse of Perlocution’ 
p423-424, 428. 
103 ‘The Impasse of Perlocution’ p427-428 
104 As Campbell asserts: “all speech acts produce some effect upon the feelings, thoughts, or 
actions of those involved in such acts, and, therefore, all speech acts are perlocutions”, op cit 
p290. J Sadock also asserts that all speech acts are perlocutions, of which illocutionary acts 
constitute one subset: “an illocutionary act is a special kind of perlocutionary act … [to which 
he assigns the term] sense perlocutions” because their “success depends on the meaning of an 
utterance”. Of that subset called sense perlocutions, illocutionary acts are, because of their 
reliance on meaning, also “force perlocutions”: J M Sadock, Toward a Linguistic Theory of 
Speech Acts, (New York, Academic Press, 1974) p153. 
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rather, a metaphor, referring to a ritualised and conventional process, and like 
all metaphors it has an inherent fluidity as a concept. Judges can decide 
according to precedent (pre-existing conventions), but their decisions are 
always open to being over-ruled on the basis of alternative interpretations. It 
is not clear how definitive Austin imagines a ‘judgement’ as being. Indeed, 
the concept of judgement is used often in hermeneutics, but exactly what is 
being imagined is not always evident: who is doing the judging, and how 
might they be over-ruled (if at all)?105  
 
Austin himself gives a variety of different impressions. He notes that  
 
difficulties about conventions and intentions must arise in deciding upon the 
correct description whether of a locution or of an illocution: deliberate, or 
unintentional, ambiguity of meaning or reference is perhaps as common as 
deliberate or unintentional failure to make plain ‘how our words are to be taken’ 
(in the illocutionary sense). Moreover, the whole apparatus of ‘explicit 
performatives’ (see above) serves to obviate disagreements as to the description 
of illocutionary acts. It is much harder in fact to obviate disagreements as to the 
description of ‘locutionary acts’. Each, however, is conventional and liable to 
need to have a ‘construction’ put on it by judges.106  
 
This itself acknowledges, not merely the apparent ‘conventionality’ of 
locutionary meaning, but also that for both illocutions and locutions, there is 
no guarantee that the meaning of the utterance (whether it is couched in 
terms of sense and reference or of force) will be understood. Reliance is 
placed instead on the possibility of judgement.  
 
However, even here Austin notes that “the whole apparatus of ‘explicit 
performatives’ serves to obviate disagreements as to the description of 
illocutionary acts” and he subsequently re-asserts the distinctions between 
“the locutionary act … which has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has a 
certain force in saying something; [and] the perlocutionary act which is the 
achieving of certain effects by saying something.”107 
 
For Austin, “illocutionary acts are conventional acts: perlocutionary acts are 
not conventional”108. He notes that “perlocutionary acts are not conventional, 
though conventional acts may be made use of in order to bring off the 
perlocutionary act. A judge should be able to decide, by hearing what was 
said, what locutionary and illocutionary acts were performed, but not what 
perlocutionary acts were achieved.”109 Austin’s suggestion that “a judge 
should be able to decide, by hearing…” goes further than simply identifying 
                                                     
105 This observation applies also, as has already been noted, to the use of the words 
‘convention’ and ‘context’. 
106 How To p114 footnote 1, passage quoted occurring on p115 
107 How To p120 
108 How To p120 
109 How To p121 
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the need for a ‘construction to be put on it by judges’110. Both suggestions, 
however, flow from his assumptions with regard to the sender view of 
meaning and of personality.  
 
Moreover, Austin’s proposal that “a judge should be able to decide, by 
hearing…” is quite incorrect. It implies that a ‘third party’ could arbitrate on 
what was meant using shared knowledge of the general locutionary and 
illocutionary conventions alone. In fact, in the case of either a ‘perlocution’ or 
an ‘illocution’, before the judge could accurately determine how the 
expression was actually taken (rather than how it appears to have been 
intended to have been taken on the basis of the words alone, which 
appearance might be quite misleading), he or she would require some 
knowledge of the detailed context of the utterance111. A judge (or indeed a 
Judge) can never say for certain what act was performed, but only what act it 
is reasonable to assume was performed, on the basis of all the available facts, 
including the context112. 
 
The nature of contextual uncertainty is illustrated by the genuinely Judicial 
circumstances of the case of Derek Bentley. He was hanged because of his 
involvement in the murder of a Police constable during a bungled break-in at 
a warehouse in Croydon in 1952. He was arrested with his co-defendant 
Christopher Craig, who fired the shot that killed PC Miles. However, Craig 
was only sixteen, and thus legally a juvenile who could not be hanged. Three 
policemen attested during the trial that Bentley had shouted to Craig “let him 
have it, Chris”. This, the Prosecution alleged, was an (illocutionary) command 
to Chris to shoot113, and helped condemn him to the gallows, since the Judge 
and Jury took it as such, as did the Home Secretary, who refused appeals for 
clemency.  
 
Bentley’s sister Iris and other campaigners on his behalf have long argued 
that this phrase should, in the context of all the facts114, have been taken as an 
attempted perlocution seeking to persuade Craig to surrender the weapon, if 
                                                     
110 Although this, too, with its use of ‘convention’ is probably in the end seen as ‘guaranteed’. 
According to How To 2 the section beginning ‘a judge should be able to decide …’ “is added 
from Pitcher’s notes” (How To 2 p167), where Pitcher refers to Mr George Pitcher (p166 – see 
reference to page 52). It is just possible that this accounts for the potential difference between 
‘having a construction put on it’, and ‘should be able to decide, by hearing’. 
111 As T Cohen asserts in his ‘Illocutions and Perlocutions’, Foundations of Language 9 (1973) 
497ff, where he demonstrates that a judge cannot always decide what illocutions happened 
on the basis of the words alone, and if the judge is informed about enough circumstances to 
allow him to determine an illocution, he may then also be able to predict some perlocutions. 
112 And taking the stance of ‘the man on the Clapham omnibus’ or wherever. See also D 
Franck, ‘Speaking about Speech Acts’, Journal of Pragmatics 8 (1984), who makes a similar 
point about the impossibility of ‘judging’ speech acts ‘externally’, as Point 5 of her article 
(p89).  
113 “Let him have it” having such a meaning in 1950’s gangster films. 
114 Including Bentley’s very limited intellect and an apparent mental age of eleven, which 
made him ‘functionally’ younger than Craig 
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it was said at all. In 1998 the Court of Appeal quashed Bentley’s conviction115 
on the grounds that the original trial Judge was biased against Bentley and 
misdirected the Jury on points of law. This example serves to illustrate the 
difficulty even Judges can have (let alone mere ‘judges’), in determining the 
categories of context and thus of language act produced. What counts as 
relevant information in this case, and who is to decide it? 
 
The question of the intent of the speaker is only revealed through the 
conventions relating to and the context of the utterance in its dialogue 
contexts, and sometimes this may never be known116. The crucial point to note 
is that even judgements made by ‘proper’ Judges with wigs and Courtrooms 
are not guaranteed; they can be disputed, superseded, rendered obsolete, 
ignored, overturned on appeal etc117. These discussions illustrate that when 
the word ‘judgement’ is used, almost metaphorically, in hermeneutics, an 
enormous amount depends on what one means by (and assumes and 
imagines as being behind) the word, just as with words like adequacy and 
meaning. Behind these lie significant presumptions with regard to 
communication and who it is that speaks and hears.  
 
E D Hirsch provides another example of this ‘metaphorical usage’. He 
suggests that a process of “validation” is necessary “to evaluate the disparate 
constructions which understanding has brought forward”118, and he imagines 
this process in a judicial manner. He has, indeed, previously acknowledged 
that “my own preference is for judicial criticism which is based upon valid 
interpretation”119. This interpretation is carried out by “adjudicators”120 who 
are experts in the field, able to compare (fairly, it goes without saying, since 
clearly no judge or adjudicator is ever biased!) “the victorious hypothesis ... 
with every disparate hypothesis severally”. Indeed, “the judge’s primary 
function is not to relish brilliant details of inference but to decide on the most 
valid principles for generating them” and to “reach an objective conclusion 
about relative probabilities.”121 
 
                                                     
115 Which is not the same thing as declaring him innocent: had he been alive, he would 
probably have been released pending a re-trial. 
116 “There must be a convergence between the things that are meant and the things that are 
recognized as meant; this will depend on successful modeling of the hearer by the speaker”, 
or on even more reciprocity than Thomason here envisages: R H Thomason, 
‘Accommodation, Meaning, and Implicature: Interdisciplinary Foundations for Pragmatics’, 
in P R Cohen, J Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication (Cambridge MA, 
MIT Press, 1992) p351.  
117 This is important to bear in mind when Jennifer Hornsby’s example of an illocution is 
discussed in Richard Briggs’s Words in Action. 
118 Validity in Interpretation (New Haven CT and London, Yale University Press, 1976) p170 
119 Validity in Interpretation op cit p161 
120 Validity in Interpretation op cit p171 
121 Validity in Interpretation op cit p172 
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Hirsch thus imagines an objective, clear-sighted expert, in some sense above 
the fray, and able to discover the truth behind the froth122. He is 
correspondingly somewhat dismissive of advocacy: “the objectivity of such 
knowledge about texts has been and will continue to be disputed for so long 
as criticism is marred by its predilection for advocacy without any 
corresponding predilection for adjudication, but such knowledge is 
nevertheless objective and founded on well-established principles.”123  
 
However, Hirsch subsequently concedes that  
 
the advocates have the task of bringing forward evidence favourable to their side 
and unfavourable to their opponents. In doing so, they might bring to light 
evidence which a judge might not have thought to consider. But without a judge 
all those relevant pieces of evidence float uselessly. Advocates are needed … 
However, unless advocates sometimes serve as judges, none of this activity will 
actually contribute to knowledge.124  
 
It is interesting to observe that Hirsch here imagines knowledge as being 
judicial, and does not note that any judicial process is potentially flawed, not 
merely because adversarial systems depend on the quality of the advocate as 
much as on the strength or extent of the evidence, but also because any 
judicial system will possess certain prejudices and assumptions. Hirsch 
imagines advocates for various interpretations engaging in judicial 
procedures, bringing “forward nearly all the important relevant evidence”125 
which can then be adjudicated on the basis of “objectively defined and 
generally accepted principles.”126 This, however, may be a rather rose-tinted 
view of the judicial process127. 
 
As Pratt observes “any linguistic theory projects a kind of ideal speaker, and 
one amusing though quite irresponsible way of characterizing linguistic 
theories is to speculate on the ideal speaker they suggest”128. This is true not 
merely of the ideal speaker of linguistic theories but also of the idealized 
notion of “judgement” they suppose. Hirsch imagines an adjudicating expert, 
Austin a Judge, and Vanhoozer and Ward have at their back the Celestial 
Judge who knows the secrets of all hearts. Derrida, Duff, Briggs, Ward and 
                                                     
122 How much more stable and trustworthy is the calm and clear-sighted view of the expert, 
perhaps in his well-appointed Senior Common Room, than the tumult of the rabble below! 
123 Validity in Interpretation op cit p173 
124 Validity in Interpretation op cit p197 
125 Validity in Interpretation op cit p182 
126 Validity in Interpretation op cit p183 
127 See for example J A G Griffith: The Politics of the Judiciary, (Glasgow, Fontana Press, 1985), 
or Stanley Fish’s own work on the ‘creativity’ of judicial decision-making. 
128 ‘The Ideology of Speech Act Theory’, Centrum NS 1.1 (1981) p5. She suggests that “for 
speech-act theory we could project an Oxford cricket player, or maybe a Boy Scout, an 
honorable guy who always says the right thing and really means it” while “in my own book 
on speech acts and literature, the ideal speaker that emerges is probably someone like Eliza 
Doolittle in a Boy Scout suit.”  
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Vanhoozer all agree that judgements can be made which enable 
communications to mean adequately, but they draw entirely different 
implications from this, because judgement and adequacy have such different 
connotations for them129.  
 
Derrida stresses and re-stresses the hesitation, and the fact that the possibility 
of a mistake is ever-present and never entirely ineradicable in any situation. It 
is this permanent risk and potential for hiatus which the hermeneutics of for 
example Briggs or Searle ignore, because they stress the extent to which 
communication actually happens, without recognizing the fact that even 
when it happens ‘successfully’, it may not be complete or to the elimination of 
other possibilities. Austin, as ever, straddles both groups, sometimes 
appearing in both. His methodology and style are clearly on the ‘apophatic’ 
side of views of judgement, while his illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction, 
and indeed his exclusion of ‘etiolations’ from language, are far more confident 
in their search for ‘guaranteeability’, as is his use of the metaphor of 
‘guaranteeability’ itself, in his use of the idea of judgement: “a judge should 
be able to decide ...”130.  
 
3. Uptake in Donald Evans’s The Logic of Self-Involvement  
 
This problem with the idea of ‘uptake’, and with the illocutionary-
perlocutionary distinction, is inherited by those who follow Austin. The 
majority of subsequent scholars simply take the distinction as read, and while 
they may revise it to suit their particular purposes, they do not question the 
ultimate validity of the distinction per se. This is certainly true of Donald 
Evans. He discusses “performative force and causal power” in section 9131 of 
his first chapter, “the Performative force of language”. I agree with Evans that 
“the performative force of an utterance on a particular occasion is part of its 
meaning”132 and thus I agree when he suggests that Austin’s restriction of 
meaning to sense and reference only “does not seem to me to be 
warranted”133. 
 
I also agree with Evans that there can be a distinction between on the one 
hand “what I mean in saying S” and on the other the belief that  
 
the words of S are such that a reasonable person, who knows the relevant 
linguistic conventions, would in the specific context take S to have the meaning 
(that is, the performative force) which is made explicit in P; otherwise S does not 
                                                     
129 So much depends on where one stands, who one trusts, and by whom (if anyone) one feels 
oppressed. Is Post-modernist suspicion liberating or tyrannical? It could be subversive of an 
Authoritarian orthodoxy, or it could be an Authoritarian orthodoxy of its own: your view of 
this will affect the meaning of anything Derrida has written.  
130 How To p121 – see previous discussion 
131 The Logic of Self-Involvement op cit p68ff 
132 The Logic of Self-Involvement op cit p69 
133 The Logic of Self-Involvement Ibid footnote 1 
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have this meaning, even though I mean (that is, intend) S to have this 
meaning.134  
 
But I believe that Evans is incorrect when he therefore implies that one can 
predict with certainty, having made all the caveats he lists, what will happen; 
and therefore that he is also incorrect to imply that meaning can be asserted to 
be equal to intention before the phrase has been uttered. This is partly because 
tone can vary meaning, but more importantly because it is what an utterance 
is taken-as that determines its meaning and intention. A phrase or utterance 
has no meaning until it is ‘taken-as’ something, it has only the potentiality of 
its ‘dictionary-meaning’ possibilities, which may or may not be in some way 
realised in its unique particularity of expression and context.   
 
Evans then goes on to distinguish “causal” use from meaning. This distinction 
is necessary because for Evans meaning, including force, “depends on 
conventions of language and society. But whether or not what I say alarms, 
pleases and inspires, and so on, is simply a matter of fact.” 135 But it is not at 
all clear why something that could be intended or accidental as an outcome, 
such as alarming, isn’t just as much a matter of linguistic and social 
convention as whether or not the same sentence warns me. Even if Evans 
intends the distinction to be demonstrated in the event of a misunderstanding 
of meaning, because if I misunderstand the utterance I miss the meaning and 
force only, nonetheless the distinction fails here too, because “causal” effects 
can be intended but unsuccessful or successful, and ‘performative’ results can 
be unintended. All the possibilities are open in either case. 
 
Whether or not an utterance did alarm me is a matter of fact, but so is whether 
or not it did warn me. Whether or not an utterance will alarm me can be 
predicted but not with certainty, and will not be known until the utterance is 
uttered: the same holds true for the warning – whether or not it will warn me 
won’t be known until after you utter the warning. The fact that we can have 
both a happy and happy-or-unhappy sense of the word ‘warning’ obscures 
the fact that neither alarming nor warning will have taken place unless some 
have been alarmed or warned, and that the meaning of what took place can 
be debated in either case. Neither is more certain than the other to have 
occurred.  
 
The difference seems for Evans to be that ‘causal’ use is not part of meaning 
because it is less ‘certain’, less tied-in to the sentence, than meaning136. The 
illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction based on the supposed predictability 
of the illocution is creeping in here again, and Evans is simply trying to 
divorce performative force from causation, just as Austin does, as discussed 
in previous sections of this thesis.  
                                                     
134 The Logic of Self-Involvement p69 
135 The Logic of Self-Involvement Section 9.2 p70 ff op cit. 
136 This applies to Evans and Austin 
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However it seems undeniable that conventions of language are as much 
‘matters of fact’ as my emotional response to an event, and the force of a 
‘linguistic convention’ is surely no more or less ‘causal’ than the use of 
rhetoric to stir emotion? Indeed, it is hard to determine the sense in which an 
illocution is not causal, in that it is caused by the understood use of language 
and linguistic or cultural conventions, just as is rhetorical success. It seems 
unlikely that anything linguistic could be causal in the same sense in which a 
switch has a causal (mechanical) effect on a current, apart perhaps from 
simply the effect of creeping up behind someone and saying “boo!” This 
might arguably constitute a purely ‘causal’ linguistic effect, where the result is 
a physical reaction caused by shock, rather than through ‘cultural’ causal 
assumptions. Jumping when someone says “boo”, however, is hardly a 
response to a perlocutionary act: it is a response to an aural stimulus. 
 
Moreover, even saying “boo” could possibly achieve a different response 
from saying “duck”, “four”137 or “look out”. If there is, as seems possible, a 
potential difference between the act of shouting “boo” and that of screaming 
in someone’s ear, this suggests that no ‘linguistic’ act, which we might loosely 
define as any use of words rather than mere noise, can be anything but 
‘linguistically causal’ in part at least: there are just different, and overlapping, 
reasons for linking cause and effect, ranging from physical stimuli to 
‘understanding’. All linguistically achieved effects are causal: ‘causal’ and 
‘performative’ here seems somewhat analogous to the idea of brute and 
institutional facts, or of regulative and constitutive rules and, like these 
oppositional concepts, it rather over-simplifies a complicated and shifting 
pattern of identity, as Thiselton notes himself138. 
 
Evans follows, and cites, Austin when he notes that  
 
there are many performatives which require a minimal degree of apprehension 
by some hearer, for example, ‘admit’, ‘warn’, ‘apologize’, ‘thank’, ‘promise’; but 
this is a pre-condition of both the performative force and the causal power; it is 
not something that blurs the distinction between the two. On the whole, the 
distinction is clear and sharp.139  
 
In this, he reflects the confusion that Austin incurs in his attempts to provide 
an adequate illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction. For Evans, the 
distinction seems to be between what is public (illocutions) and what is 
                                                     
137 On a golf course 
138 The effect of the switch is an example of the causal that Thiselton gives in his Review 
Article: ‘Speech Act Theory and the Claim that God Speaks: Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Divine 
discourse’, Scottish Journal of Theology 50 (1997) p103. However, as Thiselton later concludes, 
“the usual distinctions about cognitive/non-cognitive, action/knowledge, 
causal/conventional, expressive/communicative remain useful only with the most careful 
and rigorous qualification” given the social and institutional context of human life (p104). 
139 The Logic of Self-Involvement p71 
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possibly unique and private, applicable as an experience only to you, 
unpredictably (perlocutions). This, however, isn’t clear, and Evans simply 
asserts the clarity of the distinction between causality and performativity, 
despite both requiring “apprehension”; he doesn’t demonstrate it. As with 
Austin, the overriding necessity for the distinction is to buttress the idea that 
some meanings are ‘begotten’, and that there is a kind of guarantee as to their 
apprehension, which is implicit in their existence.  
 
In section 9.3, on Exercitives and causal power (excercitives being a particular 
kind of illocution “where the speaker brings about a conventional state of 
affairs in saying what he does”140: where he in effect exercises conventional 
authority to appoint, order or otherwise authorise something, hence the 
name), Evans attempts to deny the link between the “intended results” of an 
exercitive uttered with performative force, and the causal power of the same 
utterance, on the grounds that there are in a performative exercitive two 
distinct intentions: the intention that an utterance be an order, and the 
intention that it order someone to act in a certain way.  
 
As I have already suggested141, it seems incredible to suppose that a 
performative could be complete without a performance, and Evans is here 
beguiled by the existence of ‘happy-or-unhappy’ verbs, as Austin was. 
Moreover, it seems perverse and unnecessarily convoluted, to suggest that in 
any action I have in fact two overlapping intentions. The intention that I utter 
an order necessarily includes the intention that the order be obeyed, since 
obedience is constitutive of the existence of an order. It should be noted that 
for Evans, as for Austin less explicitly, interior intention has returned to 
“duplicate the play”142 and to appear, incorrectly, to determine and validate 
action. 
 
I know that my utterance has been successful, or felicitous, or happy, as an 
order because of the actions that follow, and I will only know that the order 
has been successful, and the order will only have been successful, if ‘the 
appropriate actions’ occur143. To say, ‘I ordered him, and the order was 
successful, but he didn’t obey’, only makes sense if the order was accepted by 
the society or in the context concerned, and if the disobedience leads to 
appropriate consequences144. An order or decree whose disobedience incurs 
no consequences is not an order at all, merely a ‘purported’ or ‘attempted’ 
order145. But this status is not absolute or unchanging146.  
                                                     
140 The Logic of Self-Involvement p71 
141 In discussing the existence of ‘happy-or-unhappy’ illocutionary verbs as identified by L J 
Cohen 
142 How To 2 p10 
143 That is to say, the actions I and others consider to be the appropriate response to ‘an order’. 
144 Courts martial or the like 
145 As the examples of James Blunt and Stanislav Petrov referred to in the previous chapter 
indicate: they ignored orders the issuing of which were subsequently ignored by the ordering 
hierarchy, with no further ostensible consequences. 
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Orders issued by the revolutionary Provisional Government in their tents in 
the wilderness, which go unnoticed, unreported, and ignored beyond their 
own forest clearing, may yet come to be enacted, and thus come to be 
recognised and take effect, when the revolutionary army sweeps into the 
capital on a wave of tanks and popular acclaim a few years down the line. 
Until that point, they have taken effect only in the area/s controlled by the 
rebels. They cannot then be called orders, except in the forest clearing, 
because they have not taken effect and are not being implemented, except in 
the forest clearing. 
 
It may be that the Provisional Government’s Decrees never get enacted 
beyond the forest clearing. It may also be that after the revolution, 
consequences are incurred for all those who ignored the decrees when they 
were first issued all those years before. All of this is possible. But the existence 
of decrees depends on the recognised and effective authority of the issuing 
authority, which inescapably includes the extent to which it obtains obedience 
and gets its decrees implemented. In the forest clearing, the Provisional 
Government’s decrees may aim at and claim national obedience, but they do 
not have it, and are thus not national decrees, though they may claim to be 
so147. When they are enforced retrospectively, they become national decrees at 
that point if they are effectively enforced and obeyed. But if the retrospective 
enforcement leads to a successful counter-revolution, the decrees, though 
‘legal’, cease to exist effectively at that point148.  
 
The ‘success of a decree’ includes its effect – its being obeyed – which is an 
inescapable part of its existence. Decrees that are lacking in some 
constitutional nicety, but which are nonetheless obeyed, are decrees far more 
securely than those Evans imagines, which are not null and void, and are thus 
in his view ‘proper decrees’, but which remain entirely ineffective. A ‘proper 
decree’ is one that has public recognition. Otherwise there is nothing to stop 
me issuing decrees governing national life from my sitting room. I can call 
these documents ‘decrees’, and affix them to as many lamp-post as I like, but 
they do not become decrees unless they acquire authority, any more than a 
‘language’ I have made up, and which is known only to me, can be called a 
language, unless it becomes learnt by others, and acquires ‘life’. 
                                                                                                                                                        
146 As Searle notes when he observes that “the secret of understanding the continued 
existence of institutional facts is simply that the individuals directly involved and a sufficient 
number of members of the relevant community must continue to recognize and accept the 
existence of such facts. ... The moment, for example that all or most of the members of a 
society refuse to acknowledge property rights, as in a revolution or other upheaval, property 
rights cease to exist in that society”: (London, Penguin Books, 1996) p117. 
147 Just as the government of Taiwan used to legislate for mainland China, and the Chinese 
Communist government likewise legislated for Taiwan. 
148 And even without a counter-revolution, the legality of such revolutionary decrees is a 
vexed issue, as it was in the English Civil War, and is in Egypt now: on what grounds can 
King Charles I, or Presidents Mubarak or Morsi, be tried, and according to what constitution? 
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Indeed, the scenario Evans imagines is, as Austin would say, ‘unhappy’, in 
that he is imagining the issuing of Royal Decrees in 1641 at the time of the 
dispute between Charles I and Parliament which lead to the English Civil 
War. In such situations, a whole variety of scenarios are possible. The decree 
of the King is presumably accepted as effective by his supporters. They 
believe it to be a decree, and they act accordingly, which is how we know they 
believe it to be a decree. If we were to ask them, they would say ‘it is a 
decree’, and they would seek to enforce it universally, on the whole country. 
 
The King’s opponents, by contrast, do not believe it to be a lawful decree. 
They believe the King is acting illegally or improperly, beyond the powers 
allowed him by God, or the laws of the land, or both. They ignore the decree, 
and seek to prevent it being enforced on themselves or others.  
 
There may be some (many?) who are uncertain, in such tense political times, 
about the legality and appropriateness of the decree. They do not know 
whether to obey the decree or not. They do so uncertainly, or half-heartedly, 
or not all, and wait to see what happens next, or who has the largest and most 
aggressive body of followers in close proximity to them. This illustrates the 
not uncommon situation of uncertainty, in which a decree has a kind of half-
life. It exists in parts of the country, and not in others, and its effectiveness 
varies.  
 
A situation, however, in which nobody obeys a decree, destroys the claim that 
a decree has been issued, or demonstrates that the issuing authority has lost 
all claim to authority at all in the area concerned. It stretches the term ‘takes 
effect’ beyond all ‘ordinary usage’ to suggest that for example the ‘Old 
Pretender’ James Francis Edward Stuart149 issued decrees that ‘took effect’ 
from his court in Rome after 1715. They may have been obeyed by his court of 
adherents in Rome, and in secret and in the hearts of his Jacobite followers in 
Britain, but they clearly did not ‘take effect’ in any meaningful way.  
 
If ‘taking effect’ “does not mean that certain legal or obedient actions did in 
fact take place”150 it is very hard indeed to imagine what it does mean; all of 
which illustrates the incoherence inherent in Evans’s attempt to distinguish 
between ‘causal power’ which takes effect, and ‘performative force’ which has 
‘intended results’, but where the results do not affect the existence and 
intention of the act151. 
 
                                                     
149 Son of James II, and known as James III to Jacobites and non-Jurors. 
150 The Logic of Self-Involvement p72 
151 Alston falls into the same confusion when he suggests that illocutionary acts have nothing 
to do with effects: W P Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (Ithaca NY, Cornell 
University Press, 2000) p23-24. 
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Evans also tries to distinguish the meaning of an utterance from the causal 
effects that may be intended, by divorcing meaning from the specific context 
of an utterance. He suggests that my intention to embarrass you by saying 
“we met at the Stork Club” is not part of the meaning of the utterance, merely 
part of my intention – what I meant, not what the utterance meant. The 
utterance “we met at the Stork Club” means simply that we met at that 
particular location: the influence or effects this utterance might have, which 
the audience need to understand, are (for Evans) distinct.  
 
In this, however, he is simply reducing meaning to sense and reference, and 
eliminating ‘force’, which is another word, effectively, for the contextual 
applicability, or actual meaning, of the utterance, in that particular context. It 
is assuming that the meaning of “we met at the Stork Club” is the same as one 
of its ‘dictionary meanings’, not the meaning it actually had when uttered. 
However, the meaning of that phrase when uttered will not exist until the 
utterance is spoken and recognised, and it may mean several different things 
at the same time.  
 
This is most helpfully illustrated by the very sentence Evans uses, with its 
reference to the Stork Club. Spoken in New York, or to a New Yorker, 
certainly when The Logic of Self-Involvement was published in 1963, the 
assumption would doubtless have been that the New York nightclub on East 
53rd Street was intended. This was apparently a well-known society venue 
until it closed in the mid 1960’s. It might not be immediately obvious why this 
was embarrassing, or intended to be so, though there are doubtless 
circumstances in which it could be152. Here, in this North American context, 
the meaning of the utterance relates to this location. 
 
I suspect, however, that this is not what Evans intends. In the context of his 
argument, it is likely that he intends to refer to the British Soho strip joint 
called the Stork Club which, certainly in the 1960’s, might well have been a 
more embarrassing venue in which to be seen153. But the possible confusion 
here, since both clubs have I believe long since closed, underlines the point 
that the meaning of this precise utterance depends very much on its particular 
context. In the one case it seems potentially much more embarrassing and 
controversial an assertion than in the other, where it might even be a 
compliment, suggesting that you move in such elevated circles. By contrast 
for me, reading Evans’s book for the first time in 2006, it was necessary to 
search on the internet to find out what the Stork Club might be: the phrase 
has long since lost any capacity to embarrass, in Britain or North America.  
 
Assuming for the moment that the strip club was the one to which Evans 
intended to refer, it is also quite possible to imagine, not merely that the 
                                                     
152 For an ardent prohibitionist, perhaps, or someone supposed to have been elsewhere at the 
time, or who was there committing adultery. 
153 Before they became a much more common sight on British high streets. 
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statement was intended to be embarrassing in 1963, but that this sentence in 
particular contexts could have meant many others things, and been intended 
to do so. Among this gamut of possibilities the context will determine which 
ones apply. Given the context of his argument, Evan’s assumes that such a 
statement can only be embarrassing, and can only be so intended. This is, 
however, not true.  
 
I can deliberately embarrass you by saying “we met at the Stork Club” – I can 
also accidentally embarrass you, and whether or not either happens is 
contextual. I can succeed or fail in my intention (so far as I know it myself): 
but my intention is not the same as the meaning of the phrase, which could 
mean various different things. It could mean, ‘I intend to embarrass you, 
and/or insult and damage you’; or it could mean rather something along the 
lines of ‘aren’t we both jack-the-lads’; or it could simply be a relatively 
‘neutral’ statement of past events. The results an utterance has constitute part 
or all of the meaning of the utterance, for an order as for an utterance meant 
to embarrass. The difference is in the context and cultural conventions in play. 
For example, the utterance here will have a different meaning, potentially, if 
said to a bishop, a stripper, or a gangster, and depending on your role and 
relation to the person addressed. 
 
As L J Cohen notes, and as I have already quoted him as suggesting,  
 
if it makes sense to discuss the meanings of English sentences, as grammarians, 
lexicographers and logicians often do, then it looks as though any individual 
utterance of ‘it is raining’ may be ascribed both a meaning, derived immediately 
from the meaning of the English sentence ‘it is raining’, and also an illocutionary 
force, depending on such variable factors as the intonation with which the 
sentence has been uttered. But on a stricter phonetic analysis here we have not 
just one sentence of spoken English, but at least two… The difference between a 
rising and a falling intonation has as much right to affect the classification of 
individual utterances into English sentences as has the difference of sound 
between ‘raining’ and ‘hailing’.154 
 
Cohen essentially here suggests that ‘the direct meaning’, which I refer to as 
the dictionary meaning/s, has no necessary bearing on the meaning as 
uttered and heard. This actual meaning of ‘it is raining’ will depend not 
merely on intonation, but on all sorts of other contextual factors too, such as: 
was the speaker planning to go out for a picnic; has he placed a bet on there 
being a dry day; has there been a five month drought; does he intend to frolic 
in the rain; has he been arguing about the likeliness of precipitation with a 
friend?155 
 
Likewise, in Evans’s example, to say ‘we met at the Stork Club’ is not 
necessarily embarrassing, although it may be, and it may or not be intended 
                                                     
154 ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 14:55 (1964) p126 
155 This list is not exhaustive!  
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to achieve that result, but what it does mean will depend on context and 
circumstances. The meaning such a phrase has, will depend on how it is 
taken, by the speaker, by the hearers, and by the person addressed. ‘How it is 
taken’ is not divorced from estimations and assumptions concerning the 
intention with which it was said, but neither is it directly analogous to those 
ideas. Evans goes astray, like Austin, by concentrating on meaning as 
determined by the speaker, rather than by correctly recognising meaning’s 
collaborative nature156. 
 
It is not possible to divorce causal and performative power on the lines Evans 
suggests, by trying to distinguish causal effects from meaning. Causal effects, 
or indeed, simply ‘effects’, can be distinguished from intention, in some 
circumstances, but both meaning and intention are determined by the effects 
the utterance has: these may not be unvarying or unanimous, but they will 
constitute the meaning of that phrase in those circumstances157, and what is 
linguistic and cultural will always be to a degree institutional and not merely 
‘brutishly causal’. Any act needs to be understood to exist, and this 
understanding is always an active response from a specific cultural and 
linguistic context: thus there is an element of conventionality about all acts, 
and the blanket performative/causal distinction must be questioned. 
 
4. The concept of the Perlocution in the work of Anthony Thiselton 
 
Unlike Evans, Thiselton recognises the nature of understanding as an active, 
‘institutional’ process158. However, in following Evans he still creates some 
                                                     
156 Which Seale is forced to acknowledge in The Construction of Social Reality (London, Penguin 
Books, 1996), when discussing ‘counting as’; “the entire argument of this chapter has 
produced a strange result. I am not entirely comfortable with it, but here it is. The move from 
X to Y [that X counts as Y] is already linguistic in nature because once the function is imposed 
on the X element, it now symbolises smoothing else, the Y function. This move can exist only 
if it is collectively represented as existing. The collective representation is public and 
conventional ...” p72.  Of course, this fatally undermines the illocutionary-perlocutionary 
distinction. 
157 As I discuss in more detail in the following chapters of the thesis. 
158 Thiselton on Hermeneutics: the collected works and new essays of Anthony Thiselton (Ashgate 
contemporary thinkers on Religion. Collected works), (Aldershot UK, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2006). p 26 – “Gadamer’s major point, like that of Wittgenstein, is that only as part of the very 
process of understanding can we tell in each case, and not in advance, what counts as an act or 
process of understanding.” I absolutely agree with this, and think that for Thiselton this poses 
immediately the problem of how in this case to conceive the illocution-perlocution 
distinction, and the uptake-understanding divergence. I should note here that it is not the 
illocution per se that is a problem: the illocution, as a contextually-created social act, as it 
were, is fine. But what is very problematic is the attempt to distinguish this from the 
perlocution, because to do so, unveils or reveals a whole load of distinctions that are very 
suspect. If the illocution and the perlocution must be distinguished, then the problems arise. 
And why must they be distinguished? In the end, simply because the assumption is that for 
illocutions meaning is begotten, and thus to an extent guaranteed before it is spoken.  
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problems for himself, exemplified when he suggests, in his essay ‘Authority 
and Hermeneutics: Some Proposals for a More Creative Agenda’159, that  
 
Jesus did not rely on mere causal power in language. Perlocutions operate by the 
causal power of psychology and rhetoric, and may readily be confused ... with 
the perlocutionary force of sheer assertiveness. This can degenerate into 
rhetorical wheedling or into verbal bullying, and stands a thousand miles away 
from the authority of Jesus. Illocutions depend on other factors, especially on the 
institutional role and authority of the speaker to perform the act. 
The words of Jesus become effective as valid and operative speech-acts because 
he is the anointed one, appointed as God’s elect to mediate divine forgiveness, 
divine judgment, divine commission. Divine promise, divinely authorized 
freedom and pledges of divine love. Thus when he says to the paralytic ‘Your 
sins are forgiven’ (Mk. 2:5; Lk 5:20; cf Mt 9:2), the speech-act operates with 
illocutionary force (i.e., in the saying of it, not merely by the saying of it), because 
Jesus is who he is.  Ahead of his time, Karl Barth was entirely correct to insist 
that speech of God is act, and act of God is speech, and that this is bound up 
with what linguistic theorists call institutional states of affairs but which Barth 
expounded in terms of divine decree, divine election and covenant promise.160 
 
There are a couple of difficulties here, in addition to the causal-institutional 
distinction Thiselton takes from Evans. One concerns the description of 
perlocutions, which seem here to be identified on the grounds of ethics as 
much as linguistics, and which are given a rather moral ‘flavour’, as though 
what primarily distinguished them was their immorality rather than any 
linguistic or conventional factors161.  
 
The other concerns the nature of Jesus’ ‘illocutionary’ authority. With regard 
to this last point, the first thing to note is that proving Jesus’ institutional 
authority, and therefore His ability to perform the illocutions Thiselton 
mentions rather than to blaspheme, is rather the point of the Gospels, and lies 
at the centre of His dispute with other areas of authority in Judaism, and in 
His social setting. Mark’s Gospel itself suggests that even for Jesus, His 
authority had to be recognised to be effective162. Christians say of Jesus ‘He is 
the Messiah; therefore He has authority to forgive sins’. But plenty of people 
who witnessed Jesus forgiving and healing thought to themselves ‘who is he 
                                                     
159 in P E Satterthwaite & D F Wright (eds.) A Pathway into the Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids 
MI, Eerdmans, 1994) pp 107-141. 
160 ‘Authority and Hermeneutics: Some Proposals for a More Creative Agenda’ op cit p132 
161 I note here Gadamer’s observation that “I find it frighteningly unreal when people like 
Habermas ascribe to rhetoric a compulsory quality that one must reject in favor of 
unconstrained, rational dialogue. This is to underestimate not only the danger of the glib 
manipulation and incapacitation of reason but also the possibility of coming to an 
understanding through persuasion, on which social life depends”: Truth and Method op cit 
p593.  
162 Mark 6:4-6 “And Jesus said to them, "A prophet is not without honour, except in his own 
country, and among his own kin, and in his own house." And he could do no mighty work 
there, except that he laid his hands upon a few sick people and healed them. And he 
marvelled because of their unbelief.” RSV 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Five: Uptake 
210 
to forgive sins?’ He was unable to perform those ‘illocutions’, precisely 
because to them He was not the Messiah163. 
 
We, reading as Christians, have already been persuaded that Jesus is the 
Messiah, and therefore for us He has the necessary institutional authority: He 
has the charism from God. This persuasion, which is a perlocutionary effect, is 
a function of and an intention of the Gospels. But, as with the textual criticism 
and the question of self-involvement we discussed in a previous chapter, this 
response is a question of the kind of readers we are, and the kind of reading 
we are engaged in.  
 
Similarly, in discussing Luke’s Christology in his Gospel, Thiselton asserts 
that Luke (and Jesus) shun “explicit rhetoric urging Christological claims”164 
because “the performing of acts on the basis of causal force constitutes in 
essence an act of power through self-assertion”165, relying rather on 
“illocutionary acts which rest on institutional roles [which] serve their 
purpose as acts which point by implication away from the self to some source of 
authority which lies beyond the self alone”166.  
 
However, the point about the majority of the acts that Jesus does is that they 
presume institutional authority, and are only effectively performed if that is 
present. If Jesus is not the Messiah, or sent from God, He has no authority to 
forgive sins167, and His healings are performed by demonic rather than Divine 
institutional forces and authority. Therefore, His performance of that act is in 
itself a claim to an identity and an institutional role. The performance of 
Messianic acts is an act with the ‘perlocutionary’ aim of persuading the 
onlookers that He is the one in whom they should have faith, and the 
recounting of those stories is likewise a perlocutionary, persuasive 
                                                     
163 Mark 3:21-22 “And when his family heard it, they went out to seize him, for people were 
saying, "He is beside himself." And the scribes who came down from Jerusalem said, "He is 
possessed by Be-el'zebul, and by the prince of demons he casts out the demons." RSV 
164 ‘Christology in Luke, Speech-Act Theory, and the Problem of Dualism in Christology after 
Kant’ in J B Green and M Turner (eds.) Jesus of Nazareth: Lord and Christ. Essays on the Historical 
Jesus and New Testament Christology (Grand Rapids MI, William B Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1994) p462. 
165 ‘Christology in Luke’ op cit p463.  
166 ‘Christology in Luke’ op cit p463. 
167 Luke 5:20-26: “And when he saw their faith he said, "Man, your sins are forgiven you." 
And the scribes and the Pharisees began to question, saying, "Who is this that speaks 
blasphemies? Who can forgive sins but God only?" When Jesus perceived their questionings, 
he answered them, "Why do you question in your hearts? Which is easier, to say, 'Your sins 
are forgiven you,' or to say, 'Rise and walk'? But that you may know that the Son of man has 
authority on earth to forgive sins” he said to the man who was paralyzed “I say to you, rise, 
take up your bed and go home." And immediately he rose before them, and took up that on 
which he lay, and went home, glorifying God. And amazement seized them all, and they 
glorified God and were filled with awe, saying, "We have seen strange things today." RSV 
See also Luke 7:48-50: And he said to her, "Your sins are forgiven." Then those who were at 
table with him began to say among themselves, "Who is this, who even forgives sins?" And he 
said to the woman, "Your faith has saved you; go in peace." RSV 
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(Evangelistic) one. Thus, Jesus is performing a perlocutionary act, albeit a 
non-linguistic one, which is indeed intended to drawn attention to Himself, 
and to Him who sent Him, together. 
 
Jesus often appears reluctant to state His identity plainly, or have others do 
so, for reasons we can speculate upon, but these do not I suggest include a 
belief that the use of causal language is ‘immoral’, but rather because He can 
be more persuasive in Himself. He is trying to show people the Kingdom, not 
merely describe it. If saying does not serve Jesus’ purposes, this is not because 
of something specific to the nature of linguistic perlocutions, but because in 
Jesus’ particular context, testifying to Himself verbally won’t work: after all, 
even His illocutionary speech acts, or institutionally-authorised ones, if you 
prefer that description (as I do!), are not evidence for those who do not 
already believe. They could only be evidence for who Jesus (or Luke) thinks 
He is. 
 
It also is not clear why Thiselton thinks that a perlocutionary act relies on an 
act of power, as opposed to an act that is institutional, given that perlocutions 
are context-dependent. For Jesus the point is that He could, presumably, have 
stood up and said plainly “I am the Messiah”168. Equally, He could have 
demonstrated His identity plainly by acts of power169. But the miracle of, for 
example, turning stones into bread, would hardly have been a perlocution, 
though it surely would have constituted an act of causal power, and would 
doubtless have been highly persuasive170.  
 
Alternatively Jesus, as He does in John’s Gospel, can spend a long time 
engaging in a perlocutionary discussion about being the bread of life171, 
presumably trying to persuade, but equally knowing that some will turn 
away because it is a hard saying, and only those whom God calls will come. 
This perlocutionary, rhetorical Jesus is hardly engaging in an act of power, 
particularly compared with the preceding miracle of the loaves, though He is 
asserting things about Himself (such as that He is the bread of life) which 
                                                     
168 which in some ways He did in the synagogue at Nazareth: Luke 4:16-21 RSV: “And he 
came to Nazareth, where he had been brought up; and he went to the synagogue, as his 
custom was, on the sabbath day. And he stood up to read; and there was given to him the 
book of the prophet Isaiah. He opened the book and found the place where it was written,  
"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the 
poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, 
to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord." And he 
closed the book, and gave it back to the attendant, and sat down; and the eyes of all in the 
synagogue were fixed on him. And he began to say to them, "Today this scripture has been 
fulfilled in your hearing."  
And the Father more or less makes a causal act of power when at Jesus’ baptism the heavens 
open and He declares “thou art my son ...”. 
169 This is what the temptations in the wilderness represent, according to some scholars. 
170 As would a resurrection appearance in the middle of Pilate’s tribunal or the Sanhedrin.  
171 John 6:25-71 
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others simply cannot believe or accept. So Thiselton’s illocutionary-
perlocutionary, causal-institutional distinction seems unclear.  
 
This is not to say that I disagree with Thiselton’s conclusions about Jesus, or 
Christology in general, merely that I disagree with his use here of the 
categories of speech-act theory, and don’t think they are helpful – indeed, I 
think that they lead to misunderstanding172, since all of the things that 
Thiselton asserts about what Luke is doing ‘Christologically’ in pages 467-8 of 
his article, which may well be correct, amount really to saying simply that 
Luke is seeking to persuade us of these things, which is of course a 
perlocutionary action.  
 
The Gospel of Luke has, if one wishes to use these terms, prima facie 
perlocutionary force, since it was written to persuade that Jesus is the Christ, 
and has participated in doing so many times. It does this in various ways, 
including by showing how Jesus Himself did all sorts of things that only the 
Messiah had the authority to do, or could do. To suggest that Jesus performs 
actions in the Gospel of Luke, that only the Messiah could do, seems highly 
plausible. Further, to suggest that we in reading are meant to grasp this 
implied status and role, is equally likely. But therefore it seems inescapable 
that Luke the author is trying actively to persuade us that Jesus is the 
Messiah.  
 
Thus, in depicting Jesus performing various acts such as forgiving, exorcising, 
etc, which we might want to bracket together as socially-constrained actions 
called illocutions, Luke is performing a larger persuasive act, which we 
should then call a perlocution, although this too is an action reliant on various 
social conventions such as language, writing, narrative, the authorial voice, 
etc, as discussed in chapter three of this thesis.  
 
Thiselton refers to Evans for the distinction between “institutional authority 
and causal force”, and outlines the distinction between illocutions and 
perlocutions as constituting the difference between the “illocutionary force” of 
actions assuming an “institutional state of affairs” and the “perlocutionary 
force” of causal persuasion such as rhetoric173. However, the difference 
between the two sorts of act in the examples that Thiselton cites, lies not in 
language but in context and society.  
 
There clearly is a distinction between the verdict of a court backed up by 
institutional and social opinion174, and a barrister’s argument, seeking to 
persuade175. But the distinction is one of role, not of linguistic usage, or 
‘rhetoric’. A judge could use, in pronouncing judgement, the most rhetorically 
                                                     
172 In addition, I don’t really see why he thinks they are illuminating. 
173 ‘Christology in Luke’ op cit p462 
174 Which Thiselton notes has “illocutionary force” ‘Christology in Luke’ op cit p462 
175 Which has “perlocutionary force” if it “was sufficiently persuasive” op cit p462. 
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persuasive of language, because no judgement is given in isolation: every 
judgement has an element of persuasiveness about it, to explain why the 
judge is passing the sentence or coming to the decision that they are, with a 
view to higher courts and the possibility of appeal; the judge’s career; the 
newspapers; and legal precedents.  
 
Likewise, a barrister could be as perfunctory or plain-speaking as they like; 
their job is to present arguments on their client’s behalf, and expose the 
weaknesses in opposing positions. It is not the language that distinguishes, 
but the stance we have towards the speaker. The judge may well seek to be 
persuasive in his language and intention; indeed he may persuade his hearers 
of many things, including his own correct decision and wisdom. His ability to 
declare a verdict depends on, and is circumscribed by, his social role, as is the 
barrister’s: the judge couldn’t sentence to death (in this country), and the 
barrister can’t, while acting as counsel, also give judgement. 
 
What makes the difference between an illocution and a perlocution here is the 
role the speakers are playing, and the social authority they have. When a 
judge says “He is clearly guilty”, this phrase is likely in most cases to have a 
different meaning than the same phrase uttered by a barrister – but for 
example it won’t necessarily if the judge is summing up to a jury and says to 
them, ‘if on the basis of the evidence you find that so-and-so occurred, then he 
is clearly guilty. However, you may find etc ...’. In this case the distinction is 
all about context. 
 
Thiselton, here, I think, makes the same mistake that many of the critics who 
see illocutionary effects in texts make, which is that they are looking for the 
cause of things they notice, at ‘the wrong end’ of the encounter. In both cases, 
what makes a text effective or self-involving, and what makes an act 
institutionally directive rather than simply a rhetorically persuasive 
perlocution, is the social context we recognise, not any inherent virtue of the 
language or text. Thiselton’s use of the language of ‘causal’ and ‘performative 
or institutional’  merely helps obscure the fact that the difference between 
them lies in social role and how we accordingly take what is said, and 
therefore makes it more plausible to look elsewhere. Thus it also enables 
Thiselton ignore the consequentiality of illocutions: that they do not exist in 
isolation, without being recognised176. 
                                                     
176 In fact, I think Thiselton is as confused about the relationship between effects and 
illocutions as Evans is, at least in his early work Language Liturgy and Meaning. Grove Liturgical 
Study no. 2 (Bramcote, Grove Books, 1975). Here, he suggests (pages 18-19) that “it is 
important to note that exercitives do not do things simply by causal force. ... a government 
decree may actually make certain actions legal or illegal. When such a decree is said to ‘take 
effect’, this does not depend on whether a given number of men actually change this attitude 
towards the actions in question, but only on whether the decree is null or properly enacted. In 
this sense, it is not the physical act of uttering a warning, or a pardon, or the baptism formula 
that actually ‘does’ anything, but the status of the pronouncement within the whole 
framework of pre-supposition, status, authority, and propriety on which the utterance 
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5. The concept of Uptake in Richard Briggs’s Words in Action.  
 
The concept of uptake which emerges from Austin and which underpins the 
idea of the illocution has been thoroughly explored in the preceding sections, 
and demonstrated to be inadequate. This again demonstrates that the sender 
view of meaning itself is untenable, with serious implications for non-
participatory views of revelation. However, before this suggestion can be 
developed, it is necessary to consider the work of Richard Briggs, who 
develops the idea of uptake, using the work of Jennifer Hornsby. 
 
Richard Briggs recognizes problems with Austin to a greater extent than do 
Ward and Vanhoozer. Briggs notes that Austin’s suggestion that 
conventionality is a distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts 
is “inconclusive or equivocal”177, and he rejects the idea that illocutions are 
uniquely conventional. However, in rejecting this problematic notion in the 
interests of clarifying the distinction between performatives, conventions, and 
illocutions, Briggs removes a crucial basis of the distinction between 
illocutions and perlocutions.  
 
The conventional basis of illocutions in How To is more important than Briggs 
allows. Without it, there is no distinction between illocutions and other 
speech acts since all acts using speech could be included on a spectrum 
ranging from external and physical conventions such as ceremonies and 
rituals, to linguistic conventions, all of which are located in a cultural-
conventional context. This accordingly seems to make the illocutionary 
category meaningless. 
 
Briggs would disagree with this assertion. The basis upon which he would do 
so is made clear when he discusses the work of Jennifer Hornsby178. He notes 
that Hornsby suggests that  
 
an illocutionary act is one which is successfully performed regardless of what 
response it evokes. It can, in this sense, be considered independently of any 
response. The only refinement to this basic idea required to make it work is to 
accept that the act must be performed in a context where it is understood. For this 
she uses the notion of reciprocity,179  
 
which requires that people “recognize” speech “as it is meant to be taken”180. 
Briggs notes that “beyond this, an illocutionary act is effective regardless of 
                                                                                                                                                        
depends for its performative force.” However, as I have argued in respect of Evans, 
understanding is an effect, and a decree that does not take effect is not a decree, but 
something debatable.  
177 Words in Action p42 
178 Jennifer Hornsby: ‘Illocution and its Significance’ in Tsohatzidis (ed.) Foundations of Speech 
Act Theory p187-207 
179 Words in Action p66 
180 Hornsby: ‘Illocution and its Significance’ op cit p192, quoted in Words in Action p66. 
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response. In contrast, perlocutionary acts require more than just reciprocity to 
have their proper consequences”181. The argument here is very reminiscent of 
Austin’s suggestion that illocutions do not have effects but only require 
“uptake”182, while it has rejected the unique conventional basis of illocutions 
that supposedly makes this possible.  
 
Further, there is no coherent way of divorcing a response to an act from 
‘being in the state of understanding’ the act. Whether one calls it 
‘understanding the act’, or ‘reciprocating the act’, or ‘recognizing the act’, it is 
nonetheless a response to an utterance or initiative which is necessary to that 
utterance’s or initiative’s becoming the act we recognize. Hornsby and Briggs 
imply that all that is required for illocutions to be recognised, is that speaker 
and listeners be ‘correctly aligned’, in the ‘right relationship’ to each other. 
This, however, is true for any act.  
 
Misunderstanding arises because the speaker (or author) and hearer (or 
reader or target) disagree, to some varying extent, about the meaning of any 
particular utterance. The further apart their assumptions about their 
communicatory context, the greater or more serious the divergence of view as 
to the meaning of the specific utterance. For any utterance to be understood 
on an agreed basis by all concerned, the participants must all be ‘correctly 
aligned’ with each other, and in the ‘right relationship’, aware of such things 
as personal intonation and sense of humour. Unless illocutions can provide a 
unique guarantee that there will be ‘correct alignment’ or a ‘right 
relationship’, the category is meaningless and useless. 
 
The crucial distinction that comes into view clearly here is between viewing 
understanding as simply the passive acceptance of something as ‘that which it 
already is’183; or as an act of recognition, or perhaps better an act of 
                                                     
181 Words in Action p67 
182 How To p116 
183 As Lähteenmäki remarks, for this kind of model “the task of the listener consists in 
mechanically decoding the message and in finding out the idea or thought represented by the 
given linguistic form produced by the speaker ...  Speaking is seen as an active process, 
whereas perception and comprehension are regarded as passive and automatic in nature ... 
the understanding of an utterance is considered basically as mechanical decoding of 
message” M Lähteenmäki, ‘On Meaning and Understanding: A Dialogical Approach’, 
Dialogism 1 (1998) p77. An example of precisely this view is Nicholas Wolterstorff, who 
suggests the following about discourse: “Typically, there’s something that the discourser 
wants to say, some speech action he wants to perform; his desire to do that may or may not 
be motivated by the desire to express some inner state. To perform that speech action, he has 
to causally bring about ... some action which will count-generate that speech action ... If all 
goes well on both sides, the interpreter, in discerning what counts as what, will perforce 
discern the content of that implemented action plan; and typically the sequence of her 
discernment will reverse the sequence of its formation” Divine Discourse op cit p183. Aside 
from any quarrel with the mechanistic model of discourse Wolterstorff here adopts, his use of 
the words “perforce” and “typically” is also noteworthy. See also his description of 
understanding on p198.  
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realization, which involves an active participation in creating ‘the something’ 
in the first place. Hornsby and Briggs both clearly take the first view of 
understanding, predicated on the sender view of meaning, and it is this which 
allows them to distinguish understanding from anything ‘responsive’, since it 
is so ‘uninvolved’, uninvolving, and ‘flat’. They reveal again the dependence 
of the illocution on this particular ‘uptakeable’ concept of understanding184.  
 
Uptaking is ‘simply’ a matter of observing something that already exists in 
completeness: it is just a question of acknowledging that, as Briggs puts it 
(adopting Searle), ‘x counts as y in context c’185. This formula is, however, 
incorrect or inadequate. If it should be read as ‘x necessarily counts as y in 
context c’ rather than as ‘x may be counted as …’, ‘x is likely to be counted as 
…’, or ‘x is generally counted as …’, then it is a proscriptive utterance which 
circumstances can always disprove. It does not describe real dialogic 
utterances as they exist in practice and thus it is either falsely prescriptive or 
simply a description of a particular act that has just taken place186.  
                                                     
184 One that I don’t think is shared by Thiselton – see for example ‘The Use of philosophical 
Categories in New Testament Hermeneutics’, The Churchman 87:2 (1973) p93. 
185 Words in Action p58, quoting Searle, Speech Acts op cit p36. 
186 Indeed, it appears that Searle and Briggs may have misunderstood G E M Anscombe here. 
They both suggest that in her article ‘On Brute Facts’, Analysis 18 (1958) 69-72, Anscombe 
distinguishes between brute and non-brutish facts. This seems by no means certain, rather 
Anscombe seems to me to be suggesting that the same fact can be more or less ‘brutish’ 
depending on what one is doing with it: “as compared with supplying me with a quarter of 
potatoes we might call carting a quarter of potatoes to my house and leaving them there a 
“brute fact”. But as compared with the fact that I owe the grocer such-and-such a sum of 
money, that he supplied me with a quarter of potatoes is itself a brute fact. In relation to 
many descriptions of events or states of affairs, which are asserted to hold, we can ask what 
the “brute facts” were; and this will mean the facts which held, and in virtue of which, in a 
proper context, such-and-such a description is true or false, and which are more “brute” than 
the alleged fact”: thus brutishness in facts depends on exactly what question is being asked – 
it is not a quality that sits in opposition to ‘institutional’ or some other such class, but is a 
relational, and indeterminate one. Facts are ‘brutish’ depending on their relationships to other 
descriptions and events, and only in certain specific contexts: in different contexts, facts 
become less ‘brutish’ and more uncertain: thus brute facts may very well also be what Searle 
would call ‘institutional’, that is to say, dependent for their existence on “institutions as 
background” (Anscombe p69). As she later observes, the institution or context which 
presupposes a description of a state of affairs called A “may or may not be presupposed to 
elements in the descriptions xyz”, where xyz are “facts which are brute in relation to A” – p72. 
Fish makes this same point in his article ‘How to do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech 
Act Theory and Literary Criticism’, MLN 91:5 (October 1976) 983-1025), where he observes 
that “the facts Searle would cite as “brute”, the facts stipulated by the standard story, are also 
institutional, and ... the power of the Law to declare a man and woman husband and wife is 
on a par with the (institutional) power of the standard story to declare that Richard Nixon 
exists”: p1020. This is further exemplified by Searle himself, unwittingly: in The Construction 
of Social Reality, (Penguin Books, London, 1996 p27) he notes that while “brute facts require 
the institution of language in order that we can state the facts”, the facts themselves, such as 
that “the sun is ninety-three million miles from the earth”, “exist quite independently of 
language or any other human institution”. But surely, a “mile” is an institutional, not a brute, 
descriptor, and the measurement of space implied by “mile” is an institutionally-effective 
one? Later on in the same work Searle notes that the “original distinction between brute and 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Five: Uptake 
217 
 
It is certainly not the case that language has a kind of ontological primacy, so 
that any word or utterance could be thought of as inexorably and inextricably 
related to a state of affairs. The sentence ‘I order you to stop’ has no 
acontextual absoluteness, no profound linguistic permanence. But equally, in 
customary usage we do not count things as other things; we do not ‘think 
about’ the meaning of utterances, unless we are in doubt as to what they 
might be. In general we do not say ‘I am counting this as an order’; we simply 
react, either by obeying, or by mutiny, or whatever187. It requires no conscious 
decision to ‘take’ language before it ‘exists’ or ‘works’. Our act of recognition 
is not, therefore, separate from the act we recognize, nor is it necessarily 
consciously reflective or consciously undertaken188. Our act of recognition, in 
concert with the related acts of others, makes an initiative into an act, and a 
single initiative can of course be recognized as more than one sort of act: as an 
act of liberation or act of terrorism, for example. 
 
If, however, someone says ‘why did you do that?’, then we would say, 
‘because it was an order’, or perhaps, ‘because I took it as an order’189. 
However, we can say this only with hindsight, because at the time, it was our 
‘taking it as’ an order that made it an order, and our taking it as an order was 
not necessarily a conscious activity; we did not ‘take it as’, but we simply 
recognized it, or heard it. There is then a certain sense of preconscious 
participation in the enactment of the utterance as part of our dialogue, a sense 
which is also held by the speaker, and which has therefore affected the act of 
speaking itself190.  
                                                                                                                                                        
institutional facts has now been transcended” (p121-122), which again suggests a degree of 
uncertainty here, although the point that he is seeking to make about the ‘reality’ of collective 
or institutional facts is one I entirely accept, though as I will argue in chapter seven, I think 
there are better ways of understanding the phenomenon. 
187 Sometimes, of course, our assumed certainty is misleading, and then, if we become aware 
of this, we have to stop and think, but as Wittgenstein observes, “one doesn’t ‘take’ what one 
knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery; any more than one ordinarily tries to move one’s 
mouth as one eats, or aims at moving it.” Phil Inv IIxi p195.   
188 See Wittgenstein again: “Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. – 
For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what 
kind of circumstances, do we say, “Now I know how to go on.” … for us it is the circumstances 
under which he had such an experience that justify him in saying in such a case that he 
understands, that he knows how to go on.” Phil Inv I §154-155 p61. 
189 Although this latter is less likely unless we are thinking ‘philosophically’ or are defending 
ourselves in a position of some doubt. 
190 I echo here Wittgenstein’s assertion that a rule is “a matter of course. As much as it is a 
matter of course for me to call this colour “blue”. ... “Red” means the colour that occurs to me 
when I hear the word “red” – would be a definition. Not an explanation of what it is to use a 
word as a name”.  §238-239. This is the point also made by Mika Lähteenmäki ‘On rules and 
rule-following: obeying rules blindly’, Language and Communication 23 (2003) where he quotes 
Wittgenstein noting “’How am I able to obey a rule?’ ... if I have exhausted the justifications I 
have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘this is simply what 
I do’” §217, and notes that “Wittgenstein came to realise that knowing a rule cannot be 
identified with having a correct mental representation of rule ... He rejects the idea of rules as 
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Therefore the uptake of an illocution is a secondary response; a neutral 
acceptance of something as ‘that which it is’, but in which the identification of 
‘what it is’ has already been made. Uptake is thus the act of understanding 
that which has already been recognized or realized. However, this definition of 
understanding as creative of and participatory in meaning is not open to 
Briggs, since he and Hornsby agree that, “the speaker relies only on a certain 
responsiveness on her audience’s part for her utterance to work for her as 
illocutionarily meant: the audience takes her to have done what she meant to. 
… When reciprocity obtains between people, they are such as to recognize 
one another’s speech as it is meant to be taken,”191 a condition that clearly 
presupposes meaning as having a pre-utterance existence.  
 
Indeed, when Hornsby writes “so what a person relies on to tell A something 
is A’s being open to the idea that she might be telling him what she in fact 
means to tell him: unless A can readily entertain the idea that she might be 
doing this, A could hardly take her to be doing it”192 she illustrates precisely 
the difficulty; there must be an act of recognition before there can be anything 
to hear. The condition of “being open to the idea that” is already a realization 
of “the idea that” – if no-one is open to “the idea that”, then it will not be 
possible to successfully express it193. Briggs also refers to “a context”194 in 
which the act can be understood. Again, this is a clear undercutting of the 
idea that meaning is brought in by the response-neutral illocutionary act.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
formula-like reified objects and conceives of them as routine-like skills to act in a normatively 
correct way in various types of situations. For him, “obeying a rule” is a practice. 
Wittgenstein holds that rules do not exist independently of action and to know a rule 
amounts to mastering a technique”. Lähteenmäki suggests the “idea of rule as praxis” (55) 
and that it is “the existing practices, customs and institutions that constitute the last court of 
appeal for our judgements concerning the normativeness of this or that behaviour” (56) 
though I note that where Wittgenstein is gardening, Lähteenmäki is, as I have noted for so 
many other hermeneuts, in a courtroom. Lähteenmäki acknowledges though that rules are 
learnt, and that they “are not external to the behaviour nor do they cause the behaviour from 
outside” (56). As Lähteenmäki remarks, “actual meanings [of utterances] are emergent in their 
nature” op cit p77. I think that Searle’s suggestion in The Construction of Social Reality 
(London, Penguin Books, 1996), that the ‘x element’ is potentially a brute one, while the ‘y 
element’ is entirely linguistic and institutional (p68) is another recognition of this. 
191 Hornsby: ‘Illocution and its Significance’ p192, passage referred to in Words in Action p66. 
192 Hornsby; ‘Illocution and its Significance’ p193 
193 Hornsby’s acknowledged omission of ‘attempt’ from the clause ‘attempt to take her to’ is 
equally significant - see Hornsby; ‘Illocution and its Significance’, p205 footnote 14. There are 
strong similarities here with Wolterstorff, who notes that “so that one’s uttering of a sentence 
may count as one’s making a request, it is not necessary that one and one’s fellows actually 
count it as that; ... The relation is that speaker and audience ought to count it as that – ought to 
acknowledge it as that in their relations with each other.” (Divine Discourse op cit p84) This 
concept of “normative ascription” is one that is clearly ethical, but is also self-contradictory in 
that clearly someone is counting it ‘correctly’ and recognising your ‘proper’ ‘normative 
standing’, otherwise  - surely - you are simply delusional?   
194 Words in Action p66 
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Referring to a prosecution for rape in which the defence Counsel successfully 
alleged that the prior conduct of the victim contributed to the assault, so that 
her refusal of consent was thereby diminished in its force, Hornsby observes 
that “just as it is more or less automatic that an attempt at an illocutionary act 
is fully successful when certain socially defined conditions obtain; so, when 
certain conditions do not obtain, there cannot be a fully successful 
performance.”195 Or, as Briggs suggests in a précis; “social conditions 
determine which illocutionary acts may be possible”196. This, however, 
underlines again the observation that reciprocity is a response requiring a 
pre-existing context, and is itself only detectable on the grounds of responses. 
In Hornsby’s example the woman’s saying ‘No’ was not an ‘illocutionary’ act 
of refusing consent to sex as Austin would have defined such an act, because 
the perpetrator of the assault did not respond as she apparently intended and, 
crucially, in the opinion of a Judge (and Jury?) her ‘no’ was in various respects 
flawed and thus ‘inoperative’ (an assertion we can make on the basis that they 
apparently found the accused ‘not guilty’197).  
 
Here, the response of the accused man, and the Judge and Jury, and 
commentators in the news media, was such as to recognize the woman’s ‘No’ 
as one of a variety of other acts, on a spectrum ranging from ‘the cry of a 
victim of patriarchy’ to ‘the complaint of someone seeking to deny her 
responsibility for her own choices’198. Her act was understood as, and thus 
became, an entirely different thing in different contexts.  
 
For the woman’s ‘No’ to have been effective as a refusal, or to have been 
accorded the status of a refusal, it would have to have been understood as 
such by her attacker, or at the least by the Court system representing, albeit 
imperfectly, a ‘social consensus’. We can assert that it was not understood as a 
refusal, and was not therefore effective as a refusal, because of the responses 
that it in fact achieved, in particular from those entrusted with judging 
whether or not it was a refusal, and thus whether or not the accused was a 
rapist199.  
 
Of course, had the case gone to Appeal, and had the judgement been 
overturned, then the understanding of the act, and thus its identity, would 
have changed. Indeed, when the history of this and other related events is 
                                                     
195 Hornsby, ‘Illocution and its Significance’ p198 
196 Words in Action p67 
197 Once again, we return to the image of ‘judgement’. 
198 Both of which précised opinions have been aired on cases like Hornsby’s example, by 
newspaper columnists. 
199 Who in Austin’s phrase “should to be able to decide, by hearing .., what locutionary and 
illocutionary acts were performed”: How To p121. The Tony Martin case, where a farmer lay 
in wait for and shot a burglar, is another example of competing recognitions of one event; 
there was dispute over the act he performed; premeditated murder or shooting in self-
defence (indeed, he might be said to have performed some other act, which our current legal 
categories do not allow us to adequately describe). 
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created in subsequent generations, the woman’s ‘No’ may well be seen as 
something different again, and as illustrative of unreconstructed twentieth-
century prejudices200; evidence perhaps of what our descendants consider to 
have been our inability to hear women properly, when they ‘sit in judgement’ 
upon us.  
 
That the Judge and Jury’s understanding is ‘unwaveringly correct’ is not 
something I intend to assert. The point being made is simply that ‘illocutions’ 
as Hornsby imagines them are not cast-iron, and cannot exist unless they are 
recognized, and thus that the category is meaningless. The recognition of 
something as ‘an illocution’ or as any act depends on the context of the 
speaker and hearers. Hornsby herself clearly recognizes the woman’s ‘No’ as 
constituting a refusal, but equally clearly others have and do not. People in 
different contexts recognize something differently.  
 
This example illustrates clearly one of the assumptions underlying the sender 
view of meaning: that everyone else shares ones own context and knowledge 
or, at the very least, ought to share them. Hornsby here starts from a position 
of knowledge: she believes that she knows exactly what the woman meant. 
This knowledge is presumably based not on an intimate knowledge of the 
woman who was assaulted, or of the events of the assault, but on Hornsby’s 
own context: she knows that ‘no always means no’201.  
 
Interestingly enough, Hornsby and I entirely agree that social conditions can 
make some things impossible to say, or perhaps to be heard. We might agree, 
also, on the moral implications of this, and on the contribution of 
pornography to the “silencing”202 of some groups. However, we entirely 
disagree on whether or not such a ‘not-heard utterance’ could be an illocution. 
Hornsby asserts that it can, on the basis of her own estimation and knowledge 
of the sincerity of the woman speaking203. She thus reverts, quite explicitly, to 
an interior view of intention, and assumes an interesting but here unexplored 
correlation between illocutions and morality204.  
 
Hornsby recognizes the sincerity of the speaker by according to herself the 
authorial (and almost divine) privilege of knowing how things ought to be 
taken, and of thus being able to assert whether they have been taken correctly 
or not, (possibly without having been at either the scene of the assault or the 
                                                     
200 Much as we regard, for example, witchcraft trials. 
201 And assumes that this is a descriptive statement, rather than a prescriptive, morally active 
one: in fact what is usually being asserted is that “no ought always to be taken to mean no”.  
202 Hornsby, ‘Illocution and its Significance’ p199 
203 Hornsby, ‘Illocution and its Significance’ p199 
204 Like E D Hirsch. See also J M E Moravcsik, ‘Introduction’ in J Dancy, J M E Moravcsik & C 
C W Taylor (eds.) Human Agency: Language, Duty and Value. Philosophical Essays in Honor of J O 
Urmson (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 1988) p3: “to ascribe knowledge and 
competence to someone is to make normative claims that are very similar to the ones we 
encounter in ethics”. 
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Court). She makes a moral judgement, with which a number of people then 
and subsequently would agree, but this is in no sense illocutionary; as she is 
aware, a number of people in the same culture did not recognize, and 
moreover to use Austin’s phrase, ‘did not have to’205 recognize, the woman’s 
‘No’ as a refusal of consent. 
 
Indeed, the Judge and Jury are quite explicitly required to understand the 
events of the assault in a quite different context from Hornsby’s own: where 
she knows what happened, they are required to try and decide, on the basis of 
what they hear in a law court, what they think happened. A juror who began 
the trial already convinced as to the facts of the case would probably be 
debarred on those very grounds. Hornsby’s hermeneutic context is 
interestingly reminiscent of the difference between a believer’s reading of 
Scripture and a non-believer’s reading: if we ‘know’ Jesus is God, that is part 
of the context, but if we are using the text to determine whether or not Jesus is 
God, it isn’t206. 
 
The whole thrust of Hornsby’s argument is based on her recognition of the 
meaning of the woman’s ‘No’ as a refusal, a judgement which may well be 
morally correct, but which is not absolute or objective. Rather, Hornsby’s 
‘recognition’ is an example of the real responsiveness and activity of being an 
‘uptaker’207, and of the necessity of being in the appropriate sort of context or 
relationship. Being in the right relationship208 is a circular process affecting 
the understanding of the meaning of the utterance. Recognizing speech “as it 
is meant to be taken” is not an act of the sort that can be performed 
irrespective of the context of the hearer and of the response it evokes. To 
claim that it is, is to have pre-judged what has been said from a preconceived 
context, a description in fact of the hermeneutic position consistently adopted 
                                                     
205 How To p33 
206 I am grateful to Professor Hugh Pyper for this observation.  
In his discussion of this example in Hornsby, J W Adams exemplifies the same problem. He 
suggests that “regardless of the response a particular utterance produces, only the proper 
linguistic conventions operating within reciprocity constitute the necessary factor for the 
performance of a successful illocutionary act” while at the same time noting in a footnote (fn 
132) Hornsby’s suggestion that “the judge’s interpretation of the woman’s “No” as “Yes” 
demonstrates that to “do a perfect illocutionary act of refusing, an utterance of the word ‘no’ 
is not enough ... a condition of her having fully successfully refused [is] that she be 
recognized as attempting to refuse” J W Adams, The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 
40-55. Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 448 (New York, T&T Clark, 2006) p42. 
Here, for Adams, the judge is performing a perlocution that invalidates an illocution, though 
it should also be noted that there is something unsatisfactory in suggesting that to ‘do a 
perfect illocutionary act of refusing, a condition is that she be recognized as attempting to 
refuse’: surely to do a perfect act of refusing requires a recognition of more than an attempt – 
it requires as an outcome either or both of the following results: that the other party accepts 
the refusal, and/or that society ‘endorses’ the refusal. 
207 And the responsibility which is involved. 
208 Being righteous, since righteousness is being in a right relationship with God 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Five: Uptake 
222 
by Briggs, Ward and Vanhoozer209. It must also be noted that both Briggs and 
Hornsby refer to illocutions as having been “successfully performed” or as 
‘working as illocutionarily meant’. This is language that is a good deal more 
definite than Austin’s initial talk of ‘felicity’, which is designed precisely to 
skirt around the question of the precise moment at which a performative 
becomes happy210. 
 
Thus I agree with Briggs that a speech-act211 is successfully performed if its 
non-linguistic conventions are in place, since one of the conventions must be 
that people recognize and understand the act. However, I do not believe that 
any speech-act can be said to have been “successfully performed regardless of 
the response it provokes”212, nor that it makes any sort of sense to assert both 
this and that such an act still requires “mutual understanding of the 
utterance”213 in order for it to be achieved. A response (of recognition and 
understanding of the act as the act that it therefore is) will have been 
achieved, if the act has become “felicitous”, and this will only be detectable by 
the response of hearers, the speaker and others; it is by response that we 
know what has happened, and by response that something (rather than 
another thing or nothing) occurs at all: response is a “non-linguistic 
convention”. There is, however, absolutely no guarantee of unanimity about 
the identification of acts. 
 
6. The Concept of Uptake: Conclusion 
 
The relationship between the recognition of an act and the consequences that 
are an inextricable part of the act and allow us to recognize the existence of 
the act, is entirely misunderstood by Austin and those who follow and adapt 
him. For Austin, conventions operate to ensure that the illocution will always 
be effective if correctly uttered: conventions make meaning identical to 
                                                     
209 If subsequent generations are dismissive of the prejudices of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century, this too will be on the basis of their different contextual position and 
differing assumptions and reading or hearing strategies. We believe, in the Western world of 
the early twenty-first century, that Judges and Jurors are properly required to discover what 
happened on the basis of what is said in court, not on the basis of their own prejudices. These 
prejudices, however, cannot be entirely eliminated. I suspect that Hornsby believes that the 
Judge and Jury were in some sense unable to hear without prejudice: that they were 
‘institutionally chauvinist’. Later generations may agree with her. However, neither our 
grandchildren nor Hornsby are prejudice-neutral; they are simply operating from a differing 
set of contextual assumptions: the Judge and Jury assumed that they were being fair-minded; 
Hornsby assumes that they were ‘deaf’.  
210 Although, as Cerf notes, Austin’s decision to talk of ‘issuing an utterance’ is to some extent 
a similar verbal sleight of hand, allowing one to slip away from ‘ordering’ or just ‘speaking’, 
to a new term with less ‘baggage’: W Cerf, ‘Critical Review of How to Do Things with 
Words’, in K T Fann (ed.) Symposium on J L Austin (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) 
p362ff 
211 He in fact refers to an illocution not a speech act, but I don’t believe that the concepts can 
be usefully disentangled: Words in Action p68 
212 Words in Action p68 
213 Words in Action p68 
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intention. For illocutions, meaning is not merely conventional but is to some 
degree guaranteed. It is not just that the meaning of utterances is recognized 
by the ‘audience’ on the basis of shared conventions, but that in the case of 
illocutions or explicit performatives, the existence of conventions guarantees 
beforehand how the audience will take an utterance. Conventions in this case 
make interior intention transparent.  
 
This assumption is shared by Austin’s followers in the field of Biblical 
hermeneutics. As Ward notes, “Kevin Vanhoozer has argued that convention 
and intention are not opposing concepts, but may be defined in terms of each 
other, if convention is seen as a corporate intention”214, where he refers to 
Vanhoozer’s suggestion that “a convention may be said to be a corporate 
intention”215. However, the reverse is rather more the case: once again things 
are being viewed from the ‘wrong end’ of the relationship. 
 
It is not that intentions coalesce to form conventions – rather it is the pre-
existing conventions that we inherit without conscious choice, that allow us to 
identify and actively realize intentions216. An intention, then, may be said to 
be created by conventions. As Haugeland observes: “the instituted 
intentionality of public symbols is original intentionality. The extant normative 
order in the communal pattern is sui generis and self-sustaining, via the 
mechanism of conformism; it is the fountainhead of all intentionality, public 
and private.”217  
 
It is the recognition by the audience that an utterance fits into the 
conventions, that allows them to recognize it as meaning something, and thus 
to recognize also the intention of the speaker as indicated in the utterance. 
This, however, eliminates the possibility of a sender-based meaning 
guarantee. It suggests, to use Austinian terminology, that all speech acts, not 
just ‘minimum physical acts’218, are created in part by the audience, and it 
acknowledges that no speech act can be an act without first having some 
effective consequences including active, creative understanding. No speech 
act can exist by virtue of the sender or speaker alone, and meaning is created 
in conversation not begotten in a pre-existing intention219. 
                                                     
214 Word and Supplement p86 [my underlining]. 
215 Is There? p244. 
216 S Knapp and W B Michaels make exactly the same mistake when they assert that “to insist 
on the primacy of intention is not to deny the importance of convention; it is only to point out 
that conventions don’t even count as conventions unless they are intended” ‘A Reply to Our 
Critics’, Critical Inquiry 9:4 (June 1983) p799: this is simply putting the cart before the horse. 
217 J Haugeland, ‘The Intentionality All-Stars’, in J E Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 
4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Atascadero CA, Ridgeview Publishing Co, 1990) p413. 
Where he identified conformism, I would identify learning, which conformism assumes, of 
course. 
218 How To p110 ff. 
219 See for example, G L Bruns: “Understanding can never be the product of a single act of 
cognition, nor can it even be constituted as a single euporia”, ‘Structuralism, Deconstruction, 
and Hermeneutics: Review of J Culler’s ‘On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after 
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Therefore I conclude, with Derrida, that the concept of the illocution as 
outlined in Austin and Searle, and employed by Briggs, Ward and Vanhoozer, 
is fatally flawed. It ignores the implications of the importance of the audience 
or readership and context of any act, for the idea of ‘meaning’. It ignores the 
active role in meaning creation of the ‘receiver’ of any utterance, and the fact 
that all utterances are not self-contained, but exist within many pre-existing 
conversations. 
 
Derrida’s conclusion that performative utterances are different only in degree 
not in kind from what Austin described as “parasitic” utterances; that they 
are all “kinds of iteration within a general iterability which constitutes a 
violation of the allegedly rigorous purity of every event of discourse or speech 
act”220 is one I therefore share. I agree that “given that structure of iteration, 
the intention animating the utterance will never be through and through 
present to itself and to its content.” 
 
I also agree with Derrida that Austin’s suggestion that  
 
ordinary language … excludes a general citationality or iterability …[means] that 
the ‘ordinariness’ in question – the thing and the notion – shelter a lure, the 
teleological lure of consciousness … [and that] in order for a context to be 
exhaustively determinable, in the sense required by Austin [at least as his 
argument unfolds], conscious intention would at the very least have to be totally 
present and immediately transparent to itself and to others, since it is a 
determining center of context. The concept of … the context thus seems to suffer 
at this point from the same theoretical and ‘interested’ uncertainty as the concept 
of the ‘ordinary’, from the same metaphysical origins: the ethical and teleological 
discourse of consciousness.221  
 
Although Derrida does not appreciate the complexity of Austin’s approach to 
intention, I nonetheless share his general conclusions regarding Austin’s 
dependence on a particular and inadequate view of meaning and personality, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Structuralism (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1982)’, Diacritics 14:1 (Spring 1984) p21, 
and again “”what constitutes knowledge has always to be worked out by means of discourse, 
not just once for all, but by means of an endless give and take among multifarious voices – 
which is what Gadamer means by tradition” p21, and “for Gadamer, understanding always 
requires the endless back-and-forth of a many-sided dialogue into which one must enter if 
one is to understand at all, but which one can never comprehend as a totality from any 
privileged methodological position. Understanding in this case can never be adequately 
described either as objective consciousness or as subjective or intersubjective agreement: … 
tradition … concerns the historicity of dialectic: this many-sided dialogue is nothing more or 
less than what comes down from the past – and we are in it and of it. Dialectic … is a mode of 
being rather than a mode of thought; it is the form which the linguisticality of our being takes. 
It is that to which we belong and which we are, and it is that which we seek to understand. 
Our hermeneutical task, in this event, is not, however, just to make ourselves heard within 
this heteroglossia but also to listen, where listening is listening in Heidegger’s sense of being 
open to the saying of language” p22. 
220 Limited Inc (Sec) p18 
221 Limited Inc (Sec) p18 
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and on the part necessarily and surreptitiously played by interior intention in 
Austin’s performative scheme222. Austin and his followers assume a sender 
view of meaning which is ultimately incompatible with their stated view of 
intention. This view of meaning is a predicate of the idea of the guaranteed 
speech act, of which Divine revelation is assumed to be an instance, and it 
requires an assumed distinction between ‘understanding’ and ‘uptake’, which 
leads to the distinction between ‘meaning’ and ‘significance’.  
 
In this chapter I have discussed the concepts of Uptake and Understanding, 
and showed that the concept of Uptake is inadequate. This discussion feeds 
directly into the question of meaning. As a corollary to the idea of Uptake, 
Ward and Vanhoozer adopt Hirsch’s idea of a Meaning/Significance 
distinction, because this allows them to defend the idea of Authorial 
revelation. There is indeed a strong similarity between the idea of 
illocutionary uptake as found in Austin and Briggs, and the idea of meaning 
and significance in Ward and Vanhoozer. However, Vanhoozer and Ward’s 
adoption of Hirsch’s concept of meaning is inadequate for much the same 
reasons as those which affect the concept of uptake.  
 
The next chapter assesses the idea of meaning which Ward and Vanhoozer 
adopt and modify from the work of E D Hirsch, a famous opponent of 
Derrida’s, and a sometimes almost lone voice seeking to re-assert authorial 
control over meaning. It considers how meaning and understanding are 
viewed, and the inadequacies of the views adopted by Ward, Hirsch and 
Vanhoozer. All of this is preparatory work, necessary before the outlining of 
my own proposals for meaning and understanding, based on the work of 
other scholars, which are put forward in chapter seven, and on the basis of 
which I make some suggestions with regard to revelation, in my concluding 
chapter eight.
                                                     
222 Although I think that Derrida himself does not escape entirely from its grip, either: and 
certainly J H Miller does not – see J H Miller, Speech Acts in Literature (Stanford CA, Stanford 
University Press, 2001). Chapter four of this work demonstrates a binary opposition between 
‘saying’ and ‘doing’ that collapses everything into doings that are ultimately unverifiable: the 
idea that we could say ‘he is angry’ and know it because we recognise it as anger, and thus 
that intention and emotion are collectively determined (though not determinate) does not 
occur to him: or rather, he is convinced (like Proust, apparently) that other people, especially 
if we love them, must always remain unknowable to us. In this respect he is mistaken. It is 
not true to claim, as he and Proust do, that others must remain for ever shadows to us, nor 
that we are imprisoned by sense perceptions – because without firstly knowledge of others, 
and secondly sense perceptions, there would be no ‘us’. Our sense(s) of our self are learnt and 
determined: what Proust’s experience as quoted by J H Miller indicates is that we can have 
more than one self. This is so because our ‘selves’ are socially constructed on the basis of the 
stories that we are taught and which we adapt and tell and re-tell about ourselves – we 
construct narratives of our life which explain who we are, and it is this realisation that 
accounts for the ‘mythic’ nature of the ‘Freudian unconscious’ noted by C Emerson in his 
discussion of Valentin Volosinov’s Freudianism; A Critical Sketch (Bloomington IA, Indiana 
University Press, 1987), which he insists on attributing to Mikhail Bakhtin; see C Emerson, 
‘The Outer Word and Inner Speech: Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and the Internalization of Language’, 
Critical Inquiry 10:2 (1983) 251. 
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CHAPTER SIX: MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the concept of uptake and compared it to 
the hermeneutic idea of understanding. By contrast with understanding, the 
idea of ‘uptake’ is inadequate as a description of how we recognise 
meaningful acts.  
 
The idea of uptake is an essential part of the illocutionary act in Austin, and is 
thus integral to the defence of authorial revelation attempted by Richard 
Briggs in particular. However, while uptake is important for Vanhoozer and 
Ward to the extent that they rely on the concept of the illocutionary act, both 
these latter scholars also make use of the work of E D Hirsch and his 
distinction between meaning and significance. (It should be noted that Hirsch 
has revised his initial theory to include the concept of Transhistorical 
Intention, a concept which in practice entirely undermines the meaning-
significance distinction, and illustrates its inadequacies – this revision is 
discussed subsequently1). 
 
Before returning to the main argument of this thesis, and outlining my own 
preferred model of meaning and revelation based on the hermeneutics of 
Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov, it will be useful to examine Hirsch’s 
concepts, and the use made of them by Vanhoozer and Ward. In particular, it 
should be noted that both the distinction between the illocution and the 
perlocution, and the distinction between meaning and significance, assume 
the idea that meaning is begotten, and thus both are ‘captives’ of the sender 
view of meaning. 
 
2. ‘Meaning’ and ‘Significance’ in Kevin Vanhoozer and Timothy Ward 
 
In Ward’s and Vanhoozer’s work, meaning is the ‘illocutionary’ property of a 
text, and is produced simply by the speaker/author2. It is ‘uptaken’ by the 
reader, leaving no room for indeterminacy. Likewise, significance is the 
‘perlocutionary’ property of a text, produced by the reader’s response. It is 
created by the reader ‘understanding’ the text. 
 
For example, Vanhoozer suggests that  
 
while it is clear that the Fourth Gospel was written in order to persuade others 
that Jesus is the Christ (John 20:31), it is still not clear whether this purpose is part 
                                                     
1 See E D Hirsch Jr, ‘Transhistorical Intentions and the Persistence of Allegory’, New Literary 
History 25:1 (1994) 549-567. 
2 “meaning is a matter of illocutions, while significance concerns perlocutions”, Is There? p 
p261 
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of the meaning of the text…. The subsequent response and behaviour of the 
audience are extrinsic, often unstable, factors, and thus cannot be part of what 
makes a speech act what it is. The Fourth Gospel testifies to Jesus Christ 
regardless of how readers respond to it, but it only persuades if readers respond to 
its testimony with belief. Searle excludes the author’s perlocutionary purpose 
from his definition of meaning.3  
 
Vanhoozer believes that “the subsequent response and behaviour of the 
audience are extrinsic, often unstable, factors, and thus cannot be part of what 
makes a speech act what it is” because illocutions are conventional in 
opposition to perlocutions, and are thus differentiated from perlocutions 
precisely by the stability of meaning that they supposedly guarantee. Thus, 
for Vanhoozer, the author’s intent as manifested in the text (a possible 
definition of what Vanhoozer thinks of as ‘meaning’) makes the text the thing 
that it is, irrespective of any response, but its purpose is a perlocutionary 
effect requiring a response. 
 
Vanhoozer therefore adopts E D Hirsch’s distinction between meaning and 
significance and suggests that there is a difference between meaning, which is 
determinate, unchanging and past (it is what the author intended in his text) 
and significance, which is what the text means in the context of our reading of 
it. Meaning, for Vanhoozer, is what the text was ‘meant’ to mean by the 
author, and significance is what it means to us now, which includes its 
persuasiveness as to its authorially-produced purpose. Thus, “properly to 
describe meaning requires us to describe the author’s intended action – not 
the plan with which the author set out to write, nor the consequences that an 
author hoped to achieve by writing, but what the author was doing in 
writing, in tending to his words in such and such a fashion.”4 
 
In other words, for Vanhoozer “meaning is a matter of what the author is 
attending to and of the way he or she attends to it.”5 Therefore, “textual 
meaning does not change because it is tied to what an author intended, and 
did, in the past.”6 However,  
 
the concern for relevance – for reading with the aim of bringing a text to bear on 
contemporary concerns – is a concern for what Hirsch calls “significance.” Unlike 
meaning, the significance of a text can change, for significance pertains to the 
relation between the text’s determinate meaning and a larger context (i.e., 
another era, another culture, another subject matter).7  
 
                                                     
3 Is There? p228 
4 Is There? p253 
5 Is There? p259 
6 Is There? p259 
7 Is There? p259 
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Thus “a text’s significance is a function of how the text comes to be explained 
and evaluated in terms of contexts not presumed by the author. Significance 
corresponds more to criticism than to interpretation.”8   
 
Vanhoozer therefore suggests, as already noted, that “meaning is a matter of 
illocutions, while significance concerns perlocutions”9. Significance is a 
consequence of meaning, and cannot be a part of the illocutionary act because 
it is a consequence. This of course is why Vanhoozer needs to adopt this 
distinction: meaning is an illocutionary act, which does not depend for its 
existence on ‘extraneous consequences’. Meaning is ‘uptaken’, Significance 
requires a response. As Ward notes 
 
in the performance of this divine illocutionary act, Scripture is sufficient for the 
mediation to any and all readers of … God’s ‘real semantic presence’ to human 
beings. Divine ‘semantic presence’ becomes divine ‘personal presence’ when the 
text’s perlocutionary effect is brought about in the life of the reader by the action 
of the Holy Spirit. This restates the christocentric thrust of Luther’s 
understanding of the sufficiency of Scripture: to urge ‘Scripture alone’ is to urge 
it as alone the means by which Christ comes in such a way that true knowledge 
of him is possible. To assert this is not to assert that Scripture is a sufficient 
guarantee of cognition of the divine illocutionary act (notitia), let alone that it can 
bring about in the reader the appropriate perlocutionary effect (assensus and 
fiducia). A reader of Scripture can still fail to recognize Christ, or, recognizing 
him, may still reject him.10 
 
Thus it is clear: meaning is an illocutionary act and is uptaken, and 
significance is a perlocutionary act and may (or may not) be understood. 
 
3. The definitions of ‘Meaning’ and ‘Significance’ in E D Hirsch 
 
In fact, Ward and Vanhoozer have added to Hirsch’s original conception of 
the difference between meaning and significance. Hirsch, in his work Validity 
in Interpretation11 suggests that the distinction between meaning and 
significance is a moral or pragmatic one determined by the posture of the 
reader, rather than one determined by different sorts of understanding12. 
However, Vanhoozer, to make his scheme successful, needs the author to be 
able to guarantee meaning because meaning is, in his scheme, necessarily 
illocutionary, while significance can be perlocutionary and contingent in 
nature.  
 
                                                     
8 Is There? p260 
9 Is There? p261 
10 Word and Supplement p205-206. 
11 E D Hirsch Jr, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven CT and London, Yale University Press, 
1976) 
12 Validity in Interpretation p 26: “any reader can adopt or reject any norm, and he is justified in 
thinking that there is no absolute necessity for his choosing one or another. … Partly for this 
reason, I have chosen a different sort of defense – one that appeals not to the ethics of 
language but to the logical consequences that follow from the act of public interpretation.” 
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This tension is illustrated by Ward’s discussion of Hirsch13. As Ward notes,  
 
Hirsch turns out not to be the robust defender of the author which he is 
conventionally taken to be. In the end what he seems to want most of all is that 
professional interpreters of texts should agree that however much they might 
continue to understand textual meaning as polyvalent, they should begin at some 
point with a recognition of what the author may have meant; this will provide 
them with a shared object of discussion, before they move, however quickly, on 
from there. Hirsch defends authorial meaning since he thinks it the best way to 
foster methodological consensus.14  
 
For Hirsch, the author cannot guarantee meaning: to discern authorial 
meaning requires a conscious strategy of interpretation (a particular reading 
strategy) on the part of the reader. Hirsch is aware of the conscious creative 
effort of all reading. He believes that it is possible to read a text neutrally and 
simply realize in it the author’s intention, but that many other readings are 
also possible: there is a moral and logical choice to be made by the reader15.  
 
Hirsch believes that only reading for the author’s purpose or intention can 
allow there to be any possibility of determinate meaning and thus any 
possibility of validity in interpretation (the title, of course, of his first, 
detailed, exploration of this topic). He suggests that “once the author had 
been ruthlessly banished as the determiner of his text’s meaning, it very 
gradually appeared that no adequate principle existed for judging the validity 
of an interpretation.”16 Indeed, “to banish the original author as the 
determiner of meaning was to reject the only compelling normative principle 
that could lend validity to an interpretation.”17 
 
Hirsch, therefore, as Vanhoozer states, distinguishes between meaning (the 
author’s accessible intention) and significance: “meaning is that which is 
represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a particular 
sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. Significance, on the other hand, 
                                                     
13 Word and Supplement p161 ff; especially pages 165-166. 
14 Word and Supplement p166-167. See also Vanhoozer, ‘A Lamp in the Labyrinth: the 
Hermeneutics of “Aesthetic” Theology’, Trinity Journal 8:1 (1987) p29: “Hirsch’s account of 
meaning, however, is only a recommendation … Hirsch is here offering not an argument but 
a recommendation, not a logical analysis of meaning but a stipulative definition.” 
15 Despite the fact that both Hirsch and Ward believe that Hirsch is eschewing morals for 
pragmatism, I do not accept that this is true. Hirsch certainly acknowledges that a reader 
“may or may not accept the idea that all uses of language carry moral imperatives” (Validity 
in Interpretation p26), but even to suggest that “the choice of a norm for interpretation is a free 
social and ethical act” (p26) is to acknowledge that a moral choice is being made: it is simply a 
choice about which different views of morality conflict. Hirsch is not prepared to ‘pin his 
colours to the mast’ here, because he hopes his logical defence of authorial intention will be 
enough. See also Hirsch’s version of Pascal’s Wager: ‘The Politics of Theories of 
Interpretation’, Critical Inquiry 9:1 (September 1982) p243ff.  
16 Validity in Interpretation p3 
17 Validity in Interpretation p5 
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names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or 
a situation, or indeed anything imaginable.”18 
 
Thus, notwithstanding some differences, there are very strong similarities 
between Hirsch’s definition of meaning and the Speech Act idea of an 
illocution. In particular, both are conveyances or “representations” of an 
agent’s intended meaning that owe nothing to the realizing ‘work’ of the 
audience. Both are ‘non-relational’: they are ‘neutral’ ‘conventional’ aspects of 
what has been done by an agent. It is also assumed by both that the meaning 
is conceived ‘outside’ the text, in the agent’s intention, which is made visible 
or actual in the text or utterance. Although in both cases the text or utterance 
– the act performed – has meaning, and it is the act itself which means 
(meaning is in ‘the thing that is done’) not any prior intention, nonetheless the 
meaning is ‘impregnated’ into the act by the agent. The act has meaning, but 
the meaning that it has owes nothing to the specific recognition of that 
particular, contextual, act19, which has been begotten not created. 
 
However, Hirsch’s understanding of meaning is rather more nuanced than 
the suggestion that meaning is an illocution. Hirsch’s conception thus differs 
in some respects from Vanhoozer’s scheme, although its greater degree of 
subtlety does not help it evade the ‘understanding-uptake’ dilemma faced by 
Vanhoozer’s Speech Act scheme. Although Hirsch acknowledges the activity 
of understanding, he does not apply this recognition consistently, a flaw he 
shares with Austin, as we have seen in the previous chapters.  
 
Unlike Vanhoozer, Briggs, Hornsby and Ward, Hirsch is well aware that all 
meaning has to be recognized, not merely ‘absorbed’ or ‘uptaken’:  
 
meaning is an affair of consciousness not of words. Almost any word sequence 
can, under the conventions of language, legitimately represent more than one 
complex of meaning. A word sequence means nothing in particular until 
somebody either means something by it or understands something from it. There 
is no magic land of meanings outside human consciousness. Whenever meaning 
is connected to words, a person is making the connection, and the particular 
meanings he lends to them are never the only legitimate ones under the norms 
and conventions of his language.20 
 
                                                     
18 Validity in Interpretation p8 
19 Compare J R Cameron: “Clearly whatever kind of thing the meaning of a sentence type 
may be, it can only be construed as a function of, or abstraction from, the specific meanings 
which individual tokens of that sentence-type possess in their specific contexts of utterance”: 
J R Cameron, ‘Sentence-Meaning and Speech Acts’. The Philosophical Quarterly 20:79 (April 
1970) p112. 
20 Validity in Interpretation p4 – and see the comparison later in this chapter of the thesis 
between this phrase and Austin’s description of perlocutions. 
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Hirsch is also quite clear that the meaning of sentences is not “literal” but 
context-related (which he describes as “occasionalist”21): “words and sentences 
outside of actual use have no fixed literal meaning at all. … Meaning-making 
and meaning-understanding … is occasionalist”22. However, Hirsch not only 
assumes that it is possible to understand exactly the meaning intended by the 
author, but that meaning is related either to the intention of the author or the 
responder, and that in either case it is a property of the text understood by a 
consciousness, rather than a function of active relationships23. For Hirsch, 
meaning is a static, abstract property, and its making is distinct from its 
understanding. 
 
There is therefore an innate, fundamental contradiction throughout Hirsch’s 
work between on the one hand his recognition that meaning is constructed, 
and on the other his insistence that the text’s original authorial meaning is an 
unchanging property of the text when read. Hirsch’s concept of meaning 
depends on the idea that one can understand a text as the author originally 
intended, without having an experience or relationship with it (since these are 
a part of the text’s significance rather than its meaning24), but that this 
understanding is nonetheless an active process on the part of the reader (a fact 
about which Hirsch is insistent). 
 
4. E. D. Hirsch’s concept of understanding, and its relation to meaning 
 
Hirsch recognizes that “a physical object that we see is not defined for us by 
the particular content of our retinal vision, but by what that content means as 
interpreted by us.”25 Thus he acknowledges that we learn and understand 
meaning. Indeed, he goes on to note that “all cognition is analogous to 
interpretation in being based upon corrigible schemata”26 and thus that “the 
process of understanding is itself a process of validation.”27 For Hirsch, “verbal 
understanding is not purely intuitive, then, but it cannot be purely rule-
governed either, and it cannot be some arbitrary mixture of the two, as I have 
                                                     
21 E D Hirsch Jr, ‘On Theories and Metaphors: A Comment on Mary Hesse’s Paper’, New 
Literary History 17:1 (Autumn 1985) p53. 
22 E D Hirsch Jr, ‘On Theories and Metaphors’ op cit p54.  
23 See Gadamer “understanding is not a method which the inquiring consciousness applies to 
an object it chooses and so turns it into objective knowledge; rather, being situated within an 
event of tradition, a process of handing down is a prior condition of understanding. 
Understanding proves to be an event ...” Truth and Method op cit p320.  
24 Validity in Interpretation p16. Thus whether or not an author subsequently asserts that the 
meaning of a text has changed for them is irrelevant: what they are asserting is that the 
significance of the text has changed for them – its meaning remains the same. Compare his 
view with that of R Panikkar, who suggests that “The text is always dependent on a context 
and, if the latter varies, the text has also to change accordingly if the original message or 
meaning of the text is to be preserved.” R Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of 
Man: Icon-Person-Mystery, (London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973) page viii.  
25 The Aims of Interpretation, (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1978) p30. 
26 The Aims of Interpretation p32 
27 The Aims of Interpretation p33 
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shown in discussing speech act theory. For our intuitions are open to 
correction, and our rules and conventions are open to change.”28  
 
Understanding, then, should be “conceived of as a validating, self-correcting 
process – an active posting of corrigible schemata which we test and modify 
in the very process of coming to understand an utterance”29. This is therefore, 
although Hirsch does not note this, an entirely dialogic, conversational and 
consensual model in practice. In this respect, Hirsch is not a particularly 
happy associate for Ward and Vanhoozer, for whom meaning needs to be 
uptaken, rather than creatively understood. 
 
However, Hirsch then goes on to suggest that “meaning is an object that 
exists only by virtue of a single, privileged, precritical approach.”30 While I 
agree (as would Bakhtin) that Hirsch is right that “it is within the capacity of 
every individual to imagine himself other than he is, to realize in himself 
another human or cultural possibility”31, this does not mean that all meaning 
can have only one perspective: that of the author alone. (It is interesting to 
note that Hirsch’s description of the act of “deliberate reconstruction of the 
author’s subjective stance”32, especially in his footnote 29 on page 238, is very 
close to Bakhtin’s description of the first stage of the actualization of 
meaning33).  
 
I agree with Hirsch that the recognition of intention is an integral and 
inescapably necessary part of all communication. However, Hirsch also seeks 
to defend the sender view of meaning, which conflicts with his view of 
understanding, which is neither sender-based nor static. For Hirsch, meaning 
is ‘what the author meant’, including all of the emotions and values which he 
acknowledges are a part of the author’s act. This can be imagined so 
satisfactorily by a reader, in an act of understanding, that the author’s original 
meaning is thereby re-enacted or revivified. Hirsch accepts that “meaning is 
not restricted to conceptual meaning … it embraces not only any content of 
mind represented by written speech but also the affects and values that are 
necessarily correlative to such a content.” Thus it includes  
 
not only intentional objects but also the species of intentional acts which sponsor 
those intentional objects… the reader should understand that an intentional 
object cannot be dissevered from a species of intentional act, that subjective 
feeling, tone, mood, and value, are constitutive of meaning in its fullest sense. 
One cannot have a meaning without having its necessarily correlative affect or 
value.34  
                                                     
28 The Aims of Interpretation p34 
29 The Aims of Interpretation p34 
30 The Aims of Interpretation p44 
31 The Aims of Interpretation p47 
32 Validity in Interpretation p238 
33 See next Chapter, in the section on Reading and Understanding 
34 The Aims of Interpretation p8 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Six: Meaning and Significance 
233 
 
However, this being the case, it is hard to see how this meaning can be 
entirely in the hands of the author: and of course Hirsch would agree. He 
suggests not that authorial control is inescapable, as Vanhoozer by contrast 
implies, but that it is possible and preferable to any other reading strategy. 
However, to understand the author’s meaning, it is necessary then to have the 
emotions and experiences and values – the ‘necessarily correlative affects or 
values’ – that the author assumed and imagined, otherwise the meaning will 
be different. 
 
In relation to Hirsch’s scheme, then, meaning could be described as both 
illocutionary, in the sense that the original, authorial meaning of the text is an 
unchanging property of the text, and perlocutionary, in that “a word 
sequence means nothing in particular until somebody either means 
something by it or understands something from it”35, a phrase which strongly 
echoes Austin’s description of a perlocution36. The actual meaning of the text 
can be known on the same basis as that on which, according to Duff and 
Austin, intention operates. That is, Hirsch believes that meaning, like 
intention, is a public matter, not an interior and private one: “the 
irreproducibility of meaning experiences is not the same as the 
irreproducibility of meaning. The psychologistic identification of textual 
meaning with a meaning experience is inadmissible. Meaning experiences are 
private, but they are not meaning.”37  
 
Vanhoozer, Ward et al would claim to agree with this, of course, but as we 
have already seen, the view of intention which they, like Austin himself, are 
obliged in practice to adopt conflicts with this assumption. I too entirely agree 
with the idea that meaning is public not private, but this is consistent with my 
conversational, reciprocal view of meaning. Hirsch, however, fails to notice 
that the fact that meaning is public not private, does not guarantee that ‘what 
the author meant’ will be automatically accessible without ‘contamination’ or 
remainder38, nor does it guarantee that meaning is simply ‘what the author 
meant’.  
                                                     
35 Validity in Interpretation p4 
36 “any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in sufficiently special 
circumstances, by the issuing, with or without calculation, of any utterance whatsoever, and 
in particular by a straightforward constative utterance (if there is such an animal)”: How To 
p109. This is one of the reasons why Vanhoozer goes on to revise Hirsch’s scheme in favour 
of the concepts of “meaning accomplished” and “meaning applied” – see the following 
section on ‘Transhistoric Intention’. 
37 Validity in Interpretation p16 
38 As Bruns notes: “we know, as a matter of hermeneutic experience, that we can arrive at 
[authorial] intentions, and thus be guided by them, only in a manner of speaking, that is, by 
producing our own versions of them. You could say that no matter how hard we try, we 
always operate allegorically when we read” – and allegory will become an important concept 
for Hirsch later: G L Bruns, ‘Intention, Authority, and Meaning’, Critical Inquiry 7:2 (Winter 
1980) 301. See also later in Bruns’s article: “When I read, I lend my spirit to the letter, and each 
reading fills the letter with the spirit of my reading. I regularly or routinely assume – it is part 
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In addition, it would appear that Hirsch is here divorcing meaning from an 
experience, so that the correspondence between meaning and an illocution is 
again striking: both are in no way dependent on anything unpredictable. 
However, it is not clear how to distinguish ‘a meaning experience’ from 
‘recognizing the unchanging meaning’ or from appreciating ‘necessarily 
correlative affects or values’, any more than it was clear how to distinguish 
the idea of ‘uptake’ in Austin et al, from that of understanding. This is for 
Hirsch a fundamental difficulty since Hirsch, like Austin but unlike 
Vanhoozer, acknowledges that the recognition of meaning is a positive action 
of consciousness, and that meaning includes the emotions and values which 
were a part of the author’s original creative action. 
 
Hirsch clearly wants to distinguish ‘the experience of a text’, which is 
associated with the text’s significance and value for the reader (and which is 
very similar to that which Vanhoozer would identify as the perlocutionary 
effect of the text), from simply ‘what the text means’, which is based solely on 
the innate meaning of the text. However, since this meaning is, as Hirsch 
would agree, public and constructed, it is not clear how meaning can be 
understood without being experienced, even given the moral determination 
to have no experience of the text, but realize only its meaning. Hirsch is 
imagining an activity, or rather a ‘pseudo-activity’, very close to the uptake 
on which illocutions rely. It is inadequate for precisely the same reasons: the 
act of realizing is active and contextual. It cannot be neutral or acontextual.  
 
Hirsch believes that “to understand an utterance it is, in fact, not just desirable 
but absolutely unavoidable that we understand it in its own terms.”39 But we 
have to understand it using our own terms – we have no option. We cannot 
learn neutrally, because we ourselves are not neutral or given identities. 
Understanding, as Gadamer demonstrates, is an active involvement in 
existence, a cause and an effect of personal development. Gadamer notes that  
 
reconstructing the original circumstances, like all restoration, is a futile 
undertaking in view of the historicity of our being. What is reconstructed, a life 
brought back from the lost past, is not the original. ... Similarly, a hermeneutics 
that regarded understanding as reconstructing the original would be no more 
than handing on a dead meaning. 40  
                                                                                                                                                        
of the convention by which I try to authorize my reading – that I read the letter in the same 
spirit in which it was written. Although with many or perhaps most texts I cannot plausibly 
do this, there is no doubt that when I do not or cannot read the letter in this spirit (the spirit, 
say, of authorial intentionality) I had better be able to explain why not; that is, I had better be 
able to adduce the authority of my reading, which may (who knows?) outweigh the authority 
with which the letter was composed”: ‘Intention, Authority, and Meaning’, op cit p 304. 
39 Validity in Interpretation p134 
40 Truth and Method op cit p166-167. By contrast, he asserts that “the co-ordination of all 
knowing activity with what is known is not based on the fact that they have the same mode 
of being but draws its significance from the particular nature of the mode of being that is 
common to them. It consists in the fact that neither the knower nor the known is ‘present-at-
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He explicitly argues that “just as the events of history do not in general 
manifest any agreement with the subjective ideas of the person who stands 
and acts within history, so the sense of a text in general reaches far beyond 
what its author originally intended”41 and thus “the hermeneutical reduction 
to the authors’ meaning is just as inappropriate as the reduction of historical 
events to the intentions of their protagonists”42.  
 
Thus, an utterance is not recognised as such in its own terms and then 
understood: the act of recognizing an utterance is a creative, active one, in 
which the utterance is recognized by a reader who has learnt how to 
recognize utterances and is continually learning from them and being affected 
by them, and who is inescapably in conversation with the utterance he or she 
has just recognised, and the context of its recognition. It is thus both 
undesirable, and impossible, to understand meaning ‘neutrally’, from outside 
history: there is no such space in which to stand, as Gadamer asserts43. 
 
However, Hirsch seems to assume precisely that such a stance is possible. He 
states that “since all understanding is “silent” – that is, cast only in its own 
terms and not in foreign categories – it follows that all sceptical historicism is 
founded on a misconception of the nature of understanding.”44 However, it is 
contradictory to suggest both that understanding is a construction, and that it 
is “silent”, which implies that it is a passive response to one voice. 
Understanding is part of a whole series of conversations, and while it includes 
an assumption of agency and a degree of ‘listening’ on the part of the reader 
                                                                                                                                                        
hand’ in an ‘ontic’ way, but in a ‘historical’ one, i.e. they both have the mode of being of 
historicity... the historicity of human Dasein [There-being] in its expectancy and its forgetting 
is the condition of our being able to re-present the past... belonging to traditions belongs just 
as originally and essentially to the historical finitude of Dasein as does its projectedness 
toward future possibilities of itself. ... Thus there is no understanding or interpretation in 
which the totality of this existential structure does not function, even if the intention of the 
knower is simply to read ‘what is there’ and to discover from his sources ‘how it really was’” 
p262. 
41
 Truth and Method op cit p380 
42
 Truth and Method op cit p382. He later suggests that “normative concepts such as the 
author’s meaning or the original reader’s understanding in fact represent only an empty 
space that is filled from time to time in understanding”: op  cit p413.  
43 “There is no such thing, in fact, as a point outside history from which the identity of a 
problem can be conceived within the vicissitudes of the history of attempts to solve it. ... The 
standpoint that is beyond any standpoint, a standpoint from which we could conceive its true 
identity, is a pure illusion”, as is the idea of course that the true identity of something is 
outside how it seems to us – this is to revert again to ideas of inward intention and agency: 
Truth and Method op cit p384. Later, Gadamer refers to the idea that one can “think only in the 
concepts of the epoch one is trying to understand” as a “naive illusion” (p414) because this 
would entail trying to understand while also trying to “exclude what alone makes 
understanding possible. ... To try to escape from one’s own concepts in interpretation is not 
only impossible but manifestly absurd. To interpret means precisely to bring one’s own 
preconceptions into play so that the text’s meaning can really be made to speak for us”: p415. 
44 Validity in Interpretation p135 
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or hearer, ‘silence’ is impossible. As Gadamer demonstrates, it is not that we 
have a choice of understanding in the text’s terms or in our own, it is that 
when we understand any text, it is we who are doing the understanding, and 
we cannot eliminate our own prejudices and assumptions, or understand 
without that act being a creative act of participation. Understanding is a 
creative act, involving at least two ‘voices’ and possibly many more: it is 
inescapably plural, perhaps even cacophonous. 
 
For Hirsch, however, understanding is also “timeless”45. This assertion could 
only have even the appearance of plausibility if we who understand were also 
timeless. For example, he suggests, in respect of Simone Weil’s interpretation 
of The Iliad, that  
 
we agree with it because we too have read The Iliad and have perceived that same 
meaning – even if we have not recognized it so explicitly. I cannot imagine any 
competent reader of any past age who did not implicitly grasp this meaning in 
The Iliad, though I can certainly imagine a time when readers did not feel this 
meaning to be a comment on life worthy of a special monograph.46  
 
But this is entirely inadequate, and ignores the affect of context on meaning47. 
We do not agree with Simone Weil’s interpretation because we have already 
perceived or recognized this meaning: her interpretation introduces 
something new that simply ‘seems right’. To suggest that “I cannot imagine 
any competent reader of any past age …” is entirely without point: this does 
not go any way towards proving that Simone Weil’s interpretation is 
unoriginal. I can well imagine “competent readers” who were not struck by 
the way in which “The Iliad discloses the role of brute force in human life”48: 
readers who understand it simply in heroic terms, or as an early form of ‘beat-
‘em-up’ entertainment.  
 
Moreover, to suggest that “I can certainly imagine a time when readers did 
not feel this meaning to be a comment on life worthy of a special monograph” 
is to recognize the crucial role played by context in the conversational creation 
of meaning: in brutal, feudal or hierarchical societies, the violence of life 
might be taken for granted and go unremarked: in a ‘more civilized’ age it 
might take apparently exceptional experiences for a critic to rediscover and 
make obvious for the first time this aspect of meaning, which these particular 
contexts and experiences have brought out49. As Gadamer asserts, “historical 
                                                     
45 Validity in Interpretation p137 
46 Validity in Interpretation p139 
47 “it is in contexts that meaning occurs”: S Fish, ‘What Is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying 
Such Terrible Things About It?’ in S Chatman (ed.) Approaches to Poetics (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1973) p133. See also the discussion of Bakhtin’s and Rosenblatt’s views in 
the next chapter. 
48 Validity in Interpretation p138 
49 See also J E Kennard’s discussion of various context-affected readings of Gilman’s The 
Yellow Wallpaper in ‘Convention Coverage or How to Read Your Own Life’, New Literary 
History 13:1 (Autumn 1981) 74ff. The idea of a ‘competent reader’ is really for Hirsch a 
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tradition can be understood only as something always in the process of being 
defined by the course of events.  ... It is the course of events that brings out 
new aspects of meaning in historical material. By being re-actualized in 
understanding, texts are drawn into a genuine course of events in exactly the 
same way as are events themselves.”50 
 
Even the linguistic conventions that we agree make verbal meaning are not 
merely linguistic: they include the context of the utterance. It is not, then, the 
case that ‘verbal meaning is that aspect of a speaker’s intention which may be 
shared’, but rather it is the case that ‘verbal meaning is what the hearer or 
reader recognises as being the meaning of the utterance, based on conventions 
that the hearer or reader assumes are shared’.  
 
Thus while I accept that verbal meaning is sharable, I do not agree with 
Hirsch’s speaker-centred suggestion that it “is [just] the shareable content of 
the speaker’s intentional object”51. Nor do I agree with the suggestion that just 
because verbal meaning is always shareable, it is therefore unchanging. 
Verbal meaning, like all meaning, is a collective activity. Meaning is not 
“determined once and for all by the character of the speaker’s intention”52 – 
which would simply abolish any distinction between the two concepts – but 
by some form of encultured conversation involving the responders and the 
agent. Indeed, intention itself is collectively determined, as I suggested in 
chapter four of this thesis. 
 
The verbal meaning of any particular intentional act is not for the agent alone 
to decide, but is decided conversationally (again, the similarity between 
Hirsch’s description of meaning, and Austin’s description of the perlocution, 
is interesting). Thus the concept of “the same verbal meaning” presupposes a 
particular, propositional view of meaning, as extractable from the words 
used, which may just be appropriate in some contexts, but not by any means 
in all53. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
circular entity: he assumes that meaning is something agreed by all competent readers, and 
any historical reader who does not agree, turns out not to be competent! 
50
 Truth and Method op cit p381 
51 Validity in Interpretation p219 
52 Validity in Interpretation p219 
53 To quote Fish: “the pure semantic value of the utterance is … merely an abstraction, which, 
although it can be separated out for the sake of analysis, has no separate and independent 
status”: S Fish, ‘What Is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying Such Terrible Things About It?’ 
in S Chatman (ed.) Approaches to Poetics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1973) p137. 
See also J R Cameron: “the significance of an indicative utterance will be transformed from a 
performative significance … into something static, with the action taken out; it ceases to have 
the nature of an institutional fact, and is no longer something created at a particular time (the 
time of utterance). (Our unwitting surgery amounts to filleting, not mere amputation, and its 
product is a cadaver)”: ‘Sentence-Meaning and Speech Acts’. The Philosophical Quarterly 20:79 
(April 1970) p115. 
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Hirsch persistently imagines that recognizing the meaning of a text, while an 
active effort, is not a response: “neither in fact nor in logic is a verbal meaning 
the same as any of the countless relational complexes within which it can 
form a part.”54 Therefore the fundamental difference between Hirsch and me 
is that while both he and I would agree that meaning is shareable55, I would 
believe that meaning is only shareable; there is no meaning otherwise: it is 
created in sharing. All meaning is relational and responsive56. Hirsch believes 
that meaning is created singly, and recognized by others. It is neither 
relational nor responsive. It is thus to all intents and purposes uptaken not 
understood, although Hirsch would deny this.  
 
Hirsch also objects to the notion that “what one understands is really one’s 
perception of or response to a meaning.”57 This suggestion is clearly 
inadequate and Hirsch is correct to object to it. ‘What one understands’ is not 
a response to the meaning, but it is the meaning of the thing itself, created in 
part by one’s own understanding act. A meaning is, quite crucially, attached 
to what is realized as being (because it has meaning) an act (or an aspect of 
one), and which therefore has value and content58.  
 
5. Authorial Intention and Transhistorical Intention:                                                                                                             
5a. In E. D. Hirsch 
 
A view of meaning such as that adopted by Hirsch, Ward and Vanhoozer, 
which sees it as being constituted in essence by the author’s intention realised 
within the text, poses for Christian biblical hermeneutics in particular, a great 
problem. How is one to understand the many Old Testament events and 
prophecies that are traditionally seen by Christians as referring to the Second 
and Third Persons of the Trinity? It cannot plausibly be asserted that the 
account of Abraham’s meeting at the Oaks of Mamre, for example, was 
intended by its human author to refer to God as Triune, or that the human 
author of chapter 53 of the Book of Isaiah intended, in describing the 
Suffering Servant, to refer to the Messiah Jesus of Nazareth59.  
 
                                                     
54 Validity in Interpretation p39 
55 “a single principle underlies what we loosely call “the norms of language.” It is the 
principle of sharability”: Validity in Interpretation p31 
56 If it is true, as Wittgenstein asserts, that there can be no such thing as a private language - 
“hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a 
rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a 
rule would be the same thing as obeying it.” Phil Inv I §202 (p81) - then it is equally true that 
there can be no such thing as a private meaning, and for the same reasons. An utterance can, 
however, have one meaning for a small group of initiates, and another for ‘the public’. 
57 Validity in Interpretation p37 
58 See the discussion of the act of shooting the donkey in chapter 5 section 2 of this thesis. See 
also S Fish, ‘What Is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying Such Terrible Things About It?’ in S 
Chatman (ed.) Approaches to Poetics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1973) p148. 
59 Because of the difference in time between the authorship of these texts on the one hand, 
and the revelation of God’s full nature, and Jesus’ own full identity, on the other. 
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Moreover, as the Russian hermeneut Mikhail Bakhtin has suggested, one of 
the attributes of ‘great literature’ is often said to be its continuing immediacy 
and relevance in contexts outside those imagined by the author60. Great 
literature ‘still has things to say’ to each new generation: it is a treasure trove, 
never exhausted by any number of readings, and neither Hirsch nor 
Vanhoozer wishes to entirely divorce this continuing appreciation of either 
the Bible, or of ‘great literature’ in general, from the author’s intention or 
control. This divorce would be necessary if all such future appreciations came 
under the scope of ‘significance’ rather than meaning. 
 
It is of course possible to say of the Bible that God is the author, rather than 
any human, so that ‘new’ Christian meanings are in accord with what the 
Divine Author intended. Vanhoozer suggests that the Divine authorship of 
the Old Testament, is evidenced in its Canonical status, which allows the 
“fuller meaning” of the Scriptures to emerge. He accepts that sometimes “the 
meaning of a historical event, for instance, does not become apparent 
immediately”61 (although it is not clear how this affects the objective ‘reality 
of the past’ he has previously so strenuously defended) and seeks for some 
way of preserving this recognition consonant with meaning being only that 
which was intended by the author.  
 
He notes that the  
 
answer, I believe, depends on what – or rather whose – intended act we are 
interpreting. A text must be read in light of its intentional context, that is, against 
the background that best allows us to answer the question of what the author is 
doing. For it is in relation to its intentional context that a text yields its maximal 
sense, its fullest meaning. If we are reading the Bible as the Word of God, therefore, I 
suggest that the context that yields this maximal sense is the canon, taken as a unified 
communicative act.62  
 
However, what this suggestion illustrates is that it is quite explicitly the 
context that allows us to read and understand properly, a context not 
imagined by the human author: Paul did not decide to write canonically; 
indeed none of the New Testament authors saw themselves as writing 
‘Scripture’. Moreover, this context – the Canon – has been created by another 
context: the Christian Church. Readers, guided by God (at least as Christians 
believe and hope), have created this context, and it is not simply propositional 
– ‘all the books which say the same thing are Canonical’ – but is in large part 
inherited. The ‘fullest’ meaning thus remains ‘intended’ only by virtue of a 
sleight of hand in respect of authorial identity, since in the case of the Bible 
                                                     
60 “For, we repeat, great novelistic images continue to grow and develop even after the 
moment of their creation, they are capable of being creatively transformed in different eras, 
far distant from the day and hour of their original birth” The Dialogic Imagination, (Austin TX, 
University of Texas, 2000) p422. 
61 Is There? p264 
62 Is There? p 265 
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the claim is that ‘God wrote the Canon’. In truth, if God did write the Canon, 
He did so through its readers63. 
 
It is the context that creates the maximal sense, not an innate property of the 
text or the will of the author (unless, in the case of the Bible, one wishes to see 
the will of the author as operating in the reading context as well as the writing 
of the text). Vanhoozer is simply privileging one particular context of one 
particular set of texts, on the basis of his own preconceived, inherited 
contextual assumptions. 
 
This dilemma is also present in Vanhoozer’s use of Bakhtin’s idea of the 
“fuller literal sense”64, which he uses as a justification for saying that 
Scriptural authors intended their Christian Canonical presence65 so that 
Christian use of the Old Testament does not contradict his insistence that 
meaning is authorial. However, in so doing he entirely ignores the thrust of 
Bakhtin’s work, which is to stress the extent to which any author is in 
dialogue with both his own time and subsequent generations, and that 
meaning is produced in this dialogue66. 
 
Moreover, the option of a Divine Author is not available to anyone seeking to 
link contemporary appreciation of ‘the classics’ to the author’s original 
meaning, since it is an argument which depends for its plausibility solely on a 
specific Christian context. Hence, in order to provide an authorially-
determined ‘intention context’ in which the fullest meaning can be identified 
without departing from authorial determination of meaning, Hirsch 
introduces, and Vanhoozer adopts, the concept of “transhistorical intention”.  
 
Hirsch takes his first steps towards this idea with his suggestion  
 
that for some genres of texts the author submits to the convention that his willed 
implications must go far beyond what he explicitly knows. This is to some degree 
an aspect of most texts …: the principle for including or excluding implications is 
not what the author is aware of, but whether or not the implications belong to the 
type of meaning that he wills.67  
 
                                                     
63 This of course is exactly what Nicholas Wolterstorff also ignores – he suggests that God 
“appropriates” human discourse – Divine discourse: Philosophical reflections on the claim that God 
speaks (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995) p63, but as he makes clear this is an 
entirely context-dependent recognition (p187). However, he completely fails to recognise the 
effect of this on his suggestion that discourse is an illocution as opposed to the perlocutionary 
nature of revelation. This is an accusation that is also levelled at Wolterstorff by B S Childs in 
his ‘Speech-act theory and biblical interpretation’, Scottish Journal of Theology 58:4 (2005). He 
points out that Wolterstorff completely neglects the canonical sense of Scripture, 
64 Is There? p 313 
65 Bad news if you read them in Synagogues I suppose 
66 For further reflections on Vanhoozer’s use of Bakhtin, see the next chapter. 
67 Validity in Interpretation p123-124 
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Hirsch himself is aware that this has implications for Scriptural interpretation: 
he suggests in a footnote that  
 
the human author’s willed meaning can always go beyond what he consciously 
intended so long as it remains within his willed type, and if the meaning is 
conceived of as going beyond even that, then we must have recourse to a divine 
Author speaking through the human one. In that case it is His willed type we are 
trying to interpret, and the human author is irrelevant. We must not confuse his 
text with God’s. In either instance the notion of a sense beyond the author’s is 
illegitimate.68  
 
In essence, then, this is a re-definition of the idea of ‘speaker’s meaning’ from 
‘things he willed’ to include ‘things he willed by implication, according to the 
genre he dictates for his text’. It allows therefore, the idea of context, albeit 
one that is entirely subservient to the author’s dictating will. It also, of course, 
assumes that questions of genre and context are questions of authorial 
declaration rather than of negotiation or ‘readerly’ contextual ascription. 
 
Hirsch subsequently came to ‘qualify and deepen’ this argument in his article 
‘Transhistorical Intentions and the Persistence of Allegory’69. Hirsch accepts 
Gadamer’s suggestion that  
 
application, and hence anachronism, and hence, as I shall argue, allegory, form 
implicit features in the interpretation of all writings that are intended to apply 
across time...  
Such writing typically intends to convey meaning beyond its immediate occasion 
into a future context which is very different from that of its production… The 
basic structures of those future situations may be preimagined, making the 
structure of allegory analogous to the structure of the original meaning. But the 
specific content of a future analogy … cannot be known. Hence in producing 
transoccasional writing, one almost always intends “contents” that go beyond the 
literal contents of one’s mind.70  
 
He goes on to quote some examples of the Supreme Court of the United States 
of America’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US 
Constitution, comparing a decision supportive of separate railway carriages 
for different ‘races’ (Plessy v Ferguson, 1896) with one declaring against 
separate education (Brown v Board of Education, 1954), some fifty years later. 
Hirsch suggests that the difference in the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
between the two cases was that the second was  
 
partly based on a recently determined relevant fact about the social world 
unknown or unaccepted by the interpreters in Plessy – namely that in the 
American context the psychological effects of separate facilities make them 
inherently unequal. Thus, on the basis of a “truer” understanding of what 
                                                     
68 Validity in Interpretation p126 footnote 37. 
69 E D Hirsch Jr, ‘Transhistorical Intentions and the Persistence of Allegory’, New Literary 
History 25:1 (1994) 549-567.  
70 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p552. 
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[Justice] Marshall called “the nature of the objects themselves,” the justices 
ruled that separate facilities are inherently unequal.71  
 
Hirsch’s argument is that the writers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended 
“to convey meaning beyond its immediate occasion into a future context 
which is very different from that of its production”72: they intended 
““contents” that go beyond the literal contents of [the writers’] mind.”   
 
Hirsch is in fact trying to find a middle way between on the one hand the 
“narrow literalism”73 of Constitutional ‘originalists’ such as Judge Bork, and 
on the other the “rigorous anti-originalists who wish to dispense with 
authorial intent altogether”74, by substituting for it “the reader’s intention”75. 
On the face of it, Hirsch’s hermeneutical concern to restore meaning to the 
author’s domain ought to make him entirely sympathetic to the ‘originalist’ 
position, which was highly critical of ‘judicial extrapolation’, and sought to 
overturn this habit in favour of an entirely literal interpretation of the 
Constitution, based solely on what its Eighteenth Century writers could have 
intended.  
 
However, the ‘originalist’ view found favour in a particular political context 
that was highly critical of ‘liberal judgements’ such as that in Roe v Wade, and 
shared some common ground with an element of particularly Republican 
Party ‘anti-big government’ thought. Hirsch is unwilling to conclude that the 
United States’ Constitution should be construed as intending to mean only 
what it meant in the Eighteenth Century, and thus that Constitutional clauses 
are inapplicable to issues such as abortion or Roosevelt-style ‘Public Works’, 
which  were not in the minds of Eighteenth Century legislators. Therefore he 
seeks to propose an alternative, which maintains some supposed ‘authorial 
control’ over meaning, while allowing for a degree of contextual 
extrapolation. 
 
There is such a position: one that acknowledges meaning as a dialogue, in 
which all parties have a share. However, Hirsch is attempting to find a 
middle way while still retaining his defence of authorial intention. Allegory 
(and ‘liberal’ judicial interpretations) are still, for Hirsch, necessarily governed 
by the transoccasional intentions of the author, otherwise they are immoral 
and inappropriate. Hirsch traces the origins of his idea in Saint Augustine’s 
biblical hermeneutics. Hirsch suggests that Augustine assumes that “the 
historical Moses intended readers to apprehend relevant truths that he, Moses, 
did not and could not be directly aware of.” In other words, the revelation of 
Jesus Christ fulfils and illuminates the ‘Old’ Testament.   
                                                     
71 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p552-553. 
72 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p552 
73 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p555 
74 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p555 
75 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p556 
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Hirsch suggests: 
 
An allegory is wrong if it is untrue to the spirit of the original intent. 
Interpretation must always go beyond the writer’s letter, but never beyond the 
writer’s spirit. And the writer’s spirit is determined not simply by abstract 
theological speculation about the nature of God’s truth, but is rooted in what 
Moses historically intended. Even if that original intention wished to 
accommodate itself to all sorts and conditions of future readers and periods of 
history, still it is to the spirit of Moses’s intention to which we must turn for 
interpretive sanction, even as we transcend the immediate contents of that 
intention.  
 
… Brown’s overruling of Plessy was an example of legitimate allegory, because 
Brown was based on a current understanding of the reality to which the law 
referred. Relevant reality as currently understood is one of the two legitimating 
principles for allegory. The other principle [is] that of constraint by original 
intention… An allegorical interpretation is legitimate when there is an 
empirically determined connection between the original intention to refer and 
that intention’s present reference. By ‘reference’ I mean what St Augustine and 
[Justice] John Marshall called respectively ‘truth’ or ‘the nature of the objects 
themselves’. 76 
 
Hirsch goes on to use in support the “blank-tag theory of names”77: the idea 
that names refer simply by naming, without needing descriptors. He suggests 
that “a reality in the world is not picked out by descriptions, but rather by a 
name that has a historical continuity or causal chain” so that we are able to 
refer “by virtue of the continuity of linguistic usage.”78 Hirsch refers to a 
“naming-baptism” or a “meaning-baptism”79 which begins the process of 
reference, and states that “the originating act has content that helps determine 
the nature of the intention to refer.”80 
 
Hirsch thus argues that the  
 
medieval allegorizers of Homer were sound in principle. Their fault lay in their 
empirical inaccuracy regarding the spirit of Homer’s original meaning-intentions, 
not in their finding anachronistic allegorical meanings... Macrobius and others 
were right to hold that the present meaning of the ancients is the transhistorical 
reality to which they meant to refer in the incompleteness of their knowledge.81  
 
This idea is adopted and amended by Vanhoozer and Ward.  
 
 
 
                                                     
76 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p558 
77 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p559 
78 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p559 
79 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p560 
80 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p560 
81 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p562 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Six: Meaning and Significance 
244 
Authorial Intention and Transhistorical Intention.                                                                                                                   
5b. In Kevin Vanhoozer and Timothy Ward 
 
For Vanhoozer, as we have noted, convincing a reader is a perlocutionary 
effect achieved by the author, and is to be distinguished from getting readers 
to understand you, which is an illocutionary action by the author82. However, 
Vanhoozer notes that there is nonetheless a complication: “what are we to 
make, however, of cases where an author intends to address readers in 
contexts other than the author’s own? Is such an intention a matter of mapping or 
meaning? We have seen that writing allows authors to communicate at a 
distance. Just what is the author’s attention span?”83 
 
This is a crucial question, because the distinction between illocutionary 
meaning and perlocutionary significance depends upon the plausibility of the 
presence of a ‘saturated context’84 allowing the uptake of meaning. The 
greater the apparent contextual discrepancy between the author and the 
reader, the less plausible the possibility of a saturated context appears. (Not 
least among the possible indicators of contextual discrepancy would be 
precisely those factors affecting reading of the Biblical texts at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century: a considerable chronological gap, and a 
considerable cultural and linguistic gap.)  
 
Vanhoozer does not detail how to distinguish those cases where the author 
intends a trans-contextual address from those cases where he does not. 
Instead he adopts a variation of Hirsch’s idea of “transhistorical intentions”: 
“the point is that an author’s intended meaning can tolerate a small revision 
in mental content and still remain the same”85. It should be noted that “mental 
content” here appears largely synonymous with the “author’s intended 
meaning”, and thus that meaning becomes synonymous with ‘the idea that 
the author wanted to express’, rather than ‘what was done’. Meaning is thus 
in practice a propositional concept, rather than an ‘artistic’ or poetic one, and 
is necessarily reliant on a perfect, ‘saturated’ context for uptake.  
 
Vanhoozer suggests “that certain applications may belong to the meaning 
rather than the significance side of the meaning/significance distinction”86 
                                                     
82 And which presumably requires merely reading with good will? “Illocutionary intent is 
thus constitutive of communicative action and of meaning in a way that perlocutionary intent 
is not”: Is There? p261 
83 Is There? p261 
84 Derrida’s phrase in his discussion of Austin 
85 Is There? p262. Vanhoozer does not, either, provide a definition of ‘small revisions’, nor 
indicate who decides what is or is not ‘small’, although this is presumably bigger than the 
sort of “sometimes perversely close” (Ward: Word and Supplement p172) or “inconsequential” 
(Word and Supplement footnote 121 p 172, quote occurring on p173, quoting Is There? p397) 
detail that Vanhoozer accuses Derrida of dwelling on! 
86 Is There? p262 
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and therefore that the meaning/significance distinction ought to be re-
worked:  
 
The meaning/significance distinction is fundamentally a distinction between a completed 
action and its ongoing intentional or unintentional consequences… [Transhistorical 
intentions identify] neither new acts nor unintended effects, but rather 
applications of the original intended meaning. I would therefore be happier to 
speak of meaning in terms of the author’s intended meaning and of significance 
in terms of the author’s extended meaning. When authors successfully enact their 
intentions, we can say meaning accomplished; when these meanings are brought to 
bear on other texts and contexts and so achieve perlocutionary effects, we should 
say meaning applied.87  
 
Vanhoozer does not want to limit ‘meaning’ to being a bland reconstruction 
of old senses and leave a text’s contemporary significance and effects entirely 
cast adrift and without any relation to the author’s intention, but equally he 
cannot do away with his need for an illocutionary guarantee.  
 
Ward likewise suggests that 
 
it can be argued that the meaning of the Bible is left unchanged by the present 
action of the Holy Spirit if some universal reference can be identified in the 
biblical texts themselves [such as the suggestion] … that the New Testament 
Gospels were addressed not to particular Christian communities …, but to ‘any 
and every Christian community in the late-first century Roman Empire’ [and that 
therefore, since] …there seems to be no significant hermeneutical difference 
between being separated from the particular culture of the writer by space and 
culture, or time and culture. It may be, then, that [the] … argument can be 
expanded to include the possibility that the Gospel-writers intended also a future 
reference to Christians in all ages: trans-cultural reference may include trans-
historical reference. People and situations of whom the Gospel-writers knew 
nothing are therefore referred to in the text to the extent that the particularities of 
the text claim to be of universal significance.88 
 
Thus “the action of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Bible is not to perform a 
new speech act, but to bring about the perlocutionary effect of the speech 
act(s) which God has performed and continues to perform.”89 
 
Ward and Vanhoozer thus blur their own illocutionary/perlocutionary 
distinction in order to claim authorial approval for certain ‘perlocutionary’ 
effects that the author would not normally under a speech act scheme be 
credited with having been able to predict accurately, or to claim as part of his 
                                                     
87 Is There? p262. I wonder why Vanhoozer refers to ‘other’ texts and contexts, since 
Perlocutionary effects apply to significance within the author’s own context too, on 
Vanhoozer’s account. 
88 Word and Supplement p203-204 
89 Word and Supplement p204. The role of the Holy Spirit is discussed in chapter eight of this 
thesis. 
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act. There are, however, a number of profound problems with this concept of 
transhistorical intention. 
 
6. Problems with Transhistorical Intention.                                                                                                                                          
6a: Differences in genre. 
 
The first problem with Hirsch’s suggestion is that much of his description of 
the idea of Transhistorical Intention is based on the use of the United States’ 
Constitution in the US Supreme Court. However, the genre of ‘Constitutions’, 
whether authorially or collectively determined, might not necessarily work in 
the same way as other textual genres. The ways in which texts and intentions 
are assessed and regarded, might vary between, say, legal and literary 
contexts, or even within legal contexts if different branches of the law or legal 
codes are being considered.  
 
Constitutions, and statutes generally, are collectively authored, politically 
‘approved’, and entrusted to ‘licensed readers’ (the Judiciary), at least in some 
democratic states. Conventions of precedence and hierarchy affect how legal 
texts may be read. None of this is necessarily applicable to literary or Biblical 
texts90. In order to establish that the rules he has outlined for legal allegory 
work in the same way for literary or Biblical allegory, Hirsch should spend 
some time acknowledging and reflecting on the potential (but arguably 
irrelevant) differences between them. This he does not do. Instead, he 
assumes that all sorts of texts are read in the same way: context, after all, is of 
limited significance in his scheme.  
 
Problems with Transhistorical Intention.                                                                                                                                                                                
6b. The irrelevancy of Authorial Intention.  
 
It is of course obvious that the intention of the various authors of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was not merely to permanently amend the 
Constitution, but to do so in particular respects, because these are 
implications of what ‘we’91 understand by the concept of a written 
Constitution and the process of Amendment. Aside from the fact that aspects 
of the Amendment, if not the entire Amendment, may have been intended to 
be punitive, the Amendment also states that all people born in the United 
States are citizens entitled to “equal protection” from the law; that the 
numbers of Representatives for each state should be proportionate to its 
enfranchised population; that rebels are barred from office; and that neither 
                                                     
90 As Jarrett notes: “there is no ‘official’ philosophical answer [to “what Kant meant in a 
certain passage”] (even if there is something like that), but there is an ‘official’ (legal) reading 
of the First Amendment. When there is, as in [some] law, an authoritative interpretive 
tradition, the original meaning and intent of the author is only one of the factors to be 
considered in determining “what the text means””: ‘Philosophy of Language in the Service of 
Religious Studies’, Semeia 41: Speech Act theory and Biblical Criticism (1988) 155.  
91 I.e. Members of democracies with written constitutions with amendment provisions, 
students of the history of the USA, etc. 
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Confederate bonds nor the costs of the emancipation of slaves would be met 
by the United States Government.  
 
In Plessy, this Amendment was not believed (by the majority) to have any 
effect on the legality of the provision of segregated railway carriages or other 
facilities, explicitly including schools. In Brown, this same Amendment was 
believed to affect the legality of the provision of segregated schooling. Both of 
these decisions were made with reference to the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the intentions of the writers. The fact that the meaning of the Amendment 
was differently understood in these two cases does not in practice reflect the 
intentions of its original drafters, but rather reflects the fact that meaning is 
not governed solely by intention, even in the case of legal documents92. The 
question of intention is further complicated in legal contexts by the fact that it 
is affected by legal precedents, and most if not all constitutional documents 
are collectively authored.  
 
As Mr Chief Justice Warren suggested when delivering the opinion of the 
Court in Brown93 
 
the most avid proponents of the post-War amendments undoubtedly intended 
them to remove all legal distinctions among “all persons born or naturalized in 
the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both 
the letter and the spirit of the amendments and wished them to have the most 
limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind 
cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. 94 
 
Therefore he goes on to suggest that “in approaching this problem, we cannot 
turn the clock back to 1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 
1896, when Plessy v Ferguson was written. We must consider public education 
[which he has already noted did not really exist in 1868] in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the nation.”95  
 
Thus, Mr Chief Justice Warren seems to be dismissing the idea that the 
intention of the writers of the Amendment is directly relevant: rather he will 
go on to construe the Amendment for himself, in the light of its current 
                                                     
92 Indeed, English Courts have in the past been reluctant to interpret Statutes on the basis of 
what was said in Parliamentary debates and Committees, preferring simply to rely on their 
own construal of the words of the Act concerned. See also S Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances, 
Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What goes 
without Saying, and Other Special Cases’, Critical Inquiry 4:4 (Summer 1978). 
93 The papers relating to this case can be found at the website of the Legal Information 
Institute, part of Cornell University Law School, at http://www.law.cornell.edu/lii.html.  
The Legal Reference for the case is 347 US 483. 
94 The Opinion of the Court in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, given by Warren, C.J., 
is at http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0347_0483_ZO.html.  
This quote comes from the fourth paragraph of the Opinion. 
95 http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0347_0483_ZO.html.  
This quote comes from the eighth paragraph of the Opinion. 
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context. He will adopt, in other words, a view of intention as understood 
action consonant with Professor Duff’s suggestion discussed in chapter four 
of this thesis. While the ‘originalist’ would argue that the intentions of the 
writers of the Constitution or Amendment should be paramount, Chief Justice 
Warren’s argument effectively asserts that the Constitution is not the property 
of its originators: rather it is owned by each succeeding generation of 
Americans. The Constitution is not a dead document, but one that lives in 
current American life96. 
 
By contrast with the decision in Brown v the Board of Education, Mr Justice 
Brown, giving the opinion in Plessy v Ferguson97, stated that  
 
the object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of 
the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been 
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon 
terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their 
separation ... do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, 
and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency 
of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common 
instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white 
and colored children, which have been held to be a valid exercise of the 
                                                     
96 As Jarrett notes “When there is, as in law, an authoritative interpretive tradition, the 
original meaning and intent of the author is only one of the factors to be considered in 
determining “what the text means”. This is especially so with texts that are used as a source 
of norms, for, as often remarked, changing conditions give rise to questions that could not 
have been envisaged by earlier writers. A standard example of this concerns the 4th 
Amendment – for the Founding Fathers were not in a position to consider whether, or under 
what circumstances, a wiretap is an unreasonable search. 
The interpretation of such (‘normative’) texts is not so much the search for the original 
meaning and intent of the author as the construction of meaning for the present … Neither 
law nor theology is history. (Nor, Barthes tells us, is literary criticism).”: ‘Philosophy of 
Language in the Service of Religious Studies’, Semeia 41: Speech Act theory and Biblical Criticism 
(1988) 155. See also the view of Gadamer: “every age has to understand a transmitted text in 
its own way, for the text belongs to the whole tradition whose content interests the age and in 
which it seeks to understand itself. The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, 
does not depend on the contingencies of the author and his original audience. It certainly is 
not identical with them, for it is always co-determined also by the historical situation of the 
interpreter and hence by the totality of the objective course of history”: Truth and Method 
(New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p307. Indeed, Gadamer later asserts that “a law 
does not exist in order to be understood historically, but to be concretized in its legal validity 
by being interpreted. Similarly, the gospel does not exist in order to be understood as a 
merely historical document, but to be taken in such a way that it exercises its saving effect. 
This implies that the text ... if it is to be understood properly – i.e., according to the claim it 
makes – must be understood at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and 
different way. Understanding here is always application”: op cit p319-320. This also 
illustrates some of the potential generic differences in play here. 
97 Legal Information Institute – the Opinion of the Court in Plessy, given by Brown, J., can be 
found at http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0163_0537_ZO.html. 
The Legal reference for the case is 163 US 537. 
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legislative power even by courts of states where the political rights of the colored 
race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.98 
 
However, in his dissenting opinion Mr Justice Harlan describes this 
judgement as in his opinion “pernicious”99, and suggests that “the thin 
disguise of ‘equal’ accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will 
not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done.”100 
 
There are thus a variety of competing interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, depending not merely on time but clearly on political approach. 
It is hard to believe that any of the original framers of the Amendment would 
have intended such a variety of approaches, although different members of 
Congress would doubtless have held all of these views. The fact that there 
have been such deep disagreements as to the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and its legality) indicates absolutely clearly that the meaning of 
‘transhistoric’ documents does not depend on the interior intentions of the 
writers, but rather on varying interpretations of the text itself, from within 
different contexts. 
 
Problems with Transhistorical Intention.                                                                                                                                                 
6c. The Context of Reading and ‘public consensus’  
 
The question of textual interpretation therefore alights on the question of 
context. When Hirsch suggests that Saint Augustine assumes that “the 
historical Moses intended readers to apprehend relevant truths that he, Moses, 
did not and could not be directly aware of”, or that the revelation of Jesus 
Christ fulfils and illuminates the Old Testament, it is quite wrong to assert 
that Moses ‘transoccasionally intended’ to refer to the Holy Trinity or the 
incarnation of God, leaving aside the question of Moses’ historical existence 
and the authorship of the Pentateuch101.  
 
It is perfectly acceptable for a Christian to argue that the Old Testament does 
indeed, because it is God’s revelation of Himself through human authors, 
refer to and mean Christian doctrines. However, it is wrong to assert that this 
meaning is the intended meaning of the human author/s: there can be no 
basis at all for suggesting that this meaning is inherent in the intention of the 
human author/s. When read in a Christian context, this text may very 
properly have these Christian meanings. However, this text could equally 
                                                     
98 Op cit. This quote comes from the Twelfth paragraph of the Opinion. 
99 Legal Information Institute. The Dissenting Opinion of Harlan, J., can be found at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0163_0537_ZD.html.  
This quote comes from the Fifteenth paragraph.  
100 Eighteenth paragraph. Although he also suggests, in the previous paragraph, that “there is 
a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become 
citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely 
excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race.” 
101 Since someone or some series of people did indeed write these books. 
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properly be read in a Jewish, secular or Islamic context, in which case it 
would have no such meaning. To suggest to an observant Jew that Moses 
intended to refer to the Trinity or the Incarnation would be offensive (and 
probably laughable) and, in the context say of a Synagogue or Sabbath meal, 
also simply wrong. 
 
The Christian sees those meanings because he or she believes that God has 
revealed Himself uniquely in Jesus Christ and that His spirit animates and 
guides His Church, from which context many hidden things become plain. 
The Christian may also believe that Moses, enjoying the Beatific vision, now 
pays homage to the Trinity and worships the Incarnate God. Neither a Jew 
nor a Muslim (nor indeed an atheist) would believe this: for them, the 
Church’s reading context is erroneous (and blasphemous). Moses did not 
intend to refer to the Trinity. That he does so, is because the Church is able to 
read the Trinity into texts, in a perfectly authentic, inspired dialogic reading 
activity, believing herself to be guided into all truth by the Spirit.  
 
Further, the nature of “relevant reality currently understood” is problematic. 
Hirsch objected to the notion of a public consensus as to meaning on the 
(spurious) grounds that unanimity is impossible, so that there would always 
be competing meanings.102 However, “relevant reality” is no more fixed or 
certain. The dissenting judgement in Plessy is evidence of the fact that relevant 
reality can always be understood in more than one way. 
 
Hirsch assumes that it is firstly possible to “empirically determine”103 the 
author’s meaning and intention, and to establish a link between the author’s 
intended meaning and the asserted allegorical meaning of the text now. For 
allegory to be legitimate, Hirsch asserts that it needs to be in line with the 
author’s original intention, ‘empirically’ extrapolated forwards into current 
conditions. The idea is that the ‘present reference’ of the author’s original 
intention is the truth or essential nature of the text. It is rather as though one 
could ask – ‘if Shakespeare had been alive today, what would he have wanted 
Hamlet to mean?’ 
 
As a description of the conversational way in which meaning is established, 
this is accurate enough, if a trifle obscure. However, the perennial confusion 
between intention and meaning (or attempt and achievement) is still 
unresolved, and is compounded when Hirsch goes on to use in support the 
“blank-tag theory of names”104: the idea that names refer simply by naming, 
                                                     
102 “The idea of a public meaning sponsored not by the author’s intention but by a public 
consensus is based upon a fundamental error of observation and logic. It is an empirical fact 
that the consensus does not exist, and it is a logical error to erect a stable normative concept 
(i.e. the public meaning) out of an unstable descriptive one.” Validity in Interpretation p13: see 
the discussion of this point later in this chapter. 
103 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p558 
104 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p559 
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without needing descriptors. He suggests that “a reality in the world is not 
picked out by descriptions, but rather by a name that has a historical 
continuity or causal chain” so that we are able to refer “by virtue of the 
continuity of linguistic usage.”105  
 
Again, this is accurate as far as it goes, but we are able to name things 
successfully not simply because of a continuity of grammar or language, but 
because we are taught the use of language and learn references and names as 
part of our cultural inheritance. What is passed down is not an ‘original 
intention’, but an agreed definition, which is itself contextual and susceptible 
to change. The name ‘John Smith’ might in the United Kingdom refer to an 
unknown person (rather like ‘John Doe’), to a Brewing Company, or to the 
now deceased Labour Party politician, as well as to one of millions of other 
individuals. We will determine (successfully or not) which is referred to, on 
the basis of the shared conversational context, not because of some magic 
inherent in the name. Neither descriptors nor ‘the name itself’ refer. What 
refers is that word uttered and recognized in that particular utterance in that 
particular context, a context within shared conversations and cultures106.  
 
As previously noted, Hirsch refers to a “naming-baptism” or a “meaning-
baptism”107 which begins the process of reference. He states that “the 
originating act has content that helps determine the nature of the intention to 
refer.”108 But this originating act is not the action of an isolated author. Babies 
do not name themselves: the names they are given, and which are often (or 
universally) conferred upon them in a public ritual which has inherited forms 
and meanings of its own, are themselves names which are inherited and 
chosen by others, with all sorts of connotations and histories.  
 
We do not name ourselves and force the rest of the world to name us 
according to our own dictates: we are named, and perhaps later we acquire 
nicknames, that are given to us and we accept. We can of course change our 
names both legally, when an adult (at least in some cultures), and by 
inventing nicknames for ourselves, but these are ineffective if no-one agrees 
to call us by our new name. We may, too, be known by different names in 
different contexts. However, any baptism is a collective act. This is true 
especially of the rite of Christian baptism, which is baptism into the collective 
inheritance of the Church as the Body of Christ, but it applies also to 
“naming-baptism” and “meaning-baptism”.  
 
                                                     
105 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p559 
106 “If there has to be anything ‘behind the utterance of the formula’ it is particular 
circumstances, which justify me in saying I can go on – when the formula occurs to me” 
which is not a separate ‘mental act’ aside from ‘going on’: Phil Inv I §154 p61. 
107 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p560 
108 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p560 
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Thus what Hirsch calls the “originating act of meaning” is not an act carried 
out by an individual agent, but is rather an aspect of a continuing 
conversation between a whole culture of actors who both speak and listen, 
and who agree on the meanings of utterances and names. Intention, and the 
interior mental knowledge of a speaker109, are irrelevant for meaning: 
meaning is what is recognized as having been done. 
 
However, it is not clear why, if Augustine was right about Moses’ intentions, 
the medieval allegorizers were wrong about Homer’s, or why the decision of 
the majority in Plessy was wrong in its own time (as the dissenting judgement 
of Justice Harlan alleged)110. Augustine was not, I suggest, more ‘empirically 
accurate’111 about Moses than the medieval allegorizers were about Homer. 
Moreover, it is not clear why Hirsch assumes that there will be “progress in 
knowledge”112. Things may be forgotten and overlooked as well as 
developed, and it is also the case that our own present-day knowledge is no 
more necessarily complete than was our ancestors (as the very existence as 
well as the form of the dissenting judgement in Plessy implies113).  
 
If it is argued that, for example, Moses intended to be true, and to tell the 
truth about God, therefore he must have meant the Trinity even if he didn’t 
know it, because the Trinity is a truth about God, then this argument surely 
also applies to every text ever written. Many authors intend not just to be 
interesting and revealing and to entertain, but also to express truths about the 
human condition of some sort or other. If their authorial intention is to be 
true, then surely all of them must intend to be orthodox Christians, or to be 
compatible with orthodox Christianity, on the assumption that orthodox 
Christianity is now known to be true. This was, I suggest, more or less the 
assumption behind medieval allegories of Homer. 
 
I note, too, that the examples Hirsch uses to test his theory that “progress in 
knowledge is indeed a legitimating interpretive principle”114 are all concerned 
with the meaning of phrases: dephlogisticated air, water, and “the atoms of 
Democritus/ And Newton’s Particles of light”. In each case, Hirsch is asking 
about the meaning of a word, and wondering whether or not some of the 
associations it might hold for us, are implied in the use of the word or phrase 
                                                     
109 What Austin called “pretended acts”. 
110 Indeed, Hirsch sometime seems to suggest that in its own time, the majority judgment in 
Plessy might have been legitimate, although it is so no longer. 
111 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p558 
112 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p562 
113 Harlan J was well aware that the Court was being racist: here he was doubtless in the 
vanguard of public opinion. In our terms, however, while correct in his view of Plessy, he was 
also himself guilty of apparent racism against the Chinese: in this sense, he both illustrates 
that knowledge is disputed, and warns us against believing that later generations will 
vindicate us in every respect rather than both praising and condemning us alternately.  
114 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p562 
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by Priestley, Coleridge or Blake. He does not address the question of the 
meaning and value of a work of art.  
 
Hirsch then secondly suggests that “sometimes in order to remain true to 
original intent you must reject original mental content.”115 This is a pretty 
clear recognition that intention does not dictate meaning. Indeed, Hirsch goes 
on to recognise that “the idea of present consensus [is] critical in defining the 
limits of legitimate allegory”116 because ‘truth’ or ‘the nature of the objects 
themselves’ “is, in actual practice, identical with our current consensus-
understanding of reality.”  
 
Not only is this alone a complete reversal of his previous dismissal of the 
possibility that meaning is a matter of public consensus, but Hirsch goes even 
further: “when current theories about natural or social reality are highly 
conflicted, we cannot determine present referentiality.”117 It is on this basis of 
‘general agreement’ that “the legitimately allegorical Plessy of 1896 became 
the illegitimately allegorical Plessy of 1954.” The problem is, of course, that 
there has never been a consensus about the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as Chief Justice Warren observed in Brown.  
 
When Plessy was decided, Justice Harlan vigorously opposed it: there was no 
consensus even on the Supreme Court, let alone anywhere else. For many 
people, including a Supreme Court Justice, Plessy was illegitimately 
allegorical even in 1896, and something important is lost if one adopts a 
position that makes it impossible to acknowledge the legitimacy of this kind 
of dissent in relation to meaning. Further, when Brown effectively overturned 
Plessy, this was by no means the result of a unanimous social consensus. It 
reflected changing attitudes, and perhaps even a change in the opinion of the 
majority, but there remain opposing views. Racism persists, and ‘originalists’ 
too would oppose the ‘creativity’ of the judgment in Brown.  
 
Hirsch has asserted (as previously noted), that “the idea of a public meaning 
sponsored not by the author’s intention but by a public consensus is based 
upon a fundamental error of observation and logic. It is an empirical fact that 
the consensus does not exist, and it is a logical error to erect a stable 
normative concept (i.e. the public meaning) out of an unstable descriptive 
one.”118 It is not clear, however, why normative concepts have to be stable, 
and why there cannot be a variety of different publics, each of whom has their 
own consensus. Why must there be one consensus and one public meaning?  
 
It is legitimately possible for something to have more than one meaning, 
depending on the context in question. The legitimacy of Plessy as an allegory 
                                                     
115 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p563-564 
116 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p564 
117 ‘Transhistorical Intentions’ p564 
118 Validity in Interpretation p13 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment does not depend on social consensus. The 
legitimacy of Plessy depends on the views of the community who are 
considering it. For some communities in America, the majority view in Plessy 
doubtless remains legitimate. They are not in a majority in the body politic. 
Even now there may be communities in which it would be unwise to insist on 
Brown or on the minority view in Plessy, and safer to keep one’s head down. 
Present referentiality is determined by different groups differently, and then 
disputed119.  
 
It may be that over time disputes are resolved and a meaning agreed. 
Presumably one interpretation emerges victorious over time, or communities 
divide along interpretative grounds. However, the example of Roe v Wade and 
the continuing controversy over abortion in the United States (and indeed 
elsewhere) indicates that it is possible for different groups to regard an 
allegorical interpretation as legitimate or illegitimate over a period of several 
generations, without there being any agreement in sight. A completely 
unanimous consensus is probably impossible120, and certainly unnecessary: 
all that is required is that enough people agree with an interpretation for it to 
be meaningful in that particular communal context121. Thereafter, every 
interpretation develops over time122.  
 
As Louise Rosenblatt suggests: “as soon as one looks for ... a consensus, one 
finds not one but divergent publics, each achieving its own consensus 
through commonly held criteria ... [such as] appeals to the common human 
experiences ... [or] the reactions of a highly selected group of verbally 
sophisticated readers ... [or] the persistence through time and changing 
generations of perhaps a limited group of readers for a text”123. We live in a 
situation of many different, overlapping consensuses.  
 
In attempting to ‘save’ texts from obsolescence and explain how it is that 
some texts remain ‘alive’ and meaningful so long after they were written, 
without diminishing the authorial veto over meaning, Hirsch ends up by 
reviving the idea of a public consensus establishing meaning that he rejected 
so firmly at the beginning of his first work on the subject of meaning. 
                                                     
119 See S Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the 
Everyday, the Obvious, What goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases’, Critical Inquiry 
4:4 (Summer 1978) p632ff, on Riggs v Palmer 1889.  
120 Would it need to include everyone who could speak the language, or everyone who lived 
in the political entity concerned, or everyone who was a citizen, for example? 
121 Or ‘lebensform’ – ‘form of life’, for Wittgenstein. Phil Inv I §23 p11. 
122 This is the point that M Hesse makes in her ‘Reply to Don Hirsch’, New Literary History 17:1 
(Autumn 1985) p 58: “we cannot have what Hirsch calls “a principle for putting a limit on 
accommodation” of theories; we only have the consensus of scientific judgment that one or a 
few theories are reasonable given all the constraints of simplicity, and so forth, as well as 
good empirical fit.” It is Hirsch’s desire for a guarantee that puts him in the same boat as 
Austin and Vanhoozer. 
123 L M Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem: the Transactional theory of the Literary work, 
(Carbondale IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1978) p160. 
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However, the influence of the community on meaning is indeed ultimately 
inescapable. This realization leads inexorably to a recognition that genre and 
context are highly influential in meaning, and are not author-determined.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
It is undoubtedly the case that thus far in this thesis, more time has been spent 
criticising the hermeneutical positions of others, than advancing anything 
positive. The thesis has been primarily determined to indicate that Speech Act 
theory is flawed, both inherently, and as a textual hermeneutical tool, and has 
not produced any detailed alternative to defend the idea of revelation.  
 
Up to this point, this thesis has demonstrated that the concept of the 
illocution, which has become for Austin’s ‘heirs’ his principal bequest, is 
incoherent. It cannot be successfully distinguished from the perlocution, and 
Austin's attempts to do so lead into incoherence with regard to intention, and 
must therefore be abandoned. The illocution works effectively as a 
description of actions that have already been successful, but it obscures the 
fact that speech acts are only ‘successful’ if they are recognised in particular 
ways, and thus that they are in part co-created by the – for want of a better 
word – audience. The use of the illocution as a descriptive tool, therefore, 
while on the face of it acceptable, in fact obscures an important truth about all 
speech acts, even ‘illocutionary’ ones. In addition to this danger when used as 
a descriptive analytical tool, the illocution is useless as a predictive one. 
 
This thesis has also demonstrated that Austin’s underlying problem, which 
has been a largely unacknowledged bequest within the illocution, lies in part 
in his assumption that meaning is begotten not created: that is, that meaning 
can exist before the utterance is recognised by the audience, and that the 
audience (which may be hearers or readers) has no part to play in the creation 
of the meaning of utterances, although he also on occasion disavows, or 
almost disavows, this belief124.  
 
However, this thesis also has a more positive aim: it is designed not merely to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of using Speech Act theory as a general 
hermeneutical key, for any purposes outside the assessment of acts within the 
text, but also to propose an alternative hermeneutical tool, and in conjunction 
an alternative understanding of revelation itself. I recognise that revelation is 
an essential concept for Christianity and that revelation requires an 
understanding of how God can address His children.  
                                                     
124 As when, for example, he concludes his demonstration of the resemblances between 
constative and performative utterances by observing that “we must consider the total 
situation in which the utterance is issued – the total speech-act – if we are to see the parallel 
between statements and performative utterances, and how each can go wrong. Perhaps 
indeed there is no great distinction between statements and performative utterances”: How To 
p52 
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Accordingly, the succeeding chapters outline the view of hermeneutics and 
revelation I propose in contradistinction to that previously criticised, which is 
based initially on the work of the Russian scholar Mikhail Bakhtin and some 
of his colleagues. Their work and their understanding of meaning, and its 
relationship to context and understanding, are outlined in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE HERMENEUTICS OF MIKHAIL 
BAKHTIN AND VALENTIN VOLOSINOV 
 
1. Introduction 
 
I noted at the end of the last chapter that this chapter makes use of the work 
of the Russian scholar Mikhail Bakhtin and his colleagues. Having been 
neglected for several generations, the work of this group has been introduced 
into literary theories and hermeneutics over the last few decades, since the 
renewal of outside interest in their work began in earnest, in the West, in the 
1980’s.  
 
Both Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov1, the collaborator of principal interest in 
this thesis, were born in 1895, and were active in Russia in the period of the 
1920’s and 1930’s. They first began to associate in the city of Nevel, moving 
later to Vitebsk, also in Belorussia, and thereafter to Leningrad (now St 
Petersburg). Their dates alone indicate that they lived in interesting times in 
Russian history, and their own careers were subject to the difficulties of those 
times, with the Communist revolution, the Stalinist terror, and the Nazi 
invasion.  
 
Volosinov died, apparently of tuberculosis2, in 1936, having produced only 
two books that bear his name, Freudianism: A Critical Sketch (also translated as 
Freudianism: A Marxist Critique) published in Russian in 1927 and translated 
into English in the 1970’s, and Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 
(published in Russian in 1929 and also translated into English in the 1970’s). 
Bakhtin, however, despite suffering from osteomyelitis and having a leg 
amputated in 1938, only died in 1975, and his bibliography is slightly larger, 
although most of the work was published posthumously or long after it was 
written, and some scholars also argue that he was primarily responsible for 
the work of others in the circle, including Volosinov, although this is much 
disputed3.  
 
Some of the work of Bakhtin and possibly others of the circle has been lost, 
and many of Bakhtin’s manuscripts were, when found, in less than perfect 
                                                     
1 Given the need to translate from the Cyrillic alphabet, various spellings of these names can 
be encountered, including Baxtin and Voloshinov. I have opted for the spellings that seem 
most frequently used. 
2 According to the website ‘Encyclopedia of Marxism’ available at 
http://www.marxists.org/glossary/people/v/o.htm#voloshinov-valentin, viewed on the 
12th of November 2013. 
3 Compare for example the introductions to the two works of Volosinov by I R Titunik, and 
the introductions to Bakhtin’s work published under the auspices of Michael Holquist for the 
University of Texas – see bibliography. See also the brief mention of the debate in M 
Lähteenmäki, ‘Consciousness as a Social and Dialogical Phenomenon’, Finlance 14 (1994) p2 
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condition4. There is dispute between modern scholars not just about the 
authorship of Bakhtin’s and his colleagues works, but also concerning the 
extent to which some of the ideas suggested were deleteriously affected by 
the conditions of censorship and tyranny under which they were written, and 
the extent of, for example, Bakhtin’s Marxist or Christian beliefs at various 
times5.  
 
Bakhtin’s own career is undeniably controversial, even on the evidence that 
has survived: he and others of the circle6 were arrested in 1929, on a charge of 
belonging to an underground association with links to the Russian Orthodox 
church. Bakhtin spent several years in internal exile in Kazakhstan, having 
been excused from Siberia on the grounds of his poor health, before resuming 
his academic career unobtrusively in the republic of Mordovia in central 
Russia, where he remained until ill-health forced him to return to Moscow for 
the last few years of his life. His principal published works are Towards a 
Philosophy of the Act7; Art and Answerability8; Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics9; 
Rabelais and His world10; The Dialogic Imagination11; and Speech Genres and other 
Essays12. 
 
Bakhtin’s interests roam over a wide field, including principally language and 
literature, but also questions of being and identity. His work is a disputed and 
complex corpus, which shares at least three similarities with the work of 
Austin: in the first place, it is very concerned with language and speech; 
secondly it was not for the most part published by the author (and is thus 
‘fixed’ in ways not necessarily intended by them); and finally it is dialogic, 
both as a concept and in form. Bakhtin stresses often the importance of 
dialogue and conversation and, very like Austin, often seems to be in 
dialogue with the reader or some other party.  
 
                                                     
4 There is a story that he used the original manuscript of his work on German bildungsroman 
as cigarette paper during the Second World War, and the manuscript of Towards a Philosophy 
of the Act is partial and incomplete. 
5 As Vanhoozer also notes (Remythologizing Theology p310 footnote 58), where he refers to the 
overview by the Bakhtin scholar Caryl Emerson, The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin 
(Princeton University Press, 1997). 
6 Though not Volosinov 
7 Apparently written in 1919-1921 but first published in Russian in 1986 and in English in 
1993. 
8 Collecting three essays first written in 1919 and the 1920’s, republished in the 1970’s in 
Russian, and collected together into the English book in 1990.  
9 First published in Russian in 1929, and then significantly revised in 1963. 
10 His doctoral thesis, which he defended in 1947, but which as a thesis was not officially 
approved, and which was thus first published in Russian only in 1965, after the re-issuing of 
the Dostoyevsky book: this work on Rabelais was the first of his works to be translated into 
English, in 1968. 
11 Four essays from the 1930’s and 1940’s first published together in 1975. 
12 generally dating from the last phase of Bakhtin’s life, but including a fragment of the work 
on bildungsroman lost when a printers was destroyed during the Second World War, which 
were first published as a collection in English in 1986. 
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I intend to use some elements of Bakhtin’s and Volosinov’s work to propose a 
new view of revelation, in a dialogue with them, and criticising the use of 
Austin made by Searle, as well as by Vanhoozer, Ward and others. The view 
of revelation I will suggest is, ironically, one that accords with Austin’s actual 
achievements, as against the achievements he perhaps sought. In particular, 
Bakhtin and Volosinov both help undermine the concept of uptake, and force 
a recognition of the co-creative role of the reader or hearer in the creation of 
meaning.  
 
Before outlining my own views on reading and understanding, drawn in part 
from the Bakhtin circle, and before comparing them with the views of John 
Searle, I suspect it would be helpful to illustrate my own interpretation of the 
work of Bakhtin and Volosinov. Accordingly the next several sections are 
devoted to a personal assessment of their work, before moving on to some 
suggestions for its use in hermeneutics. 
 
It is in fact hard to know quite where to begin in discussing the work of 
Bakhtin and Volosinov. This is an appropriate problem since it compels me to 
begin in a ‘Bakhtinian sense’ by underlining that any start is not a beginning 
per se, but an entry into an already-existing conversation, or perhaps several, 
and that dialogue between specific people in social contexts and relationships, 
and thus a perpetual movement, are inescapable13.  
 
With this initial caveat or acknowledgement in place, I will go on to say, 
firstly that the use of ‘I’ here is inescapable (since I must be answerable for my 
particular place in dialogue – as Bakhtin would insist, there is no “alibi in 
Being”14) and secondly that there are a number of themes that are of crucial 
importance to my interests in this thesis which are all interlinked. To start 
with any particular issue is problematic, because it is always possible to go 
from one concept to almost all of the others. Since all the issues are linked, one 
could start from anywhere. The nature of ‘I’ and of the self seems the best 
place to begin.  
 
From the ‘I’ I will go on to discuss how the contextuality of identity informs 
inevitably the contextuality of utterance, and how this in turn describes 
meaning as dialogic, for Bakhtin and Volosinov. This highlights the 
importance of the activeness and distinctiveness of the act of reading, and 
leads to an emphasis on the intertwined relationship between the particular 
and the universal, expressed as a necessary and productive tension between 
theory and individual experience. 
 
From the foregoing it will be seen that I find less useful some of Bakhtin’s 
specific aesthetics, particularly that relating to the distinctiveness of the 
                                                     
13 See also Truth and Method op cit p488-489 
14 M M Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act (Austin TX, University of Texas, 1993) p42. 
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novel15, and to the place of laughter and comedy.16 However, Bakhtin’s 
general aesthetics, especially as expressed in Art and Answerability, is very 
useful and will be discussed.  
 
It should also be noted that the various members of what is sometimes called 
‘the Bakhtin circle’, which included among others Matvei Isaevich Kagan, 
Pavel Nikolaevich Medvedev, Lev Vasilievich Pumpianskii, and Ivan 
Ivanovich Sollertinskii, as well as Valentin Volosinov, are not necessarily 
systematic in their approach or in their publications, and not necessarily in 
agreement, and thus anything said is always open to clarification or even 
contradiction elsewhere. This seems not inappropriate with a philosophy that 
is, and that demonstrates the inescapability of the condition of being, a ‘work-
in-progress’.  
 
2. The ‘social’ and dynamic nature of consciousness and identity. 
 
For both Bakhtin and Volosinov, the nature of consciousness is inescapably 
social: “individualism is a specific sort of ‘we-experience’”17. It makes no 
sense to think of oneself as solitary, or of one’s individuality as a private or 
personal attribute, since consciousness and personality have been inherited 
and developed in dialogue with all of one’s quite literally formative 
influences. One’s own sense of self-ness and self-consciousness, although it is 
culturally customary to see them as ‘owned’ or as ‘personal’, are in fact 
collective, although of course not solely so. Volosinov in Freudianism: A 
Critical Sketch crafts a classic expression of this;  
 
the abstract biological person, biological individual … does not exist at all. It is an 
improper abstraction… Only as part of a social whole … does the human person 
become historically real and culturally productive. In order to enter into history it is 
not enough to be born physically. Animals are physically born but they do not 
enter into history. What is needed is, as it were, a second birth, a social birth. A 
human being is not born as an abstract biological organism… Only this social and 
historical localization makes him a real human being and determines the content of his 
life and cultural creativity.18  
                                                     
15 The aspect of his thought, perhaps ironically, that Vanhoozer has adopted in his 
Remythologizing Theology. 
16 I am also less captivated that Bakhtin perhaps was by the ‘primacy’ of the concept of ‘being’ 
itself, in an ‘ontological’ sense, although Bakhtin’s use of the concept is arguably a rather 
particularized one, so that one gets a kind of pragmatic or contingent ontology, if that is 
possible! I also find highly suggestive Panikkar’s suggestion that “Being is only an image, a 
revelation of that which, if it were completely unveiled, would not even be, for being is its 
manifestation, its epiphany, its symbol:” The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon-
Person-Mystery, (London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973) p49. 
17 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p89 
18 Freudianism p15. There are interesting echoes here of the notion of being ‘born-again’ into 
the New Kingdom, and of the work of the British contemporary of both Bakhtin and 
Volosinov, John Macmurray (1891-1976), who suggests that “personality is something that 
only exists between people and which cannot exist in the individual in isolation. It is 
impossible to integrate an individual person in isolation. The creation of harmonious 
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This remains accurate even outside the Marxist ideology that inspires it, and 
outside the rather naïve assumptions about the objectivity of materialism that 
Volosinov subscribes to in this work19.  
 
In his slightly later Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, Volosinov notes 
that “the individual consciousness is a social-ideological fact”20 and that  
 
consciousness takes shape and being in the material of signs created by an 
organized group in the process of its social intercourse. The individual 
consciousness is nurtured on signs; it derives its growth from them; it reflects 
their logic and laws. The logic of consciousness is the logic of ideological 
communication, of the semiotic interaction of a social group. If we deprive 
consciousness of its semiotic, ideological content, it would have absolutely 
nothing left.21 
 
The basic unit of identity then is not singular but plural. We cannot accurately 
start with ‘I’ or ‘myself’, but need to begin with at least two poles; ‘I’ and the 
other22. Indeed, this is one of the areas of considerable complexity in Bakhtin’s 
work, since it could be argued from some of his essays that not merely two, 
but even three or four poles are the fundamental basis from which we must 
begin. Bakhtin refers not merely to ‘I’ and ‘the other’, but also ‘I for myself’, ‘I 
for the other’ and ‘the other’, as well as the author, listener, subject/hero and 
                                                                                                                                                        
relationships between children so that the joy of skilful and disciplined co-operation develops 
is the primary condition of the development of the individual himself”: J Macmurray, Reason 
and Emotion, (London, Faber and Faber, 1995) p51. 
19 See for example Freudianism ps77-78 
20 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p12 
21 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p13. As will be noted later, Volosinov’s stress on the 
social aspect of identity and consciousness does not preclude a recognition of the importance 
of the uniqueness and particularity of identity, particularly as described by Bakhtin. This dual 
recognition of both collective and individual aspects to identity illustrates the importance of 
identifying the dialogue to which utterances are addressed. The direction of a person’s travel 
has an enormous influence on what they mean in saying or doing something – two people 
who say the same thing may in fact mean quite different things by it, depending on where 
this utterance is on the journey they are making, and on the context in which they are 
speaking, and the people they are speaking to. Bakhtin’s emphasis on ‘particularity’ must be 
seen in the light of this emphasis on social consciousness, with which the emphasis on 
‘particularity’ is in tension and dialogue. See also M Lähteenmäki, ‘Consciousness as a Social 
and Dialogical Phenomenon’, Finlance 14 (1994) 1-21 
22 “’I’ can realize itself verbally only on the basis of ‘we’”; Volosinov, Discourse in Life and 
Discourse in Art, in Freudianism p100. See also “the highest architectonic principle of the actual 
world of the performed act or deed is the concrete and architectonically valid or operative 
contraposition of I and the other. Life knows two value-centers that are fundamentally and 
essentially different, yet are correlated with each other: myself and the other; and it is around 
these centers that all of the concrete moments of Being are distributed and arranged…this 
two-plane character of the valuative determinates of the world – for myself and for the other 
– is much deeper and much more essential than the difference in the determination of another 
object which we observed within the world of aesthetic seeing etc”: Bakhtin, Toward a 
Philosophy of the Act p74 
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super-addressee23, although this set is mostly in relation to a more developed 
aesthetics24.  
 
Nonetheless, the theme that “authenticity and truth inhere not in existence 
itself, but only in an existence that is acknowledged and uttered” and the idea 
that “I realize myself initially through others … just as the body is formed in 
the womb”25 is central and basic to Bakhtin’s thought also. Indeed “the plastic 
value of my outer body has been as it were sculpted for me by the manifoled 
[sic] acts of other people in relation to me” and  
 
the words of a loving human being are the first and the most authoritative words 
about him [the self]; they are the words that for the first time determine his 
personality from outside, the words that come to meet his indistinct inner sensation 
of himself, giving it a form and a name in which, for the first time, he finds himself 
and becomes aware of himself as a something.26 
 
Bakhtin can thus assert that we exist for one another as ‘tasks’ set for each 
other27, and that we are responsible for consummating, for giving meaning to, 
each other28. I am not confident that we can experience otherness to the extent 
Bakhtin appears to envisage on occasion29, but I would agree with what 
Bakhtin calls the notion of ‘transgredience’, if its contingency and developing, 
relational character is stressed30. 
 
In Art and Answerability and Toward a Philosophy of the Act in particular, 
Bakhtin repeatedly stresses the inescapability of one’s unique place in the 
world, and the inadmissibility of universal systems when they seek to dictate 
or govern the particularity of individual existence31 (once conceived of as a 
part of a society32). That he can insist so much on this aspect of selfhood is 
                                                     
23 “whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed” by the speaker – an 
eschatological fulfilment which is “a constituent aspect of the whole utterance”: M M Bakhtin, 
Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (Austin TX, University of Texas, 1992) p126. 
24 See also M Lähteenmäki, ‘Consciousness as a Social and Dialogical Phenomenon’, Finlance 
14 (1994) p13-15 
25 Speech Genres etc p138 
26 Art and Answerability p49-50. Compare this with Gadamer, who notes that “there is no first 
word and yet, while learning, we grow into language and into world. Doesn’t it follow that 
everything depends on the way we grow into the pre-schematization of our future 
orientation to the world when we learn a language and grow into everything we learn by 
way of conversation? This is the process that is nowadays called ‘socialization’: growth into 
the social”: Truth and Method (New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p570 
27 Art and Answerability p51 
28 Art and Answerability p24ff, p59/60 
29 Art and Answerability p25 
30 For example Art and Answerability p90 
31 Art and Answerability p41 
32 I should here note that in this thesis, I provide no definition of words such as ‘rule’, 
‘convention’, ‘society’ or ‘culture’. For the Bakhtin Circle, society/culture is not an exclusive 
concept but a pragmatic one, comprising those factors which surround one and with which 
one is in dialogue. There is thus a chronological, geographical, ideological, class, and religious 
element to it, and there should be no sense that the concept is prescriptive: each person’s 
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partly due to his emphasis on the mobility of being, and of his concept of 
dialogue as mobile and developing rather than static.  
 
In Bakhtin’s thought the idea of tradition is clearly always moving, and each 
self is an instance of a unique interplay between social inheritance and the 
unique body’s relation to it. Persons are realized in relationships; they do not 
in practice have a form that can be pinned down, nor can their enveloping 
society or culture – there is no prospect of ‘stopping the world’ in order to 
assess it or an individual within it; every assessment must then be to some 
extent provisional, a dialogue between the forming culture, and the ever-
developing individual in dialogue with that culture and with other 
individuals: 
 
The center of gravity in this world is located in the future … My relationship to 
each object within my horizon is never a consummated relationship; rather it is a 
relationship which is imposed on me as a task-to-be-accomplished, for the event 
of being, taken as a whole, is an open event; my situation must change at every 
moment – I cannot tarry and come to rest.33  
 
Indeed “the soul is spirit the way it looks from outside, in the other”34 and “the 
aesthetic vision of the world, its image, is created only by the consummated 
or consummatable lives of other people who are the heroes of this world”35, 
“it is only in the world of others that an aesthetic plot-bearing, intrinsically 
valuable movement is possible … To be artistically interested is to be 
interested, independently of meaning, in a life that is in principle 
consummated”36. 
 
For Bakhtin, activities such as theoretical thinking, historical description and 
aesthetic intuition “establish a fundamental split between the content or sense 
of a given act/activity and the historical actuality of its being, the actual and 
once-occurrent experiencing of it” 37, since “the act is truly real … only in its 
entirety” and not when described in terms of content or sense. He notes that  
                                                                                                                                                        
culture will be differently shaded; their place in the dialogues will be different, and they may 
not share all the dialogues of their neighbour, particularly in these pluralist days: they will 
inevitably share some, however, if only local-political ones (equable sharing of resources etc). 
33 Art and Answerability p98 
34 Art and Answerability p100 – see also p110 
35 Art and Answerability p111 
36 Art and Answerability p112. This idea of consummation is one adopted by Kevin Vanhoozer 
in his work Remythologizing Theology. This work, which is a fascinating study of a new 
direction for theology, biblically based and grappling with the question of how we are to 
imagine an recognise God’s activity in creation, suggests that one helpful key to 
understanding the relationship between Creator and Creation is precisely through an 
understanding of authorship taken from Bakhtin’s study of Dostoyevsky and others of his 
writings, and uses the idea of consummation. I will discuss Vanhoozer’s use of Bakhtin in the 
next section of this thesis. 
37 Toward a Philosophy etc p2 
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“it is only the once-occurrent event of being in the process of actualisation 
that can constitute this unique unity”38, and that an act  
 
must acquire the unity of two-sided answerability – both for its content (special 
answerability) and for its Being (moral answerability). And the special 
answerability, moreover, must be brought into communion with the unitary and 
unique moral answerability as a constituent moment in it. That is the only way 
whereby the pernicious non-fusion and non-interpenetration of culture and life 
could be surmounted.39 
 
Every act I perform is an inwardly answerable one, but the theoretical ought 
does not equal the true in my particular moment of being40 and thus “the 
ought gains its validity [only] within the unity of my once-occurrent 
answerable life”41. This is so because theories describe us as ‘not living’; as 
though we, like words, were contained in dictionaries or glass cabinets42.  
 
Ethics, then, is simply “a compilation of practically useful propositions that 
are sometimes not proved”43 and “this answerability of the actually 
performed act is the taking-into-account in it of all the factors – a taking-into-
account of its sense-validity as well as of its factual performance in all its 
concrete historicity and individuality”44. In fact, “in its answerability, the act 
sets before itself its own truth as something-to-be-achieved … This unitary 
and unique truth of the answerably performed act is posited as something-to-
be-attained qua synthetical truth”45.  
 
                                                     
38 Toward a Philosophy etc p2 
39 Toward a Philosophy etc p2-3 
40 Toward a Philosophy etc p4 
41 Toward a Philosophy etc p5. This echoes Gadamer’s conclusion that “if we start from the fact 
that understanding is verbal, we are emphasizing ... the finitude of the verbal event in which 
understanding is always in the process of being concretized. The language that things have ... 
is the language that our finite, historical nature apprehends when we learnt to speak”: Truth 
and Method op cit p492 
42 There are also some very interesting echoes again here of John Macmurray, who notes that 
“intellectual knowledge tells us about the world. It gives us knowledge about things, not 
knowledge of them. It does not reveal the world as it is. Only emotional knowledge can do 
that. The use of the senses as a practical means of getting knowledge is thus not a way of 
knowing the world at all, but only a way of knowing about it. The wider use of the senses for 
the joy of living in them, is knowing the world in itself and through emotion, not by means of 
the intellect. This is not to disparage intellectual knowledge but only to insist that it is 
meaningless and without significance, apart from the direct sensual knowledge which gives it 
reality. One cannot really know about anything unless one first knows it.” J Macmurray, 
Reason and Emotion, (London, Faber and Faber, 1995) p22. Thus, “The development of human 
nature in its concrete livingness is, in fact, the development of emotional reason” op cit p26. 
43 Toward a Philosophy etc p23 
44 Toward a Philosophy etc p28 
45 Toward a Philosophy etc p29. Compare also: “any human problem which remains abstract 
and is not concrete and lived in a real and thus limited situation is bound to remain shallow 
and swim in the muddy waters of sheer generalities:” R Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious 
Experience of Man: Icon-Person-Mystery, (London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973) page vii. 
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Bakhtin also admits that the answerable performer cannot totally understand 
everything in the act he performs – “the unitary full word can be answerably 
valid” but “while full adequacy is unattainable, it is always present as that 
which is to be achieved”46 – nonetheless “any universally valid value becomes 
actually valid only in an individual context”47. The unity-of-being is constancy 
not to values or principles but is more like “faithfulness” or “being-true-to”48 
and thus 
 
what we shall find everywhere is a constant unity of answerability, that is, not a 
constancy in content and not a constant law of the performed act (all content is 
only a constituent moment), but a certain actual fact of acknowledgment, an 
acknowledgment that is once-occurrent and never-repeatable, emotional-
volitional and concretely individual.49 
 
But this is being faithful to me, to my being-as-event, a condition where  
 
what underlies the unity of an answerable consciousness is not a principle as a 
starting point, but the fact of an actual acknowledgment of one’s own 
participation in unitary Being-as-event, and this fact cannot be adequately 
expressed in theoretical terms, but can only be described and participatively 
experienced.50 
 
Thus for Bakhtin, “the ought becomes possible for the first time where there is 
an acknowledgement of the fact of a unique person’s being from within that 
person; where this fact becomes a center of answerability – where I assume 
answerability for my own uniqueness, for my own being”51. To abdicate or 
seek an alibi for this is to be impoverished52.  
 
His conclusion is that given that there are as many different value-worlds as 
people, we have to “recognize doubt as a distinctive virtue”53 but “this doubt 
does not contradict in any way the unitary and unique truth: it is precisely 
this unitary and unique truth of the world that demands doubt”, because “the 
unity of the whole conditions the unique and utterly repeatable roles of all the 
participants”54 and moreover 
 
there is no contradiction nor does there have to be between the valuative world-
pictures of every participant … The truth of the event is not the truth that is self-
identical and self-equivalent in its content, but is the rightful and unique position 
of every participant – the truth of each participant’s actual, concrete ought.55 
                                                     
46 Toward a Philosophy etc p31 
47 Toward a Philosophy etc p36 
48 Toward a Philosophy etc p38 
49 Toward a Philosophy etc p39 
50 Toward a Philosophy etc p40 
51 Toward a Philosophy etc p42 
52 Toward a Philosophy etc p42 
53 So Derrida will be pleased - Toward a Philosophy etc p45 
54 Toward a Philosophy etc p45 
55 Toward a Philosophy etc p46 
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This is the same phenomenon as the fact that my love for you appears to me 
to be different to your love for me, but is not, because for each of us it is a 
truthful relation of embodiment, particularity and otherness. Within this 
condition of answerability, moreover, we share in our “concretely individual 
and never-repeatable worlds of actual act-performing consciousness” 
common moments which are not laws so much as presences and which are “I-
for-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for the-other”56. 
 
For Bakhtin  
 
aesthetic culture is a culture of boundaries and hence presupposes that life is 
enveloped by a warm atmosphere of deepest trust. A confident and founded act 
of constituting and shaping the boundaries of man and his world (outer as well as 
inner boundaries) presupposes the existence of a firm and secure position outside 
of him, presupposes a position in which the spirit can abide for a long time, can 
be master of its own powers, and can act without restraint. It should be evident 
that this presupposes an essential axiological consolidatedness of the enveloping 
atmosphere.57  
 
Here, in his early work, the importance of trust in making life, rather than 
merely its individualistic simulation, is enormous, and he goes on to write of 
the necessity of possessing “axiological tranquillity”, indeed of “an answerable, 
calm tranquillity”58, which depends on this trust:  
 
special answerability is indispensable … [and] can only be founded only upon a 
deep trust in the highest level of authority that blesses a culture – upon trust, that 
is, in the fact that there is another – the highest other – who answers for my own 
special answerability, and trust in the fact that I do not act in an axiological void. 
Outside this trust, only empty pretensions are possible.59 
 
The absolutely essential conditions for true or right living (being without 
alibi) are love and trust, which alone can make possible the goal, a barely 
imaginable world in which official consciousness and outer speech are united 
with the unique particularity of each individual without diminution or 
blurring60.  
 
This is a world where everyone is absolutely themselves, absolutely 
answerable for themselves, but also absolutely realized and consummated as 
that individual in a universal social whole, where there is “benevolent 
                                                     
56 Toward a Philosophy etc p53-54 
57 Art and Answerability p203-204 
58 Art and Answerability p205 
59 Art and Answerability p206 
60 There is a slight echo here of the Chalcedonian Christological definition that in Christ, 
divinity and humanity are present without blurring or diminution. See also Freudianism p89 
“in a healthy community and in a socially healthy personality … there is no discrepancy between 
the official and the unofficial conscious”. 
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demarcation”61 as the precursor to co-operation: this is – as is the Bakhtin 
Circle’s philosophy in general – highly eschatological, serving as a description 
of the New Creation, of the Kingdom of Heaven; one in which everyone can 
be, as was said of Atticus Finch, “the same in his house as he is on the public 
streets”62; where our desires and our duties are united truly and without 
compulsion. As Bakhtin puts it:  
 
It is only love (as an active approach to another human being) that unites an 
inner life (a subiectum’s own object-directedness in living his life) as experienced 
from outside and, in so doing, constitutes a unitary and unique human being as 
an aesthetic phenomenon. That is, only love unites one’s own directedness with a 
direction and one’s own horizon with an environment.63  
 
For Bakhtin, “in relation to the yet-to-be attained fullness of meaning of the 
event of being, the “thisness” of being is only factual (obstinately present-on-
hand)”64 and therefore “it is around the other … that present-on-hand being 
finds its affirmation and positive consummation independently of meaning. 
The soul is fused and intertwined with the world’s givenness and it 
consecrates that givenness”65. 
 
Even aesthetic seeing does not capture all reality66 – the key is our 
relationship to it:  
 
Even if I know a given person thoroughly, and I also know myself, I still have to 
grasp the truth of our interrelationship, the truth of the unitary and unique event 
which links us and in which we are participants. That is, my place and function 
and his, and our interrelationship in the ongoing event of Being, i.e., I myself and 
the object of my aesthetic contemplation must be … determined within unitary 
and unique Being … which encompasses both of us equally and in which the act 
of my aesthetic contemplation is actually performed; but that can no longer be 
aesthetic being. It is only from within that act as my answerable deed that there 
can be a way out into the unity of Being, and not from its product, taken in 
abstraction.67 
 
As he concludes in respect of ethics  
 
As disembodied spirit, I lose my compellent, ought-to-be relationship to the 
world, I lose the actuality of the world. Man-in-general does not exist: I exist and 
a particular concrete other exists … All these are valuative moments of Being 
which are valid individually and do not universalise or generalize once-occurrent 
                                                     
61 Speech Genres etc p136 
62 “Atticus Finch is the same in his house as he is on the public streets”, said by Miss Maudie, 
in the context of the secrets others hide away, and as description of his integrity: Harper Lee, 
To Kill a Mockingbird, (London, Penguin Books, 1971) p52. 
63 Art and Answerability p82-83 
64 Art and Answerability p132 
65 Art and Answerability p134.  
66 Toward a Philosophy etc p14 
67 Toward a Philosophy etc p17/18  
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Being, and they are revealed to me from my unique place in Being as the 
foundations of my non-alibi in Being.68  
 
life can be consciously comprehended only in concrete answerability. A 
philosophy of life can only be a moral philosophy. Life can be consciously 
comprehended only as an ongoing event, and not as Being qua a given.69  
 
For meaning and for ethics, then, for Bakhtin 
 
eternal meaning becomes an impelling actuating value for deed-performing 
thinking … only when it is correlated with actuality: the actually valued eternity 
of this thought, this book [and more fundamentally] … what is compellently 
valuable in the last resort is the actual eternity of concrete actuality itself in its 
entirety: of this human being, these human beings and their world with all its 
actual moments.70 
 
Therefore, “only lovingly interested attention, is capable of generating a 
sufficiently intent power to encompass and retain the concrete manifoldness 
of Being, without impoverishing and schematising it”71, and  “the truth of 
Being-as-event contains within itself totally the whole extra-temporal 
absoluteness of theoretical truth. The world’s unity is a moment in its concrete 
uniqueness”72. 
 
Thus while a cognitively realized system has a validity and a necessity for 
some purposes, either cognitive or ethical, it has no absolute jurisdiction. To 
impose an external system onto each person’s unique relationship with 
everyone else would be, particularly for Bakhtin, although perhaps not the 
apparently more Marxist Volosinov, inadmissible or inauthentic. It would be 
to seek an “alibi in Being”, to evade one’s own answerability for oneself and 
one’s actions by hiding behind another and seeking to apply static and 
abstract rules to the mobile and real, to being-as-event, or the “ongoing event 
of Being”73.  
 
It would be as nonsensical as trying to completely encapsulate and describe a 
work of art in other words or forms – if this could be done without remainder 
there would be no work of art left – or of trying to describe an utterance 
outside its own environment. To describe something is not the same as to 
participate in it as it is happening: “To depart from the actual into the abstract 
is to lose any purchase on the actual deed performed”74 and  
 
                                                     
68 Toward a Philosophy etc p47 
69 Toward a Philosophy etc p56 
70 Toward a Philosophy etc p59 
71 Toward a Philosophy etc p64 
72 Toward a Philosophy etc p71 
73 Toward a Philosophy etc p42 
74 Toward a Philosophy etc p7 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Seven: The Hermeneutics of Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov  
 
269 
insofar as we detach a judgment from the unity constituted by the historically 
actual act/deed of its actualisation and assign it to some theoretical unity, there is 
no way of getting out from within its content/sense aspect and into the ought 
and the actual once-occurrent event of Being. All attempts to surmount – from 
within theoretical cognition – the dualism of cognition and life, the dualism of 
thought and once-occurrent actuality, are utterly hopeless.75 
 
Indeed, such abstract systems describe us as not living76, and “once-occurrent 
uniqueness or singularity cannot be thought of, it can only be participatively 
experienced or lived through”77. To live, is to be in a permanent, ongoing 
dialogue between ones own uniqueness, and the society and cultures that 
envelop. 
 
3. The dialogic nature of utterances and meaning 
 
Having discussed what one might call the contextuality of personality, it is 
only a short step to applying this to the utterance. Bakhtin’s and Volosinov’s 
emphasis on the dynamic and social development of consciousness also 
includes a recognition of the linguistic and thus dialogic basis of 
consciousness and of the social basis of language. As Volosinov notes in 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, “the process of a child’s assimilation of 
his native language is the process of his gradual immersion into verbal 
communication. As that process proceeds, the child’s consciousness is formed 
and filled with content”78. Or again, as Volosinov notes “inner speech is the 
same kind of product and expression of social intercourse as is outward 
speech”79.  
 
The utterance was one of the Bakhtin Circle’s principal areas of interest, 
particularly in the essays published as Volosinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy 
of Language and Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art (an essay which is 
included as Appendix I in his book Freudianism)80 and Bakhtin’s Art and 
Answerability. In all of these texts the utterance is repeatedly identified as 
                                                     
75 Toward a Philosophy etc p7 
76 Toward a Philosophy etc p8 
77 Toward a Philosophy etc p13. Compare B J Kallenberg: “thought does not originate from some 
fixed point but arises simultaneously with the whole hurly-burly of a life shared together.” B 
J Kallenberg, ‘Unstuck from Yale: Theological Method After Lindbeck’, Scottish Journal of 
Theology 50/2 (1997) p205.  
78 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p81 footnote 16 
79 Freudianism p79. Again, compare Kallenberg: “languages do not arise, nor are they learned, 
privately. Language is a social phenomenon correlative with a shared form of life.” B J 
Kallenberg, ‘Unstuck from Yale: Theological Method After Lindbeck’, Scottish Journal of 
Theology 50/2 (1997) p205.  
80 Freudianism; A Critical Sketch (Bloomington IA, Indiana University Press, 1987), pages 93-
116. This book was first published in this translation as Freudianism: A Marxist Critique 
(Academic Press 1976) with a different translator’s introduction and different Appendices, 
which do not include this essay. The essay, according to the back cover of the title, was first 
published in Russian in 1926. 
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being a ‘living’, contextually understood concept that has no abstract 
existence. It may be defined as the basic unit of verbal communication.  
 
As Volosinov for example notes, “Every utterance is the product of the 
interaction between speakers and … of the broader context of the whole complex 
social situation”81. He notes that “the situation enters into the utterance as an 
essential constitutive part of the structure of its import”82, giving as an example 
two people sitting together in a room and one saying simply “well”83. In this 
case, as Volosinov notes, “taken in isolation, the utterance “well!” is empty 
and unintelligible.” Intelligibility is achieved, not through “the phonetic, 
morphological, and semantic factors of the word well”, nor even if we know 
the intonation with which the word was spoken; in this case “indignation and 
reproach moderated by a certain amount of humor”.  
 
Instead, we need to know “the ‘extraverbal context’ that made the word well a 
meaningful locution for the listener.” He defines this, in this instance, as 
comprising “the common spatial purview of the interlocutors”, their “common 
knowledge and understanding of the situation, and their common evaluation of that 
situation.” In this particular case, it is May, both people are sick of winter and 
looking forward to the arrival of Spring, and they have seen that snow is 
falling outside the window, to their great disappointment. When we know all 
this, then and only then can we understand the meaning of the word well in 
this context. 
 
In Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art Volosinov notes the contextuality of 
utterances and their reliance on “a community of value judgments”84 which pre-
date the utterance and give it meaning, or rather are the conditions within 
which utterances are produced. These judgments are identifiable not in word-
content but in the intonation of the utterance itself. In Bakhtin this becomes 
what one might call ‘full-blooded dialogism’: “speech can exist in reality only 
in the form of concrete utterances of individual speaking people, speech 
subjects. Speech is always cast in the form of an utterance belonging to a 
particular speaking subject, and outside this form it cannot exist. “85  
 
Bakhtin goes on to note that utterances are in general distinguishable through 
having differing speaking subjects86, but that all such utterances are inevitably 
in dialogue with each other: “each utterance is filled with echoes and 
reverberations … Every utterance must be regarded primarily as a response to 
preceding utterances of the given sphere”87, and not merely a response to the 
                                                     
81 Freudianism p79 
82 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism, p100 
83 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p99.  
84 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p100 
85 Speech Genres etc p71 
86 Speech Genres etc p71 
87 Speech Genres etc p91 
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past but also an anticipation and pre-emptive response to the future; “an 
essential (constitutive) marker of the utterance is its quality of being directed 
to someone, its addressivity”88.  
 
Both the utterance and the act must then be understood responsively and in 
their particular context; both are part of what Bakhtin refers to as “once-
occurrent Being-as-event”89, by which he alludes to the idea that selfhood or 
identity is not a static unalterable property but a collectively given and ever-
renewed construct that can alter and change from moment to moment in the 
context of new relationships and actions90. In a phrase with many suggestive 
echoes of Derrida’s notion of iterability, Bakhtin notes that “the 
unrepeatability of the whole is reflected in each repeatable element that 
participates in the whole (it is, as it were, repeatably unrepeatable)”.91 
 
Bakhtin and Volosinov do not by any means deny the usefulness of theory or 
abstraction, nor the existence of language as a system. However, they do deny 
that language ‘in use’ is meaningful just as part of a system; rather it is, in use, 
part of a culture and of specific genre-related relationships. In so far as Speech 
Act Theory is a study of language acts in the abstract, then, this assertion calls 
all such examinations into question, at least in so far as they claim to be 
studies of how language is used, rather than of how it might be used in a 
specific (and it must be a specific) imaginary situation.92  
 
This might be thought to underestimate the shared systematic nature of 
language, but this aspect is not something denied by Bakhtin or Volosinov, 
who notes that “the individual speech act (in the strict sense of the word 
‘individual’) is contradictio in adjecto”.93 Bakhtin and Volosinov simply insist 
that while one can discuss abstractions, and while accepted abstractions exist, 
these are in fact only examples of utterances associated with genres,94 and like 
all utterances, their meaning in use is determined not by a dictionary but by 
context. This context is not and cannot, of course, be unrelated to systems or 
dictionary definitions, but these latter are in danger of ossification and can 
never take account of the changes wrought on language by use and by life 
and cannot track all its cultural, relational, generational and geographic95 
changes and variations. If one wants to know what was meant by an 
utterance that was actually used, one must look at the context in which it was 
                                                     
88 Speech Genres etc p95 
89 Toward a Philosophy etc p34, p36 etc 
90 This is the argument advanced in the whole of the highly intense 75 surviving pages of 
Towards a Philosophy of the Act (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1993). 
91 Speech Genres etc p142 
92 This of course is the accusation that I made towards some of the uses of Speech Act theory 
in Biblical hermeneutics discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
93 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p98 
94 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p20 
95 to name but a few 
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spoken, not at the, or a, context in which it might have been spoken; thus 
meaning has a contextual as well as a systematic element.  
 
Or as Bakhtin himself observes, language includes both centripetal and 
centrifugal forces, where the centripetal, systematic aspects of ‘dictionary’ 
language do not ‘guarantee’ a minimum level of comprehension but instead 
participate in and are created by an ideologically-saturated world-view of 
concrete opinions which thus insures “a maximum of understanding in all 
spheres of ideological life”.96 Thus “the authentic environment of an 
utterance, the environment in which it lives and takes shape, is dialogised 
heteroglossia anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously 
concrete, filled with specific content and accepted as an individual 
utterance”.97  
 
Every word ‘aimed’ at an object is done so in dialogue, and through a thicket 
of pre-existing associations98; “discourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a 
living impulse toward the object”99 and there are no neutral words, but they 
are all “shot through with intentions and accents”; they have a “taste” or 
“contextual overtones”100. Volosinov, too, notes that shared collective value 
judgments  
 
determine the author’s selection of words and the reception of that selection (the 
coselection) by the listener. The poet, after all, selects words not from a dictionary 
but from the context of life where words have been steeped in and become 
permeated with value judgments.101 
 
The complex area of the nature of meaning in context and in language is not 
helped by differences in translation between the work of Bakhtin and 
Volosinov to which I have had access, so that terms may be translated 
differently. However, in precisely the same way as identity is constructed in 
an on-going dialogue between the uniquely positioned physical body of the 
subject (subiectum in University of Texas translations generally) and the 
forming culture, so meaning is realized in the dialogue of conversation or 
communication102.  
 
There is thus both a systematic, dictionary meaning of words equivalent in 
some sense to a genre-meaning of utterances, and the meaning of the 
                                                     
96 Dialogic Imagination p271 
97 Dialogic Imagination p272 
98 Dialogic Imagination p276 
99 Dialogic Imagination p292 
100 Dialogic Imagination p293 
101 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p107 
102 Speech genres, the basic building blocks of communication have “a normative significance 
for the speaking individuum, and they are not created by him but are given to him. 
Therefore, the single utterance, with all its individuality and creativity, can in no way be 
regarded as a completely free combination of forms of language”: Speech Genres etc p80-81 
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utterance in its context of actual specific use, with the meaning of the actual 
utterance involving both system and particular, to the exclusion or 
domination of neither, but incorporating both in relationship in time and in 
the event of being. Volosinov notes that “listener and hero [the personification 
of the object of the utterance towards which utterances tend] are constant 
participants in the creative event, which does not for a single instant cease to be 
an event of living communication involving all three”103.  
 
Volosinov also notes that an utterance has both significance and meaning. 
Significance he identifies as that which is “individual and unreproducible”104, 
and is the theme or thematic unity of the utterance; while meaning is those 
elements of the utterance that are reproducible and self-identical in instances 
of repetition. Meaning is divisible into constituent elements, while theme is 
not105 (he thus reverses rather the use which Vanhoozer makes of the words 
‘meaning’ and ‘significance’, in this translation). Thus “theme is a complex, 
dynamic system of signs that attempts to be adequate to a given instant of generative 
process. Theme is reaction by the consciousness in its generative process to the 
generative process of existence. Meaning is the technical apparatus for the 
implementation of theme”106; they are however, inseparable.  
 
Words have multiple possible meanings, and meaning can be regarded as the 
first speech genre, in that it, as Volosinov suggests, may have developed out 
of repeated thematic use of sound-words. He avers, “theme is the upper, actual 
limit of linguistic significance; in essence, only theme means something definite. 
Meaning is the lower limit … [it] in essence, means nothing; it only possesses 
potentiality”107, and thus ‘theme’ is contextually based while ‘meaning’ can be 
identified in the dictionary.  
 
4. ‘Consummation’ and the dialogism of meaning in utterances and in 
aesthetics 
 
There are many provocative and useful similarities between Bakhtin’s and 
Volosinov’s work on utterances, and the work of Bakhtin on Aesthetics. 
Volosinov, in discussing utterances, notes that the intonation which is based 
on the “choral support”108 of commonly-held values has “an inherent tendency 
toward personification”109, metaphorical or actual, and this clearly echoes 
Bakhtin’s stress on the importance of the hero in aesthetic activity, the title of 
an essay in Art and Answerability.  
 
                                                     
103 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p107 
104 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p99 
105 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p100 
106 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p100 
107 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p101 
108 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p103 
109 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p103 
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Volosinov’s suggestion that the utterance is doubly oriented, to the listener 
and to the object as a third party110, echoes both Bakhtin’s dialogism of the 
utterance expressed for example in Speech Genres etc;  
 
in each utterance … we embrace, understand, and sense the speaker’s speech plan 
or speech will, which determines the entire utterance, its length and boundaries. 
We imagine to ourselves what the speaker wishes to say …Therefore, the 
immediate participants in communication, orienting themselves with respect to 
the situation and the preceding utterances, easily and quickly grasp the speaker’s 
speech plan, his speech will. And from the very beginning of his words they 
sense the developing whole of the utterance,111  
 
and Bakhtin’s concept of the superaddressee; “the person who understands 
inevitably becomes a third party in the dialogue”, and since “even the closest 
descendants can be mistaken” the superaddressee is imagined; he “whose 
absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed” by the speaker – an 
instance of eschatological fulfilment which Bakhtin asserts is not metaphysical 
but is “a constituent aspect of the whole utterance”112. 
 
Moreover, Bakhtin clearly identifies Aesthetic meaning as residing in the 
interplay of contemplator and artist in the artistic object, where the 
contemplator is by no means the passive entity that the English word might 
suggest. Bakhtin notes that while possible meanings of a sentence could be 
understood in the abstract, only as an utterance (with an actual meaning) 
could we respond to it113. He notes that  
 
the sentence, like the word, has a finality of meaning and a finality of 
grammatical form, but this finality of meaning is abstract by nature and this is 
precisely why it is so clear cut: this is the finality of an element, but not of the 
whole. The sentence as a unit of language, like the word, has no author. Like the 
word, it belongs to nobody, and only by functioning as a whole utterance does it 
become an expression of the position of someone speaking individually in a 
concrete situation of speech communication.114 
 
He equates “expressivity” - a property of utterances - with intonation. It is 
intonation which is and reveals expression, and it is the possession of this 
quality which allows us to identify an utterance and which bears its meaning: 
“we repeat, only the contact between the language meaning and the concrete 
reality that takes place in the utterance can create the spark of expression. It 
exists neither in the system of language nor in the objective reality 
surrounding us”115 and “the meaning of a word in itself (unrelated to actual 
reality) is, as we have already said, out of the range of emotion… they acquire 
                                                     
110 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p105 
111 Speech Genres etc p77-78 
112 Speech Genres etc p126 
113 Speech Genres etc p82 
114 Speech Genres etc p83-84 
115 Speech Genres etc p86-87 
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their expressive coloring only in the utterance, and this coloring is 
independent of their meaning taken individually and abstractedly”.116 Words 
thus have three owners; the dictionary, the other’s as used in conversation, 
and mine used in response117. 
 
Volosinov makes this quite explicit when he suggests that  
 
in poetry, as in life, verbal discourse is a “scenario” of an event. Competent artistic 
perception re-enacts it, sensitively surmising from the words and the forms of 
their organization the specific, living interrelations of the author with the world 
he depicts and entering into those interrelations as third participant (the listener’s 
role)118  
 
and that “for living artistic perception, … relations among people stand 
revealed in the process of living social communication”.  
 
In Art and Answerability Bakhtin, in a dialogue with Structuralism’s insistence 
on form to the exclusion of other things, suggests that aesthetic analysis of art 
has three tasks; the first is to “understand the aesthetic object in its purely 
artistic distinctiveness” and structure, the second is to understand the object 
in its “primary, purely cognitive givenness and understand its construction 
completely apart from the aesthetic object” and the third is to “understand the 
external material work as that which actualises an aesthetic object, as the 
technical apparatus of aesthetic execution”, a task which can only follow the 
first two119, and which has a goal and is thus different to understanding the 
aesthetic object in terms simply of its “self-sufficient being”120.  
 
This analysis of the architectonics (or process) of structure, though, must 
recognise the architectonics of structure as related to emotion and as aiming at 
the artistic consummation of the object.121 Seen in the light of the continually 
dialogic nature of being and world, and thus recognised as impermanent 
outside its moment, this concept of consummation has obvious links not 
merely with the consummation of oneself that the other can provide, but also 
with the consummation of the utterance that can only be provided by, and is 
anticipated within the utterance by, the other.  
 
Consummation should not be seen as a finalized state, and this is made clear 
when Bakhtin goes on to note that “any creative point of view  ... becomes 
                                                     
116 Speech Genres etc p87 
117 Speech Genres etc p88 
118 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p109 
119 Art and Answerability p267 
120 Art and Answerability p268. Volosinov notes in ‘Discourse in life and Discourse in art’ that 
“the meaning, [i.e.] the import of form has to do not with the material but with the content” p108 and 
thus that the relation of form to content is a matter of ideological evaluation, while the 
relation of form to the material of art is “the technical realization of that evaluation” of 
ideology. 
121 Art and Answerability p270 
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convincingly necessary and indispensable only in correlation with other 
creative points of view”122 and that culture, which gives value to life and 
events, is ‘all boundaries’; there is nothing fixed or static about it123. The 
interdetermination with culture and reality is what allows art to live124. The 
content of an artistic object is a consummation of “cognition and ethical action 
in the aesthetic object and is a response of active contemplation”125. Content 
cannot be abstracted from context126.  
 
Moreover Bakhtin is clear that the aesthetically valued object is not 
describable simply on formal, material cognitive or ethical grounds, in 
precisely the same way as the actual utterance is not describable outside the 
specific context of its use, and as consciousness and being are not abstractable 
from their unique and specific place in the “world-as-event”127: there is a 
“non-alibi in Being”128. Just as is the case for being and uttering, the aesthetic 
object is always an event129. 
 
Bakhtin is therefore insistent that aesthetics is founded on a given human 
being as basis – the basis for aesthetic determination is what-is-given, and all 
aesthetics needs a hero in the sense that  
 
language, which the verbal artist finds to an considerable extent as something 
already on hand, is profoundly aestheticized, profoundly mythological and 
anthropomorphic, and that it gravitates toward the center of value constituted by 
a human being. Hence, aestheticism deeply permeates all our thinking, and 
philosophical thought, even at its loftiest, continues to be human in an intensely 
partial way even today (this is justified, but only within certain limits, which are 
often violated). Language or, rather, the world of language also has its own 
potential hero, as it were, who is actualised in an utterance of lived life within 
myself and within the other.130 
 
He concludes that “a given human being constitutes the center of value in the 
architectonics of an aesthetic object: it is around him that the uniqueness of 
every object, its integral concrete diversity, is actualized”131. 
 
Vanhoozer, as has been noted earlier, uses this idea of consummation, and 
explores the clearly theological undertones of the concept. However, I believe 
that he underestimates the dialogic nature of the concept. He uses Bakhtin’s 
ideas on the relationship between the hero and the author to illustrate the 
                                                     
122 Art and Answerability p274 
123 This is here suggested in relation to the boundary of particular and universal.  
124 Art and Answerability p275 
125 Art and Answerability p281-282 
126 Art and Answerability p292 
127 Toward a Philosophy etc p32 
128 Toward a Philosophy etc p40 
129 Art and Answerability p317 
130 Art and Answerability p229-230 
131 Art and Answerability p230 
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relationship between God and His creatures132 and then suggests that 
“aesthetic consummation – the process by which authors confer wholeness, 
and therefore meaning, on the lives of their heroes – is to literature as grace is 
to theology.”133  
 
The parallel between God and author is clear to the extent that both see ‘the 
whole’ of the work from outside. However, Bakhtin would himself insist that 
the hero is not fully realised without the reader as a participant. Bakhtin notes 
“it is possible, of course, to make any human document the object of artistic 
perception … indeed, the consummation of it in our aesthetic memory is often 
our obligation”134. This prompts the question, ‘where is the reader-equivalent, 
in grace?’ Meaning is not simply conferred, it is created: is there any parallel 
here with grace? 
 
Both meaning and grace are known dialogically, and cannot be grasped by 
the self alone. Both are properties of ‘a work’ that are established in dialogue 
rather than being doled out to be monologically ‘conferred’. Indeed, the 
Dominican Cornelius Ernst suggests a very similar thing in regard to grace to 
that which Bakhtin suggests in respect of meaning, which is that grace is a 
relationship created between two communicating parties. For Ernst grace is, 
as it were, a term for the mode of God’s action in creation: gratuitous, 
beautiful and self-giving:   
 
grace shows itself where we break through despair into the affirmation of praise. 
This is the fundamental experience of grace … it is the passage through ultimate 
negation into the blessed peace beyond the Cross in the exchange of love in Jesus 
and the Father, the exchange which Christian tradition has called the Holy Spirit 
... For if we call destiny the form of a theology of grace, we may call its content 
transfiguration and transformation.135 
 
Grace is “a second-order word, a way of qualifying the whole of God’s self-
communication to his creature man as a gift beyond all telling: the 
transcendent novelty of communion between God and man”, which is 
“disclosed in our lives as the gift of Jesus Christ communicated”136.  
 
Thus “our understanding of ‘grace’ is our continuous reawakening to the 
infinite inequality of divine and human love”137. Grace, then, is a way of 
describing God’s action in the world, which is an ultimately irresistible 
activity leading us on towards Him: “the mystery of divine grace and human 
freedom is that there is always a creative choice which finds and is found by 
                                                     
132 Remythologizing Theology p 325 
133 Remythologizing Theology p326 
134 Art and Answerability p148 
135 C Ernst, The Theology of Grace, Theology Today Series Number 17 (Notre Dame Indiana, Fides 
Publishers 1974) p72 
136 The Theology of Grace p75 
137 The Theology of Grace p92 
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God’s ever-transcendent, ever-new love, the sovereign mysterion of his self-
giving, its unending spring of life”138.  
 
God’s grace, then, is the agent of formation, an activity that impels and 
compels us to turn to Him, and that is hindered but not ultimately prevented, 
indeed made more glorious, by sin139. It might be regarded as the response to, 
and in a sense the other ‘aspect’ of the relationship which for us is constituted 
by, and perceived as being, prayer. Thus while I agree that for Bakhtin the 
consummation of the hero comes from outside to gives the hero meaning, I 
would note the importance of the fact that for Bakhtin, this aesthetic 
consummation comes not from the author alone, but also from readers. 
 
The image of God as a dialogic author is suggestive, but raises the question of 
the extent to which we, as His subjects in several senses, have any input into 
our own narrative. It would initially appear that we have a greater degree of 
independence than do fictional constructs, who are unaware of their own 
‘fictionality’, even allowing for the ways in which characters can ‘dictate’ to 
their author, and determine their own plots and development. However, this 
rather depends on one’s view of free will and predestination. In some cases, 
the parallel becomes quite strong.  
 
It is certainly true that both fictional characters and flesh-and-blood people 
are consummated from outside dialogically, even if the event of being that is 
human life is not the same as for a fictional character, where the ‘event of 
being’ is only the reader’s, and the fictional character is not answerable to us 
in the same way. However, both the novelistic character, and the flesh-and-
blood person, are not for Bakhtin static, and are only consummated at the end 
of life. Both character and reader are continually ‘becoming’ in the unique 
event of being. It may be that dialogically the person is more present than the 
character. But for the reader as for the character in the novel, our 
consummation lies beyond this creation140.  
 
We alone cannot determine the meaning of creation, as we cannot determine 
the meaning of our own lives – these are consummated beyond us, with or by 
others. This is, of course, also the case for the utterance. As I have already 
argued, meaning and intention can differ in the utterance. It is interesting to 
ask whether or not this is also the case in respect of our lives, and of creation? 
Vanhoozer and I, and Bakhtin, would all agree that our meaning is 
determined beyond us, in dialogue with others; does this further imply that 
                                                     
138 The Theology of Grace p84 
139 “sin is the manifest discontinuity in the mystery, grace the victorious reintegration into an 
ultimate continuity and unity, the climax of the mystery”, The Theology of Grace p88.  
140 There is in Vanhoozer’s use of Bakhtin a dimension of his thought that is absent – that of 
the importance of the community. Theologically, I would suggest that we do not relate to 
God primarily as individuals, but as members of the one body.  
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the meaning of creation is determined beyond creation, and if so, is this in 
dialogue with God?  
 
The meaning of our life might not be what we thought, or intended – but we 
cannot determine this alone, and it can only be recognised in the context of 
the life that is actually lived. Likewise, an utterance has no meaning until it is 
uttered. Further, the complete meaning of the utterance or act is fully 
consummated only in the consummation of the entire life. Likewise the 
meaning of the individual human life is consummated only in the 
consummation of the creation – of all the lives of which this life (our life) is a 
part – and the meaning of creation is consummated only in the fullness of all 
in all.  
 
We can in fact go so far as to say that God is the fullness of meaning, and that 
creation is consummated in God, (in the eternal perfect dialogue of the 
Trinity, open and full), but we cannot now know what that will be like; we 
cannot know the meaning of existence. In that sense, meaning in creation is 
becoming, and the best we can do is enter fully into the dialogue (the 
answerability). There is a sequential element to meaning, as it were. This 
insight is far closer to Bakhtin’s own position, than Vanhoozer’s suggestion 
that the consummation of life is the work of the Divine author alone141. 
 
This implies that just as the Church is unconsummated until the end, when 
she will be fulfilled in the new Kingdom, so too revelation remains until that 
point unconsummated. Revelation, in word and sacrament, is mediated. It 
will only be consummated when creation is consummated, and I “understand 
fully, even as I have been fully understood”142. Until then, its meaning is not 
determined fully143. Revelation is a part of grace – a part of the becoming of 
being. There is a necessarily provisional element to creation, and to human 
life and to the utterance; and in this created order, the meaning of utterances 
begins to be consummated in the life of the Body of which we are a part144, 
but is only finished when the New Kingdom has come in its fullness145.  
 
Just as meaning is not the property of the author, so we are not our own 
property146. Divine authorship is dialogic not merely in the sense that 
characters have a ‘life’, but (for Bakhtin and for me) in the sense that the 
                                                     
141 Vanhoozer assumes on Remythologizing Theology p341 that a character can be consummated 
before it is finished, which is incorrect – consummation implies finality – though perhaps one 
can speak of partial or provisional consummation? 
142 1 Corinthians 13:12 
143 Indeed we see “in a glass, darkly”; ibid. 
144 In a sense, the words of revelation are only the seed of the body; the body is the revelation 
itself. 
145 When we are deified in the Spirit 
146 Hence “revelation has not come to an end with the last apostle, only the writing of which it 
is a reading”: G Loughlin: Telling God's Story: Bible, Church and Narrative Theology, (Cambridge 
University Press 1996) p119 footnote 42.  
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readers help make the meaning. We of course do not co-create God, but we do 
co-create this creation He has given us, although it can only be consummated 
from outside and at the end of all created things. I agree with Vanhoozer that 
we should not imagine that God’s authorship is in doubt147, but authorial 
agency does not include determination of meaning. God remains in control, 
because He consummates creation from outside itself. Creation cannot be 
perfected from within – hence the need for the Incarnation of the Divine from 
outside.  
 
In Remythologizing Theology Vanhoozer writes a great deal about Jesus, but 
revealingly there is no mention of the role of the Virgin Mary in His 
revelation of Himself, a prime instance of creative co-operation, nor indeed is 
there very much on the implications for his thesis of Jesus’ humanity148. Thus 
while I agree with Vanhoozer that “the divine-human dialogue is actually a 
means of divine authoring, that is, an asymmetrical communicative process 
by which a hero is theodramatically consummated”149, I do not agree that this 
consummation occurs within the bounds of this created order, nor that the 
asymmetry that is inevitably involved militates against the co-operative 
nature of consummation.  
 
A religion150 can claim to have a monologic hermeneutic or a monologic text 
but it cannot prevent the passage of time and the creation of other contexts 
and other voices from rendering this claim false. Bakhtin is clear; 
compositional form (of worked material) becomes architectonic form (of 
aesthetic consummation) by the response of the contemplator151: if religion 
and the Bible are to be included within the aesthetic aspect of life, within that 
which involves uniqueness and emotion, not merely with the general and 
with cognitive and ethical values, it must also require this level of self-
involvement. As Bakhtin notes, “it is only in the world of others that an 
aesthetic plot-bearing, intrinsically valuable movement is possible … To be 
artistically interested is to be interested, independently of meaning, in a life 
that is in principle consummated”152. 
 
                                                     
147 Remythologizing Theology p491 
148 To which he refers for the first time on page 504. On p357 Vanhoozer notes that “becoming 
flesh is ... something that the Son does (in cooperation with the Father and the Spirit).” There 
is no mention of creation’s involvement here, or the Virgin’s “yes”. 
149 Remythologizing Theology p494 
150 It is worth asking here whether religious understanding can be aesthetic? Bakhtin always 
seems to exclude this, and it of course depends upon one’s view of the nature of ‘religion’. If 
one sees it as an inherently doctrinal or cognitive genre aiming towards monologism, the 
answer is clearly no. Bakhtin seems latterly to have inclined to this view. If, however, religion 
is stressed more as practice or a liturgical and communal-worship experience, then the 
answer is not so clear-cut. In either case, the Bakhtin Circle’s view of meaning severely 
undermines the view that any religious text has only one approved meaning.  
151 Art and Answerability p304/306 
152 Art and Answerability p112 
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5. The nature of ‘Understanding’.                                                                                                                                                                       
5a: John Searle’s concept of ‘the Background’ 
 
The above discussions segue neatly into an examination of the nature of 
understanding, which is of course the fundamental hermeneutical question: 
how we understand as readers, or as contemplators of any work of art, or as 
participants in dialogue. As I argue in this thesis, the assumptions made 
relating to how illocutions are understood represent one of the fatal 
weaknesses in Speech Act theory, which depends on a passive recognition of 
authorial intention-as-meaning for its existence. 
 
The Speech Act theorist John Searle’s concepts of “the Network” and “the 
Background” are indeed a partial recognition of the inadequacy of the idea of 
‘passive’ uptake in a guaranteed and inert context153. Searle notes that an 
Intentional state is only “the state that it is – given its position in a Network of 
other Intentional states and against a Background of practices and 
preintentional assumptions that are neither themselves Intentional states nor 
are they parts of the conditions of satisfaction of Intentional states.”154 Any 
Intentional state is  
                                                     
153 See M Dascal: “Speech act theory seeks to treat what it calls ‘use’ by means of strict rules, 
which can be formalized into a precise illocutionary logic. It seeks to demonstrate that use can 
be treated as rigorously as meaning has been; that it is no longer the vague notion …; that it is 
not a matter of an indefinite number of vaguely defined language games. But it may have 
gone too far in its reduction of use to meaning, thereby proving rather than disproving the 
slogan [meaning is use] it originally opposed. The price of this operation is – as usual – the 
abandonment of those aspects of the phenomena that do not fit the model and the attempted 
reduction. Those aspects of use that do not readily fit the institutional mould, the rule-based 
treatment, are either left to be handled by a complementary theory of use à la Grice, or else 
dumped in the ever present Background. To say that conversation or other aspects of use 
have no ‘intrinsic structure’ is to say that they do not fit the kind of structure privileged by 
Searle. But this does not mean that they have no organization whatsoever. It only means that 
their principles of organization allow for the open-endedness, the vagueness, the defeasibility 
that, although not easily codifiable, endow the use of language with a measure of creativity 
well beyond the rule-based creativity permitted by grammar”: M Dascal, ‘Speech Act Theory 
and Gricean Pragmatics: Some Differences of Detail That Make a Difference’ in S L 
Tsohatzidis (ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives 
(London, Routledge, 1994) p333. 
154 Intentionality p19. See also The Construction of Social Reality (London, Penguin Books, 1996) 
p129. For a similar use of the same term see also E Stenius, ’Mood and Language-game’, 
Synthese 17 (1967) 254-274: “A linguistic utterance is not as such a symptom of any particular 
(mental) state of the speaker or anything preceding it – in so far as it is, it is against the 
background of those conventional rules of language which prevail in the linguistic 
community. Therefore, the uttering of a sentence does not simply function as a signal for the 
hearer to react in a certain way. In so far as it does, it is again only against the background of 
those conventional rules of linguistic usage that prevail in the environment of the speaker 
and the hearer.” p262 – a rather better definition than Searle’s, although as D Føllesdal notes 
in his comments on Stenius, “the notion of ‘the rules of the game’ is … much more 
problematic in the case of languages that in that of ordinary games. While ordinary games are 
usually based on conventions, agreed upon in advance, it is not equally clear what is meant 
by ‘conventional rules of language’”: ‘Comments on Stenius’s ‘Mood and Language-game’’, 
Synthese 17 (1967) 277. 
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located in a Network of other beliefs and desires. Furthermore, in any real life 
situation, the beliefs and desires are only part of a larger complex of still other 
psychological states; there will be subsidiary intentions as well as hopes and 
fears, anxieties and anticipations, feelings of frustration and satisfaction. For 
short, I have been calling this entire holistic network, simply, the “Network.”155 
  
He goes on to suggest that  
 
anyone who tries seriously to follow out the threads in the Network will 
eventually reach a bedrock of mental capacities that do not themselves consist in 
Intentional states (representations), but nonetheless form the preconditions for 
the functioning of Intentional states. The Background is “preintentional” in the 
sense that though not a form or forms of Intentionality, it is nonetheless a 
precondition or set of preconditions of Intentionality.156 
 
Searle then suggests that the Background is necessary in order for there to be 
meaning157, and I would not in the slightest disagree with this: Searle’s 
“Background” is in many respects analogous to the idea of cultural context 
contained in the work of Bakhtin and Volosinov158. 
 
The difference is simply that whereas Searle appears to see the Background as 
a kind of neutral, shared guarantor of sender’s meaning, and puts it in a kind 
of secondary relation to each separate individual159, Bakhtin and Volosinov 
would want to draw attention to the way in which this “Background” in fact 
creates the ability to understand, and is much more an active series of 
relationships and experiences than simply a ‘passive presence’.  
 
Our ‘Backgrounds’ are not “derived” from our relations, as Searle suggests, 
and are not a kind of internal, “neurophysiological” property of our 
                                                     
155 Intentionality p141 
156 Intentionality p143 
157 Intentionality p147 
158 It also corresponds with for example B J Kallenberg’s suggestion that “the term 
‘mereological’ is a useful shorthand for saying that the world is organized according to a 
hierarchy of systems each of which is constituted by an arrangement of entities from the next 
rung lower in complexity”, and that language is an or the emergent property of the social 
level: B J Kallenberg, ‘Unstuck from Yale: Theological Method After Lindbeck’, Scottish 
Journal of Theology 50/2 (1997) p209 
159 He notes in Intentionality that “what I have been calling the Background is indeed derived 
from the entire congeries of relations which each biological-social being has to the world 
around itself. Without my biological constitution, and without the set of social relations in 
which I am embedded, I could not have the Background that I have. But all of these relations, 
biological, social, physical, all this embeddedness, is only relevant to the production of the 
Background because of the effects that it has on me, specifically the effects that it has on my 
mind-brain. The world is relevant to my Background only because of my interaction with the 
world; and we can appeal to the usual “brain-in-the-vat” fable to illustrate this point”: p154. 
In The Construction of Social Reality he describes the Background as consisting of “abilities, 
dispositions, tendencies, and causal structures generally ... [thus] a certain category of 
neurophysiological causation.” For Searle the Background is a kind of property of each 
individual separately. 
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individual minds, but are in fact constitutive of our ‘mind-brains’, (which 
phrase of Searle’s is an entirely inadequate description of the corporeal, social, 
self). Our “social relations” are a part of our “Background”, not a relationship 
to it, and ‘our’ “Background” predates us and is continuously changing. 
Rather than suggesting that “the Background structures consciousness”160, it is far 
more the case that we learn a particular form of self-consciousness, which 
itself forms part of the collective background, or culture, to the further 
development and expression of that consciousness. 
 
Thus I agree with many of Searle’s suggestions about ‘the Background’ and 
the existence of a “socially created normative component”161 to human 
institutions and life. In many, though not all, respects, I share his view that 
there is something fundamental about our shared inheritance that forms the 
basis for meaning and consciousness. However, there is for Searle an 
unacknowledged difficulty here in maintaining the illocutionary-
perlocutionary distinction under any guise,162 because if ‘collective 
representation’ becomes so central, this takes away from the pre-eminence of 
authorial intention, and thus blurs that distinction.163  
 
The nature of ‘Understanding’.                                                                                                                                                                        
5b: Understanding, learning and consciousness in E. D. Hirsch, Bakhtin, 
Volosinov and Gadamer 
 
E D Hirsch himself, as I have noted, is like Bakhtin and Volosinov before him 
aware that ‘understanding’ is an active rather than a passive process: “in fact, 
all understanding of cultural entities past or present is ‘constructed.’ The 
various languages of a culture … are acquired through learning, and not 
inborn.”164 He notes later that “understanding is not an immediate given but 
is always a construction from physical signs”165. However Hirsch, like 
Vanhoozer and Ward, underestimates the extent to which this learning 
creates the one who is learning, and like Searle is curiously reluctant to 
consider learning as a phenomenon.  
 
Hirsch can assert that  
 
since all the various languages of a culture are learned by more than one person, 
they can, implicitly, be learned by any person who takes the trouble to acquire 
them. And once a person has truly acquired a language it does not matter how he 
managed to do so – whether by rote and constant exposure like a three year old 
                                                     
160 The Construction of Social Reality p133 
161 The Construction of Social Reality p146 
162 Illocutions are scarcely mentioned at all in The Construction of Social Reality, and do not 
figure in the index. Perlocutions are entirely absent. 
163 As he notes: “There is exactly one primitive logical operation by which institutional reality 
is created and constituted. It has this form: We collectively accept, acknowledge, recognize, 
go along with, etc., that (S has power (S does A))”: p111. 
164 Validity in Interpretation p43 
165 Validity in Interpretation p134 
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or by disciplined application and self-conscious design. There is no immediacy in 
understanding either a contemporary or a predecessor, and there is no certainty. 
In all cases, what we understand is a construction, and if the construction 
happens to be unthinking and automatic, it is not necessarily more vital and 
authentic for that.166 
 
Up to a point, I agree with this. It is certainly the case anyone can “truly” 
learn167 a language. But to “truly” acquire a language entails more than 
simply being able to speak sentences: ‘truly’ implies a sense of ‘to completely 
inhabit the culture of the language’, and the child who, from birth is learning 
their native tongue, is acquiring with it a complex of assumptions and beliefs 
that will affect who they grow up to become in a way that will be different for 
an adult who learns the same language having grown to consciousness in 
another, no matter how well the adult comes to speak it168. Thus the ‘vitality’ 
and ‘authenticity’ of a speaker’s engagement with a culture will affect their 
ability to understand and be understood: it will affect their ability to share in 
the construction of meaning in that language169. 
 
An adult may well learn to speak the tongue “like a native”, but the ‘like’ here 
is significant: this adult is not quite a native: they may not be who they were, 
but still, they are not quite who ‘we’ are either.  As Volosinov notes in 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, and as I have already noted, “people 
                                                     
166 Validity in Interpretation p43 
167 And to ‘truly’ learn is different from simply ‘to acquire a language’. 
168 “It makes no sense to try to ground or derive the mother-tongue in something else, in 
something non-linguistic. Ordinary language, the everyday language-game, is something 
given, a datum, a donnée, a gift even, part of our form of life, which must simply be 
accepted”: F Kerr, ‘Language as Hermeneutic in the Later Wittgenstein’, Tijdschrift voor 
Filosofie 27 (1965) p516. As G S Morson notes: “we don’t learn our native language in that 
[systematic] way. It’s not as if language is handed down ready-made: instead, we simply 
enter upon the stream of communication. In fact we learn to speak by learning to participate 
in particular kinds of basic everyday speech genres” ‘Who speaks for Bakhtin?: A Dialogic 
Introduction’, Critical Inquiry 10:2 (1983) 229.  
169 This is why I am dubious about Searle’s way of putting this, when he suggests that “the 
child is brought up in a culture where she learns to treat the sounds that come out of her own 
and others’ mouths as standing for, or meaning something, or representing something”: The 
Construction of Social Reality (London, Penguin Books, 1996) p73. This is to put a false step in: 
the child learns that the sound is this word, not that it stands for it: the child learns meaning 
and relationship and identity, not just ‘symbolic relations’. In the same way I don’t agree with 
him that “any normal case of perception will be a case of perceiving as” (p133), not just 
because of the hostage to hindsight represented by the word “normal”, but also because a 
‘normal’ perception based on ‘the background’ is not a case of perceiving x as y, but simply a 
case of perceiving x. This is Wittgenstein’s point, which I think Searle has missed: that there is 
no “as” here. That Searle is aware of this difference is evident when he goes on to note that 
“the use of this word [interpretation] suggests that there is an act of interpreting whenever 
we understand something or perceive something, and of course I don’t want to say that. I 
want to say we normally just see an object or understand a sentence, without any act of 
interpreting” (p134). I entirely agree with him that there is a difference between ‘seeing’ and 
‘seeing as’, although both are I believe acts of understanding; however, I don’t think he is 
clear enough himself about this usage, nor does he consider the implications of this for 
‘illocutionary uptake’.   
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do not “accept” their native language – it is in their native language that they 
first reach awareness.” He adds in a footnote “the process of a child’s 
assimilation of his native language is the process of his gradual immersion 
into verbal communication. As that process proceeds, the child’s 
consciousness is formed and filled with content.”170 
 
Previously he has noted that  
 
in the speaker’s native language … signal-recognition is certainly dialectically 
effaced [“by the new quality of the sign”*]. In the process of mastering a foreign 
language, signality and recognition still make themselves felt, so to speak, and 
still remain to be surmounted, the language not yet fully having become 
language. The ideal of mastering a foreign language is absorption of signality by 
pure semiocity and of recognition by pure understanding.  
[He adds in a footnote] The principle advanced here underlies the practice … of 
all sensible methods of teaching living foreign languages. What is central... is that 
students become acquainted with each linguistic form only in concrete contexts 
and situations. …Thanks to this procedure, the factor of recognition of identical 
word is dialectically combined with and submerged under the factor of the 
word’s contextual changeability, diversity, and capacity for new meanings. A 
word extracted from context, written down in an exercise book, and then 
memorized together with its Russian translation undergoes signalization, so to 
speak … To put it briefly … a form should be assimilated not in its relation to the 
abstract system of the language, i.e., as a self-identical form, but in the concrete 
structure of utterance, i.e., as a mutable and pliable sign.171 
 
An adult who learns a language needs, to have ‘truly’ learnt it, to think and 
understand in that language, to ‘pre-verbalize’ in that language. Their stance 
as a speaker (and their accent) will be affected by their existing linguistic 
existence, and their total immersion in another language and culture will in 
turn affect their stance in their ‘birth-culture’. It is possible to ‘truly’ learn 
another language and be absorbed into another culture as an adult, but to do 
so changes one, and one’s relationship to one’s birth tongue and culture172. 
‘True’ learning is a two-way street, and an active engagement. If you have, in 
adulthood, truly learnt another language, you are unlikely to be the same 
person you were when you started learning, because of the exposures you 
have undergone173. 
                                                     
170 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p81 and footnote 16 
* These words occur earlier in the paragraph – I add them in here. 
171 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p69 and footnote 3. 
172 “However thoroughly one may adopt a foreign frame of mind [in learning a foreign 
language], one still does not forget one’s world-view and language-view. Rather, the other 
world we encounter is not only foreign but is also related to us”: Truth and Method op cit p458 
173 Of course, even ‘partly’ learning another language may also affect one’s self – many things 
will do as one experiences events, whatever one’s exposure to other cultures. There is an echo 
here of the argument between Graf and Fish as to whether or not reading contexts are fluid, 
and if so, what the consequences of that are for the ‘development’ of meaning: G Graff, 
‘Interpretation on Tlön: A Response to Stanley Fish’, New Literary History 17:1 (Autumn 1985) 
109-117, and S Fish, ‘Resistance and Independence: A Reply to Gerald Graff’, New Literary 
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This touches on the territory of the concept of “competence”, which is what 
Searle is considering when he suggests that “one can develop, one can evolve, 
a set of abilities that are sensitive to specific structures of intentionality 
without actually being constituted by that intentionality”174. Competency is 
rather similar to the theological virtue of wisdom (as opposed to that of 
knowledge), and has a parallel in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations175.  
 
As Searle goes on to note: “We don’t stop and think, consciously or 
unconsciously, “Ah ha! ... ‘X counts as Y in C’ and requires collective 
agreement.” Rather, we develop skills that are responsive to that particular 
institutional structure”176: skills which are developed after they have first 
been learnt, of course! One of the things that is notable in Searle’s account of 
‘the Background’ in The Social Construction of Reality, and in which he greatly 
resembles Hirsch, is his enormous reluctance to use the concept of ‘teaching’ 
or ‘learning’. He suggests that we “evolve a set of dispositions”177 and that a 
person can function in society who “has developed a set of capacities and 
abilities that render him at home in the society”178, but the reason for this, of 
course, is not random, but because they have learnt and been taught these 
attributes179. 
 
The understanding of any action as an action is not, then, a passive process. 
Reading or appreciating any action is a skilful activity. It is participating in a 
dialogue as an actor and not as a passive observer. Indeed, the condition of 
passive observation hardly exists at all; to understand is already to be 
involved. Volosinov suggests that “human thought never reflects merely the 
object under scrutiny. It also reflects, along with that object, the being of the 
scrutinizing subject, his concrete social existence. Thought is a two-sided 
mirror, and both its sides can and should be clear and unobscured”180.  
 
Indeed, for Volosinov, thought belongs to two systems at once; to an 
ideological system and to the system of my psyche. Understanding involves 
both aspects181. The individual psyche is socially constructed but also outer 
ideological signs must be ‘owned’ by the individual psyche if they are to 
                                                                                                                                                        
History 17:1 (Autumn 1985) 119-127. See also Gadamer: “you understand a language by living 
in it”: Truth and Method op cit p403 
174
 The Construction of Social Reality p142 
175 And in Truth and Method 
176
 The Construction of Social Reality p143 
177
 The Construction of Social Reality p145 
178
 The Construction of Social Reality p147 
179 It may be that one of the reasons for their shying away from learning, is because this 
would bring them onto the territory of Gadamer’s learnt, dialogic hermeneutics as depicted 
in Truth and Method 
180 Freudianism p26 
181 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p35 
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work as signs; “between the psyche and ideology there exists, then, a 
continuous dialectical interplay”182.  
 
Moreover, “any act of understanding is a response, i.e., it translates what is 
being understood into a new context from which a response can be made”183. 
Only abstract systems could be ‘understood’ passively, not actual 
utterances184. Volosinov asserts that “every conscious act is already a social 
act, an act of communication”185. When an utterance is understood, what is 
understood is not what Bakhtin calls its “neutral signification”186 but its “actual 
meaning”, and the linguistic significance relates to the “background of 
language” while the actual meaning relates to the “background of other 
concrete utterances in the same theme, a background made up of 
contradictory opinions, points of view and value judgments”, the 
“apperceptive background, pregnant with responses and objections”187.  
 
This is almost a reversal of Hirsch’s own typology: for Bakhtin, linguistic 
significance can be determined from a dictionary, but the actual meaning of 
that particular phrase uttered in that particular context is in part determined 
by those particular contextual factors188. 
 
This means that for Bakhtin “in the actual life of speech … understanding and 
response are inseparable”189, so that “with explanation there is only one 
consciousness, one subject; with comprehension there are two 
consciousnesses and two subjects. There can be no dialogic relation with an 
object, and therefore explanation has no dialogic aspects … Understanding is 
always dialogic to some degree”190. Understanding is the active engagement 
with and realization of something: explanation, which is here opposed to 
comprehension, is to be able to list the dictionary definition of a word or 
phrase, but not to be able to use it in conversation. To understand, is to have 
                                                     
182 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p39 
183 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p69 footnote. 
184 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p73 
185 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p114.  
186 The Dialogic Imagination p281 
187 The Dialogic Imagination p281. See also Gadamer: “only if we ‘recognise’ what is 
represented are we able to ‘read’ a picture; in fact, that is what ultimately makes it a picture. 
Seeing means articulating”, Truth and Method (New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) 
p83, and thus “perception always includes meaning”, Truth and Method op cit p84 
188 “a passive understanding of linguistic meaning is no understanding at all, it is only the 
abstract aspect of meaning. But even a more concrete passive understanding of the meaning of 
the utterance, an understanding of the speaker’s intention insofar as that understanding 
remains purely passive, purely receptive, contributes nothing new to the word under 
consideration … even such an understanding never goes beyond the boundaries of the 
word’s context and in no way enriches the word.” The Dialogic Imagination p281.  
189 The Dialogic Imagination p282 
190 Speech Genres etc p111 
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communicated with something else, and to be able to communicate in 
future.191 
 
It is worth making explicit at this point the remarkable similarities between 
the hermeneutical work of Bakhtin and Volosinov, and that of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. Gadamer has become famous for his hermeneutical magnum opus 
Truth and Method192, which discusses and reinvigorates hermeneutics, and 
depicts the nature of understanding as an active, inherently linguistic, event 
within the dialogue of tradition and lived-experience, which inform one 
another, very much in accord with the description of understanding, 
consciousness and language described by Bakhtin and Volosinov. The 
similarities between the active, involved description of understanding that 
can be found in Bakhtin, Volosinov, and Gadamer, are marked.  
 
In respect of understanding, Gadamer notes that  
 
just as we were able to show that the being of the work of art is play and that it 
must be perceived by the spectator in order to be actualized (vollendet), so also it 
is universally true of texts that only in the process of understanding them is the 
dead trace of meaning transformed back into living meaning193  
 
and thus that  
 
hermeneutics must be so determined as a whole that it does justice to the 
experience of art. Understanding must be conceived as a part of the event in 
which meaning occurs, the event in which the meaning of all statements – those 
of art and all other kinds of tradition – is formed and actualized.194 
 
He suggests that ultimately “understanding is the original characteristic of the 
being of human life ... [which Heidegger shows to be] the movement of 
transcendence ... [and which demonstrates that at a fundamental level] all 
such understanding is ultimately self-understanding [because] ... in every case 
.. a person who understands, understands himself (sich versteht), projecting 
himself upon his possibilities.”195  
 
Thus for Gadamer “understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as 
participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and 
                                                     
191 Cf Wittgenstein: “Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. – For that is 
the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of 
circumstances, do we say, “Now I know how to go on.” … for us it is the circumstances under 
which he had such an experience that justify him in saying in such a case that he understands, 
that he knows how to go on.” Phil Inv I §154-155 p61. 
192 Truth and Method (London, Sheed and Ward, 1988), also the revised second edition of 2004 
(New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), from which all quotes are taken, unless noted 
otherwise. 
193
 Truth and Method (New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p163 
194
 Truth and Method (New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p164 
195
 Truth and Method op cit p261 
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present are constantly mediated”196. Moreover, as for Bakhtin, so for Gadamer 
“tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather we produce it 
ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of 
tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves.”197  
 
For Gadamer,  
 
historical tradition is ... not ... an object of historical knowledge or of 
philosophical conception, but ... an effective moment of one’s own being. The 
finite nature of one’s own understanding is the manner in which reality, 
resistance, the absurd, and the unintelligible assert themselves.198  
 
In a similar manner to Bakhtin’s notion of the ‘event of being’, Gadamer refers 
to the “inner historicity of experience”199 which “is always actually present 
only in the individual observation. It is not known in a previous 
universality”200 and is a process which inclines towards ever new experiences 
and to forming a person who is “radically undogmatic”201 and 
“speculative”202.  
 
For Gadamer, as for Bakhtin, the linguistic nature of experience is also crucial: 
Gadamer insists that “hermeneutical experience is concerned with tradition. 
This is what is to be experienced. But tradition is not simply a process that 
experience teaches us to know and govern; it is language – i.e., it expresses 
itself like a Thou. A Thou is not an object; it relates itself to us”203, although 
not simply as the opinion of another individual. In words that could equally 
well be Bakhtin’s, Gadamer suggests that “a person who reflects himself out of a 
living relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning of this tradition in exactly 
the same way” as one can overwhelm the other by refusing to recognise their 
difference, or as one can refuse to recognise one’s own nature as “conditioned 
by historical circumstances”204.  
 
This is because for Gadamer “a language-view is a worldview”205. As he notes, 
“our verbal experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized 
and addressed as existing. That language and world are related in a fundamental 
                                                     
196
 Truth and Method op cit p302 
197
 Truth and Method op cit p305 
198
 Truth and Method op cit page xxxii. See also “long before we understand ourselves through 
the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, 
society and state in which we live”: p289.  
199
 Truth and Method op cit p355 
200
 Truth and Method op cit p360 
201
 Truth and Method op cit,p364 
202
 Truth and Method op cit p483 
203
 Truth and Method op cit p366 
204 Truth and Method op cit p369. This is one way of describing my view of the Speech Act 
claim to a saturated context, or Thiselton’s attempt to distinguish a Speech Act reading 
context from a reader response one, described in the next chapter. 
205
 Truth and Method op cit p459 
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way does not mean, then, that world becomes the object of language. Rather, the 
object of knowledge and statements is always already enclosed within the 
world horizon of language.”206 As Bakhtin would also insist, “we cannot see a 
linguistic world from above ... for there is no point of view outside the 
experience of the world in language from which it could become an object.”207 
 
Gadamer, like Bakhtin, also lays great stress on the importance of genuine 
dialogue or conversation. He asserts that “the fusion of horizons [of reader and 
text] that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language” and 
that in his work he is “endeavoring to approach the mystery of language from 
the conversation that we ourselves are”, and thus that “the way 
understanding occurs – whether in the case of a text or a dialogue with 
another person who raises an issue with us – is the coming-into-language of 
the thing itself”. 208  
 
For Gadamer  
 
every conversation presupposes a common language, or better, creates a 
common language. ... This is not an external matter of simply adjusting our tools; 
nor is it even right to say that the partners adapt themselves to one another but, 
rather, in a successful conversation they both come under the influence of the 
truth of the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community. To 
reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself 
forward and successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being 
transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were.209  
 
In conversation, we are led, we do not lead, and we are led in an event of 
understanding.210 For Gadamer,  
 
language is the universal medium in which understanding occurs. ... All 
understanding is interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium 
of a language that allows the object to come into words and is at the same time 
the interpreter’s own language. ... The hermeneutical phenomenon ... is a circle 
closed by the dialectic of question and answer ... [which] we can call ... a 
conversation. ... The linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of historically 
effected consciousness.211 
                                                     
206
 Truth and Method op cit p466 
207
 Truth and Method op cit p469 
208 Truth and Method op cit p386. In the Afterword, Gadamer admits that “the conceptual 
language of philosophy cannot be extricated from the whole of the language world and that, 
even at the expense of delimiting concepts precisely, its living relation to the whole must be 
preserved. That is the positive implication of the ‘indigence of language’ inherent in 
philosophy from its beginnings” (p587-588) because “in the hermeneutic sciences, a verbal 
formulation does not merely refer to something that could be verified in other ways; instead 
it makes something visible in the how of its meaningfulness” (p588). 
209
 Truth and Method op cit p386-387 
210
 Truth and Method op cit p401 
211
 Truth and Method op cit p407. Indeed, “the hermeneutical situation is not a regrettable 
distortion that affects the purity of understanding, but the condition of its possibility. ... The 
apparently thetic beginning of interpretation is, in fact, a response; and the sense of an 
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Indeed, Gadamer suggests that  
 
Language is not just one of man’s possessions in the world; rather, on it depends 
the fact that man has a world at all. The world as world exists for man as for no 
other creature that is in the world. But this world is verbal in nature. ... Language 
has no independent life apart from the world that comes to language within it. 
Not only is the world world only insofar as it comes into language, but language, 
too, has its real being only in the fact that the world is presented in it. Thus, that 
language is originarily human means at the same time that man’s being-in-the-
world is primordially linguistic.212   
 
There are some clear differences between Bakhtin, Volosinov and Gadamer, 
particularly in terms of the language they used to describe the shared and 
inherited aspect of human consciousness, variously for example ‘tradition’, 
‘society’ or ‘culture’. However, since these are in any case translations from 
the German or Russian whose nuances may not be captured in English, even 
these distinctions may merely obscure an underlying similarity in their work, 
all of which undoubtedly stresses the event of understanding and the 
dynamic nature of life as an ongoing conversation between the individual and 
their context; between uniqueness and embodiedness.  
 
The dynamic relationship between understanding and meaning shared by the 
Bakhtin circle and Gadamer demonstrates that meaning will change as and 
when understanding changes. It is therefore not necessarily the case that, as 
Hirsch suggests, “my perception of a visible object … can vary greatly from 
occasion to occasion, and yet what I am conscious of is nevertheless the same 
table, the same phoneme”213. That this most certainly is a common experience 
is simply because the table continues to have the same (and therefore 
unimportant and easily overlooked) value and meaning.  
 
To say, as we might be tempted to, that a table has no meaning, it just is a 
table, is to put it into the class of ‘everyday’ or ‘ordinary’ objects214. They 
                                                                                                                                                        
interpretation is determined, like every response, by the question asked. Thus the dialectic of 
question and answer always precedes the dialectic of interpretation. It is what determines 
understanding as an event”: p488 – and this rather echoes Rosenblatt’s depiction of the 
transactional relationship that creates the encounter of meaning.  
212
 Truth and Method op cit p459. Further underlining the similarities with Bakhtin, Gadamer 
suggests that “every word causes the whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate 
and the whole world-view that underlies it to appear. Thus every word, as the event of a 
moment, carries with it the unsaid, to which it is related by responding and summoning. The 
occasionality of human speech is not a casual imperfection of its expressive power; it is, 
rather, the logical expression of the living virtuality of speech that brings a totality of 
meaning into play, without being able to express it totally”: p474    
213 Validity in Interpretation p37 
214 “In other words, while the ordinary and the obvious are always with us, because we are 
always in the grip of some belief or other, they can change”: S Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances, 
Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What goes 
without Saying, and Other Special Cases’, Critical Inquiry 4:4 (Summer 1978) p627 
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appear to have no meaning; they simply ‘are what they are’. This, though, is 
in fact a way of saying that these things are things we have grown up with 
and are entirely comfortable with. They have no surprises for us, and raise no 
questions in our minds. We know what tables are, and what they are for, and 
where this and that particular table have come from, and that they are where 
they always are215.  
 
However, if on the following day, my uncle is found slumped over what was 
‘just a table’, murdered, or if diamonds are found in a hidden drawer, or if I 
discover that it was at this table that Schleswig was ceded to Prussia, then 
while the table’s ‘minimum physical presence’216 may be constant, it will not 
thereafter be the same table: its meaning will have altered greatly. It will 
become, not ‘just a table’, but ‘the table at which …’. Indeed, to imagine 
something less dramatic, if I come into a room one day to find a table moved, 
it may become a new object, while its ‘minimum physical presence’ is 
unchanged: it will become an object of fear or suspicion – ‘who moved that 
table, how did it get there’, or simply one now more appreciated – ‘I never 
realised before how beautiful that table was’. 
 
That which is just a table, or just a horse, or just a printing-press, to someone 
used to such things, is something with earth-shattering properties to one 
encountering the object for the first time. Familiarity alters meaning. All 
objects have meaning, and this meaning includes an assumption of value: the 
meaning and value of an object constitutes part of the object’s recognized 
identity, and can change (in just the same way as the meaning and value of an 
act can change and thus change the nature of the act: what was an act of 
liberation becomes an act of terrorism in a later text book; the British 
Government’s execution of traitors in wartime Dublin became the murder of 
martyrs whose deaths became one of the cornerstones in establishing Irish 
independence217). 
 
Hirsch’s assertion that “something can remain the same for consciousness 
even though one’s perspective, emotion, state of health may vary”218 is simply 
                                                     
215 “§602. Asked “Did you recognize your desk when you entered your room this morning?” 
– I should no doubt say “Certainly!” And yet it would be misleading to say that an act of 
recognition had take place. Of course the desk was not strange to me: I was not surprised to 
see it, as I should have been if another one had been standing there, or some unfamiliar kind 
of object.  
§603. No one will say that every time I enter my room, my long-familiar surroundings, there 
is enacted a recognition of all that I see and have seen hundreds of times before. 
§604. It is easy to have a false picture of the processes called “recognizing”: as if recognizing 
always consisted in comparing two impressions with one another… Our memory seems to us 
to be the agent of such a comparison, by preserving a picture of what has been seen before, or 
by allowing us to look into the past (as if down a spy-glass).” Phil Inv I §602-604 p157. 
216 To adopt a phrase along the lines of Austin’s “minimum physical act”. 
217 The Allied invasion/liberation of Iraq, or the most recent Ukrainian revolution/coup are 
examples other such debated acts. 
218 Validity in Interpretation p37 
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stating that the meaning of an object can be constant over time: this is of 
course true, but it is not inevitable. If the meaning of an object changes for 
someone but not for someone else, then they will both be looking at the same 
physical object, just as a text may remain unvarying as a physical object. But 
the meaning of that object or text will be different for each, because of the 
context (the history) in which they realize the object. The physical object may 
remain unchanged, not so the meaningful object219. Physicality and identity 
are not coterminous or indistinguishable, just as in the case of the ‘minimum 
physical act’ and the fully valued and realized act which Austin himself 
distinguishes and discusses220.  
 
This is the same phenomenon as the one in which a phrase has one meaning 
to ‘the public’, and another to a group of ‘initiates’. When, in The Construction 
of Social Reality221 Searle suggests that a “physical object” has “intrinsic 
features” that “do not depend on any attitudes of observers or users”, as well 
as “observer-relative” features222, he is in fact identifying the same 
phenomenon. What he refers to as “ontologically subjective features” that are 
“observer relative” is the same phenomenon more frequently termed 
‘meaning’ (which as he goes on to note is inextricably linked with 
“function”223), and his subsequent suggestion that recognising meaning is 
“intrinsic” to the observers224, is another way of saying with Wittgenstein, 
that we simply recognise cutlery as cutlery: we just ‘know what it is’, because 
we learn meanings.  
 
Searle errs, however, in suggesting that “seeming to be F is logically prior to 
being F”,225 because the nature of understanding is that “seeming to be” is 
“being”, except in hindsight: the two are simultaneous, co-dependent, and 
                                                     
219 “The obviousness of the utterance’s meaning is not a function of the values its words have 
in a linguistic system that is independent of context; rather it is because the words are heard 
as already embedded in a context that they have a meaning that Hirsch can then cite as 
obvious”: Fish, ‘Is There a Text in This Class?’, H A Veeser (ed.), The Stanley Fish Reader, 
(Blackwell, Malden MA, 1999) p45. See also S Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, 
Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What goes without Saying, and 
Other Special Cases’, Critical Inquiry 4:4 (Summer 1978) p630.  
See also H Dufva and M Lähteenmäki, ‘But who killed Harry? A dialogical approach to 
language and consciousness’, Pragmatics and Cognition 4:1 (1996) 105-123. They ask “what 
does it mean to ‘see a tree’? in real life, ‘seeing a tree’ is something meaningful. ... My 
processing system ... may connect the visual stimulus (which, by the way, does not consist 
only of the tree but of its background and context as well) to such (possible) concepts, and/or 
emotions, and/or responses, as; ’beauty’, ‘forest’, ‘oak’, ‘acid rain’, ‘autumn’, ‘picture in a 
book’, or ‘enjoying a walk in a forest’. ... In real life, trees are not seen without a context, or 
observed without some relevance. ... The process of understanding is not fundamentally data-
driven or form-driven” p116. 
220 See How To p110-111 and Chapter Four of this thesis. 
221 (London, Penguin Books, 1996) 
222
 The Construction of Social Reality p10 
223 Ibid p14 
224 Ibid p10-11 
225
 Ibid p13 
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inseparable, until we wonder if we were mistaken. ‘Seeming to be’ is 
therefore, in usage, frequently subsequent to ‘being’, because it has, at least 
often, an air of uncertainty about it; sometimes we see a thing and wonder if it 
is ‘F’ or not, as it rather seems to be – here, seeming is prior. Sometimes we 
see ‘F’, and thereafter begin to wonder if it actually is ‘F’ or not – here, 
seeming is subsequent.  
 
Hirsch and Searle are, as I have already suggested,  victims of the sender view 
of meaning. They, with Austin (and along with many other scholars) assume 
a sender view of meaning and start their ideas of meaning from the 
standpoint of a single, ‘isolated’, self or agent. As I suggested in my first 
chapter, in this view of identity and meaning, communication begins with 
‘me’, the speaker or agent, and is the process whereby I move ‘outwards’ to 
another. The starting point for philosophy is the individual adult 
consciousness, apparently self-contained and fully developed. 
 
This initial assumption as a starting point means that all communication is 
intrinsically uncertain. How can I be certain that what is in my mind can be 
understood, or that I can correctly convey my thoughts or meanings to 
another? It is interesting that it is not merely Vanhoozer or Hirsch who start 
with this assumption preoccupying their approach: it is a fundamental aspect 
of the ‘post-modern condition’ also. If the author’s intention is not identical to 
meaning – if what I say is not correctly recognized – then communication 
collapses and we are all doomed to remain as we apparently started, isolated 
individuals stuck in isolated worlds226.  
 
So it seems quite plausible that either meaning is the possession of the author 
and is made by them a property of the utterance, or that meaning is the 
property of each individual reader and thus collapses into chaos. The idea of 
the sender view of meaning – the idea that meaning is ascribed to an 
utterance by the initiator who sends the meaningful utterance out to be 
recognized (or not) by his or her audience – is coherently seen as a bulwark 
against a chaos of individualistic, competing, unrecognized meanings. 
 
However, this entire assumption is based on a false model of identity and 
communication, that ignores the fact that I do not start with my own self-
awareness and identity as a given. Instead I acquire a sense (or senses) of 
myself as I grow, learn and develop. I come to a sense (or senses) of myself as 
                                                     
226 It is this supposition that Wittgenstein is challenging in Philosophical Investigations and in 
his other later work: certainly according to Fergus Kerr: Theology after Wittgenstein (London, 
SPCK, 1997) see for example p100 “the model of the self as an intangible and private object 
alienates us from ourselves.” See also Kerr’s ‘Language as Hermeneutic in the Later 
Wittgenstein’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 27 (1965), for example “the programme carried through 
… in the Investigations … is … the surmounting of a post-Cartesian philosophy of the 
isolated worldless I by means of a thoroughgoing retrieval of a philosophy in which the 
human subject is always the participant in a community prior to all objectification and 
subjectivism” p502. 
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I come to an awareness of my culture and language, and thus my self-
awareness is at the same time an awareness of myself within certain shaping 
and creating contexts. The question of ‘who I am’ is determined by the nature 
of who I am recognised as being, by others and by myself, and this 
recognition can alter. 
 
My sense of my self is acquired and learned: it is a given gift, one might say, 
which is not a static intellectual possession but is something fluid and 
relational. I cannot be an isolated individual, doomed to be forever 
misunderstood, because my identity as ‘I’ is itself something communicated 
and corporate or shared. As G L Bruns notes: “Hermeneutical reflection 
dissolves the possibility of the solitary investigator modeled on the Cartesian 
Mind or the Transcendental Ego or the Intentional Consciousness. For 
hermeneutics, it is not enough to talk of a subject except in the presupposition 
of dialogue. A subject is always in dialogue and cannot be thought of simply 
as an agent in cognition.”227  
 
The nature of ‘Understanding’.                                                                                                                                
5c: The act of reading. 
 
If understanding is an active participation in creating the act itself from 
within a community and a context, then reading must also be seen as an 
active, participatory action, at least in so far as understanding necessarily and 
simultaneously involves reading (and there may be circumstances in which 
reading does not include understanding228, although it is hard to imagine that 
the understanding of a text of any sort could occur without reading). Reading 
is therefore a necessary completion of the creation of authorially-instigated 
meaning. This will certainly have implications for a view of revelation. 
Unsurprisingly, it is not a view of reading advocated by Hirsch or the 
proponents of a Speech Act biblical hermeneutics. 
 
Hirsch’s notion of genre229 is an attempt to create, by suggesting the idea of a 
‘layering’ of context (as with his ‘layering’ of the idea of meaning), a neutral 
background reminiscent of Searle’s own idea of “the Background” in front of 
which an individual author can plausibly exercise some control over the 
intrinsic genre of their utterance, and thus of its meaning. Hirsch is not able to 
provide, however, convincing examples of what might constitute a ‘given’, 
because every aspect of the dialogic or conversational context of a particular 
utterance, including the utterances which surround it (be they textual or 
                                                     
227 G L Bruns, ‘Structuralism, Deconstruction, and Hermeneutics: Review of J Culler’s ‘On 
Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca NY, Cornell University 
Press, 1982)’, Diacritics 14:1 (Spring 1984) 13-14, although I think no blame is attributable, and 
binary oppositions are perhaps too easy. 
228 I have had some such experiences myself. 
229 Validity in Interpretation chapter 3, p 68ff. 
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spoken), are construed and affect the construal of any particular utterance 
within that on-going dialogue.  
 
In his discussion of genre Hirsch is attempting to isolate the construals or 
assumptions we learn to make as part of our acquisition of a culture, from the 
recognition of the meaning of an utterance, in order to preserve the idea that 
meaning is understood on the basis of the authorially-intended genre intrinsic 
to the utterance. He denies the extent of the contextuality of the act of 
recognizing an utterance, because the more contextual acts of realization or 
recognition are seen to be, the less unanimity between speaker and hearer or 
reader and writer will seem to be the essence of meaning.  
 
As he later observes: the mistake of  
 
the proponents of “public norms”  ... lay not in thinking that there is a supra-
individualistic principle which enforces meanings, but in believing that this 
principle is somehow automatically given to any “competent reader.” It is the 
speaker who wills the particular intrinsic genre and, having done so, is 
constrained by its proprieties.230 
 
For one who is clear on the importance of construal or construction in 
meaning, Hirsch is peculiarly reluctant to consider the importance of learning 
or inheriting principles, as we have already noted. The suggestion that either 
speakers “will” genre, or that they are “somehow automatically given” is, for 
a professor within an educational system, perverse. Learning is not an 
automatic given, and it is a relatively universal phenomenon231. Hirsch is 
unable to suggest it as a way in which meaning is collectively authored 
because he imagines as his starting point individual, isolated adult agents, 
and because of his concern at every turn to resist any weakening of authorial 
control. 
 
Hirsch states that we cannot imply “that the meaning represented by the text 
is not the parole of an author, but rather the parole of the speech community” 
because “since only individuals utter paroles, a parole of the speech community 
is a non-existent, or what the Germans call an Unding. A text can represent 
only the parole of a speaker or author, which is another way of saying that 
meaning requires a meaner.”232 The fallacy here is to assume again that 
meaning is an either/or concept. Instead, the concept of parole itself (and 
                                                     
230 Validity in Interpretation p93-94. See the discussion in the previous chapter. 
231 “Let the use teach you the meaning” Phil Inv IIxi p212. See also J R Hobbs, ‘Artificial 
Intelligence and Collective Intentionality: Comments on Searle and on Grosz and Sidner’, in P 
R Cohen, J Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication (Cambridge MA, MIT 
Press, 1992) p453: “we are born knowing how to suckle and desiring to cuddle. Engaging in 
this collective behavior establishes a small-scale sense of community, which makes possible 
further collective behavior and communication. Language is learned, enabling us to learn the 
rules and conventions of quite complex social activities. And so on, until we arrive at the 
complex creatures we are.” 
232 Validity in Interpretation p234 
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Hirsch is right to see parole as the contextually meaningful aspect of language) 
is a dialogic one: the ‘meaner’ learns a parole, which is far more than just the 
application of the elements of the langue, but which encompasses what is 
often also called the ‘cultural context’. Thus ‘the meaning of the text’ (to say 
that the text ‘represents’ a meaning is again to fall into the sender view of 
meaning, divorcing meaning from the actual utterance itself) is the parole both 
of an author and a speech community: without the community, there would 
be no parole, and only the community can teach the parole to the author, but 
each author can adapt and evolve the parole in conversation233.  
 
Bakhtin therefore suggests, in respect of reading, that 
  
everything that is said, expressed, is located outside the “soul” of the speaker and 
does not belong only to him. The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker. 
The author (speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, but the listener 
also has his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the word before the 
author comes upon it also have their rights (after all, there are no words that 
belong to no-one). The word is a drama in which three characters participate (it is 
not a duet, but a trio). It is performed outside the author, and it cannot be 
introjected into the author. If we anticipate nothing from the word, if we know 
ahead of time everything that it can say, it departs from the dialogue and is 
reified.234  
 
Therefore, in Bakhtin’s view, the act of reading should seek 
  
to understand a given text as the author himself understood it. But our 
understanding can and should be better. Powerful and profound creativity is 
largely unconscious and polysemic. Through understanding it is supplemented 
by consciousness, and the multiplicity of its meanings is revealed. Thus, 
understanding supplements the text: it is active and also creative by nature. 
Creative understanding continues creativity and multiplies the artistic wealth of 
humanity. The co-creativity of those who understand. 
Understanding and evaluation. Understanding is impossible without evaluation.  
Understanding cannot be separated from evaluation: they are simultaneous and 
constitute a unified integral act. The person who understands approaches the 
work with his own already formed world view, from his own viewpoint, his own 
position. These positions determine his evaluation to a certain degree, but they 
themselves do not always stay the same. They are influenced by the artwork, 
which always introduces something new. Only when the position is dogmatically 
inert is there nothing new revealed in the work (the dogmatist gains nothing; he 
cannot be enriched). The person who understands must not reject the possibility 
                                                     
233 E Weigand: “the basic universal dialogic principle thus rests on the insight that there is no 
individual speech act which is, taken on its own, communicatively autonomous. The smallest 
autonomous unit of communication is the sequence of action and reaction”: ‘The Dialogic 
Principle Revisited’, Dialoganalyse III:1 (1991) 77. 
234 Speech Genres etc p121-122. There are very strong echoes here of Gadamer, and of Panikkar: 
“Real words are not mere instruments in your hands or mine, they are part of the human, 
cosmic, and also divine interplay and they mean what we all agree that they mean in the very 
act of the dialogical interchange. Otherwise they are no longer living words; they are dead:” 
The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon-Person-Mystery, (London, Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1973) page x. 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Seven: The Hermeneutics of Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov  
 
298 
of changing or even abandoning his already-prepared viewpoints and positions. 
In the act of understanding a struggle occurs that results in mutual change and 
enrichment.235  
 
The contemplation of art is necessary for the meaning of the art to be realised, 
and such also is the case for the meaning of an utterance or of a text. In all 
cases, it is not the case either that the reader/contemplator creates meaning236 
or that the reader/contemplator passively receives it from another237; rather 
meaning is realized in dialogue, as for Gadamer238.  
 
Thus Bakhtin can suggest that while ‘formal’ meaning is accessible to all 
readers or contemplators, the evaluative-semantic and symbolic aspect of 
meaning (that which is alive not dictionary-bound) is accessible “only to 
individuals who are related by some common conditions of life … in the final 
analysis, by the bonds of brotherhood on a high level”239, a conclusion that 
resembles those suggested by Gadamer’s consciousness of the tradition in 
which we are located240, the work of Raymond Gibbs241, and even Hornsby’s 
conditions for hearing illocutions, as well as John Macmurray242. 
                                                     
235 Speech Genres etc p142. See also “Not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a text 
goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a 
productive activity as well”: Gadamer, Truth and Method op cit p307. 
236 Such an isolated self-contained individual with such a degree of free reign does not in any 
case exist, for Bakhtin or Volosinov 
237 Such a situation is impossible – it would be an instance of receiving a signal not a sign, as 
happens when we begin to learn a foreign language: see Volosinov: Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language op cit p69: something we have laboriously to reconstruct ‘piece by 
piece’. 
238 In the words of Mika Lähteenmäki, “understanding is not viewed as a process whereby a 
listener finds out the thought behind a speaker’s words, rather it is regarded as a joint project 
in which meanings are mutually constructed. Moreover, ... understanding necessarily 
presupposes answering ... [and is] the listener’s active reaction to the speech act of the 
speaker. Thus understanding and answering are intimately interconnected, since 
understanding an utterance manifests itself, in one way or another, in the future reaction of 
the listener”: M Lähteenmäki, ‘On Meaning and Understanding: A Dialogical Approach’, 
Dialogism 1 (1998) 78.  
See also “the experimenter constitutes part of the experimental system (in microphysics). One 
might say, likewise, that the person who participates in understanding constitutes part of the 
understood utterance, the text (more precisely, utterances and their dialogue enter the text as 
a new participant)”: Speech Genres etc p123 
239 Speech Genres etc p166.  
240 “once again we discover that the person who is understanding does not know and judge as 
one who stands apart and unaffected but rather he thinks along with the other from the 
perspective of a specific bond of belonging, as if he too were affected”: Truth and Method 
(New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p332-333 
241 See chapter four 
242 Who suggests that there is a social life based on purposes, and “there is a second way in 
which we can enter into relationships with one another. We may associate purely for the 
purpose of expressing our whole selves to one another in mutuality and fellowship. It is 
difficult to find a word to express this kind of relationship which will convey its full meaning 
... what is common to them all [words he suggests] is the idea of a relationship between us 
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Volosinov also notes that  
 
nothing is more perilous for aesthetics than to ignore the autonomous role of the 
listener … The listener never equals the author. The listener has his own 
independent place in the event of artistic creation; he must occupy a special, and, 
what is more, a two-sided position in it – with respect to the author and with 
respect to the hero – and it is this position that has determinative effect on the 
style of an utterance.243 
 
Thus the listener or reader is “an immanent participant in the artistic event 
who has determinative effect on the form of the work from within”244.  
 
Volosinov describes the dialogism of the book and the utterance on pages 95 
and 96 of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Having distinguished 
between theme and meaning, as discussed previously, he goes on to note that 
“only active understanding can grasp theme” and that to understand an 
utterance requires an orientation towards it, and to find the right context for 
it245. Any true understanding must be dialogic in nature, and  
 
therefore there is no reason for saying that meaning belongs to a word as such… 
Meaning belongs to a word in its position between speakers; that is, meaning is 
realized only in the process of active, responsive understanding… Meaning is the 
effect of interaction between speaker and listener…  [in a collective “ecosystem”], 
only the current of verbal intercourse endows a word with the light of meaning.246 
 
The theme can be understood simply by intonation, and is rooted in collective 
value judgments, which extend far wider than merely theme and meaning. 
Meaning, of course, is continually evolving247. 
 
As Bakhtin insists, “when a listener perceives and understands the meaning 
(the language meaning) of speech, he simultaneously takes an active, 
responsive attitude towards it” and  
 
any understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently responsive, 
although the degree of this activity varies extremely. Any utterance is imbued 
with response and necessarily elicits it in one form or another: the listener 
becomes the speaker. A passive understanding of the meaning of perceived 
speech is only an abstract aspect of the actual whole of actively responsive 
understanding, which is than actualised in a subsequent response that is actually 
articulated.248  
                                                                                                                                                        
which has no purpose beyond itself”: J Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, op cit p56. This 
personal relationship is for Macmurray the purpose of society (op cit p59). 
243 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p112 
244 ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art’ in Freudianism p113 
245 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p102 
246 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p102-103. 
247 Marxism and the Philosophy of Language p106. 
248 Speech Genres etc p68 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Seven: The Hermeneutics of Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov  
 
300 
 
He goes on: 
 
Thus, all real and integral understanding is actively responsive, and constitutes 
nothing other than the initial preparatory stage of a response ... And the speaker 
himself is oriented precisely toward such an actively responsive understanding. 
He does not expect passive understanding that, so to speak, only duplicates his 
own idea in someone else’s mind … The desire to make one’s speech understood 
is only an abstract aspect of the speaker’s concrete and total speech plan. 
Moreover, any speaker is himself a respondent to a greater or lesser degree. He is 
not, after all, the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the 
universe. And he presupposes not only the existence of the language system he is 
using, but also the existence of preceding utterances – his own and others’ – with 
which his given utterance enters into one kind of relation or another … Any 
utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances.249 
 
Thus, in his description of how to read novels, Bakhtin firstly notes that the 
reader requires some knowledge of the dialogues and language of the 
authorial context (perhaps with the aid of “historico-linguistic research”250). 
He identifies two central problems: firstly those of “canonization”; the 
tendency of language to slip from being heteroglossic251 and other to being 
‘established’ and ‘literary’, which he suggests is “no obstacle”252 to one who 
“grasps the basic orchestrating languages and the basic lines of movement 
and play of intentions”.  
 
Secondly, there is the problem of “re-accentuation”, where the living word 
itself can evolve or recall its past meanings and ‘fight’ against the author, 
particularly where contextual changes make it impossible to perceive double-
voiced authorial strategies such as parody, which may become recognised 
instead as sincere or as crudely polemical253.  
 
Both of these problems are as he notes, affected by and affect the reading 
context, and moreover these problems are not simply a  
 
crude violation of the author’s will. It can even be said that this process takes 
place within the image itself, i.e., not only in the changed conditions of perception. 
Such conditions merely actualise in an image a potential already available to it. 
We could say with some justification that in one respect the image has become 
better understood and better “heard” than ever before.254 
 
Indeed, in Speech Genres etc Bakhtin notes 
 
                                                     
249 Speech Genres etc p69 
250 The Dialogic Imagination p417 
251 By which he means many-voiced and dialogic 
252 The Dialogic Imagination p418 
253 The Dialogic Imagination p419 
254 The Dialogic Imagination p420 
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the first task is to understand the work as the author himself understood it, 
without exceeding the limits of his understanding. This is a very difficult 
problem and usually requires introducing an immense amount of material. The 
second task is to take account of one’s own position of temporal and cultural 
outsidedness. Inclusion in our (other’s for the author) context.255 
 
And he concludes “for, we repeat, great novelistic images continue to grow 
and develop even after the moment of their creation, they are capable of being 
creatively transformed in different eras, far distant from the day and hour of 
their original birth”256, a concept very close to Vanhoozer’s and Ward’s idea 
of transhistorical meaning, but which fits into Bakhtin’s dialogic hermeneutics 
far better than into the ‘authorial-intentionalistic’ hermeneutics of Ward and 
Vanhoozer.  
 
Indeed as Bakhtin observes, novels exist in “great time” not simply the time 
of their own epoch, important though that is for understanding them; artists 
like Shakespeare grow “because of that which actually has been and 
continues to be found in his works, but which neither he himself nor his 
contemporaries could consciously perceive and evaluate in the context of the 
culture of their epoch”257 so that the author can be seen as a ”captive” of his 
own epoch, ‘liberated’ by “subsequent times”258.  
 
This is complementary with the acknowledgment of meaning as a system 
because the cultural unity which founds meaning is an “open unity”259 and 
thus both semantic depth and material expand. Bakhtin observes, in a way 
that will be proposed also by Gadamer, that  
 
a meaning only reveals its depths once it has encountered and come into contact 
with another, foreign meaning; they engage in a kind of dialogue which 
surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of these particular meanings, these 
cultures. We raise new questions for a foreign culture, ones that it did not raise 
itself; we seek answers to our own questions in it; and the foreign culture 
responds to us by revealing to us its new aspects and new semantic depths. 
Without one’s own questions one cannot creatively understand anything other or 
foreign (but, of course, the questions must be serious and sincere). Such a dialogic 
encounter of two cultures does not result in merging or mixing. Each retains its 
own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched.260  
 
The echo of Austin’s insistence on seriousness is notable here, and bearing in 
mind Derrida’s criticism of Austin in this respect, and indeed Bakhtin’s own 
work on Rabelais and on carnival and comedy, it should be noted that by 
serious Bakhtin means not po-faced or solemn, but with the orientation 
                                                     
255 Speech Genres etc p144 
256 The Dialogic Imagination p422 
257 Speech Genres etc p4 
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towards a genuine encounter with ‘otherness’ and towards engaging in 
genuine dialogue.  
 
The alternative position to this serious engagement illustrates its meaning 
(and this whole discussion illustrates how we are inextricably in dialogue 
with each other and how crucial is context to meaning); it is the dogmatist 
who only recognises the repeated meaning and not the new and thus “is in no 
way enriched. In what belongs to others he recognises only his own”261. As 
with selfhood, too, so meaning does not ever finish. Selfhood and meaning 
cannot be consummated except from the point of view of the outside, and in 
either case this is still provisional; only the superaddressee could completely 
consummate.  
 
Bakhtin also notes in respect of texts, which he defines as “any coherent 
complex of signs”262 – i.e. anything realized as such – that they have two 
poles; the systematic and the specifically contextual. He is aware of the 
existence and specific quality of re-reading; “the reproduction of the text by 
the subject (a return to it, a repeated reading, a new execution quotation) is a 
new, unrepeatable event in the life of the text, a new link in the historical 
chain of speech communication” 263 Thus Bakhtin notes that there must be 
  
understanding-recognition of repeated elements of speech (i.e. language) and 
intelligent understanding of the unrepeatable utterance. Each element of speech 
is perceived on two planes: on the plane of the repeatability of the language and 
on the plane of the unrepeatability of the utterance. Through the utterance, 
language joins the historical unrepeatability and unfinalized totality of the 
logosphere. 264  
 
For Bakhtin, “the reproduction of the text by the subject (a return to it, a 
repeated reading, a new execution quotation) is a new, unrepeatable event in 
the life of the text, a new link in the historical chain of speech 
communication”265 and thus the text is not a thing but an event: “the 
unrepeatable event of the text”266.  
 
Thus  
contextual meaning is personalistic; it always includes a question, an address, 
and the anticipation of a response, it always includes two (as a dialogic 
minimum). This personalism is not psychological, but semantic. There is neither a 
first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends into 
the boundless past and the boundless future). Even past meanings, that is, those 
born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable … - they will always 
change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future development of the 
                                                     
261 Speech Genres etc p143 
262 Speech Genres etc p103 
263 Speech Genres etc p106 
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dialogue … Nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will have its homecoming 
festival.267 
 
Reader and author thus “co-create” art, the reader contemplating the object 
from the position of otherness268. Bakhtin suggests that this is analogous to 
the way in which a spectator creates art from the play of others;  
 
a spectator who contemplates this life event in an aesthetically active manner 
and, in part, creates it (as an aesthetically valid whole, by transposing it to a new 
plane – the aesthetic plane) … alters the event as it is initially given: the event 
becomes enriched with a new moment, new in principle – an author/beholder, 
and, as a result, all other moments of the event are transformed as well, inasmuch 
as they become part of a new whole.269 
 
Thus, rather than imagining the act of reading as a passive ‘uptaking’, it 
should be recognized as an active, dynamic response, one that is both 
anticipated by the author, and which is necessary for the consummation of 
the work.  
 
This is at least the case for the activity of reading texts from the genre of 
‘literature’ or ‘art’, which are those Bakhtin and Volosinov generally consider. 
However, as they both argue, the act of understanding, which is included in 
the act of reading, is always and can only be an active, dynamic one. To read a 
text is to make many contextual assumptions about its genre, the intentions of 
its author/s, and its meaning, and none of these are ‘neutral givens’, they are 
all part of one’s inherited, evolving cultural context270.  
 
                                                     
267 Speech Genres etc p169-170 
268 Art and Answerability p66 
269 Art and Answerability p75 – compare this to Gadamer’s analysis of play in Truth and Method 
op cit page 106ff 
270 As Fish asserts, “a sentence is never apprehended independently of the context in which it 
is perceived, and therefore we never know a sentence except in the stabilized form a context 
has already conferred … there is no first place in the sense of a state in which the natural 
(acontextual) properties of a sentence can be observed and enumerated” (p637): because “no 
degree of explicitness will ever be sufficient to disambiguate the sentence if by disambiguate 
we understand render it impossible to conceive of a set of circumstances in which its plain meaning 
would be other than it now appears to be” (p636): S Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances, Literal 
Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What goes without 
Saying, and Other Special Cases’, Critical Inquiry 4:4 (Summer 1978). This point is also 
demonstrated by a simple experiment recorded by Sadock involving twenty “subjects” 
writing sentences and effects of language on separate cards and then trying to imagine a 
context that would unite sentences and effects randomly selected. “There was only one case 
where the participants failed to find a context that did the trick, and that was – predictably – 
one where the intended effect (the christening of a battleship) was of the kind that can only be 
accomplished by adhering to a prescribed ritual [although in this case Austin himself 
suggested ways of doing this ‘unhappily’]. In every other case it was a fairly trivial matter to 
think of a context that worked”: J M Sadock, ‘Comments on Vanderveken and on Cohen and 
Levesque’, in P R Cohen, J Morgan and M E Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication 
(Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1992) p258.  
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Matei Calinescu also suggests that many readings are in fact re-readings, or at 
least are not “virginal”, and that different assumptions and understandings 
are thus engaged from those which we imagine to be in the case in an 
abstracted or idealized ‘act of reading’.  
 
The concept of a virginal first reading, so appealing to our naïve intuition, cannot 
withstand critical reflection. 
Even before I decide to read a book, I have not only certain expectations, shaped 
by my generic acquaintance with the kind of book I have selected from a great 
many available books, but quite probably some more specific assumptions about 
the chosen book itself… So when I make up my mind to read a book …, I most 
likely already know something about it: I may have been advised by a friend or a 
reviewer to read it, or perhaps forbidden to read it by an authority figure or 
censor; I may have been given reasons why I should, or perhaps should not, read 
it; or I may have simply heard it mentioned informally as an enjoyable book, or 
as being original, topical, scandalous, etc… Even when I pick a new book by an 
unknown author on a whim, I am better informed about it than I might suspect. 
This information (which may well turn out to have been misleading) is derived 
from where the book in question is sold ...; from the books that immediately 
surround it ...; from the title ...; from the book jacket ...; and quite likely from a 
general impression gained by quickly glancing through the pages.271 
  
The act of reading itself thus contains any number of intentional suppositions 
and part-postulated ‘presences’, the gift of the reader’s own culture and 
inheritance. When it comes to communication, therefore, it is becoming clear 
that a communicatory act is considerably more complicated than the 
production of sounds or signs by an author. A text act or a speech act is an 
encultured, co-operative activity. 
 
Calinescu briefly imagines some different generic readings. “With great 
literature, we may justifiably say, each time is the first time”, while  
 
in the matter of poetry the distinction between first reading and rereading is hard 
to sustain in phenomenological terms and almost naturally tends to acquire a 
purely methodological-analytical character. 
The distinction, in this latter sense, may end up giving rise to a veritable 
imperative of re-reading: poetry must be reread!272 
 
There is the difference, too, that the length of a text makes to our reading, 
longer texts allowing “anticipations and retrospections”.273 All of this serves 
to outline the active role played by the reader in recognising and responding 
to a written text. As part of the audience, as an encultured reader, the reader 
has a considerable role in recognizing and realizing genre, and thus at the 
same time in recognizing and realizing meaning274.   
                                                     
271 M Calinescu, Rereading (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1993) p41-42 
272 Rereading op cit p43 
273 Rereading op cit p45 
274 Thiselton quotes H R Jauss as making the same point: “Jauss distinguishes between the 
effects and dynamics if successive readings. He calls a “first” horizon of expectation ... 
projected by the first reading, the horizon of aesthetic experience, or sometimes the horizon of 
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The idea of a guaranteed illocution is incompatible with this view. So, too, is 
the sender view of meaning. The acts of writing and reading, dialogic and 
mutually realizing, are like all other sorts of act: they are actively realized by 
an audience, and without this active understanding, which is never absolutely 
guaranteed, an act cannot be recognized.  
 
This is also the conclusion of Louise Rosenblatt, who developed her own 
‘transactional theory of reading’, as outlined in The Reader, the Text, the Poem: 
the Transactional theory of the Literary work275. She suggests that there are 
different sorts of reading, in particular the efferent and aesthetic. An act of 
reading where “the primary concern of the reader is with what he will carry 
away from the reading”, such as the mother frantically reading “the label on 
the bottle to discover the antidote to be administered” to a child who has 
swallowed a poison, is an efferent reading, while in an aesthetic reading, “the 
reader’s primary concern is with what happens during the actual reading 
event.”276 She acknowledges that reading exists on a continuum277, but insists 
that the act of aesthetic reading is always a transactional or dialogic encounter 
between the reader and what she refers to as the ‘poem’, which term she uses 
as a shorthand for any kind of literary work of art278.   
 
In direct opposition to the suggestion of E D Hirsch that meaning is 
‘impersonal’ she asserts that  
 
The readers' attention to the text activates certain elements in his past experience 
– external reference, internal response – that have become linked with verbal 
symbols. Meaning will emerge from a network of relationships among things 
symbolised as he senses them. The symbols point to these sensations, images, 
objects, ideas, relationships, with the particular associations or feeling-tones 
created by his past experiences with them in actual life or in literature. The 
selection and organization of responses to some degree hinge on the 
assumptions, the expectations, or sense of possible structures, that he brings out 
of the stream of his life. Thus built into the raw material of the literary process 
itself is the particular world of the reader.  
But the text may also lead him to be critical of those prior assumptions and 
associations ... He may discover that he had projected on the text elements of his 
                                                                                                                                                        
literary expectation. He calls subsequent horizons, horizons of “lived experience”.”: Thiselton 
on Hermeneutics op cit p42. He himself also recognises different reading contexts: “some 
approach biblical texts as enquirers; others may exemplify a model of “believing” reading, in which 
they perceive a personal stake; others may remain immune to the impact or meaning of a text unless 
existential shock or the seduction of a transforming narrative “world” operates. Further, strategies for 
reading didactic texts, reading poetic or symbolic texts, reading parables, or reading different types of 
narrative can and do vary”: Thiselton on Hermeneutics op cit p349. 
275 L M Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem: the Transactional theory of the Literary work, 
(Carbondale IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1978). I am grateful to Dr Stephen Burge of 
the Institute of Ismaili Studies for this suggestion. 
 
276 The Reader, the Text, the Poem: the Transactional theory of the Literary work, op cit p24 
277
 Op cit p35 
278 Op cit p17 
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past experience not relevant to it ... Most important at this point in our 
discussion, however, is the fact that the reader’s creation of a poem out of a text 
must be an active, self-ordering and self-corrective process. ... The text itself 
leads the reader towards this self-corrective process.279 
 
And hence that  
 
the poem, then, must be thought of as an event in time. It is not an object or an 
ideal entity. It happens during a coming-together, a compenetration, of a reader 
and a text. The reader brings to the text his past experiences and present 
personality. Under the magnetism of the ordered symbols of the text, he 
marshals his resources and crystallizes out from the stuff of memory, thought, 
and feeling a new order, a new experience, which he sees as the poem. This 
becomes part of the ongoing stream of his life experience, to be reflected on from 
any angle important to him as a human being.280 
 
She insists that reading is not an instance of the dictation of either reader or 
text/author, and that therefore the term transaction is appropriate for the act 
of reading because it “designates, then, an ongoing process in which the 
elements or factors are, one might say, aspects of a total situation, each 
conditioned by and conditioning the other.”281 For her, meaning is 
“experienced”282, and she suggests that “even as we are generating the work 
of art, we are reacting to it. A concurrent stream of feelings, attitudes, and 
ideas is aroused by the very work being summoned up under guidance of the 
text.”283 
 
She does attempt to identify ‘stages’ in the reading activity, in which the 
reader’s activity creating the meaning in dialogue with the work, which 
creates that experienced “work” can be described as “the evocation” which is 
in turn “what the reader interprets”284, interpretation being a secondary stage 
which “thus paradoxically involves an effort to indicate the sensed, felt, 
thought, nature of the evocation while at the same time applying some frame 
of reference or method of abstracting in order to characterize it. The reader 
                                                     
279 Op cit p11 
280 Op cit p12. This has many echoes of Gadamer – see for example Truth and Method (New 
York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p279: “a person who is trying to understand a text is 
always projecting. He projects a meaning for the whole as soon as some initial meaning 
emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text 
with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, 
which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is 
understanding what is there” in the “movement of understanding and interpretation” (p280). 
Indeed he asks “how do we discover that there is a difference between our own customary 
usage and that of the text? I think we must say that generally we do so in the experience of 
being pulled up short by the text”: ibid. See also pages 318-319. 
281 The Reader, the Text, the Poem p17 
282 The Reader, the Text, the Poem p43 
283 The Reader, the Text, the Poem p48 
284 The Reader, the Text, the Poem p70 
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interprets the evoked work within the context of the total literary 
transaction.”285   
 
Finally, she identifies the stage of evaluation, which is a stage of post-reading 
reflection that includes ‘criticism’286. Rosenblatt concludes that  
 
the transactional view, freeing us from the old separation between the human 
creature and the world, reveals the individual consciousness as a continuing self-
ordering, self-creating process, shaped by and shaping a network of 
interrelationships with its environing social and natural matrix. Out of such 
transactions flowers the author’s text, an utterance awaiting the readers whose 
participation will consummate the speech act.287 
 
It is a model that shares many similarities with that of the Bakhtin circle and 
Gadamer, but which is based not on a pre-existing ideology, but on her own 
experiences as a teacher, and on her research into what readers do actually do 
when confronted with a poem, as described in her preface and in chapter two 
(“The Poem as Event”) of her book. Unlike Hirsch, and Searle, education is a 
phenomenon of which she is fully aware, and which she values and 
incorporates into her scheme. It will not be a surprise that I find her analysis 
most helpful, and believe that it supports my own assertions about reading, 
understanding, and consciousness.     
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have outlined my own proposals for understanding, reading 
and the creation of meaning, in dialogue primarily with Mikhail Bakhtin and 
Valentin Volosinov, as well as with E D Hirsch and John Searle to a degree. I 
have demonstrated that the meaning of an utterance is dialogic and 
embedded, and that actual meanings are always created within a context, and 
in relationships. Meaning is not static and final, but nor is it arbitrary: it is 
neither the ‘possession’ of ‘authors’ or ‘recipients’288.  
 
As part of this discussion, I have also re-iterated and underlined the now 
commonly-held289 view that understanding is learnt, and is not a passive, but 
                                                     
285 The Reader, the Text, the Poem p135. In this she again greatly echoes Gadamer; “in a certain 
sense interpretation probably is re-creation, but this is a re-creation not of the creative act but 
of the created work, which has to be brought to representation in accord with the meaning 
the interpreter finds in it ... Aesthetic consciousness is generally able to make the aesthetic 
distinction between the work and its mediation only in a critical way – i.e., where the 
interpretation breaks down”: Truth and Method (New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) 
p123 
286 The Reader, the Text, the Poem p152 
287 Op cit p172-173 
288 It is for This reason that Thiselton prefers to talk of preliminary understanding rather than 
‘presuppositions’, because of a reasonable concern that this latter phrase should not be taken 
as a defence of the refusal to engage in dialogue: A C Thiselton, The Holy Spirit: In biblical 
teaching, through the centuries, and today, (London, SPCK, 2013) p96 
289
 Post Gadamer 
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an active response, even when it is ‘invisible’ to us. We understand the world 
around us without realising that we do so: cutlery, tables, the environment290, 
all of this is understood, as are our social conventions, our own place in 
culture and society, our identity within groupings, and our own uniqueness. 
All of this is learnt, and understood: all of these understandings and 
assumptions could be very different, but we have inherited and made them 
and they have made us.  
 
This understanding, however, is not static, even though so much of it is 
generally invisible. For one thing, it is always changing as we change, and we 
understand differently as our circumstances and perspectives change, and as 
we change through time and experience. Moreover, our understanding can be 
subject to enormous revolution291. Our understanding of our environment, 
and our understanding of daily life, is not ‘conscious’, in the sense that it is 
not the product, usually, of obvious thought or effort. But it is not ‘natural’ or 
‘neutral’, either. While constitutive of us, it is not simply acquired whole, but 
acquired through learning, much of which is unacknowledged, and which is a 
perpetual and dialogic process292.  
 
When we understand language, and what is spoken or read, we do so in what 
looks like an automatic or natural way293. Indeed, in a way it is natural, 
                                                     
290 And so much else that is ‘common-place’ 
291 Conversions on the Damascus Road and many other instances. 
292 As Thiselton notes, “We are not making some kind of special appeal to theology or religion 
when we assert that the individual does not in fact begin his quest for knowledge de novo, as 
if he were an isolated individual abstracted from history and society. A shared public world 
pre-exists both him and his own thinking. This public world shapes his thought in such a way 
that it not only provides and transmits shared resources of knowledge, but also shapes the 
terms on which he examines and tests that knowledge”: Thiselton on Hermeneutics op cit p703, 
also ‘Knowledge, Myth and Corporate Memory’ in The Doctrine Commission of the Church 
of England, Believing in the Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith  (London, SPCK, 1981) p47. 
293 In Wittgenstein’s terms, we say ‘now I know how to go on’, or we just go on doing it 
effectively. It should also be noted that to recognise something as ‘not an act’ but rather an 
accident or a natural phenomenon or whatever, is still to recognise it as something: even ‘not-
acts’ have to be understood. See also R Panikkar: “It is in the symbol that the real appears to 
us. It is not reality (which never appears naked, as it were) but its manifestation, its 
revelation. The symbol is not another ‘thing’, but the epiphany of that ‘thing’ which is-not 
without some symbol – because ultimately Being itself is the final symbol. Any real symbol 
encompasses and unites both the symbolised ‘thing’ and the consciousness of it. 
... The moment that words say only exactly what you mean and do not leave room for what I 
may also mean, the moment that they become only signs and cease to be symbols, the 
moment that they only signal something else and are no longer the expression, the 
manifestation and with it the veil itself of that ‘else’, in that moment they degenerate even as 
words. They become mere tools for transmission of coded messages, open only to those who 
previously possess the clue:” The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon-Person-
Mystery, (London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973) page ix. This is echoed by Rosenblatt, 
who notes that in the reading process, “what we get is not a seeing-of-the-verbal-signs, plus 
meanings, but the reading-experience, this reading-effect”: The Reader, the Text, the Poem: the 
Transactional theory of the Literary work, op cit footnote p21. For some reason this also causes 
me to think of David Jones, quoting Maurice de la Taille about the Crucifixion: “He placed 
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because we are social and created creatures, and it may be that we have 
propensities to certain forms of life. In any case, understanding which situates 
us in our worlds, and establishes the meaning of our interactions from 
moment to moment, is active, and indeed self-involving! To understand 
requires our own participation: it is not forced on us from outside, but 
depends on our own recognition and input294.  
 
Understanding exits or occurs on a spectrum: it extends to the more 
‘conscious’ and ‘effortful’ kind of understanding involved in ‘hard sayings’ 
and in confusion or ignorance, when we wonder ‘what does that mean’. In 
this kind of common experience the activity of understanding is visible. 
Indeed, here we might be at the edges of our experience, participating in 
creating new meanings295. But this is simply the tip of our participation in 
creating the meaning of everything we inhabit, which of course is mostly not 
new, but inherited and assumed. Our ‘making of meaning’ is always around 
us: we do not always see ourselves doing it296. One might say that 
understanding has a ‘volume control’: but the ‘inaudible’ is still 
understanding: it is all an activity – an active thing in which we as individuals 
in societies are involved.297 
                                                                                                                                                        
Himself in the order of signs”: ‘Art and Sacrament’ in Epoch and Artist (London, Faber and 
Faber, 1959) p179 
294 See also E Weigand: “the individual decision for a particular possibility in performance 
depends essentially on the individual understanding of the circumstances of life”, an 
expression that combines the interests of both Bakhtin and Wittgenstein: E Weigand, ‘The 
Dialogic Principle Revisited’, Dialoganalyse III:1 (1991) p86. 
295 Here, Weigand’s description of the difference between the German  Verständigung (coming 
to an understanding) and Verstehen (understanding) may be helpful: “coming to an 
understanding … presupposes action and reaction … which creates a dialogue, which makes 
up coming to an understanding … While coming to an understanding describes action, 
understanding represents a mental precondition of linguistic action … In this sense 
understanding is the precondition for action” E Weigand, ‘The Dialogic Principle Revisited’, 
op cit p87. Weigand notes in footnote 6: “Action theories which … include conditions of 
understanding as an element of the analysis of action, do not take account of the fact that 
understanding only becomes an object of enquiry when it becomes problematical” – footnote 
reference p86, detailed on p98. Bruns describes verstehen as “understanding [which] always 
has the implication of living through something as against standing outside of it”: 
‘Structuralism, Deconstruction, and Hermeneutics: Review of J Culler’s ‘On Deconstruction: 
Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1982)’, 
Diacritics 14:1 (Spring 1984) 16. See also the following: “it is my conviction that the general 
function of communication must be considered as the function of coming to an 
understanding/’Verständigung’; by understanding/’Verständigung’ I mean not only the 
understanding/’Verstehen’ of the communication partner, not only the making-himself-
understood of the speaker, but the complex function of an action game between speaker and 
communication partner, which in its most general form can be grasped as a clarification of 
both partners’ positions on the level of action, i.e. ... as dialogically oriented action functions” 
E Weigand, ‘Word meaning and utterance meaning’, Journal of Pragmatics 20 (1993) 260. 
296 Although some of for example G K Chesterton’s work, such as The Man who was Thursday 
and The Poet and the Lunatics, was designed to  awaken us to seeing the meanings we have 
already made, and polish them up 
297 As Bakhtin notes, “to see something for the first time, to realize something for the first 
time, already means to assume an attitude towards it: it exists neither within itself not for 
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This consideration of the nature of understanding has been undertaken as 
part of an examination of the use of Speech Act theory as a biblical 
hermeneutic, and it has demonstrated that one of the reasons for the overall 
failure of the attempt, is because of its assumption of a sender view of 
meaning. Such an assumption cannot tolerate the existence of understanding 
as opposed to ‘uptake’, as for example E D Hirsch demonstrates, with his own 
revisions to his work. The preceding chapters have demonstrated the 
existence of inherent flaws in Speech Act theory itself, concerning agent’s 
intention and the understanding of acts, and have I believe demonstrated that 
the theory is not a productive hermeneutic tool. Its use should be abandoned.   
 
I do not accept, however, that the failure of Speech Act theory to defend the 
sender view of meaning, dooms any idea of revelation. It is rather the case 
that ideas of revelation need to be revised, on the basis of the hermeneutics of 
Bakhtin and Volosinov, and in ways that are in fact far more theologically 
coherent. This assertion will be developed in the last chapter of this thesis.
                                                                                                                                                        
itself, but for another (already two correlated consciousnesses). Understanding is a very 
important attitude (understanding is never a tautology or duplication, for it always involves 
two and a potential third)” Speech Genres etc p115 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: COOPERATIVE REVELATION AND THE 
WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT 
 
1. Introduction: the thesis thus far 
 
This thesis has examined the use of J L Austin’s Speech Act theory in Biblical 
hermeneutics. Specifically, it has examined a way in which Speech Act theory 
has been used to defend the idea that the author controls the meaning of their 
text, and can be assured that this meaning will be taken up by the reader. 
 
This idea is important from a particular Christian viewpoint, which needs to 
be able to defend a traditional idea of revelation which assumes that when 
God reveals Himself, He does so without the need for human interaction1. 
The idea that Scripture is inerrant or infallible assumes, among other things, 
that the meaning of Scripture issues unmediated from the perfection of the 
Divine author: that meaning is made and controlled by the author, and is not 
dependent on the reader or the community. 
 
Even concepts of revelation that do not explicitly depend on Scriptural 
infallibility or inerrancy have tended to assume that when God reveals 
Himself, this is an action that He controls and can underwrite: the alternative 
is thought to be a kind of relativistic free-for-all, in which everyone creates 
God in their own image, and the possibility of an authoritative revelation and 
an authoritative tradition is eliminated. 
 
This thesis has accordingly examined both Speech Act theory as originally 
presented by J L Austin, and as it is used by biblical hermeneuts, and in each 
case has found inconsistencies and inadequacies in the theory and the uses of 
it. It has suggested firstly that the attempt to use Speech Act theory as a 
literary hermeneutic tool is problematic, and that the theory as Austin and 
Searle present it cannot be so used. This is a point with which both Austin 
and Searle would themselves agree. They would argue that literature is 
“parasitic” upon “normal speech”2.  
 
Various attempts have been made to co-opt Speech Act theory for use as a 
literary hermeneutics and in general, in so far as they have succeeded, they 
have done so by re-shaping the theory in various significant and often 
unacknowledged ways. However, this thesis has demonstrated that Jacques 
Derrida is correct in his assertion that the inability of Speech Act theory to 
cope with various ‘parasitic’ and ‘exceptional’ cases is due to flaws in the 
                                                     
1 See for example the discussion of Barth’s theology of the Holy Spirit in D S Cunningham, 
‘Interpretation. Toward a Rehabilitation of the Vestigia Tradition’, in J J Buckley and D S Yeago 
(eds.), Knowing the Triune God: The Work of the Spirit in the Practices of the Church, (Grand 
Rapids MI, William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001) 179-202 
2 See Chapter Two 
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theory not in the nature of the various exceptions. These ‘exceptions’ serve to 
illustrate a general inadequacy in the principles and assumptions 
underpinning Speech Act theory itself.  
 
This thesis has also suggested that Speech Act theory is incoherent with 
regard to the relationship between ‘authorial intention’ and ‘what is done’, 
and the relationship between these two concepts and that of ‘meaning’. The 
unique Speech Act concept of the illocution, the part of speech whose 
meaning is equivalent to the intention of the author, and which is guaranteed 
to be taken up by the hearer without the need to be recognised by an ‘active 
understanding’, collapses into incoherency under closer examination, such 
that the supposed immutable relationship between authorial intention and 
meaning cannot be sustained, nor can the illocution be distinguished from its 
perlocutionary alternative. The view that the author dictates meaning is 
incompatible with some of the basic assumptions of Speech Act theory and is 
inadequate as an approach. 
 
This thesis has gone on to suggest that E D Hirsch’s attempt to distinguish 
between meaning and significance, which is employed by some Biblical 
hermeneuts who adopt Speech Act theory to further underpin the 
relationship between authorial intention and meaning, is also flawed. In 
particular I illustrate that both Speech Act theory and Hirsch rely on the idea 
of ‘uptake’ to illustrate how meaning is ‘transmitted’ to the reader or hearer, 
and that ‘uptake’ is an inadequate concept.  
 
Underlying both Speech Act theory and Hirsch’s account is an assumption 
that I describe as “the sender view of meaning”. This assumption is by no 
means limited to the proponents of these two concepts; indeed, Derrida also 
may be said to be a victim of it. This view starts from the assumption of a 
‘separated self’: an independent, isolated agent, seeking through 
communication to impart their meaning to another, a meaning which 
predates any specific utterance, and is thus “begotten, not created”.   
 
However, this is inadequate as an account of meaning and identity. Selfhood 
and identity are constructs; concepts and realities that are created in 
conversation and that are learnt and developed3. Meaning is a co-operative 
endeavour, created in conversation, formed by encultured (theologically, one 
might want to say ‘gifted’) individuals who are formed by and form their 
cultures and traditions, and who engage with others and with texts, and by 
their active understanding create meaning.  
 
This however leaves no room for an idea of revelation as something in which 
only God is active. If meaning is made not dictated, this requires a 
                                                     
3 This can be both negative and positive: it is not necessarily the case that everything we 
inherit and learn will be, with hindsight, or given a later stance, of benefit to us. We can learn 
that we are vicious or despicable, just as we can learn that we are valued. 
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reconsideration of the role of Scripture in God’s revelation of Himself, and 
certainly undermines the concepts of the inerrancy and infallibility of 
Scripture. If the contention of this thesis is correct, and meaning is created, the 
only option open to those who seek an authorial guarantee for Scripture 
would be to claim that reading scripture is not like reading anything else.  
 
Indeed, this has sometimes been suggested4; and there is an argument for 
saying that Scripture requires a special hermeneutic, and should not be 
included within a ‘general’ theory5. However, no matter what the claims 
made for experiences of reading Scripture, it cannot be denied that every 
reader of Scripture, whether a ‘first-timer’ or an old hand, reads from within a 
context and a tradition. Not everyone who reads Scripture reads it as infallible 
or inerrant, and that some do, is a function of their own acquired reading 
stance. The role of context in the creation of meaning is inescapable. 
 
It is of course possible to accept this and claim to have an infallible reading 
context. The Magisterium could be identified as an explicit claim for such a 
context6. There are, many would argue, theological problems with this. As an 
assertion, however, it is internally consistent, and rather resembles Hirsch’s 
assertion that in reading one has a moral choice to make to read the author’s 
meaning: one can choose to adopt the correct reading stance. Neither this 
‘magisterial reading’ nor Hirsch’s moral choice can, however, claim to be the 
only possible reading: merely that they are the right one! Further, as Bakhtin 
would argue, such an ‘absolutist’ context cannot easily be “enriched”, or grow 
and learn through conversation, and precisely this objection leads one also to 
wonder how such a context is created in the first place, and how plausible it is 
as an account of how the Papacy or the Curia actually reads Scripture: the 
Magisterium in practice tends to relate to doctrine, rather than to meaning7.  
 
One of the prime motivations for those who, like Vanhoozer and Briggs, have 
sought to use Speech Act theory, is a concern to preserve the “otherness” of 
Scripture: its ability to ‘stand outside’ the reader and the reading context and 
challenge us. I do not believe, however, that this possibility vanishes if the 
sender view of meaning is replaced by a more cooperative, developing or 
‘transactional’ model8.  
                                                     
4 This is the argument Coleridge puts forward in Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit. 
5 This question is briefly discussed in the final section of this chapter 
6 And it could be argued that many who read Scripture make this claim implicitly: “we read it 
right – you don’t; so you aren’t proper Christians”.  
7 One could also suggest that within the Magisterium there is debate, and that it does not 
claims for itself an infallible reading, merely that it identifies and encapsulates the reading of 
the whole context, the whole church; “that which is always and everywhere believed” (the 
church reading, encapsulated in one man). Of course, this definition, too, is open to debate: 
believed by whom, precisely? 
8 As Gadamer notes, “just as the individual is never simply an individual because he is 
always in understanding with others, so too the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a 
culture is an abstraction. The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is 
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Although the concept of the illocutionary guarantee must be abandoned, the 
linguistic philosophy of Bakhtin and Volosinov, which sees meaning as a 
creative construction, does nonetheless provide an opportunity for a view of 
revelation which, I believe, is theologically more consistent. This view of 
revelation fits in better with the nature and activity of God presented in the 
New Testament through the person of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, and with 
the sacramental legacy He is believed to have bequeathed. It provides a far 
more adequate account of the nature and operations of the Holy Spirit 
(Himself a revelation, through theology, of unimpeachable orthodoxy, which 
post-dates the revelation of the New Testament), and gives a description of 
the role of Scripture in revelation that is both more accurate as a description of 
how Scripture is already used, and is theologically consistent with the related 
ideas of Sacramental revelation and Pneumatology.  
 
The idea that there is a simple binary choice between illocutionary meaning or 
a total, nihilistic free-for-all, where the reader creates everything, so that 
communication (and any ability to know ‘the other’) are impossible, is naïve 
and incorrect. Both of those views are in fact products of the same 
misconception, which dissipates when it is recognised that we learn meanings 
as we learn selfhood and many other related concepts, all of which affect and 
are affected by our existence as relational beings. Therefore, I assert, on the 
basis of Volosinov’s and Bakhtin’s ideas, that it is still possible to use a 
concept of revelation, but one which does not rely on any kind of 
‘illocutionary’ attributes, speaker-based or guaranteed. 
                                                                                                                                                        
never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed 
horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. 
Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all 
human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion. The 
surrounding horizon is not set n motion by historical consciousness. But in it this motion 
becomes aware of itself.” Truth and Method, op cit, p315. See also Valliere, who notes, in a 
manner that answers any suggestion that communities are sealed-in: “Thorough-going 
pluralism is disaggregating; it assumes that each entity in a series is sufficient for those who 
have elected or inherited it. Yet as soon as one assumes that the plures are somehow 
insufficient – that they complement or supplement or need each other – one is no longer a 
radical pluralist ... If within our own little worlds we discover that we can communicate with 
those who live in other little worlds, and that together we can help each other, challenge each 
other and enlighten each other, then by virtue of that discovery alone we are no longer living in 
our own little worlds but in a larger one.” P Valliere, Conciliarism: a History of Decision-making 
in the Church, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 2012) p38. See also “my point is 
that in dialogue I start questioning my own questions. I look at myself and say ‘Is that the 
obvious or only way of asking the question?’ ... In other words, in dialogue I discover the 
things that are not necessarily at the forefront of my mind. I discover something beyond what 
suits my ‘comfort zone’. I may discover resources within my own language that I didn’t 
suspect and I may discover tensions in my own language that I didn’t suspect, as I listen and 
absorb from another”: R Williams, ‘Dialogue is a means of ‘God-give discovery’; address at the 
Christian Muslim Forum Conference of Scholars Monday 22nd March 2010, available at 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/926/archbishop-dialogue-
is-a-means-of-god-given-discovery#sthash.w3e6YWeu.dpuf.  
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Instead, it understands God as revealing Himself in co-operation with His 
audience/readership. I believe that this enables us to properly understand the 
action of the Holy Spirit in revelation. This is how the Holy Spirit acts; 
working with and within His creation, enabling us to realize the presence and 
purposes of God. Our realization and cooperation is a necessary part of the 
process of revelation – of God’s revealing activity. 
 
2. The Holy Spirit and revelation:                                                                                                                                  
2a. The inadequacies of the sender view of meaning if the Holy Spirit lives 
 
If this thesis is correct, the Holy Spirit is thrust to the fore as the primary 
agent of revelation, since it is by His actions that God is generally described as 
working in creation, and it is through Him that we are united in the Body of 
Christ. One of the problems with the idea of an unmediated Scriptural 
revelation, as with Biblical infallibility or inerrancy more generally, is that it 
effectively neuters the Holy Spirit, and reduces Him merely to a bystander, 
who has no purpose or role save that of performing what can become seen 
merely as God’s ‘party tricks’.   
 
As E F Rogers Jr notes in his introduction to The Holy Spirit: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings9 which he has edited, “theology has had trouble ... 
explaining what the Holy Spirit adds, no matter that pattern and invocation 
always included it [sic – the Holy Spirit is, of course, not ‘an’ ‘it’, as Thiselton 
points out10]. In modern Christian theology, anything the Spirit could do, 
Christ could do better, even if traditional Christians would be surprised to 
hear it put that way. ... Is the Spirit superfluous? Academic theology has all 
but answered yes.”11  
 
Rogers suggests that this is because many academics have worked with a 
model that imagines the Spirit as being involved in bridging the gap between 
“the exterior history of the Son and the interior of the human heart”12, 
exacerbated by the presumption that what in fact crosses the gap is 
“information”:  
 
                                                     
9
 E F Rogers Jr (ed.), The Holy Spirit: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Chichester, John Wiley 
and Sons, 2009). 
10 See his The Holy Spirit: In biblical teaching, through the centuries, and today, (London, SPCK, 
2013). 
11 E F Rogers Jr ‘Introduction’ in The Holy Spirit: Classic and Contemporary Readings op cit p1. 
See also R Williams, ‘Word and Spirit’ in the same volume, p54. Thiselton quotes Moltmann 
as suggesting, in A C Thiselton, The Holy Spirit: In biblical teaching, through the centuries, and 
today, op cit p401, that in fact the Holy Spirit has been ‘rehabilitated’ in the last few decades: I 
suspect that, as Thiselton notes, interest in the Holy Spirit, and on an ecumenical level, has 
been re-awakened, but without any agreement on how we should understand the action of 
the Spirit in theology and ethics: without any kind of hermeneutical consideration to His 
work. 
12 E F Rogers Jr ‘Introduction’ in The Holy Spirit: Classic and Contemporary Readings op cit p1 
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on that view, what Christ brings down from heaven and deposits in the heart is 
just revelation, the knowledge that saves. ... The distance-crossing model can 
obscure why the Spirit might be a good thing, especially when its revelation that 
makes the trip. In that case Christ can bring it better, even into the heart.13 
  
As Thiselton asks, while discussing the debate between the followers of 
Warfield and Orr, is revelation “informational rather than primarily 
transformative”14? This almost seems to hark back to the linguistic debate 
with which this thesis began, in which Austin demonstrates that language is 
not simply descriptive but also active: language is not merely ‘informational’ 
but also ‘per/transformative’! 
 
Rogers instead proposes a model based on incorporation, where “the Spirit 
introduces the human being into the interior of a relationship among Father, 
Son, and Spirit”15 and thus adopts a ‘transformative’ assumption, but this 
indicates another part of the overall uncertainty about the Spirit’s role: in 
revelation, that which is revealed is God. There is an element of ‘information’ 
involved here inevitably, in that what God reveals is His existence and intent. 
The revelation that ‘God is’, is informative if He was unknown, and the 
revelation that ‘God is merciful, jealous etc’ is informative in that it tells us new 
things about Him. 
 
However, we must be careful to remember, as Raimundo Panikkar insists, 
that God’s self-revelation is neither that of an ‘outside agent’, nor indeed of 
simply another element to be considered in the overall fabric of life. God is 
not a ‘fact to be considered’, but He is all that is real, and the only reality, and 
this recognition transforms our own understanding of creation, and ourselves 
within it.  
 
God and the world are neither one nor two. The fact that they are not two is as 
evident as the fact that they are not one. If they were one, one could not even 
speak of God, for only the world would then exist. Monism is atheism. If they 
were two, God would not be the Absolute, for the common ‘element’, the 
predicate of both, which includes both God and the world, would be superior to 
and more comprehensive than either – which is contrary to the definition of God 
as Absolute. 16  
                                                     
13 E F Rogers Jr ‘Introduction’ op cit p2. This concern is also shared by R Williams, ‘Word and 
Spirit’ op cit 
14 A C Thiselton, ‘Authority and Hermeneutics: Some Proposals for a More Creative Agenda’ 
in P E Satterthwaite & D F Wright (eds.) A Pathway into the Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids MI, 
Eerdmans, 1994) p111. See also R Williams, ‘Word and Spirit’, in E F Rogers Jr (ed.), The Holy 
Spirit: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 2009) p57 
15
 E F Rogers Jr ‘Introduction’ in The Holy Spirit: Classic and Contemporary Readings op cit p2 
16 R Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon-Person-Mystery, (London, 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973) p36.  He has previously insisted on “the non-dual 
character of the Real, the impossibility of adding God to the world or vice versa, the 
impossibility of putting in dvanva, in a pair, God and the world”, ibid. See also R Norris: 
“God is not “in” the world (or for that matter “outside” it). On the contrary, the world is “in” 
God, who is  the “place” in which the finite order is set, and is therefore non-mediately 
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‘Information’ about God in the Christian tradition (and doubtless others also) 
is (if it is understood), inevitably transformative, of self and of outlook and of 
understanding. 
 
This in turn though provides its own problems for hermeneutics. It is easier to 
conceive of a hermeneutical theory, whether ‘special’ or ‘general’, if we are 
envisaging changes only on an informational level, in knowledge. However, 
as many hermeneuts have suggested in their own ways, this is not the case: 
hermeneutics is indeed about the change in self and in relationships17. This 
perhaps opens the door for a broader and deeper understanding of the 
transformative role of Spirit, but raises questions about the role of Scripture, 
that are in any case to the fore even if revelation is regarded as more 
‘informative’. 
 
If revelation is a revelation of information, it would seem that the Spirit has 
little role to play here18. If revelation is more relationally transformative, in a 
more hermeneutically sophisticated sense, it seems to endanger everything 
the illocution is one means of defending, by forcing ‘meaning’ to become 
much more ‘open-ended’ and ‘relational’ (said preferably with a slight sneer!). 
In particular, the possibility that communities will never hear anything other 
than their own voice, addressed right at the beginning of this thesis, returns 
centre-stage, as a necessarily pressing problem. 
 
To some extent, the suggestion that meaning is dialogic or ‘transactional’ 
defuses some, though not all, of these concerns. They are present, though, 
somewhere in the background when, for example, Thiselton notes that 
 
in speech-act theory, the initiating, enabling, or creative act does not originate 
with the reader, except in the case of such sub-categories as acts of praise, 
confessions, or prayers. (We leave aside, for the present, the distinctively 
theological question of whether such acts are responsive components within the 
frame of a divine-human-divine dialogue).19  
 
In part, this is what is so dangerous, because Thiselton is wrong to assume 
that Speech Act theory divorces the creative act from the reader. Instead, 
Speech Act theory invents a kind of ‘suspension of disbelief’ as it were, where 
                                                                                                                                                        
present to it ... As the world’s medium and context, its ground, God does not belong in the 
same file-folder with created things – or, for that matter, in any file-folder at all. God is 
everything’s’ holder and upholder”: R Norris, ‘Trinity’, in E F Rogers Jr (ed.), The Holy Spirit: 
Classic and Contemporary Readings (Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 2009) p26 
17 As Gadamer and Bakhtin assert, as well as Ricoeur in Oneself as Another. Understanding 
and dialogue are self-involving because they are active. 
18
 D S Yeago, ‘The Bible. The Spirit, the Church, and the Scriptures: Biblical Inspiration and 
Interpretation Revisited’, in J J Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God: The Work 
of the Spirit in the Practices of the Church, (Grand Rapids MI, William B Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2001) p62 
19 A C Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (London, Marshall Pickering, 1992) p598 
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the reader denies their own effects, and thus claims a unique sort of reading 
that otherwise does not take place. Speech Act theory pretends to a kind of 
‘purity of context’ or ‘saturation of context’ that is in fact illusory20.  
 
That this hierarchy exists for Thiselton is demonstrated when he continues  
 
by contrast in reader-response theory the effects are determined by the 
contingent social horizons themselves which define the community of readers to 
which a reader belongs. If any act of will is involved, this can be traced only to 
routinizations which originated in the corporate will of the community; 
otherwise meaning is either simply causally generated, or count-generated by 
virtue of conventions alone. But speech-acts entail performance-acts which carry 
extra-linguistic consequences.21 
 
To some extent, what Thiselton has in view here is the kind of ‘Fish-y’ 
community where there is no ‘outside’, to which he is right to object, but of 
course these are not the only alternatives, as has already been discussed 
through a consideration of the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Louise 
Rosenblatt22. It is also not clear what is meant here by ‘conventions alone’. Are 
these rigid, or fluid: learnt customs, or rigid codes?  
 
Thiselton then goes on to say that speech-act reading is a count-generated act, 
making the difference again an uncertain one. It is not clear why a ‘reader-
response reading’ cannot generate extra-linguistic consequences, unless the 
definition of ‘reader-response’ entails the belief that there is, as it were, 
‘nothing outside the text’? I would argue that a ‘speech-act’ reading is a kind 
                                                     
20 As Gadamer demonstrates in respect of Bultmann’s “existential fore-understanding”: Truth 
and Method (New York NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p340ff. 
21 Ibid. Of course, saying that speech-acts entail performance acts sounds rather like Austin’s 
equally suspect perlocution/effects-illocution/uptake  distinction, or the causal-illocutionary 
distinction Evans adopts. 
22
 See also Valliere, who notes, in a manner that answers any suggestion that communities are 
sealed-in: “Thorough-going pluralism is disaggregating; it assumes that each entity in a series 
is sufficient for those who have elected or inherited it. Yet as soon as one assumes that the 
plures are somehow insufficient – that they complement or supplement or need each other – 
one is no longer a radical pluralist ... If within our own little worlds we discover that we can 
communicate with those who live in other little worlds, and that together we can help each 
other, challenge each other and enlighten each other, then by virtue of that discovery alone we 
are no longer living in our own little worlds but in a larger one.” P Valliere, Conciliarism: a 
History of Decision-making in the Church, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 2012) 
p38. See also “my point is that in dialogue I start questioning my own questions. I look at 
myself and say ‘Is that the obvious or only way of asking the question?’ ... In other words, in 
dialogue I discover the things that are not necessarily at the forefront of my mind. I discover 
something beyond what suits my ‘comfort zone’. I may discover resources within my own 
language that I didn’t suspect and I may discover tensions in my own language that I didn’t 
suspect, as I listen and absorb from another”: R Williams, ‘Dialogue is a means of ‘God-give 
discovery’; address at the Christian Muslim Forum Conference of Scholars Monday 22nd March 2010, 
available at 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/926/archbishop-dialogue-
is-a-means-of-god-given-discovery#sthash.w3e6YWeu.dpuf.  
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of reader-response which, precisely by virtue of its operating assumptions, 
generates extra-linguistic effects.  
 
In his article , ‘Speech-act theory and biblical interpretation’23, Brevard Childs 
notes that “the movement by which scripture becomes the vehicle of divine 
revelation was by means of the Holy Spirit. ... The human words were not 
transformed into a new form of illocutionary divine discourse, but were now 
understood and made alive through a divine activity.”Thus for him, it is 
precisely the case that “the most fundamental flaw in the new hermeneutical 
theory [Speech Act theory] arises from the failure to understand the role of 
the church in collecting, shaping and interpreting the Bible, which is the issue 
of canon”24, or in other words, this neglect of a proper consideration of 
context. 
 
Childs concludes that “the term scripture refers, above all, to the divine 
authority of these writings. The scriptures derive from the inspiration of 
God's Spirit in the revelation of God to his people. The scriptures not only are 
inspired in their origin, but are continuously infused with the promise of 
divine illumination”, and he argues that we should see the canon as part of 
this infusing of divine illumination:  
 
The apostolic church never claimed to have created its canon of scripture, but 
understood its formation as a response to the divine coercion of the living Word 
of God. Thus the concept of canon was a corollary of inspiration. ... Nevertheless, 
scripture did not fall from heaven, but arose within the bosom of the community 
of faith, shaped by its usage in worship, preaching, and catechesis.25 
 
Thus he concludes that “within the last generation the full hermeneutical 
significance of the Christian canon has become increasingly clear. The canon 
not only established the boundaries within which the Word of God was 
heard, but in addition it provided the context for its interpretation”26 and thus 
the context within which revelation occurs and the Spirit works. This question 
of the reading context, and of the role, if any, of the Spirit in this area, is not 
one that Speech Act theory addresses, because of its exclusive focus on the 
speaker.  
 
As a sideline, this question of the reading contexts in which revelation and 
inspiration occur, reflects also on the related hermeneutic implication of 
prevenient grace: the idea that the initiative for our response to God, must 
always come from God, because we cannot take the initiative ourselves. If it is 
the case that any response made by a believer is only possible because of prior 
(prevenient) divine initiative, does this imply passivity or activity on the part 
                                                     
23 B S Childs, ‘Speech-act theory and biblical interpretation’, Scottish Journal of Theology 58:4 
(2005) 375-392 
24
 B S Childs, ‘Speech-act theory and biblical interpretation’, op cit p380 
25  Childs op cit p381 
26 Ibid p382 
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of the believer? Is this operation of grace in the believer, an activity of the 
believer, or simply of an outside agent? This, of course, is tied up with ideas 
of predestination and free will, but it is interesting to ask what the 
implications of this debate are on the activity of the Holy Spirit as anything 
other than an appendix or appendage to the Word?  
 
D S Cunningham suggests that  “revelation is not revelation unless it is 
revealed to someone; this, in turn, requires active reception on the part of the 
recipient. Revelation cannot bypass the human will, as though it were 
medicine injected with a syringe”27, and he goes on to note  
 
But if the reception of revelation is an active endeavor, requiring considered 
judgments of the heart and mind on the part of the recipient, then it cannot be a 
private affair. It is less analogous to taking a prescription drug, and more 
analogous to some form of physical therapy ... Similarly, in the theological 
context, a  person’s formation in and by the community of belief becomes an 
essential and critical aspect of the process of revelation and interpretation. One 
cannot be expected to “hear” the revelatory Word rightly, nor to “read the signs 
of the times”, unless one has already been formed by the Christian narratives 
and habituated into certain ecclesial practices, such as baptism, worship, and 
mutual care.28  
 
This might imply that the question of prevenience is simply a 
misunderstanding of how we learn anything, theological , revelatory, or 
mundane: everything is learnt by relationships, and we learn to recognise 
God through these relationships: it is not innate, but God operates through 
creation. On a deeper level, one must also ask to what extent are we capable 
of doing anything, even existing, thinking, or understanding, without the 
grace of God, and thus at what point is it possible to draw a line between His 
grace, and our response?29 
  
It is in any case noteworthy that several scholars have identified the place of 
the Holy Spirit in hermeneutics as problematic in the work of others. Indeed, 
in After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation. Scripture and 
                                                     
27 D S Cunningham, ‘Interpretation. Toward a Rehabilitation of the Vestigia Tradition’, in J J 
Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God op cit p194. 
28 D S Cunningham op cit p194-195 
29 In the case of a child, it may be that the influence of their parents – genetic and social – can 
never be entirely eliminated, but that as we attain adulthood we become answerable (in 
Bakhtin’s phrase), for our own contributions. This metaphor may have an application here. 
Alternatively, as S L Stell suggests: “true human understanding of God is itself thoroughly 
the work of God, and therefore appropriately named revelation. Nevertheless, such 
understanding does not entail a suspension of our human capacities, but their fulfilment by 
the inclusion of human reality within the divine life of God’s covenantal creation, 
redemption, and sanctifying communion”: ‘Hermeneutics in Theology and the Theology of 
Hermeneutics: Beyond Lindbeck and Tracy’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 64:4 
p698 
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Hermeneutics Series 230, W Olhausen has responded to Thiselton’s article 
‘Behind’ and ‘In Front Of’ the Text’31 by suggesting that   
 
the difficult task of developing a hermeneutic model that integrates an 
understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit still remains to be done within 
Thiselton’s programme. While his chapter continues to affirm the Spirit’s 
significance, it is not immediately clear why or in what way. In light of this, I 
conclude the response by drawing attention to the need for an integrated 
approach to the work of the Spirit,32 
 
an observation which might perhaps have contributed to Thiselton’s 2013 The 
Holy Spirit: In biblical teaching, through the centuries, and today33. In this work 
Thiselton begins by identifying seven aspects of the biblical testament to 
God’s Spirit34, in a work which is primarily a dialogue with the Pentecostal 
and Renewal Movements.  
 
Thiselton traces the ways in which the Holy Spirit has been received and 
described in Christian history, with a special interest in how to relate 
Pentecostal and ‘Third Wave’ Renewal understandings to other particularly 
Western and protestant Christian pneumatologies.35 After his extensive and 
detailed survey of many theologians, he concludes by identifying seven 
fundamental themes36 that he regards as “starting points” around which 
ecumenical agreement could be coalesced before further work might be 
undertaken, and then six issues on which further dialogue with Pentecostals 
                                                     
30
 After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2 
(Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 2001) 
31 Op cit pages 97-116, reprinted in Thiselton on Hermeneutics: the collected works and new essays 
of Anthony Thiselton (Ashgate contemporary thinkers on Religion. Collected works), (Aldershot, 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) chapter 33 pages 607-624 
32 W Olhausen: ‘A ‘Polite’ Response to Anthony Thiselton’, in  C Bartholomew, C Greene and 
K Möller (eds.), After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation. Scripture and Hermeneutics 
Series 2 (Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 2001) p122 
33
 London, SPCK, 2013 
34 These are His creative transcendence; His anointing of individuals for tasks in the 
community; His being an ‘extension’ of God, revealing and inspiring (including a distinction 
made by Orr between revelation as “the provision of truth about God” and “inspiration 
[which] lies in the use made of it” p14); His being discerned only by His effects; His being 
creative ; His giving life; and His being able to be shared from one to another.   
35 Interest in the Orthodox theologians jumps from the Cappadocians to Lossky, and in the 
West ‘Catholic’ thought leaps from Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross to John Henry 
Newman. 
36 These are that the Holy Spirit is at least a person (if not “suprapersonal” p470), and never 
an ‘it’; that He is transcendent and ‘other – “the beyond who is within” (p470); that the Spirit 
is part of a Trinitarian narrative in which all three ‘persons’ are inseparably involved; that the 
Spirit “is shared out as a common possession of the whole people” (p475) for the good of the 
whole; that the Spirit is Holy because He is a person of the Holy Trinity – all holiness relates 
to and flows from the Trinity who alone is the holy God; that He is discerned in His effects, 
but only with care – not everything is ‘of the Spirit’, and we must find a balance between 
tradition and personal revelation; and that the Holy Trinity alone should be worshipped and 
revered: The Holy Spirit: In biblical teaching, through the centuries, and today, (London, SPCK, 
2013) 
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and the Renewal Movement is required. Finally, Thiselton identifies “five 
issues in hermeneutics and two in New Testament Exegesis”37 that he offers 
up for further reflection by Pentecostals and the Renewal Movement, as areas 
in which, though he does not say this explicitly, he feels that their experience 
and theology needs refining.  
 
The last of these, which he admits might on first sight seem a little “prosaic”38, 
is the question of the Holy Spirit and inspiration. He suggests that we should 
refer “inspiration and authority not directly to the Bible as such, but to God 
and to God the Holy Spirit through the Bible.” In this he echoes rather the 
Church of England’s own Windsor Report39 which suggests that “the phrase 
‘the authority of scripture’, if it is to be based on what scripture itself says, 
must be regarded as a shorthand, and a potentially misleading one at that, for 
the longer and more complex notion of ‘the authority of the triune God, 
exercised through scripture’.”40  
 
Thiselton concludes that “the Holy Spirit persists with us through ordinary 
everyday situations” and is as present in the “ascending ministry “of prayer 
as in the “descending” one of blessing41. I entirely agree with this, and would 
merely note that it simply establishes again the sense in which the work of the 
Spirit is easier to point to when encountered in people and situations, than to 
describe in theory. I don’t think that Thiselton ever quite establishes in a 
consistent account, his theological-hermeneutical understanding of the role 
that the Spirit plays in revelation.  
 
2. The Holy Spirit and revelation:                                                                                                                                                                                  
2b. The inadequacy of Kevin Vanhoozer’s account of the Spirit’s work 
 
By way of underlining the difficulty, Thiselton himself has suggested that 
Vanhoozer’s work has ‘pneumatological deficiencies’42, and I think that this is 
perhaps an understatement, since Vanhoozer very clearly illustrates the 
assault on the understanding of the Holy Spirit that is required by the 
illocutionary elevation of Scripture as primary agent of revelation.  
 
                                                     
37 The Holy Spirit: In biblical teaching, through the centuries, and today, (London, SPCK, 2013) 
p492 
38 Op cit p499 
39 The Windsor Report 2004, The Lambeth Commission on Communion, (London, The 
Anglican Communion Office, 2004). Available at 
http://www.aco.org/windsor2004/downloads/index.cfm on the Anglican Communion 
website, and free to download: site visited 21st February 2014. 
40 Windsor Report paragraph 54 
41
 The Holy Spirit: In biblical teaching, through the centuries, and today, (London, SPCK, 2013) 
p500. 
42 He refers to hesitating over the “neat polarities, over-exclusive alternatives, and uniformly 
triadic patterns to be correlated with Trinitarian modes of action” in Is There?, see Thiselton on 
Hermeneutics: the collected works and new essays of Anthony Thiselton (Ashgate contemporary 
thinkers on Religion. Collected works), (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) p616 
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For example Vanhoozer asks  
 
Is meaning “in” the text, or is it the product of the encounter between the text and 
the Spirit-led reader? More pointedly: Should the meaning of a text include the 
history of its effects? The oddness of the question surfaces when one rephrases and 
refines it: Does the meaning of a communicative act include its unintended effects? 
If “what it means” is only discerned in the light of Spirit-led tradition, how should 
we explain the response of the readers in Nehemiah 8, who no longer belonged to a 
living tradition, or the responses of the readers in Acts 2, whose reception 
inaugurated a new tradition? Furthermore, how can we distinguish Spirit-guided 
community interpretation and practice from other, more mundane, interpretive 
practices, imposed perhaps, by less holy spirits?43  
 
As I have already argued at length, it makes no sense to isolate meaning from 
effects, nor is it simply that a list of effects equals meaning. Indeed, I do not 
accept the validity of the suggestion that there is a sort of ‘either-or’ situation 
present. Therefore, to seek to distinguish “Spirit-guided community 
interpretation and practice from other, more mundane, interpretive practices, 
imposed perhaps, by less holy spirits” is, sadly, not possible without 
hindsight. There is no guarantee in the living of the Christian life, only the 
hope of the presence of God44.  
 
Identifying the work of the Spirit is notoriously difficult, and has always been 
so; perhaps the most we can hope for, is to remember  
 
that no one speaking by the Spirit of God ever says "Jesus be cursed!" and no one 
can say "Jesus is Lord" except by the Holy Spirit. Now there are varieties of gifts, 
but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord; and there 
are varieties of working, but it is the same God who inspires them all in every one. 
To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good.45 
 
As St Paul goes on to note, there is one pre-eminent gift, that enables us to live 
for one another, the “still more excellent way”46 of love, and “the fruit of the 
Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, 
                                                     
43 Is There? p412. 
44 It is worth recalling that it was not given to everyone who saw Jesus of Nazareth to 
recognise Him, indeed the religious authorities of the day did not. Not everyone who is 
baptised, or comes to a communion service, or reads the Bible, recognises God there either. It 
is only possible for us to recognise God if we learn to in love from our parents, our teachers, 
our families and friends, and from the Church. The realization of God is given to us by those 
who teach us, and this means that it is given to us by the Holy Spirit Himself, entering into 
and using mortal and imperfect things, using all those around us. The Holy Spirit always acts 
in co-operation with mortal things, transforming them with their permission, and we cannot 
say of something ‘this is Revelation’ unless we have been made able to recognise it. God’s 
Real Presence in the things He sanctifies may be absolute, but someone has to come to 
recognise it and show it to other people, before we are able to see it ourselves. 
45 I Corinthians 12:3-7. As Thiselton notes – it might be better to read verse 3 as “May Jesus 
curse”. 
46 1 Corinthians 13:1 
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gentleness, self-control”47. If we seek for an assurance, this may be the best we 
can get.  
 
I would suggest that there are a variety of ways in which the Church as a 
whole and her individual members are helped, through the Spirit, to remain 
faithful to her/their calling: these are all interrelated and have, I think, no 
particular priority48. They are; Holy Scripture; the Creeds; the Sacraments 
(Mysteries); the Ordained Ministry; and Prayer and Thought49. The same list 
applies to us as individuals, as to the Church as a whole body. All of them are 
gifts shared within and for the Community, who has in turn created and 
adapted them and been changed by them in return.  
 
However, I think that the closest we can come to a guarantee of the sort that 
Vanhoozer here desires, is to recognise that “God makes himself known to the 
believer not by telling us new information about himself, and not even or not 
only by revealing a law, but by making us able to enter into a relationship 
with him in which we have confidence and intimacy – like the intimate 
relationship a child has to a parent” 50. It is through living with God that we 
learn about and from Him, just as the most profound lessons we learn from 
our parents are those we learn simply from the manner of their being with us. 
It is also worth bearing in mind Paul Valliere’s observation about fourth 
century Christian Conciliarism and the search for ‘orthodoxy’:  
 
It was the conciliar process, a process belonging to no one in particular but to the 
catholic network as such, which produced a lasting consensus. The shouting and 
shoving, the dead ends and switchbacks, the factions, rivalries and animosities – 
these were part of the story, and not a peripheral part... But fourth-century 
Conciliarism was a Christian story, which is to say a divine-human story. 
Grandeur collaborated with misery in it.51 
 
 
                                                     
47 Galatians 5:22-23 
48 It should be noted that all of these are of course central in worship, through which as S K 
Wood observes we acquire “kinesthetic knowledge” of God in the liturgy by communal 
participation. We ‘do’, and we acquire knowledge of not about God. This is “an expansion of 
relationship, a broadening of horizon, a creation of something new within us”: S K Wood, 
‘The Liturgy. Participatory Knowledge of God in the Liturgy’, in J J Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), 
Knowing the Triune God op cit p96. 
49 Consistent and systematic thought is usually called theology, and may issue in doctrine. 
“Doctrine does not fall from the sky: it develops. ... Doctrine is a theoretical construct, but 
consensus is a communal achievement”: P Valliere, Conciliarism: a History of Decision-making in 
the Church, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012): p81.  
50 Archbishop Rowan Williams, ‘How does God reveal himself? A Christian Perspective’, 
Lecture given by the Archbishop of Canterbury at the World Islamic Call Society Campus, Tripoli, 
Libya on  Thursday 29 January 2009, available at 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/833/how-does-god-reveal-
himself-a-christian-perspective.  
51 P Valliere, Conciliarism: a History of Decision-making in the Church, op cit p83. Perhaps the 
Holy Spirit can even work though politics! 
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With regard to the specific instances of textual illocution which Vanhoozer 
cites, it is worth observing that in both cases the communities concerned had 
already gathered together, in Nehemiah 8 to hear the Law which Ezra was to 
read, and in Acts 2 for worship or fellowship, and that in both cases there 
would seem thus to be a tradition of sorts already established. Vanhoozer is 
not clear on whether a living tradition is identical with a Spirit-led one, nor on 
how one might identify a dead tradition. However, it seems likely that the 
readers in Nehemiah 8 did indeed belong to a tradition, merely one that 
needed re-shaping. A dead tradition could perhaps be one that was no longer 
practised, or more controversially, one that occurs without true life: though 
here, the pressing question is, who defines whether life is present, and on 
what basis?52 
 
Indeed, leaving aside the question of the historical veracity of the events 
recounted53, Nehemiah 8 also seems likely to have occurred, if historical, after 
Ezra’s arrival and reforms54, while the ‘new tradition’ inaugurated in Acts 2 
had arguably already been inaugurated55 and in any case was quite clearly a 
continuation to some degree of the previous Jewish tradition; it was after all 
‘The Messiah’ who had come. Neither of these events is thus the “freeze-
frame” moment of a-traditional response Vanhoozer suggests. In both cases, it 
is simply a question of the development of tradition that, Vanhoozer has 
already recognised, occurs in respect of meaning.  
 
Vanhoozer also suggests that  
 
illocutionary efficacy is a matter of meaning. The effect in question concerns the 
reader’s recognition of the author’s illocutionary intent. Another word for this is 
simply “understanding” (e.g., a metaphor is recognised as a metaphor, a warning 
as a warning, etc.)…. The “communicative presumption” – namely, that 
illocutionary intent is usually recognizable – is something shared by all texts, not 
only the Bible. The suggestion that either the church magisterium or the Spirit’s 
illumination is a prerequisite for understanding would call this presumption into 
question. On the level of meaning, then, the Spirit renders the Word efficacious 
by impressing on us the full force of a communicative action: its illocution. In so 
doing, the Spirit does not alter the literal meaning but brings it home to the 
reader.56 
 
Vanhoozer here quite explicitly confuses the contextual conventions that 
make acts understandable as acts, with the illocutionary efficacy of the 
                                                     
52 Some Christians might, for example, argue that Judaism is a dead tradition now that the 
Messiah has come, but this is not an argument that would go unopposed, either by other 
Christians or of course by Jews. Moreover, the prophet Ezekiel’s experience with the dry 
bones might suggest that no tradition can ever be said to be dead beyond recall. 
53 And the historicity of the Ezra-Nehemiah-Esdras corpus is complex 
54 D L Smith-Christopher, ‘15. Ezra-Nehemiah’, in J Barton and J Muddiman (eds.), The Oxford 
Bible Commentary, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) p308ff. 
55 At the Crucifixion/Resurrection, the Last Supper, the Road to Emmaus, the Ascension, take 
your pick.  
56 Is There? p427 
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‘communicative presumption’. His concept of illocutions is also undermined 
by the word “usually”, since if illocutionary intent is not recognizable due to 
something other than wilfulness, this misunderstanding must have an effect 
on the existence of illocutions seen as drawing their force from recognised 
intention. If even sometimes an honest reader can fail to recognise 
illocutionary intent, then this must mean that illocutions are not guaranteed, 
but require the right circumstances to be effective (the right context).  
 
Aside from these flaws in the idea of the illocution already addressed 
elsewhere, it is noticeable that the Spirit here becomes a kind of second-order 
operative. As Vanhoozer notes: “the Spirit’s agency consists, then, in bringing 
the illocutionary point home to the reader and in achieving the corresponding 
perlocutionary effect – belief, obedience, praise, and so on. The Word is the 
indispensable instrument of the Spirit’s persuasive (perlocutionary) power”57. 
He elaborates: “the Spirit, then, is a witness to what is other than himself – to 
the Logos, to meaning accomplished – and enables readers to respond to this 
Word so that it can achieve its intended effect: significance, meaning applied. It 
follows that the Spirit’s work is not to supplement the author’s intention, but 
rather to sustain and to fulfil it”58.  
 
In all of this, the Spirit of necessity does nothing new. There is no ‘guiding 
into truth’59 here. The Spirit does not help us understand the meaning of the 
Bible, but rather provides a kind of additional, secondary impetus towards a 
response. The initial relationship is between reader and Word60, to which the 
Spirit adds merely the reader’s desire to respond: the Spirit is relegated to the 
level of significance alone. The glory and authority belong to the Father and 
the Word: the Spirit is relegated to the level of perlocutionary effects: to the 
secondary arena of response, not the primary arena where the illocutionary 
Word is ‘uptaken’. 
 
The content of revelation is a matter solely of the Word revealing Himself in 
Scripture: the Spirit’s only involvement in this revelation is to persuade us of 
its reality: the revelation per se does not require His involvement. This is 
another example of an all-too-easy trend: the overshadowing and overlooking 
of the Spirit, and His unconscious ‘relegation’ within the Trinity: 
‘binitarianism’. In this scheme, the Spirit doesn’t have any creative or 
innovative role, but is just reactive – to do with the effect, not content, of 
revelation61.  
                                                     
57 Is There? p428 
58 Is There? pp429 
59 John 16:3 
60 Who has become dangerously dis-incarnated, or rather ‘in-logated’: indeed, it is precisely 
the case that the Word became flesh, not text, and the Word is of course the Second person of 
the Trinity: the Son, not Scripture. 
61 Effect here is nothing to do with content, as the illocutionary scheme demands. It is 
interesting that my concern is almost the opposite of that voiced by B D Ingraffia, who notes 
of Vanhoozer’s scheme “I am troubled by his assertion that the understanding of any 
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By contrast, an understanding of revelation as an unfolding dialogue, a co-
operative endeavour, allows us to truly understand the role, dignity, power 
and responsibility of the Spirit in these ‘post-Messianic’ times. The Triune 
God acts within Creation and with created things primarily as the Holy 
Spirit62. As the Spirit, God breathed life into everything63, and as the Spirit, 
God guides and moulds His creation, co-operating with Creation to bring it to 
fullness. The Spirit is Love, and the goal of this love is to restore all things to 
perfection in God.  
 
Christians are vessels of the Spirit because they are members of the Church, 
the child of the Spirit, and are given life and breath by Him. The Spirit 
inspires His Church in her Worship, in her praying64, in her theologians and 
people, and in the Sacraments and Scriptures that the He co-operates with us 
in creating and re-creating within the Spirit-filled community that is the 
Church65. In the words of the World Council of Churches: 
 
A variety of factors are woven into that fullness [which is “the fullness of the 
experience of the interpreting community”], and these compose the 
hermeneutical locus within which Scripture is interpreted. These factors include 
oral tradition, narratives, memories and liturgies, as well as the life, teachings, 
and ethical decisions of the believing community. Thus, many dimensions of the 
life of the community are part of the context for interpreting the scriptural texts. 
Scripture emerges from episodes of life, a calendar of feasts, a scheme of history, 
and the witnessing account of the living people of God. In addition, Scripture 
becomes alive once again as it engages the life, feasts, history, and witness of 
faith communities today. From this perspective, the praxis of the Christian 
communities and people in different particular cultural and social contexts is 
itself a reading and an interpretation of the scriptural texts and not simply a 
position from which to approach the texts.66 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
communicative action is possible only with the aid of the Holy Spirit. Surely non-Christians 
understand communicative actions all the time, without the aid of the Holy Spirit?” B D 
Ingraffia and T E Pickett, ‘Reviving the Power of Biblical language: The Bible, Literature and 
Literary Language’, in C Bartholomew, C Greene and K Möller (eds.), After Pentecost: 
Language and Biblical Interpretation. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2 (Carlisle, Paternoster 
Press, 2001) p245. 
62 Although, of course, no person of the Trinity can ever be truly said to act alone: the Trinity 
is always a Unity. 
63 Genesis 2:7 “Then the LORD God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into 
his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being.”  
64 “The Spirit intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words” – Romans 8:26. 
65 And part of our vocation is to learn to tell a new story about ourselves, which accepts the 
reality of sin, repentance and forgiveness, admits our interdependence as members of one 
another in Him, and recognises our sharing in the mission of God, in His work to restore the 
Kingdom and make all things new and perfect in Him. This new story of our humanity gives 
us and all creation a new identity and meaning, and a hope for the future. 
66
 WCC Report “A Treasure in Earthen Vessels: An Instrument for an Ecumenical reflection 
on Hermeneutics” paragraph 23. 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Eight: Cooperative revelation and the work of the Holy Spirit 
 
328 
3. The Holy Spirit and revelation: a cooperative ‘sacramental’ account 
 
Therefore, my final conclusion, to which the work of this thesis has lead, is 
that we should understand that revelation occurs in the same way as does 
meaning, that is, both are the products of understanding, which is the product 
of and creator of co-operative relationships. Not only is this logically 
necessary if my assertions about the cooperative nature of meaning are 
correct, but it is also more theologically consistent. This is the case because the 
model for all Christian revelation is provided in God’s incarnation in which, 
according to the modern English language translation of the Nicene Creed, 
the Word “was incarnate of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary”, a 
description intended to stress the willing co-operation between God and 
creation in creating a meaningful revelation.   
 
Revelation, as perfected and typified in the incarnation, is not a process by 
which God sends Himself unilaterally, unmediated by that which He has 
made. Rather, personified primarily in the Holy Spirit, He at every stage 
works within and co-operates with His creation, exposing Himself to the risks 
inherent in that act of submission or self-emptying67. Revelation always 
contains the possibility of misunderstanding and miscommunication, both a 
mistake of information, and a misconception of personality and identity, as 
does any human act. The Word, indeed, does not remain inviolate or 
abstracted, (a mere ‘grammatical possibility’), but becomes flesh (an 
‘actualized’, ‘particular’ meaningful expression – an utterance!), inheriting all 
the vulnerabilities and abuses to which our flesh is heir. It is in flesh that God 
is primarily revealed, a flesh which required human cooperation to mould 
and nurture. 
 
Christians should, indeed, understand even God’s act of creation itself as self-
giving, because as a consequence of it God elects to be potentially 
misunderstood. In the Divine act of creating that which was ‘not-God’, and 
therefore not perfect, just as in the act of choosing for Himself a people, there 
was and is always the risk of misunderstanding. This risk is minimized68 not 
by a Divine authorial fiat but by our attentiveness, listening to and living in 
the Holy Spirit, sent to us as Counsellor and Guide69.  
                                                     
67 “In the Father the apophatism (the kenosis or emptying) of Being is real and total. This is 
what elsewhere I have called ‘the Cross in the Trinity’ i.e. the integral immolation of God, of 
which the Cross of Christ and his immolation are only the images and revelations”: R 
Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon-Person-Mystery, (London, 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973) p46. See also R Williams, ‘Word and Spirit’, in E F Rogers 
Jr (ed.), The Holy Spirit: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 
2009) p61 
68 but not eliminated 
69 As S L Stell puts it: religious understanding is “constituted by the intrinsic interplay of 
tradition, experience, and their creative conjunction through human insight/imagination/ 
inspiration. This alternative structure for understanding is thus not a method imposed upon 
one’s interpretive endeavours, but is itself determined by the internal perichoretic 
relationships which compose tradition, experience, and the creative imagination:” S L Stell, 
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God’s revelation is a co-operative endeavour, and as His creatures we create it 
with the Word, in the power of the Holy Spirit who animates and guides us. 
As Panikkar puts it:  
 
God and man are, so to speak, in close constitutive collaboration for the 
building-up of reality, the unfolding of history and the continuation of creation. 
It is not a case of man toiling here below and God surveying him from on high, 
with a view to giving reward or inflicting punishment. There is a movement, a 
dynamism, a growth in what Christian call the mystical Body of Christ ... God, 
man and the world are engaged in a unique adventure and this engagement 
constitutes true reality.70 
 
Every way in which God reveals Himself to us, is through the Holy Spirit 
entering into and using mortal and imperfect things71. If the Incarnation was 
God becoming flesh, bone and sinew “from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin 
Mary”, then the Church, Christ’s Body present here and now, is flesh, bone 
and sinew slowly being changed into the perfect image of His body by our 
participation in Christ through our baptism into His life in the Spirit72.  
 
The Sacraments are God present, through the power of the Holy Spirit and 
the prayer of His people, in bread and wine or other created things73. And the 
Bible is God present, through the power of the Holy Spirit, in human words 
and languages. Revelation occurs when Scripture is read within the 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Hermeneutics in Theology and the Theology of Hermeneutics: Beyond Lindbeck and Tracy’, 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 64:4, p697. 
70 R Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon-Person-Mystery, op cit p75.  
71 As Stell puts it, using his own, slightly I think over-egged, Trinitarian terms, “Christian 
experience is the human experience of the divine reality pointed to in tradition, structured 
according to God’s work in creation, and enabled by God’s presence in the Holy Spirit; 
Christian tradition is the historical recollection (and enabling) of the human experience of 
God's presence in Jesus Christ and the living tradition of the Risen Lord who continues to be 
experienced through his present Spirit; and creative inspiration is the human ability gifted by 
the gracious God who enables human experience and shapes human tradition specifically for 
the purpose of being present with humanity through the Holy Spirit” S L Stell, ‘Hermeneutics 
in Theology and the Theology of Hermeneutics: Beyond Lindbeck and Tracy’, Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 64:4, p698. 
72 “The Spirit bears witness, and the church is the witness the Spirit bears ... It is within this 
context that we must locate the biblical texts if we are to understand them as “inspired”: D S 
Yeago, ‘The Bible. The Spirit, the Church, and the Scriptures: Biblical Inspiration and Interpretation 
Revisited’, in J J Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God: The Work of the Spirit in 
the Practices of the Church, (Grand Rapids MI, William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001) 
p63 
73
 R Williams, ‘Word and Spirit’, in E F Rogers Jr (ed.), The Holy Spirit: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings (Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 2009) p63. See also B R Brinkman: 
“in sacramental realities man is drawing upon himself and his most intimate human 
experiences, and ... in the long run it is in the experience of himself, as an experience of himself 
and of his world, that man allows the sacramental hinge of salvation to operate”: ‘On 
Sacramental Man: IV The Way of Interiorization’, Heythrop Journal 14:3 (1973) p282 
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worshipping, believing community that is the Body of Christ, the Church74. In 
the words of Gerard Loughlin "in the sense that the Church's reading of 
Scripture is part of God's whole work, we can say that revelation has not 
come to an end with the last apostle, only the writing of which it is a 
reading."75  
 
Our realization and cooperation is a necessary part of the process of 
revelation – of God’s revealing activity. Revelation is therefore a doctrine not 
so much about how God speaks, as how we hear Him. It relates to 
Ecclesiology and to Biblical scholarship (which examine our culture of 
listening), and to Pneumatology (how God helps us read and hear): to the 
actions we hear now, and our ability to hear them. Of course, as a part of this, 
and in the same way as our cultures teach us and are changed by us, God 
forms His own audience by His past action of creating a culture of listening, 
and His present action of maintaining it76. 
 
It is in respect of God’s making of a culture that the role of the Sacraments 
comes to the fore. They are not merely the primary way in which the Holy 
Spirit creates this necessary culture of listening, but they are of course another 
example of the way in which God habitually reveals Himself: through the 
things of creation. The sacraments, however one might define them, are at 
least instances in which God is revealed through human prayer and human 
activity or making.  
 
The sacraments require bread, wine, and oil, and human actions and prayers, 
in order to become vessels of revelation, and of course, they need to be 
recognized as sacraments for God to be revealed in them. A marriage is only a 
sacrament in a believing context: for a company of atheists, the sacrament that 
a Christian might recognize is simply not there. Likewise Melchizedek and 
the gift of manna become significantly revelatory only in the context of the 
Christian Eucharist. Moreover, the revelation of God that occurs 
sacramentally through His presence in bread and wine can only happen not 
merely through recognition77 but if we thresh and mill and bake the bread 
                                                     
74 As Brevard Childs would seem to suggest: this is certainly the focus of the work of James A 
Sanders, who argues that the establishment of the Canon is an instance of the co-creation of 
Revelation: see for example From Sacred Story to Sacred Text: Canon as Paradigm (Eugene OR, 
Wipf and Stock, 1987) p4: the “Holy Spirit should be viewed not only as working with the 
individual contributors to the Bible, but also as working all along the path of its formation”. 
75 G Loughlin: Telling God's Story: Bible, Church and Narrative Theology, (Cambridge University 
Press 1996) p119 footnote 42.  
76 B D Marshall argues that the truth of gospel is witnessed by the Spirit making the 
community a ‘habitable’ repository of its own truth-claims: B D Marshall; ‘The Epistemic Role 
of the Spirit’, in E F Rogers Jr (ed.), The Holy Spirit: Classic and Contemporary Readings 
(Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 2009) 316-321 
77 “The Church confesses Christ’s real, living and active presence in the eucharist. While 
Christ’s real presence in the eucharist does not depend on the faith of the individual, all agree 
that to discern the body and blood of Christ, faith is required” (World Council of Churches 
Lima Document: Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry, Eucharist paragraph 13). 
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and press and ferment the wine, so that our cooperation extends, as in the 
case of Mary’s womb, a long way into the process of revelation.  
 
As Robert Jenson suggests, while discussing Barth,  
 
if the Pentecostal creation of a structured continuing community were identified 
as the “objectivity” of the gospel’s truth pro nobis, then this community itself, in 
its structured temporal and spatial extension, would be seen as the Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit (condition of the very possibility) of faith. Or again, if the 
Community between the Father and the Son were himself an agent of their love, 
immanently and economically, then the church, as the community inspired by 
this Agent, would be the active mediatrix of faith.78  
 
The realisation of the depth of the integration between revelation on the one 
hand, and the Spirit-guided or filled Church on the other, lies behind many of 
the contributions to Knowing the Triune God79, a work produced from a self-
described “catholic and evangelical” theological background. As the editors 
claim in the introduction, “the Christian knowledge of God, though it is 
communicable and therefore ‘saleable’ knowledge, cannot be grasped or 
shared in abstraction from the web of concrete practices from which it arises 
and in which it lives.”80 Thus they suggest that their  
 
mode or style of theological reflection must begin both from God’s always-
precedent action and grace ... and from the holy catholic Church, the communion 
of saints, which is likewise also always prior to the thinking and pondering of 
the individual theologian. ... And it must begin from these two as, in some 
proper sense, one single starting point: in the Spirit, beginning with God’s action 
and beginning with the Church and its practices are one beginning, in a unity in 
which the divine and the human are neither divided nor confused. ... The 
assumption in these essays is that the action of the Spirit has already united 
divine and human, inner and outer, public and private, soul and body, in the 
communion of the Church and in the distinctive discourse, institutions, and 
practices that make up its life. This precedent action of the Spirit is discerned and 
followed, but not constructed or constituted, by theology.81 
 
One of the lessons of any hermeneutical appreciation of the contextual nature 
of understanding and thus of meaning is that there can be no avoiding the 
importance of the Church, where ‘Church’ denotes the context of ‘family of 
believers’ and ‘household of God’ with an inherited Tradition, rather than any 
particular, hierarchical or structural sense of specific denominational 
                                                     
78 R Jenson, ‘You wonder Where the Spirit went’, in E F Rogers Jr (ed.), The Holy Spirit: Classic 
and Contemporary Readings (Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 2009) p16. He notes in footnote 
16 attached to the word ‘agent’ that “I do not yet know how to work out this proposition 
conceptually” p18. 
79
 J J Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God: The Work of the Spirit in the 
Practices of the Church, (Grand Rapids MI, William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001) 
80
 J J Buckley and D S Yeago, ‘Introduction: A Catholic and Evangelical Theology?’, in J J 
Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God op cit p9. 
81
 J J Buckley and D S Yeago, ‘Introduction: A Catholic and Evangelical Theology?’, in J J 
Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God op cit p17-18. 
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traditions, important though they may be82. The Church is where we learn of 
God, and thus of what it is to be human, and we pass her on as we received 
her83. 
 
Indeed, I would suggest that hermeneutics is a secular word that covers the 
same ground as does a theology of the Holy Spirit, so that rather as we 
imagine that a doctrine of atonement concerns the Son, so a philosophical 
hermeneutics in fact concerns inevitably the action of the Spirit84, since it must 
concern questions of communication, understanding, society and selfhood 
which overlap significantly with their theological alter egos revelation, 
wisdom, the Church, and vocation/theosis.  
 
I should note at this point that Gadamer finds the doctrine of the incarnation 
of the second person of the Trinity and the relationship between the divine 
and human natures of Christ helpful as a sign of the relationship between the 
‘word’ and the ‘thing’: in both cases there is a relationship in which neither 
vanishes in the other, but they are inextricable85.  
 
                                                     
82 It is because I prefer to think of ‘the Church’ as a body and as a family filled with the Spirit, 
rather than in terms of particular structures or traditions, that I prefer to speak of her in 
personal rather than impersonal terms: ‘her’, rather than ‘it’, where the Church is by 
theological tradition feminine (the bride of Christ) rather than masculine. One of the 
questions posed by a strongly pneumatological sense of the Church, though, is the question 
of how her divisions relate to the work of the Spirit. Reinhard Hütter’s description of Luther’s 
“pneumatological ecclesiology” helps here: he suggests that Luther tells us “that the church is to 
be understood as a web of core practices which at the same time mark and constitute the 
church. These practices are the Spirit’s works through which the Holy Spirit enacts his 
sanctifying mission in the triune economy of salvation.” He lists these core practices on pages 
34-35 of his ‘The Church. The Knowledge of the Triune God: Practices, Doctrine, Theology’, in J J 
Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God op cit. (The quote is from p35). 
83 In a suggestive phrase, Hütter writes that “the church is the end of the subject”: R Hütter, 
‘The Church. The Knowledge of the Triune God: Practices, Doctrine, Theology’, op cit p26. I like this 
phrase, though don’t agree with his direction of travel exactly: I think he starts from the 
individual and relates them to the Church, whereas in a ‘Volosinovian’ sense, I suspect that 
‘the Church’, and possibly also churches, come first. 
84 One might speculate that if the Word is implicated in human language and thought as logos 
and reason, then perhaps in the same way the Spirit is implicated in that which makes it 
possible to talk: in shared consciousness and context. In the same way perhaps rationality is a 
question of perceived relations that can be debated, and of knowledge, and is of the Word, 
while creativity, which leads us into the unknown and unpredictable, is of the Spirit? 
Panikkar puts it differently, and more profoundly: the Trinity is “Epi pántōn – over all, super 
omnes, the Source of Being, which is not Being, since, if so, it would be Being and not its 
source: the ultimate I.  Dia pántōn – through all, per omnia, the Son, Being and the Christ, he 
through whom and for whom everything was made, beings being participants in Being: the 
Thou – still scattered in the many thous of the universe. En pāsin – within all, in omnibus, the 
Spirit, divine immanence and, in the dynamism of pure act, the end (the return) of Being”: 
The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man op cit p68-69.  
85
 Truth and Method op cit p434ff. See for example p438: “this is more than a mere metaphor, 
for the human relationship between thought and speech corresponds, despite its 
imperfections, to the divine relationship of the Trinity. The inner mental word is just as 
consubstantial with thought as is God the Son with God the Father.” 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Eight: Cooperative revelation and the work of the Holy Spirit 
 
333 
I entirely agree that “the subject matter that is thought (the species) and the 
word belong as closely together as is possible. Their unity is so close that the 
word does not occupy a second place in the mind beside the ‘species’; rather, 
the word is that in which knowledge is consummated – i.e., that in which the 
species is fully thought”, and thus that “the proclamation of salvation, the 
content of the Christian gospel, is itself an event that takes place in sacrament 
and preaching, and yet it expresses only what took place in Christ’s 
redemptive act”. This certainly, I agree, implies that for both word and Word 
their meaning “cannot be detached from the event of proclamation. Quite the 
contrary, being an event is a characteristic belonging to the meaning itself”86.  
 
However, there is no mention anywhere here of the third person of the 
Trinity. While it may be true that there is a link between on the one hand 
words and thought, and on the other the Word and the Father, as Panikkar for 
example suggests in describing the Son as that which is revealed87, the neglect 
of the Spirit does seem pressing. I would certainly argue that in the case of 
both words and the Word – that are both undoubtedly events in which 
meaning is made – there is nonetheless a here unreflected-upon, but crucial, 
involvement of ‘those who recognise’ and ‘He who makes pregnant with 
possibility’. Theologically, as I suggested a moment ago, these latter two 
entities, the community and the Counsellor, may be themselves suggestively 
linked in both the sacred and secular contexts. 
 
It would certainly seem possible that the first four concepts of 
communication, understanding, society and selfhood previously mentioned 
involve the action of the Spirit just as the last four (revelation, wisdom, the 
Church, and vocation/theosis) do, but undeniably all of these latter four 
concepts are traditionally and inextricably linked to the Spirit’s work: this 
may have implications for the relationship between a general and a special 
Biblical hermeneutics discussed in the next section. For the moment, however, 
I can at least assert that since revelation involves understanding meaning, and 
communication, it is certainly a work of the Spirit with and through the 
Church88. Thus it is impossible to separate a community’s experience of the 
                                                     
86
 Truth and Method op cit p444 
87 “Nothing can be said of [‘if’ is printed] the Father ‘in himself’, of the ‘self’ of the Father. 
Certainly he is the Father of the Son and Jesus addresses him as Father, but even ‘Father’ is 
not his proper name, though he has no other. In begetting the Son he gives up everything, 
even, if we may dare to say so, the possibility of being expressed in a name that would speak 
of him and him alone, outside any reference to the generation of the Son” (p46) and “any 
attempt to speak about the Father involves almost a contradiction in terms, for every word 
about the Father can only refer to the one of whom the Father is Father, that is, to the Word, 
to the Son. It is necessary to be silent”: p47: from R Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious 
Experience of Man: Icon-Person-Mystery, (London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973)  
88 See also Stephen Fowl ‘How the Spirit Reads and How to Read the Spirit’, in E F Rogers Jr 
(ed.), The Holy Spirit: Classic and Contemporary Readings op cit p304: “the Spirit’s activity is no 
more self-interpreting than a passage of Scripture is. Understanding and interpreting the 
Spirit’s movement is a matter of communal debate and discernment over time. This debate 
and discernment is itself often shaped both by prior interpretations of scripture and by 
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Spirit and her interpretation of the scriptures, just as word and thought are 
inseparable. 
 
This imagining of the role of the Spirit in a sacramental sense, and of the 
‘sacramental’ nature of hermeneutics, properly understood, links to the idea 
of the artefact. The cultural processes by which humanity creates things of 
cultural significance that are more than purely functional tools, and thereby 
creates and develops a conception of the meaning of creation, and human life, 
(including the creation of narratives) are themselves a constituent part of 
God’s revelation, and are works of the Holy Spirit. This theme is outlined 
both in the work of Cornelius Ernst: 
 
Just as St Thomas, say, ordered the whole indefinite range of being by referring to 
substances, independently existing entities, we in our turn need to locate the 
whole indefinite range of meaning by referring to some privileged locus and 
original instance. The proposed instance here runs as follows: meaning is that 
praxis, that process and activity, by which the world to which man belongs 
becomes the world which belongs to man. We may particularize this instance still 
further by seeing meaning as a kind of game. We transform the world to which 
we belong by taking it up into the world of the games we play. Meaning, that is 
to say, is historical; it assumes a world prior to man into a world of human 
communication, by work, play, dance, travel, love, conversation, reflection - the 
totality of human life and death, in the continuity of a humanity which inwardly 
transforms the biological into the historical order. The possibilities of meaning 
are indefinite, which is not to say that they are infinite, but only that they have no 
ascertainable bound, each particular realized possibility being of course finite 
(compare 'being')89  
 
and also that of the poet and theologian David Jones, with his idea of homo 
faber: man the maker90.   
 
The emphasis on humanity as being essentially meaning-creating is implicit 
also in Gadamer’s Truth and Method, when he depicts “the linguistic 
constitution” of humanity’s world as allowing us to be freed from merely 
                                                                                                                                                        
traditions of belief and practice.” See also: “Scripture functions as a quasi-sacramental 
instrument of the Holy Spirit, through which the Spirit makes known the mystery of Christ in 
order to  form the church as a sign of his messianic dominion”: D S Yeago, ‘The Bible. The 
Spirit, the Church, and the Scriptures: Biblical Inspiration and Interpretation Revisited’, in J J 
Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God op cit p51. 
89 The Theology of Grace, Theology Today Series Number 17 (Notre Dame Indiana, Fides 
Publishers 1974), p 68, compare also C Ernst, Multiple Echo: Explorations in Theology (London, 
Darton, Longman and Todd 1979) p55. See also S Fish: “the most remarkable of [man’s]  ... 
abilities [is] the ability to give the world meaning rather than to extract a meaning that is 
already there” S Fish, ‘What Is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying Such Terrible Things 
About It?’ in S Chatman (ed.) Approaches to Poetics (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1973) p134. See also M Holquist “the body answers the world by authoring it ... authorship is 
a means for shaping meaning in a long and complex chain of interactions” , ‘Answering as 
Authoring: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Trans-Linguistics’, Critical Inquiry 10:2 (1983) 317.  
90 See for example the essays ‘Art and Sacrament’ and ‘The Utile’ in D Jones, Epoch and Artist 
(London, Faber and Faber, 1959), p147 footnote 2, and p184. 
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existing in an “environment”91. ‘Environment’ here has a similar meaning for 
Gadamer as does the word ‘event’ for me, when it is compared with an ‘act’92: 
the distinction is that the ‘world’ of humanity is linguistic and meaningful, 
whereas an ‘environment’, like an ‘event’, in this sense is simply stimuli93.  
 
This is also the reason why the apparent dichotomy between Natural Law 
and revelation as means of discovering or knowing God, is non-existent.  It 
has for a long time been clear that before one can say ‘this instance of order or 
beauty or selflessness is a way in which we can learn about God indirectly’, 
one must have an idea that God is involved in, or properly represented by, 
concepts such as order, beauty, or love. Otherwise, one could equally well 
claim to discern a Creator in works of cruelty, despair or violence94.  
 
However, we are only able to understand concepts such as order, beauty and 
love, through our own created and encultured understandings and 
personalities, and in the world around us, itself a doubly created artefact; 
created as matter, and by us created as meaningful. Moreover, all revelation, 
as I have argued, is to a degree sacramental: it all occurs within nature, rather 
than externally, and it all requires creative recognition. Thus both Natural 
Law and revelation are as categories inseparable95. Indeed, part of our 
cultural context is the narratives that we are a part of, and that we reshape in 
our own lives as they shape us and our expectations: we understand the 
meaning of utterances and actions, within the larger narratives of selfhood 
and culture that we inherit and shape, in a way that combines our own 
creativity and, perhaps, divine intervention in our story. As Gadamer and 
Bakhtin suggest, what makes ‘nature’ itself a meaningful concept, are the 
stories we learn and retell of which we and nature are a part: stories of order 
or magic, of purpose or chance, of redemption or entropic decay.96  
 
The link between revelation and human imagination and artistic endeavour 
identified by Ernst and Jones is further strengthened if art is understood to be, 
                                                     
91
 Truth and Method op cit p460 
92 See chapter five of this thesis 
93 Gadamer goes on to note that “language has its true being only in dialogue, in coming to an 
understanding. This is not to be understood as if that were the purpose of language. Coming to 
an understanding is not a mere action, a purposeful activity, a setting up of signs through 
which I transmit my will to others. Coming to an understanding as such, rather, ... is a life 
process in which a community of life is lived out. [And] ... human language must be thought 
of as a special and unique life process since, in linguistic terms, ‘world’ is disclosed”: p462 
94 See for example the Monty Python parody of the hymn ‘All things bright and beautiful’, 
with lines such as “All things sick and cancerous, All evil great and small, All things foul and 
dangerous, The Lord God made them all.” 
95 This is the argument of D S Cunningham also: “There can be no purely natural knowledge 
of God, for there is no pure nature; ... Nature is always graced, always being graced, by God. 
So any knowledge of God that we can glean from the world is also graced, and continues to 
be graced, by God:” ‘Interpretation. Toward a Rehabilitation of the Vestigia Tradition’, in J J 
Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God op cit p182. 
96 These are not necessarily oppositional concepts  
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in part, the genre of human activities that consist in listening to indeterminate 
possibility97. In this case, there is a link between human creativity in Art, 
which is a dialogue where the meaning is not finite, and the Divine revelation 
(in Creative, generative actions), whose meaning Christians are living and 
uncovering. Both are allied, in comparison to other genres of communication, 
such as Public Notices or Manuals, where there is far less an expectation of 
permanent potential to be uncovered or explored but never exhausted. 
 
It is suggestive to recall that in his first definition of ‘utterance acts’, discussed 
in some detail in chapter four of this thesis, Austin himself uses a phrase that 
is taken from the Book of Common Prayer catechism definition of a 
sacrament. As I noted in chapter one of this thesis, the Christian tradition has 
engaged in long debate over whether or not Sacraments are valid or effective 
“by virtue of the ‘work’ having been done”98, or by virtue of the worthiness of 
the minister or congregation. The suggestion that sacraments are valid if the 
work is done properly is directly analogous to the idea that a Speech Act is 
effective if the “accepted conventional procedure” is adopted, while the 
suggestion that sacraments depend on the Minister or congregation, is 
directly analogous to the idea that Speech Acts depend on the interior 
intention of the speaker.  
 
My own definition, both for sacraments and ‘speech acts’, is that they are 
effective ‘by virtue of the ‘work’ having been recognized as having been 
done’. In both cases – the existence of the sacrament and the meaning of a 
phrase – there is the necessity that there should be a ‘collective’ recognition, 
which does not depend solely on the (apparent) agent: both are part of a 
continuing dialogue, and ultimately both involve the co-operation of Divine 
and human creativity99.  
 
4. Conclusion of the thesis 
 
The subject of this thesis has been one specific hermeneutic approach to the 
Bible, and the linguistic theory that underpinned it. One possible effect of this 
thesis, therefore, might be to discourage continuing use of Speech Act theory 
as a literary hermeneutic and, indeed, as a theory of language. This is 
                                                     
97 As Gadamer and Ricoeur have argued, for example. 
98  A Loades, ‘Sacraments’, in A Hastings, A Mason and  H Pyper (eds.) The Oxford Companion 
to Christian Thought, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) p634-637, quote taken from first 
column on p636 - where the ‘work’ is the proper form of the sacrament – the correct words or 
rituals. 
99 I would also observe that this has implications not merely for Biblical hermeneutics, but 
also for our understanding of authority: Jesus taught, and “the crowds were astonished at his 
teaching, for he taught them as one who had authority, and not as their scribes” (Matthew 
7:28-29), and the difference in part lay in the fact of His being outside authoritative structures, 
but nonetheless being recognized by the crowd as having authority: it is the recognition by 
the governed of the rightful nature of authority that distinguishes it from the exercise of mere 
power.  
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certainly one of its aims! However, this thesis also has wider aims. The work 
of Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov has been used to demonstrate that 
the Christian concept of revelation does not depend on any kind of authorial 
guarantee, or on the sender view of meaning, but that it can be maintained 
using a conversational concept of meaning.  
 
Indeed, this thesis has argued that a view of meaning and of revelation as 
collaborative undertakings is more consistent, theologically, with the idea of a 
God who reveals Himself sacramentally, and with a God who is three 
persons, rather than merely two. A view of meaning as created in 
conversation gives far more room for an appreciation of the work of the Holy 
Spirit within the Divine life. 
 
This thesis began more as a ‘general’ hermeneutic than a ‘special’ one. This 
was despite the fact that although the hermeneuts who have adopted Speech 
Act theory have done so with a special hermeneutics of the Bible in view, they 
have been prepared, or even keen, to expand their conclusions outwards to 
defend not merely divine revelation, but also the authority of the author more 
generally. Moreover, I have every sympathy with those100 who object to a 
world-defining narrative being uneasily shoe-horned into existing ‘secular’ 
categories, and thus with the opposite move from ‘general’ to ‘special 
Biblical’101. I am also unhappy with the kind of ‘ghetto-isation’ which insists 
that a special Christian hermeneutics must remain solely ‘special’; inviolate 
and uncorrupted. I believe – as all Christians must – in the incarnation. If we 
believe in that narrative, it has implications for everything102.  
 
Nonetheless, I had no particular theological suppositions in view at the start 
of this argument which, in its inception was simply an examination of the 
flaws in a theory of language, and in its applicability as a textual hermeneutic.  
Looking back now, it seems to me that I followed threads, and have come to a 
conclusion that these ‘general’ observations are also inevitably ‘special’.  
 
In other words, I suggest that the only general hermeneutical theory that 
makes sense, is to investigate and consider all the different special 
                                                     
100 Such as Kevin Vanhoozer in Remythologizing Theology, and Hans Frei more generally 
101 For example B D Ingraffia, who objects that “the same Holy Spirit who inspired the Biblical 
writers is present with us, guiding us in our interpretation of Scripture. This is an astounding 
claim, whose power should not be diminished by being applied to the reading of literature”: 
B D Ingraffia and T E Pickett, ‘Reviving the Power of Biblical language: The Bible, Literature 
and Literary Language’, in C Bartholomew, C Greene and K Möller (eds.), After Pentecost: 
Language and Biblical Interpretation op cit p247. 
102
 “Theology can assume philosophy into itself because God can assume flesh. Only because 
God takes on flesh can it be again truly human. Only because logic wittingly or unwittingly 
participates in the Logos is it truth-bearing. Only because demonstrations participate, 
wittingly or unwittingly, in the demonstration of the Father by the Son can they be valid. 
Only when the five ways participate wittingly or unwittingly in the Way can they lead to 
God”: E F Rogers, ‘The Stranger. The Stranger as Blessing’, in J J Buckley and D S Yeago (eds.), 
Knowing the Triune God op cit p282-283.  
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hermeneutics that are appropriate and/or adopted in different contexts, some 
of them religious, some of them not; to elucidate, recognise, and test them. 
The general theory is the pragmatic one that there are lots of special 
hermeneutics! It is a theory of dialogues, horizons, or transactions. This may 
be tied in to my slight scepticism about the usefulness of theory more 
generally, although of course, simply to describe is not without theoretical 
assumptions: theorising is inherent in language103.  
 
Certainly, I believe that I have demonstrated that meaning is created in 
context, so every reading is new, and special, and answerable, and engaged. 
One of the special hermeneutic contexts involves the action of the Holy Spirit 
in revelation. He enables us to know God and be addressed by Him, reading 
these canonical texts in the context of His presence, which presence is 
achieved through the relationships I have noted already104.   
 
As with the idea of prevenient grace noted earlier, it is a moot point perhaps, 
whether the Spirit is always present when we read in the ecclesiological 
context, and indeed, whether He is present in other contexts also. Without 
wanting to go too far at this point into arguments on this score, my suspicion 
would be that the Spirit is present in every context105, but we may not listen, 
or the context might prevent us from hearing, and from engaging in a 
genuinely open dialogue. Thus not every context in which the Spirit is present 
will be revelatory, because not every context involves the reading of canonical 
scripture with the aim of knowing God106.  
 
                                                     
103 As Thiselton himself notes, “The problem is not that the hermeneutical theorist should 
refrain from offering general hermeneutical models. ... The problem is that such models are 
sometimes treated as overarching interpretive keys rather than as exploratory or functional 
working models. The search for pluriform models that relate to different texts and different 
genre remains a fundamental and indispensable part of hermeneutics”: Thiselton on 
Hermeneutics: the collected works and new essays of Anthony Thiselton (Ashgate contemporary 
thinkers on Religion. Collected works), (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) p401.  
104 Scripture, Sacraments, Ordained Ministry, Prayer and Thought, and the Creeds: all of these 
together might qualify as the Tradition with a capital T. And all of these allow us to meet 
Ingraffia’s objection to involving the Spirit in every action of understanding, unless we want 
to argue for His presence outside Christendom, which we might, of course! 
105 As Kallenberg suggestively puts it: “the effects (and affects) of God’s immanence occur at 
the same mereological level as other aspects of communal life such as language. To put it 
elegantly, ‘Thou  ... inhabitest the praises of Israel’ Psalm 22:3”: B J Kallenberg, ‘Unstuck from 
Yale: Theological Method After Lindbeck’, Scottish Journal of Theology 50/2 (1997) p213, where 
he has defined ‘mereological’ as being the realisation that “the world is organized according 
to a hierarchy of systems each of which is constituted by an arrangement of entities from the 
next rung lower in complexity” p209. Gadamer suggests that “understanding is the original 
characteristic of the being of human life itself” which Heidegger revealed to be “the 
movement of transcendence, of moving beyond the existent”: Truth and Method (New York 
NY, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p260, which includes the awareness of self-identity in one’s 
historical rootedness and finitude, in dialogue with conversation partners and one’s context. 
One might say that the Holy Spirit is ever-present in this encounter. 
106 It is possible to read Canonical Scripture without that aim, and of reading other texts, 
especially devotional and theological ones, with that aim.  
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It is interesting to note here that Panikkar suggests that  
 
the revelation of the Father is the revelation of God transcendent – of such a 
transcendence that, strictly speaking, even the name of God cannot be attributed 
to him. Thus, for us, pilgrims as we are in space and time, it is the Logos that is 
God. The revelation of the Spirit, on the other hand, is the revelation of God 
immanent. ... the divine immanence is not simply a negative transcendence ... 
Essentially it signifies the ultimate inner-ness of every being, the final 
foundation, the Ground of Being as well as of beings.  
Properly speaking, the concept of revelation can be applied only to the Son. 
Transcendence as such cannot reveal itself ... since that which reveals itself is no 
longer transcendence but the revelation of it, i.e. God, the Son, the Logos, the 
Icon. Transcendence needs to reveal itself in order to manifest itself, [which  I 
would suggest is why creation presupposes incarnation] to make 
itself known, but for that precise reason when it manifests itself it ceases to be 
transcendence and becomes revelation, the manifestation of the transcendent. In 
a way that is analogous, revelation of immanence has no meaning at all, strictly 
speaking, for if immanence is to reveal itself, that implies that it is not immanent 
but underlying (since it had to be revealed). Transcendence ceases to be when it 
reveals itself: immanence is incapable of revealing itself, for that would be a pure 
contradiction of terms; an immanence which needs to reveal itself, to manifest 
itself , is no longer immanent. 
Divine immanence is first of all a divine immanence: God is immanent to himself, 
and it is only God who can be immanent to himself. 107 
 
The Spirit in that sense is ‘too close to see’, as we cannot see the air we 
breathe108. 
 
However, the context of reading Scripture as part of the Canon, in the context 
of the Church, in the context of the sacraments, of prayer and of thought, 
communally, is one that is ‘set up’ or given, with a pledge of His revelatory 
presence, in the same way that Christians believe that there is a pledge or 
promise of His presence, indeed of the Triune presence, in Baptism and in the 
Eucharist. It is perhaps a question of obedience as ordered listening to and 
sharing in a conversation. This underlies the point that Valliere makes when 
he suggests that “the New Testament is conciliar in a deeper sense: it serves 
the conciliar principle by embodying it. ... The New Testament is the textual 
icon of the church-in-council, or if one prefers, of churches-in-council. More 
                                                     
107 R Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon-Person-Mystery, (London, 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973) p58. I think that Panikkar’s ideas suggest that the answer 
to B D Marshall’s question about the exact relationship between the God worshipped by 
Christian and by Jews is to suggest that both of us can only know the Son/Word: B D 
Marshall, ‘Israel: Do Christians Worship the God of Israel?’, in J J Buckley and D S Yeago 
(eds.), Knowing the Triune God: The Work of the Spirit in the Practices of the Church, (Grand 
Rapids MI, William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001) 231-264 
108
 Of course, if immanence is not underlying, it paradoxically is a form of transcendence: a 
kind of through-transcendence or ‘intranscendence’: this is where spatial metaphors cease to 
be of any use at all! 
WHAT NOT TO DO WITH WORDS:  
USES OF SPEECH ACT THEORY IN BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Chapter Eight: Cooperative revelation and the work of the Holy Spirit 
 
340 
than that, it is the church’s only permanent council, the council that never 
adjourns.”109 
 
It must on this point be accepted that, in practice, this thesis will not change 
the way in which the Bible is read110. As Gadamer himself has argued, 
however, sometimes it is not necessary that a thesis will change things, 
merely illuminate what is already done: “if there is any practical consequence 
of the present investigation, it certainly has nothing to do with an unscientific 
‘commitment’; instead, it is concerned with the ‘scientific’ integrity of 
acknowledging the commitment involved in all understanding”111. And as 
Mary Hesse notes, sometimes travelling is all, arriving nothing!112  
 
But it is an aim of this thesis that although our approaches to and readings of 
the Bible will not change, nonetheless if our understanding of Biblical 
hermeneutics and of the concept of meaning alters, perhaps so too will our 
understanding of those with whom we differ over such matters of 
interpretation. I would hope that we might be encouraged to pronounce with 
greater humility and attentiveness because we recognise that we are bringing 
some of our own gifts to the table, rather than merely regurgitating what we 
have been fed. Perhaps we might also more readily accept that other 
meanings are not simply the result of wilful ignorance, but the consequence of 
different conversations, in which the Spirit is also a participant, as we hope 
He is with us113. 
 
Every Christian already reads in different contexts, creating a different 
meaning in the Biblical text in liturgical worship, private study, and prayerful 
meditation using lectio divina or a similar method. This thesis will not change 
that, but it might help to bring our understanding of what we are doing and of 
the role of the Holy Spirit therein, into line with what we already do, and the 
belief we express in our hermeneutic practices. If this thesis encourages a 
realisation that there is no such thing as a neutral reading of Scripture, even 
within the Anglican Communion, it will have achieved one goodly aim! 
Moving on from that, might be the recognition that revelation is a revelation 
                                                     
109 P Valliere, Conciliarism: a History of Decision-making in the Church, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) p42 
110 As Mary Hesse remarks, “philosophical theories usually leave ordinary practice as it is”: 
‘Reply to Don Hirsch’, New Literary History 17:1 (Autumn 1985) 59.  
111 Truth and Method op cit, Foreword to the Second edition page xv. As he suggested in a 
letter to Emilio Betti, which he quotes in the first supplement to Truth and Method 
(Hermeneutics and Historicism), “Fundamentally, I am not proposing a method; I am describing 
what is the case”: op cit p534, but of course, this description will, as Gadamer notes, have 
implications for how we then recognize and conceive what we are doing. 
112 ‘Reply to Don Hirsch’, New Literary History 17:1 (Autumn 1985) 60. 
113
 “if the Church is understood ... primarily in terms of the singular practices through which 
it [she] is formed and bound to God, then theology which is oriented to those practices can 
share in that which unifies the Church even when the Church is divided.” J J Buckley and D S 
Yeago, ‘Introduction: A Catholic and Evangelical Theology?’, in J J Buckley and D S Yeago 
(eds.), Knowing the Triune God op cit p11 
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not merely of facts or knowledge, but of a relationship that, as the term 
‘understanding’ itself implies, involves personal effort, and personal change, 
within changing contexts. 
 
One of the reasons underlying the use of Speech Act theory, as acknowledged 
in the first chapter of this thesis, was a concern to preserve the idea that we 
can engage with an ‘other’, and be challenged by that which we have not 
made ourselves. I entirely agree that this is an important, indeed a vital, 
consideration.  
 
However, the very existence of a notion of selfhood, whatever that might be, 
has been learnt from others, and presupposes their existence: all of our 
experience is a continuing conversation in which we learn from others. The 
‘solution’ variously offered by those who adopt the illocutionary speech act is 
in fact simply the privileging of one particular context and position, which is 
declared to be neutral and to some degree or other reified, without sufficient 
recognition of the contingency and change of all conventions and 
conversations.  
 
Those hermeneuts who adopt the idea of the ‘revelatory illocution’ all fail to 
recognize the extent to which they have assumed that their own reading 
context and their assumptions about the nature of meaning and genre are 
universal. They fail to recognize that the protection of meaning’s ability to be 
‘other’ lies not just in the authority of an author but in the multitudinous 
variety of his attentive, continually engaged and debating, readership, which 
in God’s case, translates into the Spirit-filled fullness of His Body, the 
“mystical company of all faithful people”114. Illocutionary ‘uptake’ requires 
collective participation and recognition, a process in which the individual is 
formed conversationally, and thus ceases to be ‘uptake’ at all, but becomes 
simply an understanding that is developed and deepens over time, 
particularly through an experience of that greatest of the Spirit’s gifts, a 
relationship of self-giving love.  
 
As the World Council of Churches puts it:  
 
1. The unsearchable mystery of God's love was made manifest, through the 
power of the Holy Spirit, in the covenant with Israel and fully revealed in the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This mystery has been proclaimed in the 
                                                     
114 Quoting the Book of Common Prayer. Or, in the words of the WCC: “As the churches 
engage in dialogue in the growing communion of churches in the ecumenical movement, a 
further and wider hermeneutical community is created. As it engages in ecumenical dialogue 
each church and tradition opens itself to being interpreted by other churches and traditions. 
To listen to the other does not necessarily mean to accept what other churches say, but to 
reckon with the possibility "hermeneutics of confidence". A hermeneutics for unity should entail 
an ecumenical method whereby Christians from various cultures and contexts, as well as 
different confessions, may encounter one another respectfully, always open to a metanoia 
which is a true "change of mind" and heart”: WCC Report “A Treasure in Earthen Vessels: An 
Instrument for an Ecumenical reflection on Hermeneutics” Paragraph 8. 
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Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Christian faith is the saving gift from 
God, which enables believers to receive the good news of God's love for all 
human beings and to become children of God and members of Christ's body the 
Church. Faith in Christ gives life to the communion (koinonia) of the Church. This 
faith has been handed on and received since apostolic times, from one generation 
to the next and from culture to culture.  
2. This transmission takes place within the ambiguities of human history and the 
challenges of daily Christian life. So Paul can speak of us as having "this treasure 
in earthen vessels" (2 Cor 4:7). Thus faith also relies upon human forms of 
expression and interpretation, dialogue and communication, all of which are 
fragile and all too often fragmented embodiments, none of which is completely 
adequate, of the mystery which has been revealed. These manifold human forms 
of expression include not only texts but also symbols and rites, stories and 
practices. Only at the end of time will the Church's contemplation of God's 
revealed mystery go beyond a partial knowledge and arrive at that "knowing 
even as we are known" of which Paul writes in 1 Cor 13: 9-12. … 
37. Yet ultimately, amid the many ecclesial traditions, the one Tradition is 
revealed in the living presence of Christ in the world, but is not something to be 
captured and controlled by human discourse. It is a living, eschatological reality, 
eluding all attempts at a final linguistic definition and conceptual disclosure. One 
way of describing the one Tradition is by speaking about the ecclesial capacity of 
receiving revelation. This capacity is nothing less than the gift of the Holy Spirit, 
received by the apostles at Pentecost and given to every Christian community 
and to every member of the community in the process of Christian initiation. This 
capacity is the gift of the Holy Spirit who "will guide you into all the truth" (Jn 
16:13), who is the Spirit of truth; that truth is Jesus Christ himself (Jn 14: 6), the 
perfect image of the Father from whom the Spirit proceeds. The capacity to 
receive the fullness of revelation is actualized in the Church's celebration of the 
eucharist, which involves both a hearing and an embodying of the Word of God, 
a participation in the eschaton, the feast of the kingdom115.  
 
                                                     
115 WCC Report “A Treasure in Earthen Vessels: An Instrument for an Ecumenical reflection 
on Hermeneutics”, paragraphs 1, 2 and 37. 
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